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Foreword
The trading of water, which developed in response to competing 
pressures on the resource from users and for the environment, 
emerged during the early 1980s. The intention was to facilitate 
more efficient use of an increasingly scarce resource by enabling 
water to move to more productive uses.
An open, robust water market is expected to provide numerous 
benefits to individuals, communities, the environment, and the 
economy more broadly. A number of concerns have, however, 
also been expressed about the economic and social impacts of 
the water trade. 
The objective of this study was to report on the impacts of water 
trading on individual water entitlement holders, industries and 
communities in the Victorian Murray Valley and, in doing so, 
to differentiate between changes that are the result of allowing 
water to move via trade and those that reflect changes in the 
economy that have affected the industries and communities 
in the study regions.
The report provides valuable information for policy makers who 
are examining the social and economic impacts of water trading 
on rural communities and industries and whether there might be 
alternative mechanisms that could be used without imposing 
major constraints on the propensity for water to trade to its most 
productive use. It seeks to contribute to understanding the 
impacts of water trading on all stakeholders across regional 
economies and communities.
The project was funded jointly by the Rural Industries Research 
and Development Corporation, the National Water Commission 
and the Murray–Darling Basin Commission.
As an addition to RIRDC’s diverse range of over 1600 research 
publications, this report forms part of the Rural People and 
Learning Systems R&D program, which aims to identify generic 
cross-sectoral concerns for the rural sector and lead to improved 
market adjustment, innovation and adoption of research results.
Most of RIRDC’s publications are available for viewing, 
downloading or purchasing online through our website:
• downloads—www.rirdc.gov.au/fullreports/index.html
• purchases—www.rirdc.gov.au/eshop
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Managing Director 
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The main points
•	 In order to understand water trading, the permanent 
and the temporary trades need to be considered together. 
Both types of trade affect water use in a region, and there 
is often an offsetting direction in observed temporary and 
permanent trading.
•	 Water trading increases the parties’ capacity to react 
to changes in circumstances. 
•	 Water trading is a catalyst for change that would in any 
case have happened as a consequence of drought, variation 
in commodity markets and rural adjustment.
•	 It is difficult to untangle the effects of water trading from 
the background of drought. Any approach implying that all 
impacts associated with changes in water use are attributable 
to or caused by water trading would be misleading and 
unhelpful for policy development.
•	 There is a clear movement of water from irrigation districts 
to greenfield sites. This trend is away from existing shared-
channel infrastructure and towards direct river pumping—
in other words, a move from public (or collectively owned) 
infrastructure to private infrastructure.
•	 Trade in permanent entitlements has assisted existing 
industries such as the wine industry and prompted 
development of new horticultural ventures in Sunraysia.
•	 Water trading allows more flexible risk management 
and farm decision making—including the decision to 
leave agricultural production.
•	 Water trading in an agricultural system that has both annual 
and perennial crops gives farmers greater flexibility in making 
decisions about their priorities for water use, offers a means 
of managing risk and cash flow—particularly in dry times—
and facilitates business growth and development.
•	 Water trading can have both positive and negative social and 
economic effects for the local communities. There is strong 
community opposition to permanent trading out of a district. 
•	 The social impacts in the regions studied are not merely 
a temporary phenomenon associated with the introduction 
of water trading. Rather, they will probably be a permanent 
feature of regional economies exposed to the rapid shifts, 
facilitated by water trading, in investment between different 
types of irrigated agriculture. 
•	 Communities can find change and adjustment difficult. 
The communities in the case study regions that were 
exporting water experienced reduced populations and 
less local spending. Communities in the case study regions 
importing water experienced increased populations but did 
not necessarily have the infrastructure and services to 
accommodate the new arrivals.
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Summary
This report examines changes in the Victorian Murray Valley that 
could be attributed to water trading. It considers the patterns of 
water trade and the views of irrigators and community members 
in three case study regions. In an effort to distinguish these 
changes from rural change that would in any case have 
occurred, the report also considers the factors that motivate 
decisions about trading water.
The report is for people who want to understand how water 
trading is changing irrigation industries and communities. For 
policy makers and others with a broad interest, Part One bases 
its findings on observations in three of the most important water 
trading regions in the southern Murray–Darling Basin. For those 
interested in particular regions, each of these regional experiences 
is described in the case studies that form Part Two of the report.
Background
Water trading in Australia has developed as a response to ‘the 
return of scarcity’. Competition from other water users and the 
environment became apparent in the early 1980s, at the end of 
a century-long drive to build dams and distribute entitlements 
to use water for irrigation. With all the easy-to-construct and 
cost-effective dams in south-eastern Australia already built, 
increased water harvesting had run its race as a means of 
enabling new irrigation developments. Implementation of a 
cap on diversions in 1997 then limited the amount of water 
available for irrigated agriculture in the Murray–Darling Basin.
Water trading was intended to facilitate more efficient use of 
an increasingly scarce resource by allowing water to be moved 
to more productive uses. It was expected that an open and robust 
water market would provide numerous benefits—to individuals, 
communities, the environment, and the economy in general. 
Nonetheless, from the beginning, a number of concerns were 
expressed about the economic and social impacts of 
water trading.
Objectives
This research report examines evidence on the various social 
and economic impacts of water trading with a view to informing 
policy debate. It focuses on regions where water trading is most 
prevalent—the irrigation districts of Goulburn–Murray Water 
and throughout the Sunraysia region on the Victorian side 
of the Murray. 
The primary objective was to ‘ground truth’ the experience with 
water trading. In particular, the authors sought to quantify and 
report on, through detailed case studies, the actual impacts of 
water trading on individual water entitlement holders, industries 
and communities in the Murray Valley, in order to test the 
assumed benefits and perceived concerns arising from the trade.
It is important that individuals, communities and governments 
are able to differentiate between changes that are the result 
of allowing the movement of water and those reflecting other 
changes in the economy that have affected industries and 
communities. At present it is extremely difficult to isolate the 
effects of water trading from a background of drought, varying 
commodity markets and rural adjustment. The extent to which 
water trading might speed up the rate of change associated 
with other drivers of change is also poorly understood.
The report provides for policy makers information on the 
potential to redress any social, economic and financial impacts 
on local communities without imposing major constraints on 
the ability for water to be traded to its most productive use. 
The insights and lessons gained from the study will contribute 
to the Australian Government’s Raising National Water Standards 
project to monitor the impacts of interstate water trading—a 
requirement of the National Water Commission under the 
National Water Initiative. Although the aim is to inform policy 
debate, any recommendations relating to water market policy 
are outside the scope of the report.
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Methods used
Social information was collected through interviews in the 
selected regions, involving irrigators and the broader community. 
Thirty-three farmers and 112 other community members 
participated. The economic information was derived from 
publicly available material and the authors’ own analysis.
The regional case studies are presented as Part Two of this report:
• Sunraysia
• Pyramid–Boort
• Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna.
Results
In order to consider changes that are the result of allowing water 
to be moved, and those reflecting other changes in the economy 
that have affected industries and communities, the report 
examines the following:
• the size and direction of water trading
• the drivers of rural change affecting water use and trading
• the impacts that can be attributed to water trading.
Size and direction of water trading
In the past decade there has been considerable variation 
in regional experiences of water trading, in both the size 
and direction of water trading and the type of water being 
traded—‘permanent’ water entitlements or ‘temporary’ 
seasonal allocations.
• Initially, from 1995–96 to 2001–02, the dairying areas of 
Rochester and Central Goulburn and the horticultural region 
of Sunraysia were all buyers of water entitlements. Water was 
bought from mixed farming regions such as Pyramid–Boort. 
• The dairying area of Kerang–Cohuna was also initially a small 
buyer of water entitlements, but from 1997–98 increased 
demand from Sunraysia, coinciding with restricted supply 
from Pyramid–Boort (because annual trade out was limited 
to 2 per cent of total entitlements), meant that Kerang–
Cohuna became a seller of water entitlements.
• In the three seasons from 2003–04 to 2005–06 Pyramid–
Boort and Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna 
sold water entitlements to meet further increases in demand 
from Sunraysia. 
• In aggregate, irrigators in Sunraysia are buying water 
entitlements and selling temporary allocations. Nonetheless, 
within the region there has also been trade out of irrigation 
districts. Private diverters account for virtually all the 
inward trade.
Temporary trade volumes are generally larger than permanent 
trade volumes. In many regions annual temporary trade volumes 
outweigh the effect of cumulative permanent trading, and much 
trade occurs within areas as well as between areas.
A common and noteworthy feature of the regions studied is that 
there is often an offsetting element in temporary and permanent 
trading. Many areas made (net) purchases of water allocations 
while (net) selling water entitlements; other areas were (net) 
sellers of water allocations while (net) buying water entitlements. 
The prolonged drought is possibly masking the full implications 
of this: a return to the seasonal rainfall patterns of the late 20th 
century might see much more temporary trade into areas such 
as Pyramid–Boort. 
In the future, water that has currently been secured for maturing 
trees and vines in Sunraysia might not be sold on the temporary 
market as the water demands of these trees and vines increase.
An important point here is that, to understand the trade, 
permanent and temporary water trading need to be considered 
together. Both types of trading affect water use in a region. 
Irrigators’ views on the two types of trading differ greatly.
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A comparison of total water reallocated through trading for each 
of the regions shows how the often-offsetting effects of temporary 
and permanent trading have led to increased water for irrigation 
use in the Sunraysia and Rochester, Central Goulburn and 
Kerang–Cohuna regions, while reducing the water used 
in Pyramid–Boort (see the accompanying figure).
Drivers of water trading
Water trading in the Victorian Murray Valley follows the 
postulations of economic theories of trade and investment. 
The trade increases different parties’ capacity to react to changes 
in circumstances. This report finds that water trading is a catalyst 
for other drivers of change in rural economies, rather than being, 
of itself, the primary driver of change. 
There are three key drivers of water use and trading:
• the settlement history of irrigation districts
• seasonal water scarcity
• commodity markets and industry pressures.
The history of irrigation districts has implications for current 
water trading and emerging pressures. Water trading provides 
a mechanism for adjusting for past decisions in irrigation 
development that are no longer appropriate—such as irrigation 
of unproductive land or land less suitable for irrigation or 
independently irrigating small, separate blocks. In Sunraysia there 
is a trend away from existing shared-channel infrastructure and 
towards direct river pumping because greenfield sites offer 
advantages to horticultural industries, which benefit from 
new irrigation layouts and economies of scale. 
Dry weather has two main effects on water trading. It increases 
the demand for irrigation water and reduces the water supply. 
With or without water trading, drought would lead to tough 
times and many property foreclosures. Water trading delays and 
prevents some of the sales by giving farmers an additional asset 
with which to manage debt. Trading out of dairying regions, 
for example, is a mechanism for clearing some of the debts 
accumulated from 2002–03 and, although this is perceived as 
detrimental to the local community, the alternative mechanism 
for managing this debt would have arguably been even more 
detrimental, with impoverished farm families, fire sales of assets 
and bank foreclosures.
Changes in the economic circumstances of different industries 
are also key drivers of water trading. Trading in northern Victoria is 
consistent with commodity prices and prospects. This applies to 
both permanent and temporary trading. For example, the 1990s 
saw favourable terms of trade for manufactured dairy products, 
and the dairy industry expanded accordingly. Trade in water 
has coincided with major changes in marketing arrangements 
for irrigated commodities (dried vine fruit and dairying), episodes 
of severe drought, and responses to taxation and other policy 
settings. The specific influence of water trading is hard to isolate 
from these developments. If no trading of water (separate from 
land) were possible, the investment, employment and regional 
boom observed in Sunraysia might never have occurred. Future 
commodity price changes will affect prospects in different 
industries and the pattern of water trading. 
Regional experiences
• The Sunraysia region has been a large purchaser of water 
entitlements whilst also selling large volumes of water 
allocations. Mildura and Robinvale have both been growing 
rapidly, prompted by the expansion in the horticultural 
industries in the surrounding districts. Mildura’s growth 
cannot, however, be attributed entirely to the water trade 
since the growth of regional centres is common throughout 
rural Australia. Growth places pressure on services and 
infrastructure in rapidly growing communities; this is 
especially apparent in Robinvale.
• Pyramid–Boort was the only region studied that has been a 
net seller of both permanent water entitlements and seasonal 
water allocations. In Pyramid Hill the loss of water from the 
district has been associated with the loss of farms and 
production and the subsequent loss of people and income 
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for the town. For Boort, this was offset by recreational tourism 
centred on Little Lake Boort and the development of the 
olive industry, which provides alternative demands for 
water in the region.
• Rochester was a purchaser of water entitlements in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s but sold large volumes 
of permanent water in 2003–04 to 2005–06. Water use 
in the area has not changed dramatically because recent 
sales of water entitlements have been offset by purchases 
of water allocations from other areas. Irrigation in the area 
is predominantly for dairy farming. The community of 
Rochester is under great pressure from the very low seasonal 
allocations in 2002–03 (57 per cent of entitlements) and 
2005–06 (23 per cent) as well as the trend to farm 
amalgamation.
Until the past three irrigation seasons Central Goulburn had 
bought and sold small (net) volumes of water entitlements. From 
2003–04 to 2005–06 larger volumes of water entitlements were 
traded out of the area. Many dairy farms in the area were geared 
towards using more than 100 per cent of water allocations when 
sales water was available. Lower allocations in recent years 
have therefore meant buying water on the temporary market, 
supplementing feed or reducing production. The residents of 
Kyabram and Tatura were aware of the effect of the water trade 
on their communities, but they were more concerned about the 
impact of drought and the loss of young people, who leave for 
better education and career prospects and rarely return.
Since the late 1990s Kerang–Cohuna has consistently sold water 
entitlements and purchased water allocations. The combination 
of dairying and mixed farming allows for diversification between 
irrigation and dryland agriculture. The communities of Kerang 
and Cohuna fear that the current water trading trends will mean 
the eventual closure of the ageing irrigation infrastructure 
in the area.
Findings
Separating the effects of water trading from other causes of rural 
change requires a counterfactual: how would decision making 
and outcomes in the various regions be different in the absence 
of water trading?
Economic impacts
It is difficult to untangle the effects of water trading from the 
background of drought but, by considering observed outcomes 
and possible actions in the absence of such trading, the authors 
found the following:
• Without temporary trade the dairy industry would have fared 
much worse than it did during the past 10 years of drought.
• Even with temporary trading many dairy enterprises collapsed 
as a result of the extraordinarily low seasonal allocations of 
2002–03 and 2006–07. Permanent trading meant that those 
farmers left farming with more money than they otherwise 
would have had.
• Without temporary trading many existing horticultural 
enterprises in the Goulburn system would not have survived 
the extraordinarily low seasonal allocations.
• Many mixed farms survived the low seasonal allocations by 
selling water on the temporary market, thus making more 
money than they would have done by growing crops. 
• In the absence of drought—when high seasonal allocations 
would be expected—temporary trading into regions such as 
Pyramid–Boort could be expected to be higher.
It is also difficult to separate the effects of water trading from 
the background of structural adjustment, but the authors 
nevertheless found the following:
• Water is being permanently traded out of closer settlement 
areas with small farms—such as Mildura in Sunraysia and 
Tongala in the Central Goulburn area.
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• Because of the advantages of developing greenfield sites 
and the difficulty of achieving economies of scale as a 
result of the small block sizes in some irrigation districts, 
new developments mainly occur outside constituted 
irrigation districts.
• Without permanent trading there would have been very 
little large-scale horticultural development in Victoria in 
the past 10 years.
Similarly, while it is difficult to untangle the effects of trade 
from the background of commodity markets, the authors 
found the following:
• Without permanent water trading the wine boom would 
have been confined to existing irrigators switching away 
from dried fruit to wine grapes, rather than the extensive 
plantings of wine grapes that have occurred.
• The almond boom might not have taken place, since 
that is an industry heavily reliant on economies of size.
• Less water will be available for temporary trading back into 
dairy areas as current plantings of vines and trees mature.
• Changes in the relative prices of commodities are likely 
to alter the patterns of trade.
Social impacts
Water trading can have both positive and negative effects on 
local communities:
• There is widespread, vehement community opposition to 
permanent trading out of a district. Some farmers have been 
ostracised by their community for selling their permanent 
water entitlements. With persistent drought, though, there 
is a greater appreciation that many individuals might be 
selling unwillingly.
• Most of the people interviewed were strongly supportive 
of the principles and practice of temporary water trading.
• Water trading has imposed greater management challenges 
for irrigators in industries where price and marketing risks 
were previously regulated and production risks were 
managed by conservatively run irrigation systems.
• Social impacts in the regions studied are not simply a 
temporary phenomenon associated with the introduction 
of water trading. Rather, they are likely to be a permanent 
feature of regional economies exposed to the rapid shifts—
facilitated by water trading—in investment between different 
types of irrigated agriculture. 
• Although water trading by entitlement holders is voluntary, 
the trade also affects third parties. Trade into a region can 
lead to increased competition in production, queuing for 
timely irrigation water delivery, and higher water tables. 
Trade out of a region can lead to increased water delivery 
charges to remaining users (because of stranded assets), 
the build-up of disease and pest plants and animals, and 
depopulation. 
• Change and adjustment can be difficult. Communities in 
regions exporting water can experience reduced populations 
and less spending. Communities in regions importing water 
can experience increased populations without necessarily 
having the infrastructure and services to properly 
accommodate these new arrivals.
• Service industries—such as agricultural services, farm 
supplies, and machinery sales and service—that supply 
inputs to irrigated industries are affected by the growth and 
contraction of irrigated industries through the water trade. 
Not only does demand in these industries depend on whether 
water is moving into or out of a region; it also depends on 
the types of farms between which water is moving.
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Conclusions
• In broad terms, water trading in the Victorian Murray Valley 
follows the postulations of economic theories of trade and 
investment. Similarly, the economic and social impacts 
identified through this study are generally consistent with 
what would be predicted from rural sociology theory relating 
to communities exposed to rapid structural change associated 
with boom-and-bust cycles in agriculture.
• To understand the water trade, it is necessary to consider 
permanent and temporary water trading together. Both 
types of trading affect water use in a region, and there is 
often an offsetting direction in observed temporary and 
permanent trading. 
• Water trading prompts change that would in any case 
have happened as a consequence of other forces for change 
in rural economies—such as drought, varying commodity 
prices and rural adjustment—rather than being, of itself, 
the primary force for change.
• It is difficult to untangle the effects of the water trade from 
the background of drought. Any approach implying that all 
impacts associated with changes in water use facilitated by 
trading are attributable to or caused by trading would be 
misleading and unhelpful for policy development.
• Future changes in commodity prices will affect prospects 
in different industries and the pattern of water trade.
Recommendation
When considering the impacts of water trading, it is important 
to take into account both temporary and permanent trading and 
to acknowledge the context of the observed changes in water 
use—which is a context of rural change and structural adjustment. 
Any approach implying that all impacts associated with 
changes in water use facilitated by trading are attributable 
to or caused by trading would be misleading and unhelpful 
for policy development.
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Part One
The economic and social 
impacts of water trading
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1. Introduction
Frontier Economics, in association with Tim Cummins and 
Associates, Dr Alistair Watson, and Dr Elaine Barclay and 
Dr Ian Reeve of the Institute for Rural Futures at the University 
of New England, was commissioned to research the impact of 
water trading on individual water entitlement holders, industries 
and communities along the Murray River. 
This report examines evidence on the various social and 
economic impacts of water trading, with a view to informing 
policy debate. It focuses on regions where water trading is most 
prevalent—the irrigation districts of Goulburn–Murray Water 
and Lower Murray Water on the Victorian side of the Murray. 
The insights and lessons gained from the study will contribute to 
the Australian Government’s Raising National Water Standards 
project to monitor the impacts of interstate water trading—a 
requirement of the National Water Commission under the 
National Water Initiative.
The primary objective of the project was to ‘ground truth’ 
the experience with water trading. In particular, the consultants 
sought to quantify and report on, through detailed case studies, 
the actual impacts of water trading on individual water 
entitlement holders, industries and communities in the Murray 
Valley, in order to test the assumed beneﬁts and perceived 
concerns arising from the trade.
Information was collected through a series of interviews in 
the case study regions, involving irrigators and the broader 
community. (The approach to the ﬁeldwork is described in 
detail in Appendix A.) The experiences of these regions 
and communities are separately documented in the regional 
case studies that form Part Two of this report. The regions 
examined were:
• Sunraysia—including Mildura, Merbein, Robinvale, 
Red Cliffs and river diverters
• Pyramid–Boort
• Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna.
Water trading: assumed beneﬁts 
and perceived impacts
The broad objective of allowing water to be traded is to 
maximise the value of scarce water resources by enabling their 
transfer to the most productive environmental or consumptive 
use. Economic theory suggests water trading will reallocate water 
to these ‘higher value’ uses. A market allows water to be bought 
and sold and hence reallocated between competing uses:
Trading can reveal the opportunity cost of water to the 
community—that is, the beneﬁt forgone by not using water 
in its best alternative use—and, through mutually beneﬁcial 
trades, facilitate the movement of water to regions and for 
uses where it is most highly valued. (Productivity Commission 
2006, p. 68)
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The following are some of the economic, environmental and 
social benefits that might accrue at the individual, regional and 
national levels from water trading:
• increasing community awareness of water as a scarce 
resource that can be transferred to its most productive 
consumptive or environmental use by trading
• providing regional development opportunities though 
the transfer of water from low-value to high-value use, 
with economic and job growth in rural communities
• providing a financial incentive for achievement 
of efficiencies in water use
• allowing new investors to acquire water without jeopardising 
the jurisdiction’s responsibility for adherence to sustainable 
environmental flow regimes and associated caps on 
consumptive use
• allowing vegetables, rice, cotton and other annual crops 
to use surplus water allocations from permanent plantings 
that are expected to be available in normal years
• reducing environmental pressure—for example, by transferring 
water away from areas of high leakage to areas where more 
sustainable production can be achieved
• gaining fuller advantage of the physical interconnections in 
the river and delivery systems. The potential benefits of trade 
in these interconnected systems extend to more efficient 
production and use of water for irrigation, the environment 
and electricity
• allowing business to enter the market to manage risks to 
shared resources and overcome expected declines in security 
as previously ‘sleeper and dozer’ licences are activated or in 
the face of climate change
• allowing more efficient consumptive use of water without 
further impacts on environmental flows or ground water–
dependent ecosystems
• allowing landholders seeking to retire, restructure or leave 
agriculture to realise the full value of their assets.
Concerns have, however, been expressed about various 
impacts of water trading. In particular, there is concern that 
those involved in water transactions might fail to consider 
broader impacts on third parties and the community generally. 
Prominent here is concern about the potentially adverse impacts 
on regions if water is traded out to other regions. The following 
are other perceived negatives:
• While the ability to sell water entitlements provides an 
automatic adjustment mechanism for individual farmers, 
the sale of water outside a region can affect others in the 
region. The costs of maintaining existing water infrastructure 
can fall on fewer remaining users, making it more difficult 
for them to remain viable—the ‘stranded assets’ problem.
• Contraction of irrigated agriculture in a region will 
have a flow-on effect to various support industries 
in the region, which do not have water entitlements 
as a compensating benefit. 
• Water trading has the potential to cause adverse 
environmental impacts. 
• There have been suggestions that the activities of 
‘water barons’ or ‘speculators’ may lead to inequitable 
market outcomes.
There are also different perceptions of the benefits and costs in 
relation to temporary and permanent trading—see Appendix B.
These concerns underpinned the gradual and partial introduction 
of water trading and the imposition of various restrictions on the 
trade in order to allay the concerns. For example, there is an 
annual interim threshold limit on the level of permanent trade 
out of irrigation districts of 4 per cent of the total water access 
entitlement for the irrigation district.1 The National Water Initiative 
seeks the removal of barriers to trade but in an orderly fashion, so 
as to allow the market to develop and to understand the impacts. 
1 It is agreed under the National Water Initiative that the impact of 
trade under the interim threshold will be reviewed in 2009, with 
a view to raising the threshold to a higher level if that is considered 
appropriate and a move to full and open trade by 2014.
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Framework for analysis
This study looks at the impacts of water trading by comparing 
observed data with the way individual decisions would have 
been made and regions would have been developed in the 
absence of the trade. Defining and measuring the impacts of 
water trading require the definition of a counterfactual case—
the situation that would occur in the absence of water trading.2
Defining a counterfactual is important in order to establish those 
changes that are the result of permitting water to move by means 
of trading and those that are the consequence of other micro 
and macro changes in the economy that have affected industries 
and communities in the study regions. Water trading is not 
the only change that has occurred on the Victorian side of the 
Murray River since permanent trading began in 1991. There 
are probably numerous factors that prompt changes in patterns 
of water use—movements in commodity prices, wet and dry 
years, and so on. An important point here is that approaches 
implying that all impacts associated with changes in water use 
facilitated by trading are attributable to or caused by trading 
would be misleading and unhelpful for policy development.
2 Water trading encompasses the trading of water entitlements 
either together with or separate from land and takes in all forms 
of transactions—permanent, temporary, intrastate and interstate, 
leasing and other transactions.
The report’s structure
The remainder of this report has the following structure:
• Chapter 2 examines the size and direction of water trades 
in the study regions.
• Chapter 3 identifies the key factors that have driven, and are 
currently driving, temporary and permanent water trading.
• Chapter 4 discusses the impacts of water trading on 
individual entitlement holders, industries and communities.
• Chapter 5 presents the findings and conclusions resulting 
from this research.
• Part Two presents the detail of the three regional case 
studies—Sunraysia, Pyramid–Boort, and Rochester, 
Central Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna.
• Three appendixes discuss the consultation methodology used 
in the fieldwork and the outcomes of the consultations—in 
particular, attitudes to and perceptions of the water trade—
and provide a brief history of water trading in Victoria.
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2. Patterns of water trade
The study focuses on the experience of water trading in three 
case study regions in Victoria—Sunraysia, Pyramid–Boort, and 
Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna. This chapter 
brieﬂy describes the case study regions and the broader irrigation 
systems within which they sit. It also provides an overview of 
water trading at the aggregate system level and summarises and 
compares the patterns of water trading in the case study regions.3
Such information quantiﬁes a direct effect of water trading, 
since water is bought and sold between regions in response to 
the way water was initially allocated between regions and also 
in response to changes that affect decisions about water use. 
If no water trade were possible, no reallocation of the water 
resource between districts could occur.
The case study regions
Victoria has several irrigation areas. The largest of them, 
by volume of irrigation water delivered, is the area served 
by Goulburn–Murray Water, which itself contains numerous 
regions (see Figure 2.1). There are three systems in the area 
serviced by Goulburn–Murray Water:
3 The water trading experience for each of the case study regions is 
examined in detail in the case studies that form Part Two of this report.
• The Goulburn system—feeding off the Goulburn River, with 
storage at Lake Eildon—contains the districts of Shepparton, 
Central Goulburn, Rochester, Pyramid–Boort, Broken River, 
Goulburn River and Loddon River.
• The Campaspe system—feeding off the Campaspe River, 
with storage at Lake Eppalock—consists of the Campaspe 
district and Campaspe River pumpers.
• The Murray system—which draws water from the Murray 
River, with storages at Hume and ultimately at the Snowy 
headwaters, and includes the area from the Torrumbarry Weir 
to Nyah—contains the districts of Murray Valley, Kerang–
Cohuna, Swan Hill, Tresco, Nyah, Woorinen, Upper Murray, 
Mitta Mitta River, Kiewa River, Ovens River and Murray River.
The Sunraysia district and private diverters between Nyah and 
the border with South Australia are serviced by Lower Murray 
Water and draw on water from the Murray River.
Sunraysia
The Sunraysia Irrigation District is bounded by the Murray 
River from Nyah to the South Australian border, a river distance 
of about 770 kilometres. Lower Murray Water and the First 
Mildura Irrigation Trust pump river-quality water for irrigation 
and domestic and stock supplies and provide a subsurface 
drainage service to about 3600 customers in the region. This 
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is a horticultural region, although there is dryland cropping 
in outlying areas. Mildura is the main regional centre; other 
townships of note are Red Cliffs, Merbein and Robinvale.
Pyramid–Boort
The Pyramid–Boort Irrigation District covers 166 215 hectares, 
of which 126 400 hectares are suitable for irrigation. Among 
the townships in the area are Tandarra, Dingee, Calivil, Bears 
Lagoon, Durham Ox, Boort, Pyramid Hill and Macorna. 
The Loddon River flows through the area, and Goulburn–
Murray Water supplies the Pyramid–Boort Irrigation District 
by gravity-fed channel water from Lake Eildon via the Waranga 
Western Channel. About 1250 properties are serviced in the 
area through a network of 150 kilometres of natural waterways 
and 1391 kilometres of constructed distribution channels. Water 
entitlements in the area total 234 729 megalitres (Goulburn–
Murray Water 2006b).
Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna
The Rochester–Campaspe irrigation system provides water 
to 1290 customers via the Goulburn, Murray and Campaspe 
Rivers and some 664 kilometres of distribution channels and 
476 kilometres of drains. The main sources of water supply are 
Lakes Eildon and Eppalock; supplementary supplies are taken 
from Greens Lake. Water entitlements in the area amount to 
187 396 megalitres in the Rochester area and 20 202 megalitres 
in the Campaspe Irrigation District. The Rochester Irrigation 
District covers an area of 107 750 hectares, of which 
61 700 hectares are irrigated; the Campaspe Irrigation District 
covers 9300 hectares, of which 5010 hectares are irrigated.
The Waranga–Mallee Channel, built in the early 1900s, runs 
480 kilometres from the Waranga Basin, near Rushworth, to 
the Eastern Mallee area west of Boort. The Campaspe Syphon 
takes the Waranga–Mallee Channel under the Campaspe River 
through three 90-metre concrete pipes (Rochester.org 2007).
The Central Goulburn Irrigation District covers 173 053 hectares, 
of which 113 106 hectares are irrigated, and is one of the largest 
irrigated areas in northern Victoria. It extends south and westwards 
from the Goulburn River and includes the towns of Ardmona, 
Echuca Village, Girgarre, Kyabram, Lancaster, Merrigum, 
Mooroopna, Murchison, Stanhope, Tatura, Tongala, Undera and 
Wyuna. More than 2800 irrigated holdings are serviced by an 
extensive network of 1460 kilometres of distribution channels 
and 882 kilometres of drains. Water rights in the area total 
385 000 megalitres, supplied mainly from Lake Eildon, which 
has a capacity of 3 390 000 megalitres (Goulburn–Murray 
Water 2006b).
Kerang–Cohuna is in the Torrumbarry Irrigation District, which 
extends along the River Murray from Gunbower in the east to 
Nyah in the west and southwards to include the town of Swan 
Hill. It covers 167 000 hectares, of which 150 000 hectares are 
suitable for irrigation. The irrigation system supplies about 2650 
irrigation customers and a further 600 domestic and stock 
customers. Water for the area is released into the Murray River 
at Hume Dam. Water from Dartmouth Dam, on the Mitta Mitta 
River, provides supplementary storage for Lake Hume.
Figure 2.1 Goulburn–Murray Water irrigation districts
Source: Goulburn–Murray Water.
Central Goulburn
Rochester–Campaspe
Pyramid–Boort
Torrumbarry
Victoria
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Trading at the system level
Although specific regions are the focus of this study, patterns of 
water trade in these regions must be seen in the context of the 
broader systems that these regions—together with other regions 
not the focus of this study—comprise. This takes in a broader 
set of water trading markets.
To encompass all buyers and sellers of water allocations and 
entitlements in the southern Murray–Darling Basin, it would 
be necessary to include irrigators in New South Wales, South 
Australia and elsewhere in Victoria. However, while interstate 
water trade is still relatively limited and Victorian trade is most 
prominent in regions serviced by Goulburn–Murray Water 
and Lower Murray Water, the four systems of these irrigation 
authorities give a complete story. Water trading in the areas 
covered by Goulburn–Murray Water and Lower Murray Water 
relative to those serviced by other rural water authorities is 
discussed in Appendix C, as part of a brief history of water 
trading in Victoria.
Figures 2.2 to 2.5 show the temporary and permanent trades 
of water that have occurred in the four main irrigation systems 
of Victoria. In addition, they provide a cumulative measure of 
permanent trades—representing the total change in the volume 
of entitlements held in the system—and an indication of the 
total available water that has been reallocated through trade, 
as follows:
The volume of interstate trading is still relatively small, so the 
net transfer of water from the aggregate of these systems is small.
The Goulburn system
Temporary transfers of water into and out of the Goulburn system 
were small until 1999–2000. From 2000–01 to 2002–03 there 
were net transfers into the system of more than 20 000 megalitres. 
This was followed by net transfers out of the system in 2003–04 
and 2004–05, but 2005–06 saw a return to the system being a net 
purchaser of temporary water, with a net inflow via temporary 
trading of more than 50 000 megalitres (see Figure 2.2).
The net transfers of permanent water entitlements have been 
largely the reverse of the observed net transfers of temporary 
water: there were permanent net transfers out of the system 
in 2001–02 and 2005–06. There were also net transfers of 
permanent water out of the system in 2003–04 and 2004–05. 
Three consecutive years of approximately 20 000 megalitres 
a year of permanent trading out of the system have meant that 
the slight cumulative trend of water out of the system until 
2002–03 was greatly amplified by the end of the 2005–06, 
with 70 000 megalitres of entitlement being traded out. In 
2005–06, 1 156 463 megalitres of entitlement were held in 
the system (Goulburn–Murray Water 2006a). This cumulative 
permanent trade thus represents 6 per cent of total entitlement.
Total available
water reallocated
through trade
Change in available water allocations
via trade in entitlements
Change in available water via temporary 
trade in allocations that year
Change in available water via temporary 
trade in allocations that year
Total cumulative
change in 
entitlements
= +
Maximum allocation
announcement in 
the system that year
= x +
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Generally, the temporary trade flows have determined the total 
volume of water reallocated through trade. The large amount of 
temporary trading into the system in 2005–06 was outweighed 
by the cumulative trade of permanent water out of the system 
from 1995–96 to 2005–06, meaning that the volume of water 
available in the system in 2005–06 was less than the volume 
before trading began.
The Campaspe system
The Campaspe system has predominantly traded water in 
temporary markets. Only in 2005–06 were there significant 
net transfers of permanent water: about 800 megalitres of 
entitlements were traded out of the system (see Figure 2.3). 
The largest net transfers out of the system occurred in the 
three irrigation seasons from 2000–01 to 2002–03. The 2004–
05 and 2005–06 irrigation seasons saw temporary water trading 
bring over 1000 megalitres into the system, enough to outweigh 
the permanent trading out of the system such that the total 
water reallocated through trade in 2005–06 was positive.
The Murray River system above Nyah
In the Murray River system of the area serviced by 
Goulburn–Murray Water large volumes of water have been 
traded in temporary markets. Over 50 000 megalitres were 
transferred into the system in 2003–04 and 2004–05, and over 
20 000 megalitres were transferred in 1997–98 and 2005–06. 
Nearly 10 000 megalitres were transferred in 1998–99 and 
2002–03, while net transfers out occurred in 1995–96 and 
2000–01 (see Figure 2.4).
For permanent trading, entitlement volumes have consistently 
been leaving the system—about 5000 to 10 000 megalitres every 
year from 1998–99 to 2005–06. This is picked up by the 
representation of cumulative permanent water trade as a relatively 
steady negative slope, with a total of about 55 000 megalitres 
being permanently traded out of the system since 1995–96. 
In 2005–06, 1 132 505 megalitres of entitlement were held in 
the system (Goulburn–Murray Water 2006a). This cumulative 
permanent trade thus represents 5 per cent of total entitlements.
The very large temporary trades into the system in 2003–04 and 
2004–05 outweigh the accumulation of permanent outflows and 
so increased the availability of water (compared with a ‘without 
trading’ scenario) in these years. Nevertheless, the effect of 
permanent trading taking water out of the system dominates 
in all the other years since the trend of trading out entitlements 
began in 1998–99.
The Lower Murray River system: Sunraysia
The Lower Murray River system (Sunraysia), serviced by Lower 
Murray Water, has experienced trends that differ greatly from 
those in the systems of Goulburn–Murray Water: temporary 
trading has been resulting in net transfers out of the system, and 
permanent trading has been transferring water entitlements into 
the system (see Figure 2.5).
The amount of net temporary transfers out of the Lower 
Murray system has been increasing: about 5000 megalitres 
were traded out in each of 2000–01 and 2001–02, 15 000 
to 20 000 megalitres were traded out in each of 2002–03 and 
2003–04, and nearly 30 000 megalitres were traded out in each 
of 2004–05 and 2005–06.
Permanent trading resulted in a net transfer of water into  
the system of about 5000 megalitres each year from 1997–98 
to 2002–03. The net inflow increased dramatically to over 
20 000 megalitres each year between 2003–04 and 2005–06, 
leading to a cumulative increase in water entitlements in the 
system of more than 100 000 megalitres since trading began 
in 1991–92 (ACCC 2006). In 2005–06, 371 828 megalitres 
of entitlements were held in this system (Lower Murray Water 
2006). The cumulative permanent trade thus represents 
30 per cent of total entitlements.
The consistent inflow of entitlements has outweighed the 
temporary trade outflow to give an overall positive net transfer of 
water when all the water reallocated through trade is considered.
Patterns of water trade   
Figure 2.2 The Goulburn system, 1995–96 to 2005–06
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Figure 2.3 The Campaspe system, 1995–96 to 2005–06
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Figure 2.4 The Murray system above Nyah, 1995–96 to 2005–06
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Figure 2.5 The Lower Murray system, 1995–96 to 2005–06
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Water trading in the case study regions
The patterns of water trading at the system level provide 
important context, but this study focuses on the regions of 
Sunraysia, Pyramid–Boort, and Rochester, Central Goulburn 
and Kerang–Cohuna. Detailed information was collected on 
the temporary and permanent water trading of these regions.4 
The following discussion examines temporary and permanent 
trading and the total water volumes reallocated through trade 
in the three regions during the past decade.
It is important to note that the figures shown are for temporary 
and permanent net transfers of water in the selected regions 
only and not for all the regions between which water trading is 
possible. This means that the total trade in water allocations or 
entitlements will not necessarily net to zero across the selected 
regions. In fact, it is apparent that the case study regions (in 
aggregate) have been net importers of both temporary and 
permanent water. As discussed in relation to the Goulburn–
Murray Water and Lower Murray Water systems, there is little 
trade into or out of the aggregate of these regions. This implies 
that regions other than the chosen case study regions are net 
exporters of water.
The following regions were significant sellers of temporary water:
• Goulburn River—a net exporter of about 120 000 megalitres 
between 1995–96 and 2005–06
• Murray River—a net exporter of about 65 000 megalitres 
between 1995–96 and 2005–06
• Goulburn Valley Water—a net exporter of about 
56 000 megalitres between 1995–96 and 2005–06
• New South Wales—a net exporter of about 46 000 megalitres 
between 1995–96 and 2005–06
4  Similarly detailed trade information for areas within the Sunraysia 
system—Merbein, Mildura, Red Cliffs, Robinvale and private river 
diverters—was collected for a number of recent years. The data are 
presented in the Sunraysia case study (see Part Two).
• Shepparton—a net exporter of about 38 000 megalitres 
between 1995–96 and 2005–06.
The following regions were significant sellers of permanent water:
• Swan Hill—a net exporter of about 16 300 megalitres 
between 1995–96 and 2005–06
• Shepparton—a net exporter of about 10 500 megalitres 
between 1995–96 and 2005–06
• Goulburn River—a net exporter of about 3700 megalitres 
between 1995–96 and 2005–06.
Aquaculture, Sunraysia
Temporary trades
Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna have 
generally been the water purchasers in the temporary market, 
while Pyramid–Boort and Sunraysia entitlement holders have 
been selling water allocations (see Figure 2.6). In 2005–06 
regions other than those being examined in this study sold 
large volumes in temporary markets, since all but Sunraysia 
had net transfers into their region.
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Figure 2.6 Temporary water trading, 1995–96 to 2005–06
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Sources: ACCC (2006), Goulburn–Murray Water annual reports, Lower Murray Water annual reports, Sunraysia Rural Water annual reports.
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Figure 2.7 Permanent water trading, 1995–96 to 2005–06
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Figure 2.8 Cumulative permanent water trading, 1995–96 to 2005–06
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Sources: ACCC (2006), Goulburn–Murray Water annual reports, Lower Murray Water annual reports, Sunraysia Rural Water annual reports.
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Figure 2.9 Total water reallocated through trading, 1995–96 to 2005–06
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   The economic and social impacts of water trading
Permanent trades
In the early years of permanent trading, water users in the dairy 
regions of Rochester and Central Goulburn and the horticultural 
region of Sunraysia generally bought water entitlements from 
sellers in mixed farming regions such as Pyramid–Boort. There 
was increased activity in permanent water trading from 2003–
04 to 2005–06, with the regions serviced by Goulburn–Murray 
Water selling water entitlements and these entitlements being 
purchased by irrigators in the Sunraysia region (see Figure 2.7).
The cumulative permanent water trading history shows that 
water entitlement trading in the 2003–04 to 2005–06 irrigation 
seasons dominates the smaller volumes of permanent trading 
in previous years (see Figure 2.8).
Total water reallocations through trade
Figure 2.9 shows the total water reallocated through trading 
for the study regions from 1995–96 to 2005–06.
The total water reallocated through trading is calculated by 
summing the change in available water through allocations to 
traded entitlements and the change in available water through 
temporary trade in allocations that year. This shows how the 
often-offsetting effects of temporary and permanent trading 
have led to increased water for irrigation use in Sunraysia and 
Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna, while reducing 
the water used in Pyramid–Boort. As noted, the study regions 
(in aggregate) have been net importers of both temporary and 
permanent water, which means that the total water reallocated 
through trade has also increased in aggregate across the regions.
An important determinant of this offsetting pattern in water 
trading is Sunraysia horticultural developers, who are buying 
permanent entitlements in order to secure future water supply 
for new plantings. While the plantings are young they do not 
require the full volume of water, so allocations are temporarily 
traded out of the region, which means that in future, as the 
current plantings mature, there will be less water Sunraysia 
irrigators will be willing to temporarily trade out of the region.
Intra-regional trade is another mechanism for reallocating water 
between irrigators in the same industry (such as dairying in 
Rochester and Central Goulburn) or irrigators that are close by 
but produce different crops (such as mixed farms and horticulture 
in Boort). This is discussed further in Appendix C.
The main patterns
Three main patterns emerge from the analysis of 
water trading data:
• There is often an offsetting effect of temporary and 
permanent trading. Many regions made (net) purchases 
of water allocations while (net) selling water entitlements 
or were (net) sellers of water allocations while (net) buying 
water entitlements.
• Temporary trade volumes are generally larger than permanent 
trade volumes. In many regions the temporary trade volumes 
outweigh the effect of cumulative permanent trading.
• There have been big increases in volumes of permanent 
trading in the past few years—most notably 2003–04, 
2004–05 and 2005–06—and regional limits on selling water 
entitlements have been reached. This period coincides with 
historically low allocations on the Goulburn system and, 
as a consequence, severe financial pressure on irrigators 
in those areas.
Regional experiences of water trading in the past decade have 
varied considerably, in terms of the size and direction of trading 
and the type of property right being traded (permanent water 
entitlements or temporary seasonal allocations):
• Initially, from 1995–96 to 2001–02, the dairying regions 
of Rochester and Central Goulburn and the horticultural 
region of Sunraysia were all buyers of water entitlements, 
the water being bought from mixed farming regions such 
as Pyramid–Boort.
Patterns of water trade   
• The dairying region of Kerang–Cohuna was initially a small 
buyer of water entitlements, but from 1997–98 increased 
demand from Sunraysia, coinciding with restricted supply 
from Pyramid–Boort because annual trade out was limited 
to 2 per cent of total entitlements, meant that Kerang–
Cohuna became a seller of entitlements.
• In the three seasons from 2003–04 to 2005–06 Pyramid–
Boort and Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna 
sold permanent water entitlements to meet further increases 
in demand from Sunraysia. 
• In aggregate, irrigators in Sunraysia are buying water 
entitlements and selling water allocations. Nonetheless, 
within Sunraysia there has also been trade out of irrigation 
districts. Private diverters (those outside the districts) account 
for virtually all inward trade.
• In aggregate, river diverters in the Sunraysia region are buying 
water entitlements and, at least until their new crops mature, 
selling water allocations. 
• In aggregate, district irrigators in Sunraysia are currently 
selling water entitlements.
Channel, Red Cliffs
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3. The drivers of water use and trading
Identiﬁcation of the key drivers of water use and trading, to 
explain the patterns of water trading discussed in Chapter 2, 
can be done at both the micro and the macro levels.
A micro-level analysis focuses on the factors inﬂuencing 
individual decisions about water use and trading. A number 
of previous studies have focused on understanding individuals’ 
decisions from the perspective of the individuals’ ﬁnancial and 
personal circumstances; this includes recent work done in the 
Loddon–Campaspe Irrigation Region (Fenton 2006). The previous 
work suggests that decisions made by farmers are a response to 
many factors. For example, Fenton found that the motivation 
to sell water permanently was almost exclusively to do with 
ﬁnancial difﬁculties, while the motivation not to sell temporary 
water was more inﬂuenced by social norms—including social 
labelling and beliefs about the impacts of permanent water sales. 
Farm-level decisions can be inﬂuenced by individual attitudes 
and can be subject to a degree of inertia. As has been observed 
before, many farmers initially adopted a cautious approach 
to water trading, perhaps reﬂecting a lack of awareness of how 
the market worked and the costs and beneﬁts of trading in it. 
Only 20 per cent of irrigators had been involved in any form of 
trading by 1996 (DNRE 2001), but participation in the market 
is now widespread (Bjornlund & Rossini 2006).
Examination of the factors determining individual decisions 
requires individual survey analysis, as discussed in the regional 
case studies in Part Two. The discussion in this chapter focuses on 
the broader economic and other factors affecting the industries 
and regions in question. In any event, individual water trading 
decisions need to be seen in the context of the broader economic 
and other factors that explain the key drivers in speciﬁc regions 
or more generally.
A more macro-level analysis focuses on interrelated factors such 
as structural changes in the economy, the state of international 
commodity markets, water availability, risk management and 
farm ﬁnancing decisions, and the regulatory framework 
governing water trading.
This type of analysis focuses on water as an input to agricultural 
and horticultural activities. Economic theory would predict that 
water trades to activities where it has highest marginal value; 
that is, the trade is driven by divergences in the value of water 
in different uses at different times. Further, different factors are 
likely to affect the temporary and permanent water markets. For 
example, commodity prices and other industry fundamentals that 
affect returns as a whole and returns from water in particular 
are likely to be important determinants of temporary water 
trades. Permanent trades are likely to be determined by longer 
term structural changes.
This chapter looks at the factors determining water use and trade:
• the history of irrigation districts—the way water was allocated 
and used in the past
• water scarcity
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• industry conditions and commodity prices affecting the 
marginal value of water in different productive activities.
Irrigation history
With the notable exception of the Pyramid–Boort region, the 
original irrigation schemes matched allocations of irrigation 
water to farm size. An objective was to create family farms with 
more or less standard (owner-operated) labour requirements 
across a range of industries. These ‘home maintenance areas’ 
varied between industries and, importantly, also over time, 
providing evidence of the longstanding pressures for farm 
consolidation. For example, in the Sunraysia region standard 
vineyard sizes steadily increased from 4 hectares in the Mildura 
settlement of the 1890s to 4–6 hectares in Merbein in the 1910s 
to 6–8 hectares in Red Cliffs in the 1920s and 8–10 hectares 
in Robinvale in the 1940s. Water rights in these districts were 
in essence granted on the basis of 3 acre-feet of water per acre 
(9 megalitres a hectare). On average, irrigators apply less than 
this amount.
In Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna the 
Victorian State Rivers and Water Supply Commission surveyed 
the soils judged most suitable for irrigation before buying land, 
subdividing, supplying water and finding new settlers to farm the 
land. Each irrigation farm was allocated a legal right to sufficient 
water to irrigate the entire farm—1 acre-foot of water per acre 
(3 megalitres a hectare).
By contrast, in the Pyramid–Boort region, which had a history 
of failed privately owned ‘irrigation trusts’, the State Rivers and 
Water Supply Commission supplied water to existing settlers. 
Farm size in Pyramid–Boort had been set by the minimum 
subdivision size allowed for in the Victorian Selection Acts. 
The commission could not supply enough water to irrigate all 
the land on any given farm, so, rather than supplying a few farms 
with all the water they needed (as in the Goulburn Valley), the 
commission shared the available water between all the farms 
with access to its channels. It granted water rights at the rate 
of 1 acre-foot for every 5 acres (0.6 megalitres a hectare). This 
was insufficient to irrigate an entire farm. The channel system 
distributing the water in this region was also longer and more 
complex than channel systems in the Goulburn Valley; it was 
harder to manage, and the water delivered to the area’s farms 
arrived more irregularly than water supplied to farms in the 
Goulburn Valley.
The size of the initial holdings in each irrigation area, the 
way the land was laid out and the initial distribution of water 
entitlements are still affecting farm viability and the trade in 
water. Without water trading, irrigators could secure additional 
water only by buying additional properties and transferring the 
water from them. Once the nexus between land and water was 
broken, water could be moved to industries and farms with 
superior income and growth prospects. This lessened the initial 
handicap of inadequate farm size, which led to high unit capital 
and labour costs and low incomes.
Moreover, the prosperity of irrigated industries changed 
over time. Sometimes this was because of the ebb and flow 
of commodity markets; at other times profitability was affected 
by government decisions on industry assistance. For most of their 
history, irrigated horticulture and dairying have had above-
average levels of industry assistance, usually in the form of 
home consumption price schemes backed up by restrictions 
on imports and other protective devices. Irrigated mixed farms 
based on sheep production and cereal cropping traditionally 
received little product-related assistance.
Before water was tradeable, water entitlement holders who 
either did not use any of the water they were entitled to or 
only partially used it surrendered the right to use that water. 
With the advent of trading, most of these ‘sleepers and dozers’ 
entitlements would have been activated since they can now 
be sold for financial gain.
The regional case studies in Part Two elaborate on the diverse 
origins of Victorian irrigation districts.
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Water scarcity
Like any other markets, water markets are most active when 
the commodity being traded is scarce. In the Murray–Darling 
Basin the availability of supply is determined largely by rainfall.
The demand for irrigation water increases in dry years 
because there is increased water demand by crops through 
evapotranspiration as well as less rain falling on the land and 
so a greater need for irrigation water as a supplement. Dry 
conditions generally decrease the amount of water available 
for irrigation because there is less inflow into storages, which 
results in lower allocations to the holders of water entitlements. 
Because farm production systems are geared towards using a 
particular amount of water, low allocations mean either that 
production will be reduced or that additional volumes of water 
will be sought through water trading. This is reflected in the 
increased water trading activity in recent years (as shown 
in Chapter 2) and the price at which water entitlements and 
allocations are traded.
Different industries and different producers assign different 
relative values to these additional volumes of water (the value 
of the marginal product of the water in particular water use 
activities). Generally, these valuations diverge further with more 
extreme decreases in allocations as a result of the characteristics 
of production—for example, the ability to substitute away from 
water to other inputs (such as labour, capital or feed) or the 
flexibility to alter production. As Appels et al. (2004) pointed out:
• Annual croppers have the greatest flexibility and so 
can act most opportunistically in response to water prices. 
They can choose whether or not to plant at the beginning 
of each season.
• Dairy farmers might be able to substitute (to some degree) 
away from irrigating pasture and towards other forms of 
feed—although the price of these feed sources can rise in 
dry years—or reduce production by agisting or selling cows.
• Horticulturists might be willing to pay high prices for water 
in order to keep their vines or trees alive because of the high 
costs and lengthy times involved in re-establishment.
In fact, these three behaviours were all observed in 2006–07:
Fodder prices have risen a lot but not as much as water … 
I’ve heard of some big fodder producers deciding (that 
growing hay) was not worth it and selling their allocations 
this year … This was exacerbating the shortage of stock feed. 
Some dairy farmers had chosen to sell some cattle and 
then sell water allocations to benefit from the high prices. 
An unexpected turn in the grape market has made it viable 
for some grape growers to buy extra water to make up for 
low allocations caused by the drought. (The Age, 3 January 
2007, p. 19)
Bjornlund and Rossini also found:
The most important drivers of farmers’ willingness to pay 
for water are water supply and demand represented by 
the level of seasonal allocations as well as precipitation 
and evaporation. High value farmers with investments in 
long-term plantings, pastures and equipment are forced 
to pay high prices during periods of scarcity to limit their 
potential losses caused by drought. (2006, p. 13)
Dry years have obviously had a big impact on water trading 
activity in the Victorian Murray, with large volumes of water 
traded and high prices being observed in years such as 2002–
03 and 2006–07.
Industry characteristics and changes
Water use is different in the various irrigation industries. 
The industry shares of irrigation water in northern Victoria are 
roughly one-half for dairying, one-third for mixed livestock and 
cropping, and the remainder for horticulture. About half of the 
horticulture is in the Goulburn Valley (dominated by stone fruits) 
and the other half on the Murray (mainly grapes). Water is not a 
big cost in horticulture compared with other inputs, but it is a 
largely unavoidable cost. Other industries have greater flexibility 
in water use. Furthermore, horticulture’s smaller share of total 
water use makes that industry’s expansion easier than for 
extensive irrigation so far as water is concerned.
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Irrigation in northern Victoria has been categorised in several 
ways, including by location, industry and markets, extent of 
government intervention, source of water, environmental effects, 
and type of irrigation. Expanding this classification, the 
following distinctions are useful:
• private diverters versus (former) government irrigation 
settlements
• horticulture versus irrigated dairying versus irrigated 
mixed farming
• interruptible versus non-interruptible irrigation 
production systems
• gravity versus pumped irrigation districts
• Murray River versus other sources of irrigation water
• flood and furrow irrigation versus capital-intensive 
on-farm irrigation techniques
• irrigated production for domestic and export markets
• regulated versus unregulated irrigated industries.
Each of these distinctions implies economic consequences 
for irrigation farming and has influenced the patterns and 
impacts of water trading. The way government irrigation 
settlements were established meant skewed size distributions 
from the start, with a high proportion of small farms. Some 
locations were unsatisfactory on environmental criteria. Private 
diverters—especially important in horticulture—choose their 
own scale of operation. More prudent planning processes 
based on zoning now seek to reduce any potential adverse 
environmental consequences of horticulture. 
Changes in the economic circumstances of different industries 
are important determinants of water trading. As the Victorian 
Government’s White Paper noted:
Trade out of gravity districts has surged since mid-2003. 
The two per cent annual limit on water trading out of certain 
areas has been reached—or is close to being reached— 
for four out of Goulburn–Murray Water’s six areas. On the 
selling side, this surge reflects the accumulated financial 
pressure of the drought, especially in the Goulburn system. 
As well, currency movements have helped to depress prices 
for exports, putting added pressure on the dairy industry. 
The surge in trade is also being driven by large new irrigation 
developments—almonds, olives and wine grapes—between 
Nyah and Robinvale. One developer alone is looking for 
50 000 megalitres. The pattern of trading has changed since 
the 1990s, when most trade was within regions, dairy farmers 
did much of the buying, and the rate of change was moderate. 
Now, dairy farmers are joining mixed farmers as sellers. In 
past downturns, farmers had to stay on their farms until things 
improved; now they can sell their water and move away. 
(Department of Sustainability and Environment 2004, p. 79)
The following discussion looks at how the changing 
circumstances of different industries have affected water use 
and hence water trading, including in the case study regions. 
Future changes in commodity prices will also affect prospects 
in different industries and consequently water trading patterns.
Dairy farming
Victorian dairies produce over 60 per cent of Australia’s fresh 
milk and 75 per cent of its manufactured dairy products. Dairying 
accounted for $2.4 billion (27 per cent) of the total value of 
agricultural production in Victoria ($8.7 billion) in 2003–04 
(Department of Primary Industries 2006). The gross value of 
milk rose by 5 per cent compared with 1998–99, to $1.7 billion, 
mainly because of an 8 per cent increase in the average price 
(ABS 2005).
Dairying occurs in the irrigation areas of northern Victoria 
(encompassing the case study regions) and in the state’s high-
rainfall (more than 700 millimetres a year) south-west, north-
east and Gippsland regions.
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Trends in the dairy industry
In the 1990s there were generally favourable terms of trade for 
manufactured dairy products, and the dairy industry expanded 
accordingly. Water trading aided this expansion. The industry 
became fully deregulated in 2000; this was accompanied by 
an adjustment package. Restrictions on interstate trade in fluid 
milk were also removed. Figure 3.1 shows the effect on farm-
gate prices for milk.
Irrigated dairying can be thought of as a quasi-interruptible 
production process providing opportunities for modifying the 
amount of irrigation water used by substituting purchased feed 
for irrigated pastures, agisting cattle, varying the culling rate, 
and altering the balance of annual and permanent pasture.
The risk management balance for dairy farmers is not an easy one. 
In severe droughts the prices of water and purchased feed move 
in the same direction. Costs thus rise sharply while production 
is moving in the other direction (see Table 3.1). The length of a 
drought cannot be known. In the 2002–03 drought season it 
turned out that the decision to buy feed and water was not the 
best one (provided agisted cattle were well cared for) because 
the drought conditions had led to increased prices for both water 
and feed. Milk production fell sharply in northern Victoria during 
2002–03 and had not recovered before the onset of the 
extremely dry conditions of 2006–07. Water trading creates 
opportunities to manage these risks, but not all irrigators will 
make the right call in such an uncertain environment. This 
was evident in the responses of people interviewed in the 
study regions.
There has been considerable change at the industry level. Most 
noteworthy is the aggregation of dairy farms (see Table 3.2) in 
order to gain economies of scale in dairy production.
Note: Figures for 2005–06 are provisional.
Source: Dairy Australia (2006a).
Figure 3.1 Inflation–adjusted farm–gate prices for milk, 1987–88 to 2005–06
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The water demand of dairying
In the early 1990s the industry was undergoing rapid aggregation, 
with farms getting larger. For many dairy farmers, the simplest 
strategy for increasing production was to use all the sales water 
made available to them at the time by Goulburn–Murray Water. 
In the eastern Murray system many dairy farms built production 
systems based on the assumption of an additional sales water 
supply equal to 80 per cent of water right. In the less reliable 
Goulburn system dairy farms often relied on 50 per cent of water 
right through sales water.
In the mid- to late-1990s dry seasons led to a tightening of the 
supply and a reduction in the volume of water available for sale. 
Dairy farmers geared for a high level of sales water availability 
found themselves forced to either buy supplementary feed or buy 
water from mixed farmers. As noted in Chapter 2, dairy farmers 
in regions such as Rochester and Central Goulburn were buying 
water entitlements at this time.
In the early 2000s dairy farmers were affected by low water 
availability, and milk prices began to fall. To manage this, 
the farmers adopted one of three strategies (Barr 2005):
Table 3.1  Milk production in Victoria, 1999–2000 to 2005–06
(million litres)
Year Gippsland Northern Western Total
1999–00 2 036 2 755 2 079 6 870
2000–01 2 026 2 744 2 014 6 784
2001–02 2 191 3 006 2 208 7 405
2002–03 2 008 2 526 2 050 6 584
2003–04 1 888 2 511 2 035 6 434
2004–05 1 965 2 567 2 081 6 613
2005–06 2 023 2 510 2 050 6 583
Sources: Dairy Australia (2006a), Dairy Research and Development Corporation (2003).
Table 3.2  Change in the Victorian dairy industry, 1979–80 to 2005–06
Year
Number of registered 
dairy farms
Number of dairy cows 
(’000 head)
Milk production 
(million litres)
1979–80 11 467 1 047 3 151
1989–90 8 840 968 3 787
1994–95 8 379 1 113 5 114
1999–00 7 806 1 377 6 870
2004–05 6 108 1 295 6 613
2005–06 5 892 1 280 6 583
Source: Dairy Australia (2006a).
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• They could continue to produce milk by purchasing water. 
The price of temporary water rapidly approached $300 a 
megalitre—far greater than a dairy farmer could make from 
the purchase. The advantage of this option, however, was that 
it maintained both the herd and the pastures, leaving the farm 
system ready to respond quickly if water was available the 
following season. The down side was increased debt.
• They could continue to produce milk by purchasing feed 
substitutes. Feed prices were high, though, and dryland 
farmers were also competing for the limited reserves of fodder 
across the state. This strategy had the advantage of retaining 
the herd, ready for production in the following season. But 
perennial pastures would die, debt would increase (albeit to 
a lesser extent than for the first option) and the return to full 
production when water availability increased would be slower.
• They could cease production, at least temporarily, and lend 
or lease the most valuable cows to dairy farmers in southern 
Victoria or Tasmania. This became known as ‘cow parking’. 
Not all cows would be available next season, but the nucleus 
of a herd would be there from which to rebuild production. 
At the end of the season this left the business with less debt 
than the other two options, but with a much slower pace of 
rebuilding production.
In the 2006–07 season the persistent drought and less water for 
irrigation stymied pasture growth, driving up fodder costs. In 
addition, farm-gate milk prices were forecast to fall by 3 per cent 
during the year. This led to many farmers drying off cows early 
and reducing their herd size, resulting in a fall in Australian milk 
production of almost 11 per cent in 2006–07 (ABARE 2006).
Horticulture
Horticulture and fruit growing accounted for $1.8 billion 
(20 per cent) of the total value of agricultural production in 
Victoria ($8.7 billion) in 2003–04 (Department of Primary 
Industries 2006). Vegetable, fruit and grape growing were the 
largest sectors in the horticultural industry; for example, the 
Victorian grape industry grew from $332.9 million in 2000 to 
$379.4 million in 2004, a rise of 14 per cent (ABS 2005a, 2005b).
Withdrawal of assistance and micro-economic reform have 
been prominent in horticultural industries for the last couple 
of decades. This first affected dried vine fruits and citrus in 
pumped irrigation districts on the Lower Murray, coinciding 
with the early days of water trading. 
Trends in wine grapes
Good prices for wine grapes and confident expectations for the 
wine industry provided an obvious and welcome adjustment 
path for producers of dried vine fruits. Wine grape production 
has lower labour costs than dried vine fruit and at the time was 
believed to have good export prospects. Water was also traded 
into these areas for corporate vineyards. Wine grape prices then 
dropped as the new vineyard investments started producing 
(see Figure 3.2).
The Mallee Statistical Division—which roughly corresponds 
with the Kerang–Cohuna and Sunraysia Irrigation Districts—
has been the location of most wine grape plantings in northern 
Victoria and produces the vast majority of Victorian wine 
(see Table 3.3).
Trends in other fruits and nuts
The Mallee Statistical Division (Kerang–Cohuna and Sunraysia) 
and the Goulburn Statistical Division (which roughly corresponds 
with the Rochester, Central Goulburn and Shepparton Irrigation 
Districts) are the site of other horticultural activity (see Table 3.4). 
Some of the major developments have been made using 
managed investment schemes—a financial vehicle for 
pooling individual investments.
Within the Mallee Division the citrus industry, centred around 
Mildura, is important. In 2003 it produced 21 per cent of 
Australia’s citrus from 7300 hectares.
Almonds are also prominent in Mildura, as well as around 
Robinvale, Boundary Bend and Lindsay Point. About 55 per cent 
of Australia’s almonds are produced in the area, and production 
is expected to double soon (SMEDB 2006). National production 
has almost doubled since 1999 and is expected to treble, from 
16 000 tonnes in 2006 to 48 000 tonnes in 2012. In 2004 
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Table 3.3 Wine grape production and area planted, Victoria, 1994–95 to 2004–05
Winemaking production (’000 tonnes) Area of vines bearing (’000 hectares)
Statistical division 1994–95 2001–02 2004–05 1994–95 2001–02 2004–05
Melbourne 4.6 9.6 19.5 0.6 2.8 3.0
Barwon 0.5 0.8 2.7 0.1 0.4 0.5
Western District 0.5 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.2
Central Highlands 1.8 2.7 5.2 0.3 0.7 1.1
Wimmera 0.2 1.2 1.2 0.1 0.4 0.3
Mallee 113.3 458.7 464.6 15.8 23.8 22.6
Loddon 0.8 3.6 6.1 0.2 0.9 1.2
Goulburn 5.3 13.6 20.6 0.7 2.6 2.9
Ovens–Murray 9.9 23.4 29.8 0.9 3.0 3.0
East Gippsland 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1
Gippsland 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1
Victoria 137.6 514.1 551.2 19.0 35.0 35.0
Source: ABS (2005c).
Source: ABARE (2006 and previous years).
Figure 3.2 Grape prices, Australia, 1989–90 to 2006–07
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Timbercorp and Select Harvest Limited harvested their first joint 
venture of 4000 hectares; this corresponds with the jump in 
almond tree plantations in 2001 (see Figure 3.3). 
The boom in the Australian almond industry has been supported 
by several factors: Australian frost-free, dry-heat climates are 
ideal for growing almonds; Australia is close to major almond 
importers in Asia; and the harvest is counter-seasonal to Australia’s 
main competitor, California, which produces 80 per cent of the 
world’s almonds. The boom in the Victorian almond industry has 
coincided with an increase in world almond prices as a result 
of increasing demand. The high prices are, however, not likely to 
be sustained since Californian production is expected to increase 
by 50 per cent by 2010 (Saitama & Olson 2006).
Timbercorp is an example of a managed investment scheme with 
significant horticultural plantings in the study regions. It has been 
a major driver of the expansion in almond growing in the 
Sunraysia region and has made large plantings in a number 
of years (see Table 3.5). Future growth is, however, uncertain 
in the light of recent changes to the taxation arrangements and 
product rulings for non-forestry managed investment schemes.
The olive industry has also seen an increase in production 
in the area, with larger scale commercial plantings appearing 
in recent years. Timbercorp has been making large plantings 
in Boort. Industry growth has been supported by the suitable 
climate and soils and increasing demand, and olive prices 
have been steadily rising since 1999–2000.
Horticulture in the Goulburn Statistical Division focuses on 
fruit growing. The biggest change in the industry has been 
the move away from fruit for processing to fresh fruit.
Table 3.4 Area of fruit and nuts irrigated, Victoria, 1992–93 and 1996–97
(’000 hectares)
Statistical division 1992–93 1996–97
Melbourne 2.0 2.2
Barwon – –
Western District – –
Central Highlands 0.3 0.3
Wimmera 0.2 0.2
Mallee 5.7 6.7
Loddon 0.4 0.5
Goulburn 6.8 7.9
Ovens–Murray 0.2 0.6
East Gippsland – –
Gippsland 0.2 0.3
Melbourne 15.9 18.7
– Zero. 
Sources: ABS (1994, 1998).
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The water demands of horticultural industries
Water is a necessary input for investment in horticulture that 
involves new plantings—either to expand production or to 
replace old rootstock. The water demands of new trees or vines 
are relatively well known into the future, so horticulturalists 
often choose to hold permanent water entitlements as a risk 
management tool and sell temporary water while the crops are 
maturing. For example, ‘A specific risk management strategy of 
Timbercorp is to pre-purchase water rights. According to trade 
records the company started purchasing water in the 2000–01 
season, and up to the end of June 2004 had purchased total 
permanent water entitlements of 23,090ML’ (SKM 2006).
Many of the people interviewed for this study explained the 
observed permanent trade into Sunraysia and temporary trade 
out of the region as horticulture securing the full future water 
demand of new crop plantings. The water not required during 
tree and vine maturation is sold in temporary markets, which has 
implications for future trends in water movement. For example, 
Table 3.5 Timbercorp horticultural projects: hectares developed, 2000 to 2005
Crop and location 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Almonds in north-west Victoria – 224 1101 1114 1224 1446
Olives in Boort 362 980 650 625 155 –
– Zero. 
Source: Australian Agribusiness Group (2006).
Source: Almond Board of Australia (2006).
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the temporary trade in water allocations that currently offsets 
what would otherwise be a reduction in water availability in 
regions from which water entitlements have been sold might 
lead to reduced supply in the future.
New horticultural developments allow new varieties of existing 
crops, or new crops altogether, to be planted and new irrigation 
techniques to be adopted. In comparison, established vines 
or orchards provide less flexibility with water use or other 
production choices.
Mixed farming
Mixed farms in the Victorian Murray Valley generally produce 
wool, prime lambs and beef cattle from annual irrigated 
pastures and irrigated crops.
Trends in mixed farming
In the 1990s, 40 per cent of the water in the Goulburn–Murray 
system was being used by mixed farmers. Mixed farms were 
spread throughout the Goulburn–Murray Water irrigation area 
but were particularly concentrated in the Pyramid–Boort and 
Kerang–Cohuna districts (Barr 2005).
In the early 1990s a significant event for mixed irrigation farming 
was the collapse of the reserve price scheme for wool and the 
subsequent protracted fall in wool prices and production. The 
declining wool prices prompted many mixed enterprise farmers 
to decrease their sheep-related activities and expand in areas 
such as beef cattle and cropping. Cropping was an attractive 
alternative because of productivity growth and a readily available 
market for grain in the nearby dairy industry. Expansion in beef 
cattle raising was supported by increasing beef prices. 
Declines in wool prices were partially offset by favourable prices 
for sheep meat, which swung the balance of irrigated pasture 
farming even further in favour of dairying. Trading of water was 
again important in influencing the adjustment of land, labour, 
capital and farm enterprises following the hard times in the 
wool industry.
The water demands of mixed farming
During tough times the selling of water separately from the farm 
land was not attractive to many mixed farmers: without water, 
the farm house and the fixed investments on the farm were 
worth very little. People on smaller farms generally supported 
themselves through off-farm work; people on larger farms were 
generating sufficient income for their family and business needs. 
The mixed farmers who did sell water alone generally did so in 
response to financial pressure or because they were increasingly 
dependent on off-farm work and no longer needed the water 
(Bjornlund & McKay 1999).
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4. The impacts of water trading
• for communities in irrigated areas.
The discussion that follows aims to separate the impacts of 
water trading from the impacts of other factors affecting the 
shape of rural Victoria. It is, however, difﬁcult to make such 
a separation, and this difﬁculty reinforces two of the main 
messages of the report:
• A key impact of water trading is to speed up the rate 
of change associated with the other factors bringing 
about change.
• It is thus difﬁcult to untangle the effects of water trading from 
a background of drought, changing commodity markets and 
rural adjustment. 
Impacts on the individual 
irrigator or farm
The authors conducted a series of interviews in the case study 
regions with irrigators and the broader community, to discuss 
their experiences of water trading and its impacts. Part Two of 
this report details these individuals’ experiences and perceptions.
At the farm level, water trading allows farmers to make decisions 
about managing their water in a way that was not possible before 
trading was introduced. Rather than take steps each season to 
manage the water made available to them through the allocation 
process, farmers can earn cash from selling water instead of 
Water trading has allowed water to be moved between different 
industries and different regions in response to changing industry 
and regional circumstances.
The central interest of this study was to examine the impacts 
on communities, industries and individuals of these water 
movements, with reference to actual experience in the selected 
regions—Sunraysia, Pyramid–Boort, and Rochester, Central 
Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna. The aim of the ﬁeldwork was to 
develop an understanding of the social and economic impacts 
of permanent and temporary water trading in the Murray Valley 
from the viewpoint of people living in the regions in question.
Examination of the patterns of water trade revealed considerable 
variation in the regional experience in the past decade—in 
the size and direction of water trades and the type of water 
being traded (temporary or permanent). The way these events 
have affected rural communities has also been highly variable. 
Gaining clarity about the exact nature of the social and economic 
impacts was a difﬁcult task since these are complex and 
interrelated themes.
This chapter summarises the impacts of water trading 
at different levels:
• for individual irrigators and farms
• for irrigated industries
• for industries associated with the inputs and outputs 
of irrigated industries
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applying the water to crops or they can buy additional water 
at the market price. Alternatively, a farmer can choose not to 
buy or sell water and to simply manage the farm using the 
allocated volume of water.
The interviews confirmed that all three of these behaviours 
are evident in farmer participation (or non-participation) in 
the temporary water market:
• Selling surplus water. ‘I’ll continue to utilise the surplus water 
either for on-farm production or, if the market’s available to 
trade it temporarily, I’ll just take advantage of that. But I’ve 
certainly got no problems utilising it mainly as a temporary 
seller where there is value in doing it … If you handled your 
water well, watched carefully, you could temporary trade off 
your water at the end of the season when you’re virtually 
finished with it, and it’s a nice little earner.’
• Purchasing additional water. ‘I’ve still got to buy water— 
no issues with that this year. I’ll probably still have to buy 
400 megs minimum, just to get the vines through.’
• Abstaining from the water market. ‘I gave it to [the 
environment] last year. I gave them 50 ML and left 15 ML 
the year before because that’s all I had left. And whatever 
I have left at the end of the season I don’t sell it, I give it to 
them.[Some farmers] do the same old thing if they have 25 ML 
or 200 ML … [they do] the same thing every year because 
that’s what they have always done. The bottom line doesn’t 
really come into it.’
In the absence of a water market it would not be possible 
for an irrigator to sell at the market price the water not applied 
to a crop. In this instance, two scenarios are possible:
• The additional water would continue to be applied to the 
crop—and presumably earn less for the farmer than it would 
have on the market, given that it would have been sold if 
trading were possible.
• The additional water would have been left in the river or 
in storage. This suggests that the possibility of water trading 
has led to using the water resource more fully. There is much 
literature discussing the activation of previously unused water 
rights (see, for example, Tisdell et al. 2001) as well as the 
river management and environmental consequences of 
all allocated water being used (for example, van Dijk et al. 
2006) and the increased risk of over-allocation of the 
water resource.
Among the consequences for individual irrigators 
are the following:
• flexibility in production decisions
• management of cash flow and debt
• risk management
• impacts on other irrigators in the region. 
Flexibility in production decisions
If farmers were not able to enter the market and buy additional 
water in a given irrigation season their planting decisions would 
be different for both annual and perennial crops. For example, in 
the case of perennial plantings farmers would need to plan for 
significant crop loss if there was an allocation shortfall, rather 
than knowing that such a shortfall could be redressed by paying 
for additional water volumes.
Activity in permanent water markets is not so much a reaction 
to annual surpluses or shortfalls—such as through weather 
variability and allocation levels—but is more linked to helping 
manage changing production decisions, farm cash flow and risk. 
Permanent water has been tradeable in its own right since water 
ownership was unbundled from land ownership. Nevertheless, 
many permanent trades occur when a farm is sold as a ‘going 
concern’, which encompasses both the land and the water.
Changing production techniques on a farm—be it in irrigation 
technology or the crop planted—is an expensive exercise that 
also has consequences for water requirements. Appels et al. 
(2004) found that investment in ‘water-saving’ irrigation systems 
is not made purely for the value of the water saved; rather, these 
capital investments in physically water-efficient technologies 
increase crop quality and yields as well as being more labour 
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efficient. The value of the water saved can, however, be part of 
the decision to invest, with this value being realised if the water 
can be traded. Changing the crop on a given area of land can 
increase the water required per hectare above the volume 
that was initially granted as an entitlement—for example, 
redeveloping from vines (which use 5–6 megalitres a hectare) to 
almond trees (which use 12 megalitres a hectare) in the Sunraysia 
region, which originally had an entitlement of about 9 megalitres 
a hectare. Water trading enables the water requirements of the 
new crop to be secured; otherwise, water from one section of 
the farm would have to be borrowed to water the new crop or 
the development would not occur.
Management of cash flow and debt
The argument that the trade in water entitlements gives farmers 
flexibility to manage cash flow and debt is somewhat contentious. 
Selling the water entitlement while keeping the farm land 
provides a mechanism for immediately reducing debt, but it 
means temporary water must be relied on to keep farming in 
the future, which may not be a feasible long-term strategy:
A good farmer has always had the ability to put his water on 
the temporary market; a bad farmer if he sells his permanent 
water won’t be able to buy it back.
… depends upon the individual level of debt. If they haven’t 
got much debt then just keep your permanent allocation, 
but if they have … see a lot of people have been forced to 
sell off surplus water because of their high debt levels and 
poor returns.
That’s one of these water things: you bag the blokes that sell 
it until it gets personal and then you are glad you can do it. 
Nevertheless, depending on crop type, some see the substitution 
of permanent water for temporary water as a legitimate farm 
business strategy. If water demand is flexible year to year 
(interruptible versus non-interruptible) water is required only 
in years when it is relatively cheap. For example, irrigators of 
annual crops (such as annual pasture, melons or vegetables) said 
in interviews that their production would occur only in years 
when the water price is relatively low (such that the temporary 
price is 3.5 per cent of the entitlement price) and not in dry years 
such as 2002–03 or 2006–07 (such that the temporary price 
is 15–30 per cent of the entitlement price).
The pressures on cash flow and debt are not always linked to 
farm management ability because many farms are family farms. 
For example, one irrigator sold part of his water entitlement to 
fund his daughters’ education:
My daughters were due to go away to school. And I couldn’t 
find the funds to send them. And I believed there was no 
point in 10 years’ time saying, ‘Well now I’ve got the money 
—now you can go to school’. I sold a couple of hundred 
megs to put them through school. So I was a most reluctant 
seller … but it was something I did for the girls at the time. 
It was my aim, one day, to buy it back, but that is a vision 
that won’t be realised the way things are going. 
Apart from the water trading opportunity, other mechanisms to 
fund his daughters’ education would have been to increase the 
level of farm debt (a new loan or increasing an existing loan) or 
to sell a portion of the family farm (land and water).
Risk management
Managing the risk associated with variability in water supply has 
become increasingly important in recent years as allocation 
percentages have fallen below 100 per cent in some years (as 
well as reduced expectations of sales water volumes). Water 
entitlements are seen as a hedge against reduced allocation 
levels. By purchasing additional entitlements, irrigators with 
highly inelastic water demand (say, a basic need to keep vines 
and trees alive) can protect themselves against the need to buy 
additional water allocations on the temporary market in dry 
years, when the price is highest.
The incentives for the farmers’ buying and selling of water 
were put succinctly by one irrigator:
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In the broader scale of things—taking drought out of the 
equation—in terms of water trade, it cannot be lost sight of 
that this is a market-driven exercise and it is mainly willing 
buyers and willing sellers. There is no pressure, other than 
economic pressure, put directly on people to sell or buy 
their water.
Droughts are short-term crises and water allocation trading 
can help farmers manage at such times, but water entitlement 
trading solutions can have long-term consequences. Trade allows 
farmers to sell water to manage cash flows during dry times, but 
their ability to buy water in the future is not guaranteed. The flip 
side to this is that water entitlement sales during the height of 
a drought might yield higher prices, and there is the possibility 
of future wet years when either allocations and/or entitlements 
might be cheap. In dry periods, if farmers have incentives to sell 
water rather than produce, then less fodder is produced and the 
price of feed substitutes for dairy herds increases.
Impacts on other irrigators in the region
From the perspective of the individual irrigator, the flexibility 
water trading gives other water users can have detrimental effects. 
A farm has neighbouring properties, can share water delivery 
infrastructure with other irrigators in the area and competes with 
other farms producing the same output, and when water trade is 
possible they also compete with other farms for the use of water. 
These interrelationships mean that the actions of one irrigator 
can affect other irrigators. For example, if a neighbouring farm 
sells its water permanently the block might not be adequately 
maintained and thus come to pose a disease or weed risk; 
further, the burden of maintenance of the water delivery 
infrastructure will fall to the remaining irrigators. Another 
example is if water is bought by a new farm: this is negatively 
viewed by some irrigators, who see the produce of the new 
enterprise competing with their own produce.
Water trading can also have implications for channel capacity 
and the timing of water deliveries. In general, if water is traded 
out of a region and is no longer used on properties in the area, 
congestion in delivery channels is eased. If water trades into 
a region there will be increased congestion. In Sunraysia, for 
example, people interviewed spoke of the reduction in river 
flows reaching Mildura when the private diverters upstream 
turned on their pumps.
Impacts on irrigated industries
At the industry level, water trading enables industries to react 
faster to change and to contract or expand. In the absence of 
water trading, other inputs to production could be increased 
or decreased in response to industry change, depending on 
the time frame, which in turn depends on the type of input:
• Farm consumables—such as fertiliser, seed, pesticides and 
herbicides—can be managed responsively in the short 
term, with a stockpile or inventory kept or additional 
supplies ordered.
• Farm labour can be adjusted in the short term through 
altered hours by existing workers or through contract labour. 
Some labour skills are industry specific; others can be more 
generally applicable.
• Farm capital can be adjusted in the longer term by new 
investment or running down existing assets. Capital from 
one industry application may have limited value for use 
in other industries.
• Land—and the associated bundles of water—can be adjusted 
in the long term to move to a different production system.
Tradeability makes water more akin to being simply another 
farm consumable whose use can be adjusted in the short term, 
as opposed to the long-term adjustment of land–water bundles.
Water trading is also a catalyst for industry change: it allows 
irrigation of land that has not historically been irrigated. This has 
been observed, for example, on greenfield sites in the Sunraysia 
region. These sites can start afresh on a large scale, with block 
layouts and irrigation in accordance with best practice at the 
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time—this knowledge can be almost directly applied from 
elsewhere in Australia or overseas where that type of crop is 
being grown under similar conditions—and farmers managing 
their own water delivery infrastructure through pumping directly 
from the river. In contrast, to develop a new horticultural crop 
such as almonds on blocks in an existing irrigation scheme that 
are at the time growing grapes is more expensive because it 
entails buying many properties, the expense of demolishing 
or working within the original block layouts, and reliance on 
a purpose-built design and shared water delivery infrastructure 
that may not meet the crop’s needs. In this way water trading 
facilitates a response to the economic stimuli provided by 
commodity markets, taxation arrangements, and local and 
global demand.
With or without water trading, the face of any irrigated industry 
would have changed during the past decade because there 
have been changes in the mix of inputs that are used in best-
practice irrigation farming. For example, capital intensity 
has increased with a number of advances:
• laser levelling—which has become more prevalent 
in flood-irrigated districts
• machine harvesting—which is now more widely 
used in horticulture
• pressurised irrigation delivery technology
• increased monitoring and sensor use
• increased mechanisation—as with dairying technology.
Uptake of such innovation has been prompted by the 
increases in yield and quality and the labour- and water-
saving characteristics of the technology. Even without water 
trading, these water savings are of value because they permit 
the irrigation of a greater farm area, yet water trading means 
that an additional option is available—that of selling the water 
for cash, either temporarily or permanently. As a result, water 
trading could make some of the investment decisions associated 
with increasing capital intensity marginally more attractive. 
Increased capitalisation has also meant that the average 
farm size has grown in keeping with larger unit sizes in farm 
production—such as the area of vines a harvester can pick in 
a given time, the area of crop that can be managed by one 
worker, and the number of cows that can be milked each day. 
Water trade has little impact on the drivers of farm aggregation.
In a system where water is linked to land, reduced water 
availability can mean a proportional reduction in the amount 
of water available to all types of crops. In a connected system, 
however, a variety of crops can be farmed, and this proportional 
reduction is not a very efficient distribution of the available 
water. For example, applying less water to annual crops will 
reduce yields or the area planted, whereas applying less water 
to perennial plantings might reduce current yields as well 
as putting at risk the survival of trees and vines and reducing 
yields in future seasons. 
Water demand differs between industries, which brings with 
it differing reactions to risks in water availability. Additionally, 
different industries have different options available to them for 
substituting for water use to some degree. If water can be traded, 
some crops can be grown opportunistically, with annual 
plantings varying according to water availability; in contrast, 
perennial plantings have relatively fixed water demands from 
year to year. In extremely dry years water entitlement holders 
who generally grow annual crops can find that they would earn 
a better return from their water allocation by selling their water 
rather than applying it to their crops. Farmers with perennial 
crops are willing to pay higher prices to buy additional 
water for their crops and so avoid catastrophic loss of 
their permanent plantings. 
This means that in the absence of water trading it can be 
expected that an irrigation system with a given security of 
supply would be dominated by an industry (or industries) 
whose characteristics of water demand complement the 
characteristics of the water supply. This has often been put 
forward as an explanation for the distinct historical differences 
between irrigation practice on either side of the New South 
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Wales – Victoria border: more opportunistic crops are grown 
on the northern side, which traditionally has less security of 
water supply, whereas the southern side is dominated by 
dairying and horticulture. 
Another impact of water trading is that the trade provides a 
means for industries with different demand characteristics to 
co-exist efficiently in the same irrigation system (with a given 
level of supply security). For example, an industry based on a 
crop with consistent water demands can develop in a system 
with low security of supply because it can secure the additional 
water it requires in years of low allocations by buying water 
on the temporary market or by holding increased amounts 
of permanent water. Alternatively, water trading makes it 
more feasible for more opportunistic crops or industries to be 
developed in a system with a highly secure supply—as observed 
with melons, which are now a cash crop in Sunraysia. This 
flexibility to reallocate water is the primary benefit of the water 
trade. Peterson et al. (2004) found that water trading in dry years 
could offset half the production losses (gross regional product) 
that would have otherwise occurred.
Specific industries
Following is a summary of how the main irrigation industries 
in the case study regions have been affected by water trading. 
At this industry level, it is difficult to separate the impacts 
of water trading from the drivers of water use and trading 
described in Chapter 3.
Dairying
The analysis in Chapter 3 suggests that without temporary water 
trading the dairy industry would have fared much worse than 
it did during the past 10 years of drought. Temporary trading 
allowed dairy farmers to buy water when it was needed or to 
sell their annual allocation on the temporary market and offset 
increased expenditure and/or production losses. Data on water 
trading in the case study regions show that the Goulburn–
Murray Water regions, which have a high proportion of dairying, 
have recently begun selling permanent entitlements but have 
also been buying temporary entitlements.
As discussed, the trade also facilitated growth and restructuring 
in the dairy industry in response to changing market conditions 
and deregulation.
Permanent trading meant that farmers who left farming did so 
with more money than they otherwise would have. It is thought 
that until 2003–04 the total irrigated area for dairy production 
did not decline significantly. (More recent data on land use are 
not available.) Any declines in the area of irrigated dairying 
in the case study regions are likely to be constrained by the 
annual limits on permanent trade out of particular districts. 
Horticulture
Permanent water trading has allowed horticulturalists to secure 
the future water demand of new plantings on land that was not 
previously irrigated. Growth in permanent entitlements in the 
Sunraysia region, as shown in the trade data, is almost entirely 
for growth in the horticultural industry, much of it on greenfield 
sites. It is therefore expected that without permanent trading 
there would have been very little large-scale horticultural 
development in Victoria in the past 10 years. For example, in 
the absence of permanent trading, the wine boom would have 
been confined to existing irrigators switching away from dried 
fruit, and the almond boom might not have occurred since that 
industry is heavily reliant on economies of size.
Further, without temporary trading many existing horticultural 
enterprises in the Goulburn system would not have survived the 
extraordinarily low seasonal allocations. Many mixed farms 
survived those allocations by selling water on the temporary 
market, making more money than they would have done by 
growing crops. 
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Mixed farming 
Mixed farming enterprises tend to produce the lowest returns 
for water input and are therefore more likely to sell water in 
times of water scarcity. They thus accounted for the majority 
of the early trade in permanent entitlements, especially from 
small to medium-sized enterprises. Mixed farming enterprises 
are particularly common in the Pyramid–Boort and Kerang–
Cohuna regions. In the absence of drought, when seasonal 
allocations are high, temporary trade into these regions 
could be expected to be higher.
Related industries
Industries such as agricultural services, farm supplies, and 
machinery sales and service are affected by expansion and 
contraction of the irrigated industries they supply. The Centre for 
International Economics analysed the contribution of irrigation 
to the Australian economy and to employment in 1996–97: 
it found that, although the direct contribution at the farm level 
represented just 0.65 per cent of gross domestic product, the 
total contribution of irrigation, taking into account all indirect 
effects, is 2.33 per cent of GDP (CIE 2004).
Irrigated agricultural industries provide the input for processing 
industries and have flow-on effects. For example:
• The direct contribution of all Australian irrigated agriculture 
to GDP was estimated to be $3446 million in 1996–97, while 
the indirect contribution to GDP of irrigated food and fibre 
processing was $2521 million and the indirect contribution 
to GDP of flow-on effects was $6420 million.
• Irrigation was also found to provide a large number of jobs, 
both directly and indirectly. Direct employment in irrigated 
agriculture was estimated to be 28 900 full-time equivalents, 
while indirect employment in irrigated food and fibre 
processing was 19 700 and in other indirect irrigation 
employment 122 400 (CIE 204).
It is the accumulation of direct and indirect effects that results in 
local economies’ dependence on agriculture. One person who 
was interviewed said, ‘There’s no doubt a town like Rochester 
relies on the farming community. If the farmers have money they 
spend it and everybody benefits from it. As soon as things go 
bad the farmer shuts up shop and everybody feels the effect’.
As discussed, in the absence of water trading there are ongoing 
pressures for change in irrigated industry. This means that the 
demand for services, farm supplies, and machinery sales 
and service is not static. If water trading speeds up irrigated 
industries’ response to various pressures, industries that are 
directly related will find demand for their goods and services 
fluctuating more readily.
When water moves between farms, industries and regions, so 
does the use of other farm production inputs. Were the water 
being reallocated between similar uses associated with a similar 
mix of inputs and were these inputs sourced in a similar way, 
then relatively offsetting effects (at the aggregate level) could 
be expected. Were the trade between neighbouring farms, the 
related industries would not be affected because providers of 
goods and services generally service specific geographic areas. 
Were the trade between regions, demand for farm supplies, for 
example, would decline in one area but increase by a similar 
amount in the water purchasing region.
If farms that are trading water use different inputs or obtain 
these inputs in different ways, the impact on industries servicing 
irrigated industries might be more pronounced. For example, 
decisions on where to obtain inputs often depend on the size of 
the ‘decision-making unit’—be it family farms or large company 
farms. Family farms might rely on local service providers for farm 
inputs such as fertilisers, on contractors for machinery such as 
harvesters and on local mechanics for maintenance. Larger farms 
might find it efficient to buy some of these items directly, 
bypassing the related industries and local suppliers. As one 
interviewee put it, ‘These big companies, what are they buying 
around here? Nothing! They bring everything in’. Another person 
observed, however, that this might not always be the case: ‘Well, 
we do a lot of work for large corporate irrigation developments 
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and that’s a key source of our work, which depends on water 
trade. The scale of developments we are dealing with is huge. 
So [water trading has] been positive for this business’.
Other industries closely related to irrigated industries are 
the processors of irrigation outputs. When, for example, the 
production of milk or hay declines in a region, the throughput 
of the processing factories is reduced, although it is difficult to 
attribute this to water trading when there has been a series 
of dry years with allocations well below traditional levels.
Irrigated activity has flow-on effects for businesses in the 
surrounding towns by affecting the communities’ spending 
capacity. In the recent dry years dairy farmers have been in a 
difficult situation, and this affects their purchasing behaviour 
in town. One project participant noted:
They used to run on 150–200 per cent water right. And, 
being electricians, we were servicing their dairy equipment. 
There would be motor breakdowns or pump breakdowns 
and things like that, and it started to slow down a few years 
ago. I can’t remember seeing a dairy farmer from that area 
out there coming into my shop and buying [something that 
was] not a necessity.
The impact of water trading might be more difficult to 
determine since, as one interviewee noted, it is complicated by 
weather effects as well as a background of small communities 
under pressure:
I think it’s just a sign of the times. There’s really nothing bad 
that has happened in Boort. There have been a lot of good 
things happen, but the fact is that the pressure is on small 
rural communities to survive. People nowadays have fast 
modern cars they can travel into Kerang, Swan Hill and 
Bendigo and do their shopping. Most of the businesses that 
are housed in a small town really have to compete with 
some of the larger ones in bigger towns, the Better Electricals, 
the Retravisions, the Targets and all that, and nowadays its 
just too costly for businesses to stay open. They don’t make 
enough; they don’t sell enough clothes in a small town; and 
they don’t sell enough fridges in a small town.
In this way, the impact of water trading is to be a catalyst 
for industry expansion and contraction, which affects related 
industries. It depends on the location of the water movements 
(and thus the towns and local economies affected) and the types 
of industries buying and selling water. For example, expansion 
of labour-intensive industries can bring population increases 
or their contraction can bring population decline.
Social impacts in the 
case study regions
The regional case studies allow for an examination of the 
impacts of changes in water use and trading on communities. 
The following sections provide an overview of the socio-
economic situation in the case study regions, in order to place 
the impacts of water use and trading in a broader context.
Sunraysia
In Sunraysia the trading of water into the district has encouraged 
economic and population growth and the expansion of irrigation 
industries. In particular, a number of managed investment 
schemes have established large horticultural operations in the 
region. Water trading has also promoted growth in associated 
industries, although the down side of this is that it has increased 
competition in the sector. If no trading of water (separate from 
land) were possible, the investment, employment and regional 
boom observed in Sunraysia might never have occurred.
This growth has contributed to Mildura becoming one of 
Australia’s 10 fastest-growing regional centres. At present the 
city has a population of 51 263 and is a major service centre. 
There are high levels of employment—particularly in agriculture 
and related industries (much higher than national averages)—
and this can be partly attributed to the water trade. Mildura’s 
residents talked about the city’s critical mass sustaining and 
perpetuating the economic and population growth. But Mildura’s 
growth cannot be attributed entirely to the water trade: the 
growth of regional centres is common throughout rural Australia.
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At present drought and a simultaneous downturn in wine grapes, 
dried fruit and citrus are having a negative effect on the local 
economy. Water has become a valuable tradeable asset, and 
a number of smaller operators, mainly in the public irrigation 
districts, have sold their permanent entitlements to cover debt, 
retire or leave the industry. This has led to concern about the 
loss of water from the region and the sustainability of smaller 
outlying communities. 
The other centre of focus in Sunraysia was Robinvale, with 
a population of 4400. Like Mildura, Robinvale has benefited 
greatly from water trading into the district. With good soils and 
climate, this area is the quintessential ‘place of higher value use’ 
of water. Several large corporate horticultural operations have 
become established in the area since the late 1990s, and the 
town is growing rapidly. It is an exciting place to be because of 
the economic growth and the perceived unlimited possibilities 
for horticulture. For the large managed investment schemes and 
the very wealthy large family businesses in the district, along 
with some of the businesses that support those industries, water 
trading has been highly beneficial. Some businesses have 
benefited more than others. Immigrant workers tend to send 
a lot of money home and short-term workers ultimately take 
their earnings with them, which means the local economy 
is deprived of some income. 
Robinvale is experiencing a boom and with that boom has 
come social structural change. The high labour demands of 
the horticultural industries have led to a significant in-migration 
of workers from diverse ethnic backgrounds, which has strained 
the town’s infrastructure and services and created problems for 
community cohesiveness, including crime. A study commissioned 
by the Swan Hill Rural City Council (2006) found that the 
difficulty of obtaining census returns from these in-migrants 
means that, although the town has an official population of 
about 4000, the actual population is more likely to be twice that. 
This has occurred because many casual workers are unlikely 
to be identified by census collectors and many new immigrants 
distrust government officials and fail to complete the census form.
Pyramid–Boort
Pyramid–Boort has experienced considerable movement of 
water out of the region, which has allowed better management 
of salinity. In Pyramid Hill, a community of 400 people, the 
continual loss of water has been accompanied by a loss of farms 
and production and a consequent loss of people, income and 
services from the town. Business owners were finding it difficult 
to compete when people were shopping elsewhere. Returns 
were depleted because there are fewer people in the district 
and those remaining have little to spend. Furthermore, transient 
workers rarely spend their money locally. The residents who 
tenaciously remain are passionate about their community, 
committed to sustaining what they have, and deeply concerned 
that, if water is removed totally from the district, the town will 
die. To the community’s credit, some innovative ventures have 
been established, among them an abattoir, a quarry, a pet-food 
factory and Pyramid Salt, a company that is making use of the 
region’s salinity by extracting and marketing salt. There is a social 
divide in the community, between the large cohort of transient 
workers and the traditional farming families.
The township of Boort, with a population of 800, is unique 
in that it has been a big importer as well as a big exporter of 
water. Some of the better soils in the area provide income from 
dryland agriculture. Water trade has contributed to Timbercorp 
establishing a large olive plantation there, which has had positive 
and negative impacts on the town. Families whose farms were 
bought by the company have left the district and, although 
Timbercorp has brought some employment and income to the 
town, much of its business is conducted outside Boort, leaving 
many empty shops. On the plus side, the long-established and 
wealthy farming community that remains is cohesive and 
committed to sustaining the town.
Rochester
The smallest irrigation district included in the study was  
the Rochester–Campaspe Irrigation District, which has been 
an importer of water for many years, particularly from the 
Pyramid–Boort region. However, recent trade out of the district, 
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significant reductions in water allocations (at the time 22 per cent 
in the Campaspe system) and the consequent loss of productive 
irrigated agriculture in the district are a major concern for 
residents. As in Kerang–Cohuna, structural change is occurring 
in the district, and residents fear the loss of more people from 
the area.
Rochester, a town of 2600 people, is a service centre for 
the large dairying community and the site of several support 
industries. The district is traditionally very wealthy, the economy 
is totally dependent on agriculture, and drought, deregulation 
in the dairy industry and water trading out of the region have 
adversely affected local businesses. A large dairy factory that 
has long been a big employer in the town recently stood down 
some workers.
Central Goulburn
In the Central Goulburn Irrigation District drought was  
having a big impact on the economies of the towns of Kyabram 
(population 5500) and Tatura (population 3000). In Kyabram, 
water trading has led to the establishment of water broking 
firms and an irrigation supply company, but it has also been 
associated with the downsizing of an engineering company 
and the closure of three canning factories in the district. 
Tatura has not experienced any major loss of industry, 
although recent declines in local industry practices 
and employees were a concern.
Water trading has allowed dairy farmers to trade water out  
of the area, and participants were well aware of the negative 
impact this trading can have. Because Kyabram and Tatura are 
close to the regional centres of Shepparton and Echuca, an 
increasing number of hobby farmers have moved in as the 
traditional farmers have moved on. This is a concern for the 
loss of production, for the social structure of the communities 
and for the environment. 
Kerang–Cohuna
For many years water has traded out of the Kerang district and 
this has alleviated the salinity problem in the area. The balance 
of dryland- and irrigation-based industries contributes to 
economic stability. Crops are doing well, confirming that the 
land in the area can be very productive if farms have access 
to water. The town has a population of 4000, and its central 
business district and industrial estate are impressive. The 
industrial area in particular is growing, with some substantial 
industries supported by an enthusiastic and proactive council. 
Most of the growth is independent of the water trade, although 
the trade has allowed the council to facilitate the development 
of horticultural businesses such as the Brown Brothers vineyard 
and a cherry orchard. Drought and the sale of permanent water 
entitlements, on the other hand, are seen as contributing to 
a loss of farms and people from the community. The sight of 
previously productive farmland now dry and often in poor 
condition was demoralising for residents. In particular, the flight 
of young people from the district was a concern for almost every 
person interviewed, despite this being characteristic of most 
rural communities (ABS 2003). 
Nearby Cohuna, a town of 3000 people, is set in beautiful 
surroundings on the Murray River, adjacent to Gunbower 
Island. The town has been built around a long-established 
dairy industry, and the residents display a high degree of 
attachment to place. They perceive water trading to be a threat 
to the stability of local industry and ultimately to their town as 
more water is traded out of the region and more dairy farms are 
sold. To sustain the town’s economy, community leaders were 
looking to tourism and encouraging retirees and sea changers 
to move to the area. Residents feel helpless in the face of the 
changes that are happening. There was an awareness that some 
adjustment might be necessary, but people were sad and 
resentful that this was the case.
The social effects of water trading
The heterogeneity of rural communities was evident in the 
idiosyncratic nature of the effects of water trading on each 
of the case study communities. One health service provider 
noted the degree to which services needed to be tailored 
to each community within a district:
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To quote John Humphreys from Monash University, ‘When 
you know one community you know one community’, and 
for each of our communities their issues are their issues. 
Within that context, the way in which community identity, 
their sense of belonging and social capital are sustained, 
maintained and even strengthened is unique to each of 
those communities. 
There have been differences in the way the communities have 
coped with these changes. The following effects were observed.
Rapid structural change
Rapid economic development can lead to the boom-and-bust 
cycles that are so familiar to Australian agriculture. In Mildura, 
water trading had facilitated development in wine grapes, 
but the current glut in the market, which has coincided with 
downturns in citrus and dried fruits, has resulted in the loss of 
some smaller operations. Fortunately, Mildura is a large city with 
a diverse economy and can withstand such changes. 
A number of large corporate horticultural operations have been 
established in Sunraysia, and a direct consequence of this is that 
Robinvale is facing significant social difficulties as new arrivals 
flock to the town to meet the high labour demand. This has 
placed great strain on the town’s infrastructure. The other regions 
were experiencing the effects of water being traded out. Along 
with the consequences of drought and deregulation in the dairy 
industry, towns in these regions were losing people as farmers 
sold their water entitlements and production on their 
farms declined.
Although water trading offers potential for economic advantages 
and employment for smaller communities that have few other 
competitive strengths, these communities lack the resources 
to survive economic downturns and are less able to diversify. 
Further, small communities are ill-equipped to cope with the 
social disruption that accompanies rapid economic growth. 
For example, the large number of immigrant workers drawn to 
Robinvale has strained housing, professional, community and 
health services and created problems for community 
cohesiveness, including increasing crime. The community faces 
a major challenge in accommodating the needs of a diverse 
range of people and lifestyles. This is a daunting, and probably 
impossible, task given that the demands of the mobile population 
outstrip the capacity of publicly funded resources to provide 
the necessary services. 
Robinvale typifies the process of uneven social development 
as a consequence of uneven economic development (Furuseth 
1989). There are concerns that the headiness of the booming 
economy might mask the reality of how the community would 
cope with a loss of water and the withdrawal of some of the large 
corporate operations. Freudenburg (1992) described booming 
economies such as this as ‘addictive’ because the initial 
experience is exhilarating but the long-term consequences can 
be debilitating. Robinvale does exhibit the main characteristics 
of a vulnerable community—geographic isolation, imbalances 
of scale and power in the horticultural industry, and the absence 
of alternatives for diversification. 
Community cohesion
Residents of the case study communities were asked to rate the 
level of cohesion in their community on a scale of one to five, 
where one was fragmented and five was strong and united. 
The mean ranks for the regions were Sunraysia 3.81 (SD .98), 
Kerang–Cohuna 3.94 (SD .80), Pyramid–Boort 4.07 (SD .59) 
and Rochester and Central Goulburn 4.09 (SD .54). Rochester 
and Boort had the highest levels of cohesion because these 
are older, established farming communities that share similar 
values and goals. Robinvale residents reported the lowest level 
of cohesion, mainly because of the presence of large numbers 
of immigrant workers from diverse ethnic backgrounds. Thus 
economic and social change associated with water trading affects 
the social cohesion of communities, which in turn affects levels 
of social capital—the networks of mutual support, reciprocity, 
trust and obligation that enable a community to work together 
(Coleman 1990, Putnam 1993).
Depopulation
For many years economic decline in rural Australia has resulted 
in towns losing jobs and as a result population and then basic 
services such as banks, health facilities and schools. People in 
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the case study regions saw water trading as exacerbating the 
situation by providing a means for farmers to trade out of debt, 
retire or leave a district, causing further population losses from 
towns. Of particular concern is the exodus of young people. 
According to the 2001 census, there has been a continuous 
migration of people aged 15 to 24 years from rural areas to urban 
centres. Between 1996 and 2001 almost three times as many 
young people left country areas as arrived in those areas—226 
net departures per 1000 young people (ABS 2003).
A review of census data for the case study communities reveals 
a significant decline in this cohort, particularly in places such 
as Pyramid Hill. Many young people appreciate the benefits 
of country life, but they often have to leave to pursue further 
education and employment opportunities (Eacott & Sonn 2006). 
Young women are much more likely to leave than young men, 
and this results in a marked age and gender imbalance. If 
economic and social opportunities cannot sustain a critical mass 
of young people, the means by which a community reproduces 
itself (marriage, family, and so on) and the demand for vital 
services such as education and other forms of social consumption 
break down (Barclay et al. 2007). In some areas, though, these 
population losses are partly offset by in-migration of people in 
older age groups. These might be the same people who left 
20 years earlier or they might be ‘tree changers’.
Social pressure
The negatives associated with the loss of permanent water from 
a region have led to some resentment being directed at farmers 
who participate in the permanent trade. Fenton (2006) found 
that some farmers have been ostracised by their community for 
selling their permanent water entitlements. This current study 
did identify these pressures, but the persistent and intensifying 
drought has seen a softening of that resentment and a greater 
appreciation that many individuals may not be ‘willing sellers’. 
Such behaviour can be explained by the fact that residents of 
small, integrated communities tend to work out interpersonal 
agreements for achieving desired outcomes (Freudenburg 1986). 
Ellickson (1991) maintains that these informal social norms are 
consistently utilitarian, serving to maximise the welfare 
community members obtain in their everyday interactions with 
others and to minimise the costs to the community as a whole. 
As a consequence, some norms can be beneficial to some 
members of a group and harmful to others. Punishment for 
those who do not conform can be negative gossip, ostracism 
and intolerance on the part of other community members. 
In the social life of small communities, future encounters 
are often unavoidable.
Health and welfare
Water trade–related loss of people from a region threatens the 
provision of health services in smaller communities, particularly 
places such as Pyramid Hill. Once a doctor, hospital or other 
service is lost, it is extremely difficult to replace. Such losses 
can also call into question the viability of other services, such 
as aged care facilities. Service providers in the study regions 
stressed the importance of maintaining existing medical services 
because of the implications for the local community if the 
services close. If people have to travel to seek medical help, 
more will move away. 
One of the consequences of the sale of water entitlements from 
small properties in the Mildura area concerns service delivery 
to the large number of elderly people who keep living in the 
house on their property long after the water has been sold and 
they have ceased working the land. Legislation prevents people 
on less than 10 acres (4 hectares) from retaining their house 
block and selling the remaining dry land. There are concerns for 
the health and wellbeing of these families who cannot afford to 
move off the farm. Meals-on-wheels delivery is difficult for ageing 
ethnic populations who have specific dietary needs. There are 
fewer volunteers because they have to use their own car, pay 
for their petrol, and travel large distances to bring services to 
people on isolated properties. 
Water trading also has an impact on the mental health of 
people in these communities. Service providers said the impacts 
of drought and water trading on psychological health were 
entwined. Many were seeking extra counselling services in order 
to meet the increased demand. Cohuna residents feel a loss of 
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control and helplessness in relation to the changes being brought 
about by the trading of water out of the community. Drought 
also saps energy, and the residents are at a low ebb. The lack 
of water for gardens and, ultimately, the declining aesthetic 
appeal of the towns in some of the regions, particularly in 
the Campaspe area, were dispiriting for residents. 
Recreation
Sport and recreation are a vital part of the social life of rural 
communities. The current high cost of water and people’s 
inability to keep paying club membership fees have meant that 
many sporting clubs are struggling to survive—especially those 
that need large water allocations to maintain their grounds. Golf 
clubs, in particular, are losing business. School grounds have 
also suffered, and many school facilities are used by the wider 
community. Without sporting and social events to bring people 
together, isolation increases and community cohesion 
declines (Stark 1991).
The social value of lakes for recreation in the case study regions 
was very apparent. Little Lake Boort is clearly Boort’s greatest 
attribute and also brings tourist income. The local farmers 
recognise this value and contribute water to the lake when they 
can. Water for environmental purposes was appreciated, but it 
was the social value of lakes for recreation that was of primary 
importance. Little Lake Boort is also a pivotal resource for 
country fire brigades: it is the only source of water for 
helicopters involved in firefighting over a wide area.
Crime
The level of crime is a strong measure of community wellbeing. 
Most of the case study communities had low crime rates, and 
the local police said their communities were made up of law-
abiding, hard-working citizens. As a larger centre, however, 
Mildura experienced more crime, and local police referred 
to some additional problems associated with the presence 
of seasonal workers. Pyramid Hill suffered some problems 
with domestic violence and affray associated with the 
transient workforce.
Water theft is not widespread, but there have been some 
big thefts of irrigation equipment from the large corporate 
horticultural operations. Barclay et al. (2004) found that 
corporate farms are more likely to be the target of thieves 
because the thieves consider such operations wealthy and 
able to afford the loss. 
According to social disorganisation theory (Bursik & Grasmick 
1993, Sampson & Groves 1989), residential instability, ethnic 
heterogeneity and income inequality are factors that contribute 
to low community cohesion and greater social disorganisation 
and consequently more crime. Unfortunately, Robinvale has 
all these characteristics, and they are a direct consequence 
of water trading.
Socio-economic indicators 
in the case study regions
The socio-economic data presented in this section come 
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics census basic community 
profiles for 1991, 1996 and 2001.5 Although it is difficult to 
attribute specific changes to water trading, the data provide 
an important general indication of socio-economic trends 
in the case study regions. 
Population
Figure 4.1 shows the change in the population of the case study 
regions from 1991 to 2001. The most significant change was in 
Pyramid–Boort, where the population decreased by 11 per cent 
during the period. Kerang–Cohuna’s population decreased by 
8 per cent, while the population of the other areas increased 
by between 3 per cent (Sunraysia) and 6 per cent (Rochester). 
5 The 2006 census data were not available at the time of writing. Further, 
the ABS boundaries and the irrigation districts do not exactly align. 
It is assumed that Sunraysia is represented by the Mallee Statistical 
Division except for Gannawarra; Kerang–Cohuna is represented by 
Gannawarra Statistical Local Area; Pyramid–Boort is represented by 
Loddon North SLA; Rochester is represented by Campaspe–Rochester 
SLA and Campaspe South SLA; and Central Goulburn is represented 
by Campaspe–Kyabram SLA and Greater Shepparton B West SLA.
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As Figure 2.9 shows, Pyramid–Boort was the region with the 
largest net transfer of water out, with both permanent and 
temporary trade moving water out. There was significant selling 
of permanent entitlements from Kerang–Cohuna but significant 
temporary trade into the region. The other regions—all with 
positive population growth rates—had increases in the net 
amount of water transferred in.
Central Goulburn had a water trading pattern similar to that of 
Kerang–Cohuna but did not experience a population decline. 
However, trade out of Central Goulburn was most significant 
after 2002. If there is a causal link, the impact may not appear in 
the available population data set. Similarly, much of the growth 
in entitlements in Sunraysia occurred after 2001. Interviews in 
Sunraysia suggest that the population has increased considerably, 
particularly in and around Robinvale.
Median age
Figure 4.2 shows that the median age of people in each of the 
case study regions is notably higher than the median for Victoria 
as a whole. It is also rising steadily, particularly in Pyramid–Boort 
and Kerang–Cohuna, where the median of 40 years in 2001 
was five years higher than the Victorian equivalent. An ageing 
population might have been a contributing factor in decisions 
to sell permanent water entitlements.
Percentage of the population aged more 
than 65 years
Figure 4.3 shows that the proportion of the population aged 
more than 65 years has been increasing in all the case study 
regions. In each region the percentage is higher than that for 
Victoria as a whole, a pattern that would be expected in all 
rural areas. Pyramid–Boort (18.4 per cent in 2001) and 
Kerang–Cohuna (17.8 per cent) have the highest proportion  
of their population over the age of 65 years. Again, ageing 
farmers might be more likely to sell water permanently.
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Percentage of the population in employment
Figure 4.4 shows the proportion of the population in employment 
in of each the case study regions. In each region in 1991, 1996 
and 2001 the percentage is lower than that for Victoria as a 
whole—except for Pyramid–Boort, which had a much higher 
proportion of employed people in 1991, although this had fallen 
significantly by 1996. In Sunraysia the proportion of employed 
people increased from 40 per cent in 1991 to 43 per cent 
in 2001.
Percentage of employed people working 
in agriculture, fisheries and forestry
Figure 4.5 shows that the proportion of people employed 
in agriculture, fisheries and forestry in each of the case study 
regions is much higher than the proportion for the state as a 
whole. Generally, the percentage is declining in each of the 
case study regions, with the exception of Pyramid–Boort 
(between 1991 and 1996), which also had the highest proportion 
(54 per cent) in 2001. The Australian Bureau of Statistics data 
used to represent the Sunraysia region include Mildura, a major 
regional centre: this probably explains much of the difference 
between Sunraysia and the other regions. 
Median weekly household income
Figure 4.6 shows that the median weekly household income 
in each of the case study regions has increased over time but 
is much lower than the Victorian median. Despite—or perhaps 
because of—significant water trading out of Pyramid–Boort, 
that region’s median weekly household income has increased 
significantly, from a low base of between $300 and $399 in 
1991 to $500 to $599 in 2001. Incomes in Sunraysia increased 
greatly between 1996 and 2001, from $400–499 to $600–699. 
By 2001 Rochester had the highest median weekly income 
compared with the other case study regions ($700–799).
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Separating the effects of trade 
from other causes of change
Separating the effects of water trading from other causes of rural 
change requires a counterfactual: how would decision making 
and outcomes in the various regions be different in the absence 
of water trading?
The effects of water trading are difficult to separate out because 
the alternative—what would have occurred in these regions if 
the water trade were not possible—is unobservable. In addition, 
the communities in the study are subject to the pressures that 
affect many rural communities in Australia:
• drought
• the vagaries of international markets
• falling commodity prices
• the high price of fuel
• deregulation of the dairy industry
• the ‘disappearing middle’—the decline in the number of 
farms, leading to a polarisation between larger holdings 
and smaller or hobby farms
• loss of services and declining populations in rural towns—
particularly the loss of young people. 
Although drought and the declining number of farms were 
common to all the regions studied, the type and extent of the 
other impacts just listed varied between the regions at the time 
this work was being done (2006–07). Mildura was feeling the 
negative effects of falling commodity prices for the wine grape, 
citrus and dried fruit industries. The exodus of young people 
was particularly evident in Pyramid Hill, Boort and Kerang. 
In Tatura and Kyabram local economies were affected by the 
towns’ proximity to large regional centres. 
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One indication of what would have happened in the absence 
of water trading is gained by looking at the total amount of 
water reallocated through trading. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
total water reallocated through trading is calculated by summing 
the change in available water through allocations to traded 
entitlements and the change in available water through temporary 
trade in allocations in a particular year. The often offsetting effects 
of temporary and permanent trading have led to increased water 
for irrigation use in the Rochester, Central Goulburn, Kerang–
Cohuna and Sunraysia regions, while reducing the water used 
in Pyramid–Boort. As noted, the study regions (in aggregate) have 
been net importers of both temporary and permanent water. 
The total water reallocated through trading has increased in 
aggregate across the five regions. 
In the absence of water trading, expansion in certain activities 
and regions and adjustments in others would have been much 
more difficult. For example:
• The expansion of horticultural industries in Sunraysia would 
have been constrained in the absence of water trading. Had 
inter-regional water trade not been possible, the alternative 
for greenfields developments would have been even more 
water being traded out of the pumped districts—leading to 
more acute social disruption in these areas. Had no trading 
of water (separate from land) been possible, the investment, 
employment and regional boom observed in Sunraysia might 
never have occurred.
• Many of the districts studied are highly reliant on dairy farms, 
which were under great pressure during the 2002–03 drought. 
With or without water trading, drought leads to tough times 
and property foreclosures. At this time water trading gave the 
dairy farmers the option of buying in water to supplement 
their allocations, rather than prematurely drying off their herd 
or substituting to stockfeed other than irrigated pasture. 
Decisions to maintain production did, however, lead to 
considerable debt being accrued. Water trading out of these 
dairying areas is a mechanism for clearing some of this debt 
and, although it is seen as detrimental to the local community, 
the alternative for managing the debt would have arguably 
been even more detrimental, with impoverished farm families, 
fire sales of assets and bank foreclosures. Water trading delays 
and prevents some of these sales by giving farms an 
additional asset with which to manage debt.
Although it is difficult to untangle the effects of trade from 
the background of drought, by considering observed outcomes 
and possible actions in the absence of trade, this study found 
as follows:
• Without temporary trading, the dairy industry would have 
fared much worse during the past 10 years of drought. 
• Even with temporary trading, many dairy enterprises collapsed 
in the extraordinarily low seasonal allocations of 2002–03 
and 2006–07. Permanent trading meant that those farmers 
left farming with more money than they otherwise would 
have had.
• Without temporary trading, many existing horticultural 
enterprises in the Goulburn system would not have survived 
the extraordinarily low seasonal allocations.
• Many mixed farms survived the low seasonal allocations by 
selling water on the temporary market, making more money 
than they would have by growing crops. 
• In the absence of drought and with high seasonal 
allocations, the volume of temporary trade into regions 
such as Pyramid–Boort could be expected to be higher.
Although it is also difficult to untangle the effects of trade 
from the background of structural adjustment, this study 
found as follows:
• Water is trading permanently out of areas with small farms 
and closer settlement—for example, Mildura and Tongala.
• New developments mainly occur outside constituted 
irrigation districts because of the advantages for developing 
greenfield sites and the difficulty of achieving economies 
of scale on the small blocks in some irrigation districts.
• Without permanent trading, there would have been very 
little large-scale horticultural development in Victoria in 
the past 10 years.
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Again, although it is difficult to untangle the effects of trade 
from the background of commodity markets, this study found 
as follows:
• Without permanent trade, the wine boom would have 
been confined to existing irrigators who switched away 
from dried fruit.
• The almond boom might not have occurred since almond 
growing is an industry heavily reliant on economies of size.
• There will be less water available for temporary trading 
back into dairying areas as current plantings of vines and 
trees mature.
• Changes in the relative prices of commodities are likely 
to alter the patterns of trade.
The difficulty of separating out the effects of water trading from 
other factors was also evident in the community consultations 
and interviews. Persistent drought has caused a downturn in local 
economies and the loss of people from communities. From the 
interviews, it seemed that residents consider that water trading 
exacerbates the impacts of drought in regions that have been 
selling water entitlements. Few, however, could rate the impact of 
water trading on their community in relation to other influences; 
those who did tended to rate the impact of water trading as 
relatively low. Several of the participants observed that if there 
was good rain nobody would be particularly concerned about 
the impacts of the water trade.
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5. Findings and conclusions
The purpose of this study was to ‘ground truth’ the assumed 
beneﬁts of and perceived concerns about water trading by 
examining the experience of three regions in the Victorian 
Murray Valley—Sunraysia, Pyramid–Boort, and Rochester, 
Central Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna.
The advantages of water trading
In broad terms, water trading in the Victorian Murray Valley 
follows the postulations of economic theories of trade and 
investment:
• Water trading improves the capacity of different parties 
to react to changes in circumstances. 
• Permanent trading has allowed horticulturalists to secure the 
future water demands of new plantings on land that was not 
previously irrigated. The trade in permanent entitlements has 
assisted the development of new industries such as the wine 
industry and new horticultural developments in Sunraysia. 
This promotes economic activity in the region, bringing 
increased employment and investment. 
• Water trading facilitates ﬂexible risk management and farm 
decision making, including the decision to leave agricultural 
production. Temporary trading in water allocations has helped 
with risk and ﬁnancial management for dairy farmers in 
northern Victoria, who, because of drought, have endured 
10 years of low seasonal allocations, including extraordinarily 
low allocations in 2002–03 and 2006–07.
• Water trading in a system that has both annual and perennial 
crops gives farmers ﬂexibility in decision making about their 
priorities for water use, as well as a means of risk and cash 
ﬂow management, particularly in dry times. It also facilitates 
business growth and development.
The potential disadvantages 
of water trading
The economic and social impacts identiﬁed in this study are 
generally consistent with what would be predicted from rural 
sociology theory relating to communities exposed to rapid 
structural change associated with boom-and-bust cycles 
in agriculture:
• Water trading has posed management challenges for 
irrigators in industries where price and marketing risks were 
previously regulated and production risks were managed by 
conservatively run irrigation systems.
• Water trading can have negative effects on local communities. 
There is strong community opposition to permanent trading 
out of a district. Some farmers have been ostracised by their 
community for selling their permanent water entitlements. 
With persistent drought, however, there is a greater 
appreciation that many individuals could be selling 
unwillingly.
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• The social impacts in these regions are not simply a 
temporary phenomenon associated with the introduction 
of water trading: rather, they are likely to be a permanent 
feature of regional economies exposed to the rapid shifts—
facilitated by water trading—in investment between 
different types of irrigated agriculture. 
• Although water trading by entitlement holders is voluntary, 
the trade also affects third parties. Trade into a region can 
lead to increased competition in production, queuing for 
delivery of irrigation water, and higher water tables. Trade 
out of a region can lead to increased water delivery charges 
to remaining users (the ‘stranded assets’ problem), 
the build-up of disease and pest plants and animals, 
and depopulation. 
• Change and adjustment can be difficult. Communities in 
regions exporting water can experience reduced populations 
and less spending. Communities in regions importing water 
can experience increased populations without necessarily 
having the infrastructure and services to accommodate the 
new arrivals.
• Service industries—such as agricultural services, farm 
supplies, and machinery sales and service—are affected by 
the growth and contraction of irrigated industries through 
water trading. Not only does demand in these industries 
depend on whether water is moving into or out of a region: 
it also depends on the types of farms water is moving to 
and from.
Conclusions
• To understand the water trade, it is necessary to consider 
permanent and temporary trading together. Both types of 
trading affect water use in a region, and there is often an 
offsetting direction in observed temporary and permanent 
trading. 
• Water trading prompts change that would in any case have 
happened as a consequence of other forces for change in 
rural economies—such as drought, commodity markets and 
rural adjustment—rather than being, of itself, the primary 
force for change.
• It is difficult to untangle the effects of water trading from 
the background of drought. Any approach implying that all 
impacts associated with changes in water use facilitated by 
trading are attributable to or caused by water trading would 
be misleading and unhelpful for policy development.
• Future changes in commodity prices will affect prospects 
in different industries and the pattern of water trading.
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Part Two
The regional case studies
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Case study A: Sunraysia
Introduction
This case study is one of three studies to form part of a 
project examining the social and economic impacts of 
water trading, with the objective of informing policy in this 
regard. The project focuses on regions where water trading is 
prevalent—the irrigation districts of Goulburn–Murray Water 
and Lower Murray Water, on the Victorian side of the Murray. 
In particular, it seeks to quantify and report on, through the 
case studies, the actual impacts of water trading on individual 
water entitlement holders, industries and communities in 
the Murray Valley, in order to test the assumed beneﬁts and 
perceived concerns arising from the trade. The information 
examined was collected through a series of interviews and 
consultations in the case study regions, involving irrigators 
and the broader community. 
Apart from Sunraysia—including Mildura, Merbein, 
Robinvale, Red Cliffs and private river diverters—the regions 
studied were Pyramid–Boort and Rochester, Central Goulburn 
and Kerang–Cohuna. Much of the material presented for 
the Sunraysia study reﬂects local people’s views about their 
experience of water trading, rather than the authors’ views 
and analysis, which are presented in Part One.
This case study is structured as follows. After a brief 
description of the Sunraysia region, the pattern of water trade 
into and out of the region in the past decade is described. 
Focusing ﬁrst on irrigated agriculture, the study then 
examines the main forces—irrigation history, institutional 
settings and the changing fortunes of particular products and 
industries—affecting this water trading and the costs and 
beneﬁts of the trade, predominantly from the perspective of 
those in the affected industries. The study then looks at the 
experience of those in the major centres of Mildura and 
Robinvale, again largely from the perspective of the people 
interviewed. The main lessons from the case study are 
brought together in the concluding summary.
Location
The Sunraysia Irrigation District is bounded by the Murray 
River from Nyah to the South Australian border, a river 
distance of about 770 kilometres. Lower Murray Water and 
the First Mildura Irrigation Trust pump river-quality water 
for irrigation and domestic and stock supplies and provide 
a subsurface drainage service to about 3600 customers in 
the region. It is a diverse horticultural region, with dryland 
cropping in the outlying areas. Mildura is the main centre. 
Other sizeable communities are Red Cliffs, Merbein and 
Robinvale.
Patterns of water trade
The Sunraysia region has been increasing (net) temporary 
water allocations out of the district while purchasing 
permanent water entitlements. Although this behaviour differs 
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from that in the other case study regions, the timing of the 
increased activity in permanent water markets is similar: the 
past three irrigation seasons, from 2003–04 to 2005–06, have 
seen a marked increase in purchased volumes (compared 
with the increased selling observed in the other regions 
in these years). The consistent inflow of entitlements has 
dominated the temporary trade outflow effects to give an 
overall positive net transfer of water when all the water 
reallocated through trade is considered (see Figure A.1).
Aggregation of data to the Sunraysia regional level hides 
some movements of water that are occurring in the region, 
which consists of a number of pumped districts—Red Cliffs, 
Robinvale and Merbein—and private diverters.
There is a strong positive correlation in water trading 
movements for the Merbein, Red Cliffs and Robinvale sub-
districts. There was little temporary trade from 1995–96 to 
2001–02, then a spike in sales of temporary water in 2002–
03, of about 5000 megalitres in Merbein and Red Cliffs and 
about 1000 megalitres in Robinvale. This spike in sales is 
associated with the drought year, when the Goulburn system’s 
seasonal allocation was only 57 per cent. During 2003–04 
to 2005–06 these districts sold temporary water at a roughly 
constant annual rate of 2000 megalitres in Merbein and Red 
Cliffs and 475 megalitres in Robinvale.
Source: Murray–Darling Basin Commission
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There has been much less activity in permanent trading. 
All three districts have been buying and selling permanent 
water in very small amounts, and there is no general trend. 
The largest volume of permanent water traded by the three 
districts in any irrigation year occurred in Red Cliffs in 1995–
96 (–2363 megalitres). This in fact is a significant deviation 
from the average trade of about –190 megalitres. Since 1995–
96 all three districts have been net sellers of permanent trade, 
as indicated by their cumulative amounts in 2005–06. 
By 2005–06 Red Cliffs had traded out 4000 megalitres of 
permanent water, and Merbein and Robinvale had traded 
out 1700 and 64 megalitres respectively.
Apart from the temporary trade in 2002–03, water trading 
by private diverters (on the Murray below Nyah) accounts 
for the great majority of the water traded in Sunraysia. This 
is supported by Figures A.2a and A.2b, which show that the 
values for this district and the Sunraysia total are often very 
close together. The amounts of water traded in and out of this 
district are large relative to all other districts in the region, 
which is why this district has a big influence on the total 
value of water traded in and out of Sunraysia. Temporary 
trade out of the district steadily increased from 2000–01 
(7820 megalitres) to 2004–05 (25 000 megalitres). It then 
decreased slightly in 2005–06, to 24 400 megalitres. 
Interestingly, permanent water transfer occurs in the opposite 
direction; this is the only district of Sunraysia that is a 
net importer of permanent water. There was a small bout 
of permanent water purchasing activity from 1997–98 
to 1999–2000 and in 2001–02, with amounts at about 
5500 megalitres a year. This was dwarfed by permanent  
Source: Sunraysia Rural Water Authority.
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Figure A.1 Sunraysia water trading, 1995–96 to 2005–06
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Figure A.2a Sunraysia districts water trading, 1995–96 to 2005–06
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Figure A.2b Sunraysia districts water trading, 1995–96 to 2005–06
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Figure A.3 First Mildura Irrigation Trust water trading, 2001–02 to 2005–06
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water trading from 2003–04 to 2005–06, when about 
24 000 megalitres was bought each year. This trend is also 
made clear by the cumulative trade values, which show a 
steady increase during these periods. By 2005–06 more than 
100 000 megalitres of permanent water had been traded into 
this district. Overall, permanent water trading outweighs the 
effect of temporary trading—evident in the positive amounts 
of total water reallocated every year since 1995–96.
The First Mildura Irrigation Trust also manages water in  
the area (see Figure A.3). It began permanent and temporary 
trading in mid-December 2001 and in both types of trade is 
a net exporter of water. Temporary transfer out of the district 
peaked in 2003–04, at about 11 000 megalitres. In 2004–05 
and 2005–06 temporary trade out of the region was about 
5000 megalitres a year. A steady 1100 megalitres a year of 
permanent water has been traded out by the First Mildura 
Irrigation Trust since 2002–03. The constant negative slope 
in the cumulative permanent trade line accentuates this 
trend. The combined effect is a net transfer out of about 
8750 megalitres in 2002–03, 2004–05 and 2005–06  
and 13 000 megalitres in 2003–04.
Key drivers in irrigated agriculture
Irrigation history
In 1887 the Chaffey Brothers’ Mildura Irrigation Company 
established irrigation infrastructure and helped to finance 
settlers at Mildura. An expanse of 100 000 hectares of 
irrigation was envisaged, but the company collapsed in 
its infancy and its affairs were taken over by irrigators who 
formed the First Mildura Irrigation Trust. The next spurt in 
irrigation development came in 1910, when a dairying 
settlement was established at Merbein. Irrigation districts 
were established after World War 1 and World War 2 at 
Red Cliffs and Robinvale respectively (VMSWQ 2006). 
From the 1950s the widespread availability of electricity 
and improvements in pumping technology meant that 
new irrigation developments were centred on individual 
enterprises, which could pump their own water from the 
River Murray (VMSWQ 2006).
Initial distribution of water entitlements
In the Sunraysia region as a whole land is abundant and 
water is scarce, but inside the irrigation districts land is 
relatively more scarce than water. In the irrigation districts 
most of each property was deemed to be irrigable at the time 
of settlement. All irrigable land in the Merbein and Red Cliffs 
irrigation districts was originally issued with 3 acre-feet 
of water per acre; since metric conversion this has been 
described as 9.144 megalitres a hectare.
Robinvale irrigators were originally given 7.62 megalitres a 
hectare (2.5 acre-feet per acre) but, for the sake of consistency 
with neighbouring private diverters, this was upgraded to 
9.144 megalitres a hectare during the Sharing the Murray 
process in 1996. Legal argument over the exact nature of 
entitlements in the First Mildura district was resolved by 
converting them to 9.144 megalitres a hectare during the 
same process. Upgrades were also made for irrigators with 
crops requiring large amounts of water—for example, citrus.
Long-term average annual water use by irrigators in Sunraysia 
is about 7.8 megalitres a hectare, so most irrigators have the 
potential to be sellers on the temporary market in most years. 
On the other hand, until the recent drought many of them 
judged the transaction costs of entering the market to be too 
high; for example, someone on 4 hectares might have only 
5 megalitres to sell. In 2003–04 there were 94 temporary 
trades of 5 megalitres or less originating in Sunraysia; there 
were 10 trades of 1 megalitre or less; the smallest parcel 
was 0.1 megalitre.
Conversion from dried fruits to table grapes or wine grapes 
allowed some irrigators to bring under irrigation land that 
was previously set aside for drying greens and racks. Mostly 
they did this by stretching their existing water entitlements 
over more land. But for this marginal potential to expand, 
most district irrigators are landlocked by their neighbours: 
to expand their businesses they must buy land and water.
Some private diverters—especially those in intensively 
developed areas such as Nangiloc–Colignan—are similarly 
landlocked. Others have more potential to expand their 
business by bringing dryland areas under irrigation.
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The legacy of closer settlement and 
soldier settlement
Water trade has brought into even sharper relief the impact 
of closer settlement policies on property size in the older 
irrigation areas.1 Size matters in horticulture. It matters in 
agriculture in general, and new irrigation developments 
relentlessly pursue economies of size. Needless to say, 
though, not all new developments are successful.
Property consolidation into larger economic units is one of 
the main ways of maintaining competitiveness in the older 
irrigation areas, even though it also involves the purchase 
of redundant assets such as homes, machinery sheds and 
clapped-out plantings. The other option in those areas is 
to combine off-farm work with part-time farming. This is an 
efficient use of resources in economic terms, and economies 
of size and scale are not a concern in the use of labour once 
it is fully employed. 
These structural adjustment pressures are most acute 
in the oldest irrigation areas, where properties are small. 
For example, in the First Mildura Irrigation District the vast 
majority of original properties covered 4 hectares, including 
a house, garden, machinery sheds and fruit-drying greens. 
By comparison, many of the new irrigation developments 
cover hundreds of hectares. 
In the older irrigation areas irrigators who do not have the 
capital base to embark on consolidation are consigned to 
blending off-farm and on-farm work. Despite all their hard 
work, it is likely that the farm’s relative contribution to their 
total income will continue to fall over time. Alternatively, 
they can sell up and move on, although many defer this 
decision until they reach retirement age. Some owners of 
small horticultural properties that are close to growing urban 
centres choose to hang on in the hope of realising the real 
estate value of their land once urban encroachment reaches 
their doorstep. 
1  There is plentiful literature on farm size, structural adjustment and 
productivity in Australian agriculture. For a concise account and 
other useful references, see Keogh (2004).
This process would have happened anyway: it was happening 
before the water trade began. It is evidenced by the steady 
increase in property size that accompanied successive waves 
of closer settlement. For example, in the Sunraysia area 
standard vineyard sizes steadily increased from 4 hectares 
in the Mildura settlement of the 1890s to 4–6 hectares in 
Merbein in the 1910s, then 6–8 hectares in Red Cliffs in 
the 1920s and 8–10 hectares in Robinvale in the 1940s. 
Nonetheless, it can be argued that the water trade has 
accelerated the process.
Many people see the recent changes as a continuation 
of the long-term trend:
This is a continuance of the agrarian revolution. The 
bigger are going to get bigger and the smaller are going to 
pull out. It’s just a fact of life because of commercialism 
and size of property. Once 30 or even 15 acres of dried 
fruit was a sustainable area; now I’d suggest 100 acres 
is the base because of the capital equipment and 
investment. If you’ve got a small enterprise you can’t 
afford to perhaps experiment and put drips in or go to 
greater efficiency. The bigger groups are generally more 
likely to be thinking forward and to attend courses and 
be more innovative than the small person.
Many see aggregation as the key to survival: ‘… and I think 
you’ll see less people and bigger properties. That’s what it’s 
really all about’. This is not to say that getting bigger is a 
sure-fire way of avoiding getting out. Timing is everything. 
Decisions are made in prospect, not in retrospect, and they 
are always made with imperfect information. As one irrigator 
put it, ‘I doubled the size of my property a couple of years 
ago. I bought because I thought we’d hit the bottom of the 
market. It turns out we were just on the edge of the bloody 
precipice. This could easily take me under’.
Urban planning schemes also influence people’s decision 
to leave farming and whether or not this provides the 
opportunity for others to expand:
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In Mildura you have two water districts. You have an inner 
ring, the First Mildura Irrigation District and beyond that 
you have Lower Murray Water. The urban development 
of Mildura has been encroaching on the First Mildura 
Irrigation Trust’s clientele, and they are traditionally the 
smaller properties. The FMIT area in general was based 
on soldier settlement, 10-acre blocks, and what we’ve 
got at present is a lot of people who would like to excise 
the house they live in on that 10-acre block and sell the 
remaining land. The planning scheme doesn’t allow that 
to happen. You can’t excise off unless you have 10 hectares 
or more. So what is happening is—our concern is that it 
will happen more and more—is these people, because of 
the downturn in the value of the blocks, they can’t afford 
to sell the block and buy a house in Mildura and have 
some money tucked away for superannuation. So … what 
they are doing, now that the water is not tied to the land 
and they can trade it, is sell off their water and stay on 
their house and have a bare 9 acres or so around them. 
So our big fear is that with the freeing up of the water 
market that we may well end up with all these bare 
blocks around the place until such time as urban 
encroachment will take up a small percentage of that 
but there will be more and more of these appearing.
Different irrigation districts are seen as offering different 
opportunities and different costs. The result is that there 
are different degrees of aggregation and redevelopment in 
different areas. Most redevelopment has occurred in Red 
Cliffs and Robinvale: ‘I don’t believe there’s been the 
development in FMIT [the First Mildura Irrigation Trust] yet; 
Merbein, there hasn’t been the same level of re-development 
or the same sort of consolidation of properties’. The reason 
may relate to the quality of the supply system:
I think Red Cliffs had a better water supply [compared 
with] Merbein, and that’s my experience through the 
irrigation industry. I think generally the actual land is better, 
soil quality is generally better, there’s nice properties 
at Merbein, but there’s a lot of poor ones too, so there 
hasn’t really been the redevelopment … FMIT have a 
pretty average water supply system but they have smaller 
properties—more transaction costs.
The dearth of dryland properties immediately adjacent to 
the irrigation districts also influences the amalgamation of 
properties in the irrigation districts: ‘The expansion by the 
big guys has meant what would have been available land 
is pretty much gone for the small guy, so a small guy that 
wants to expand has to go and buy existing irrigation blocks 
within Robinvale district and Euston and Tol Tol and the 
other satellite areas’.
There are pros and cons associated with redeveloping in the 
irrigation districts relative to developing a ‘greenfield’ site:
The problem with Merbein is that if you want to be a 
serious irrigator—which you’ve just got to— you just can’t 
go and buy a big slab here and get on with it. It took me 
I think it was something like 26 years to get 75 acres ... 
The benefit of being in here is that you can do it in more 
manageable chunks and you don’t put yourself at risk as 
much. But, having said that, the cost of doing it in here 
is about 50 per cent more than doing it on the greenfield 
site. You go into the greenfield site and it’s just horrendous 
… Some guys are buying greenfield sites for less than 
$1000 an acre and counting the cost of water to that is, 
well, you have to put the money up but you can write 
it off pretty quickly. I paid over $1200 an acre to clear 
the vines off the block and I’ve gone in there with every 
weed known to man. The only reason you could buy the 
block was because it was [terrible], and I think I would 
have spent twice as much money on herbicides and salty 
headlands that don’t grow readily. 
This is not to say that aggregation is the only strategy for 
maintaining business viability. Part-time farming is likely 
to be an efficient use of resources, particularly in industries 
such as horticulture, which have a highly variable demand 
for labour. One advantage of living near a city such as Mildura 
is that it offers many off-farm opportunities to ensure that 
labour is fully employed. One person who was interviewed 
referred to Mildura’s Economic Sustainability Study:
This is saying that if you are on 15 hectares or below 
then you’ll probably be OK because you generally have 
access to off-farm income, that you don’t need a full-
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time person and you don’t need to be on your property 
all of the time to run your business. So if you wanted to 
stay on the land and get through this you would probably 
survive. But I think those that are on 15 hectares and 
below … that accounts for 23 per cent of the area 
but 74 per cent of the businesses. And if they want 
to in general terns they will get through. If they have 
50 hectares or above—and that’s 6 per cent of the 
businesses and 52 per cent of the area, so that is all 
that Lower Murray Water area out there in that outside 
circle, which is all large-scale farms. And this report says 
they will get through also because they have economies 
or efficiencies of scale and access to capital. What they 
are saying is those farms from 15 to 50 hectares, which 
are 20 per cent of the businesses and cover 24 per cent 
of the area, are the ones that will struggle to get through 
this and, of those, it is quite possible that 600 may not 
survive the current circumstances because generally it 
takes the owner of the property to run the property, so 
he doesn’t have off-farm income and they don’t have 
the efficiencies of scale of the larger properties.
The disappearing middle is an uncomfortable place to be, 
as a grower remarked:
I’m sure the only reason I’m still paying the bills only a 
couple of months late is because I’ve got critical mass. 
The downside of it is I can’t get any off-farm work because 
I’m absolutely committed and I’ve got to pay whatever. 
But I’ve automated a couple of pumps which I’m the only 
one that does any irrigation, about two or three times a 
night I need to change water and now I’ve automated 
that. That helps a bit.
The importance of family labour and 
management costs
The scale of a business is often capped by the activity 
the owner is most reluctant to delegate. Often this is 
irrigation—particularly if they are using older, unreliable 
systems or the cost of getting it wrong is high, as is the case 
with furrow irrigation. Irrigating is a crucial task on the farm. 
It must be done well, so in family businesses the property 
owner often ‘does’ the irrigating. It takes a great deal of time 
and can limit farm size (Tim Cummins & Associates 2001):
I think that the large properties have been pretty efficient. 
I think you probably average a worker per 100 acres. 
The initial set-up of it provides quite a lot of work for 
contractors, but long term it’s all about more and more 
economies of scale. Like, for instance, I’ve found that, 
since we are not getting the money we used to, with 
our own properties we had five full-time people and we 
had a permanent manager and people who worked for 
him, and at that stage I was still [working off-farm], so I 
was completely hands-off. Now I’ve cut those five people 
to one part-timer and myself. I’ve got one guy that does all 
the tractor driving. I do all the irrigation, all the arranging, 
whatever, and the harvesting. We get contract people in 
to contract prune, things like that. We have found that 
nothing has really changed—like the quality of the blocks 
and all that—which is very supportive. Anyway, it’s good 
in the end. 
Reliance on one person to do all the essential work can, 
however, make an enterprise difficult to sell:
I’m resigned to the fact that if my health was no good 
I’d have to sell, and we have agreed that it’s absolutely 
no point because its so complicated to run this, because 
I’ve got bits and pieces everywhere. I do all the irrigation. 
I never let anyone do any water because it’s just a critical 
thing. And so the deal is if I’m crook we are just going to 
sell it and worry about it after. And it’s not going to be 
easy to sell either, no, not in one unit. No, no you would 
never sell this as one unit. If I’m healthy we will keep 
going as long as I can, and if I’m not, well, that’s the 
way it is. 
Corporate farms have generally broken this nexus. They put 
a strong priority on simple, uniform and robust irrigation 
systems so that the task of irrigating can be delegated with 
confidence. They generally adopt systems that are reliable 
and provide a margin for error. For example, they might insist 
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on following a calendar or rely on detailed monitoring and 
reporting; alternatively, they might achieve the same outcome 
by having sufficient scale to warrant the employment of 
skilled and experienced staff. Most family businesses have 
not developed these sorts of systems. Consequently, the area 
of irrigation that can be managed by the owner effectively 
determines the size of the business (Tim Cummins & 
Associates 2001).
Trends in public and private water delivery 
infrastructure
Immediately before the introduction of water trading, there 
were about 17 000 hectares of irrigation inside the public 
irrigation districts (Sunraysia Salinity Management Plan 1991). 
Outside those districts, with full uptake of sleeper and dozer 
licences, the potential area irrigable by private diverters was 
also about 17 000 hectares (Nyah to SA Border Salinity 
Management Plan 1992). Since the introduction of water 
trading, the region has been a net importer of water. Most 
of the new water is delivered to farms outside the irrigation 
districts through private infrastructure. Now twice as much 
land is irrigated outside irrigation districts as in them. 
The underlying trend has been for water to move out of 
the region’s irrigation districts—especially in the Merbein 
and First Mildura districts. Even so, significant extra volumes 
are being pumped through the Red Cliffs and Merbein 
infrastructure to supply water to newly licensed irrigators 
just outside the district boundaries. Typically, these irrigators 
take advantage of spare capacity in the main arms of the 
supply infrastructure, often by building balancing storages 
on the farm.
Part of the motivation for the Alfred Deakin Irrigation Project 
Feasibility Study (SMEC 2001) was to quantify the potential 
to increase revenue for the existing water authorities—and 
thereby reduce annual water charges for their customers—by 
using existing infrastructure or building new infrastructure 
to attract developers to contract with water authorities for 
the delivery of their water:
The Deakin process clearly showed that the technical 
and economic dynamics had changed since the days 
of the Chaffeys and the State Rivers and Water Supply 
Commission, when large centralised pumps and channels 
were put in first and what was staged was the plantings. 
What we are seeing now is the private sector working out 
what they believe to be the optimum annual investment 
in infrastructure and plantings combined. As soon as there 
is enough interest in coordinating overall investment to 
justify investment in infrastructure to service the scale of 
total development, then there is no longer any argument 
for government involvement. Insufficient private 
investment or lack of hard commitments might lead to 
government carrying the risks, but that is not what is 
happening. 
Many vocal irrigators thought the Deakin Project would do 
nothing other than bring in more horticultural competitors. 
Moreover, from their point of view, the newcomers were 
going to get a free ride on the infrastructure that the current 
irrigators were paying for. To make things worse, they believed 
the newcomers would probably receive a higher level 
of service than the current irrigators were receiving.
Labour intensity versus capital intensity 
in dominant industries
The wine grape industry in Sunraysia is capital intensive. 
The table grape industry is labour intensive. The dried vine 
fruit industry is in transition from being labour intensive 
to being capital intensive. 
Drought management
At 95 per cent, allocations on the Victorian side of the 
Murray were not having a significant impact on farm 
profitability in Sunraysia in 2005–06:
In the horticulture area rain doesn’t have the same 
significance as it does in the dryland area because 
all of our water comes down the river and, generally 
speaking, if it rains it will just give more consistency to 
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the entitlement that is coming down the river. So it 
probably wouldn’t change. The downturn in the market out 
there in the present has nothing to do with water: it has 
got to do with market and efficiencies of production.
The prospects for the next year were not nearly so bright. 
Irrigators were bracing themselves for of 30 per cent 
allocations or less.
As a drought response, the Victorian Government had stated 
its intention to introduce ‘carryover’, so that irrigators can 
carry forward any unused allocations from the current season 
into the next. But carryover water might not be available in 
the next season because there might not be sufficient water 
available to cover the losses incurred in actually delivering it. 
In other words, there was no guarantee the irrigators would 
actually be able to use the water just because they had 
carried it forward.
Government also said it would consider using the Minister’s 
power to ‘qualify rights’ to favour permanent plantings over 
other consumptive water uses in extreme situations. In 1997 
the Victorian Government had made it plain it would not 
invoke those rights in what was then understood to be the 
worst-case scenario for the Murray of 60 per cent allocations: 
Some people are saying that the market will fail at 
some point—perhaps at somewhere around 20 per 
cent—and that if it gets that low they might think that 
qualifying rights would be the fairest approach.
When you have crops that are like vines and trees,  
they are not yearly crops, they are things that need to 
be sustained. If you lose a wheat crop it’s very disastrous 
but it’s only one year, but if you lose your eight or  
10 years of vines or trees you have a huge problem,  
so in terms of sustainability it’s a very serious matter.
Institutional settings
Penalties for use above the seasonal allocation
The stiff penalties for using more than the seasonal allocation 
encourage a flurry of temporary trade at the end of each 
season to balance water accounts. As one person who 
was interviewed put it:
There is a $1000 a megalitre penalty up here. If you go 
one meg over you cop a $1000 fine at the end of the year 
… There was a manager who stuffed up so we had a long, 
protracted disagreement with the water authority. Now 
we’ve sorted it out, but it cost me money because he 
just misjudged or misread, and it’s got to the point where 
I go and physically read them all myself. But, anyway, to 
balance it up, sometimes it might be 5 megs over so you 
have to trade in 5, or you may be coming into May 
and June and some properties there may have more 
water than they need so they’ll actually sell that or trade 
between properties at the market rate. So one owner 
will buy it off this owner for whatever the price is on 
the particular exchange. 
Vineyard, Red Cliffs
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The 2 per cent rule
When permanent trade was introduced the Victorian 
Government limited total annual permanent trade out of 
any irrigation district to 2 per cent of total entitlements for 
the district. The purpose of this ‘2 per cent rule’ was to keep 
the rate of change in manageable bounds and to ease 
revenue pressure on the water authorities.
To date, the 2 per cent rule has not been invoked for Merbein, 
First Mildura, Red Cliffs or Robinvale. Under the National 
Water Initiative the limit is being increased to 4 per cent.
Reconfiguration
Victorian legislation now provides scope for irrigation 
districts to be ‘reconfigured’ to improve their economic 
efficiency. The pressure for reconfiguration is strongest when 
water has been transferred away from smaller spur channels 
and pipelines, leaving small volumes to be delivered at high 
cost to those remaining on the spur system. 
Relative to other parts of Victoria, there is very little pressure 
for reconfiguration of the Sunraysia districts. Trade in to 
service properties just outside district boundaries has at 
least partially offset trade out of Red Cliffs and Merbein. 
First Mildura is landlocked, and trade out has until recently 
been mostly from the core of the system as a result of urban 
encroachment. First Mildura Irrigation Trust irrigators are 
less concerned about reconfiguration than they are about 
the potential for the trust to be forced to merge with Lower 
Murray Water.
Interim delivery shares
‘Unbundling’ of northern Victorian water entitlements on 
1 July 2007 will result in district irrigators holding delivery 
shares that entitle them to specified volumes being delivered 
per unit of time during periods of peak demand for the 
delivery of water. The delivery shares will also confer on 
them the liability to keep paying for their access to the 
delivery system even if they sell their water.
To reflect these changes, access and delivery tariffs have 
been changed in advance of unbundling. This will help 
protect the revenue base of water authorities, act as a 
disincentive to permanent water trade out of the districts, 
and allow for setting exit fees based on the present value 
of this revenue stream.
Salinity impact zoning
The Victorian Mallee has been divided into two river salinity 
impact zones. When permanent water trade started in 1994 
trade into the high-impact zone was prohibited, but ‘used 
water’ could be traded within the zone. Trade into the low-
impact zone from outside the Mallee could proceed only 
if the purchaser agreed to pay to offset the deemed average 
river salinity impact of each extra megalitre of irrigation in 
that zone. This was initially set at a capital cost of $130 a 
megalitre, with an ongoing operating and maintenance 
charge of $3.30 a megalitre (Nyah to SA Border Salinity 
Management Plan 1992).
In 2002 the zoning system was revised because most 
development was taking place in those parts of the low-
impact zone where actual river salinity impacts were higher 
than the anticipated average. As a result, Victoria was in 
danger of running out of ‘EC/salt credits’. The revised system 
subdivided the low-impact zone into four divisions, and 
the new offsetting charges were set at $26, $65, $130 and 
$260 a megalitre. Most of the development since has been 
in the L1 division, where the capital charge is $26 a megalitre.
The system will be revised further after unbundling on 1 July 
2007. Irrigators will have an ‘annual use limit’ specified on 
their water use licences, and they will be able to ‘hold’ twice 
that amount to manage the risk of low allocations. They will 
have to pay the per-megalitre offsetting charge to increase 
their annual use limit. They will then be able to buy and 
sell water permanently or temporarily without hindrance—
provided they stay within their annual use limit and their 
holding limit.
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The current situation is less clear. In theory, water can be 
traded into the high-impact zone provided there is no net 
increase in the amount of water being used in that zone. 
In practice, people assume it cannot be traded back in. As 
one grower put it, ‘So I suppose the other thing happening 
is people who have not harvested their wine grapes, they 
have basically left them on the vines and there’s a lot of 
vineyards here that have been abandoned this year and 
the water has been sold. And once the water goes it more 
difficult to bring back because it’s a high-impact zone’.
Source-tagging
After unbundling, the water shares being used in Sunraysia 
will be identified as coming from either the Goulburn system 
or the Murray system. Depending on the season, these 
different water shares might have different allocations attached 
to them. The prospect of this change has precipitated much 
recent trade out of the Goulburn system into Sunraysia. This 
is largely because allocations on the Murray system have 
been higher than those on the Goulburn in the past 10 years, 
and, before unbundling, water traded out of the Goulburn 
to the Murray was assigned the higher allocations of water 
coming out of Murray storages. Some of these allocations 
have then been traded back up the Goulburn system. This 
will not happen once the water shares are ‘tagged’ to the 
source storages.
Industry concerns
Dried fruits
The introduction of permanent water trading coincided 
with the deregulation of the dried fruits industry, and many 
growers see water trading as having caused the demise of 
this industry:
Another casualty of the freeing up of water trade has 
been the dried grape industry. Traditionally the pumped 
irrigation districts of the First Mildura Irrigation Trust and 
Lower Murray Water had a majority of plantings of grapes 
for drying, with a smaller area of citrus and a few wine 
grapes. In 1992 Sunraysia produced 90 000 tonnes of 
dried grapes, a record crop. Today the industry produces 
30 000 tonnes, the decline being mainly due to the 
diversion of sultanas to wineries and replacement 
of sultanas with wine grapes.
Other growers believe dried fruits were bound to be 
in trouble as soon as governments decided to reduce 
assistance:
I don’t think the large managed investment schemes 
have caused the problems in dried fruits by any means. 
Dried fruit was always going to be in trouble once the 
government said they were going to reduce tariffs and 
deregulate primary industry and was always going to be 
competing against low-cost countries. So I don’t see that 
they’ve had that impact at all … You’ve got to look at the 
history of the dried fruit industry, and it was very much 
put in place for several reasons. It expanded principally 
to take up soldier settlers in all the states. It was an ideal 
vehicle—small-sized properties, large numbers of people, 
high employment, terrific. But it was never really put in 
place in response to a market outcome; it was social, 
economic and whole range of other issues. It was always 
going to be in a hell of a fight once going back to the late 
50s and 60s when we started losing preferential markets 
in Britain and Canada. It’s a credit to the industry in many 
ways that it survived as long as it did at the size that it did. 
But it wasn’t the dried fruit industry that let the growers 
down: it was just that, basically, the opportunity in wine 
and table grapes was a far better use of the land and 
water. So I guess in some ways it was good timing because 
the opportunities were there.
Some large dried fruit developments have taken place since 
deregulation. These are characterised by their emphasis on 
reducing labour intensity and their specialisation in producing 
‘five crown light’, the premium grade for which Australia 
has a comparative advantage. But, as one grower explained, 
this carries its own risks:
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The property I look after is a big one and it has reasonable 
contract for five crown light, so it’s got a fixed price 
…’05 was a good year because we got a lot of that 
grade. Last year wasn’t so good: we were probably 
$500 000 down or so because of the rain. We actually 
got some rain during harvest … only small rains but 
they darken the fruit, so it went down to five crown 
dark [a lower grade] for which we don’t have a base. 
Wine grapes
In a decade wine grapes went from boom to bust in Sunraysia. 
This was partly because optimism colours forecasting and 
therefore investment and partly a consequence of the 
lumpiness of investment in winemaking infrastructure. 
Quantum increases in winemaking capacity occur every 
few years. Wineries are keen to contract for grape supply 
whenever there is a risk of their infrastructure being under-
used. The relatively smoother increase in plantings and 
tonnages means that towards the end of their investment 
cycle wineries are likely to encounter oversupply:
Several wineries need a significant cash injection because 
they are in serious trouble. They’re in trouble because, 
well, they claim it’s because the purchase price of grapes 
is too high, but it’s the wineries that pushed the purchase 
price up, not the grape growers. That’s something that you 
need to be very mindful of. Grape growers did not push 
fruit prices to the heights that they are or were. Grape 
growers pushed prices down; wineries pushed prices up. 
Grape growers pushed them down in a scramble to get 
their fruit in; wineries pushed them up to get people to 
invest. Nothing simpler than that. Wineries often contract 
with serious prices in them to get their plantings in the 
ground. The price of red grapes went from $200 to $400 
to $600 to $900–$1200 a tonne in subsequent years and 
then they crashed after that. 
Contracts with wineries played an important role in 
underwriting Sunraysia irrigators as they adjusted their 
way out of dried fruit production. Those contracts gave 
banks the confidence to lend money for redevelopment 
of old vineyards:
With one of my MBA subjects, I did a really detailed 
analysis of dad’s business and looked at equity, looked 
at revenue over time, and return on investment between 
1997 and 2001. So it had taken him 35 years to grow the 
business to x size, yet in those four years he managed 
to double his holdings whilst retaining something like 
75 per cent equity or something ridiculous, so he creamed 
it in those good years. Because he was there, he hit the 
deck running; he didn’t cringe like some guys because 
he was good to his contracts; a lot of guys turned their 
back on their contracts and chased bigger deals. But he 
creamed it in those years and then you look at that point 
where you say you should have cashed in your chips. 
But that’s OK, if you can get through …
Contracts with some wineries proved to be less valuable 
than others:
You’ve seen the change that has occurred here with the 
wine and dried fruit industry. The dried fruit industry is 
a bloody stamp compared to what it was. But most of 
those people have had a go again. There’s an example of 
some good social adjustment issues with that movement 
from dried fruit into the wine industry. The structural 
problem with the wine industry is not water; it’s not 
whether they are too small; it’s really that they have 
been emasculated from the beginning by these sorts of 
relationships. And [name] has been at the forefront of 
that. He actually cancelled contracts last year. He then 
turned round and backed up and said to those growers 
that he cancelled contracts, and then he says, ‘Well, we’ll 
do a joint venture, you put your fruit in and I’ll market it 
for you and crush it, and it will cost about $200 to crush 
it’—which I reckon is about $50 above what it should 
cost—‘and if there is any money left over we’ll pay you’. 
Now that is really …
Many growers are hanging on in the expectation that the 
wineries will eventually have to take their fruit because 
wineries need throughput of grapes to maintain their returns:
It just depends on that supply–demand balance. 
If they really want the grapes they really have to contract. 
Because then you get competition for them. That’s why, 
if you can, some of those properties have been lucky 
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enough not being in a contracting phase or trying to get 
a contract when there is a glut on. You really want to be, 
when the balance has shifted a bit, because now it’s just 
‘no sir, two bags full, sir’ and that’s business.
If I was a winery I’d be out there securing my supply line 
because those factories don’t run economically if they 
aren’t at 100 per cent capacity … Somebody said the 
other day a winery is just a pile of stainless steel on a 
sandhill. If you’ve got nothing going through it, if you 
reduce the volume of fruit going through—say, you can 
crush 100 000 tonnes and that’s the economic working 
capacity of that winery—if you drop back to 75 000 
tonnes that flows right back into the cost to produce 
a litre of wine. So, by reducing the throughput of the 
wine you increase the cost per unit of production.
Market conditions can change quickly—from the glut to 
increasing prices as a result of frost damage in some areas 
in 2006–07:
One of the local suppliers sent a letter around to all 
growers to say that contracts wouldn’t be renewed, and 
none of these grapes would be needed next year. So I 
started cutting them off, and now they say, ‘We might 
review that situation; we might be able to take some 
this year’. So guys have committed to probably $1500–
1880 an acre expense and denied themselves a crop for 
two years, and that’s a $6–7000 per acre turnaround. 
So it’s very hard to know what to do … But, on the other 
hand, guys that were told last year they weren’t going 
to get their fruit in, and they just didn’t believe it they 
thought, ‘Here’s an enterprise that’s got 120 000 tonnes 
[capacity] and its got all these facilities: they can’t not take 
grapes’ and they kept on watering and spraying and all 
that—and they didn’t take any grapes! You can’t believe 
that either. So you have guys making decisions with 
information at one end of the spectrum and decisions 
at the other—guys saying, ‘Yes, we are going to keep 
our grapes healthy for sale’—and they both lost out. 
It’s just unbelievable.
Property size is important for wine grapes: 
• Harvest areas. In one night a harvester can do 
4 to 6 hectares, so this is an important unit size 
for production.
• Span of control. ‘The unit size for a fully developed 
property with no young vines—just in maintenance, 
spraying and irrigating and fixing the odd broken post—
is 50 hectares per person with a tractor and spray cart, 
and so on.’
• Spreading risk. It is important to grow different varieties: 
‘If you don’t and one variety goes down you have 
nowhere to go’.
• Labour requirements. ‘You don’t need as much labour 
on a big wine grape property as you do a little one.’
• Capital—ownership or leasing or contractor. ‘One of the 
problems with the smaller vineyards is they’ve got too 
much money tied up in capital. Like wheat cockies: until 
about 10 years ago, every cocky had a header, pulled it 
out every year, whereas now they realise there is no point 
having a little one going for months. Might as well have 
a contractor out for 10 days and have it all in and done. 
I think that is one of the bigger issues, just getting the 
right amount of capital.’
The water intensity of grapes is relatively low in comparison 
with other horticultural crops such as almonds. Almonds 
need 12–13 megalitres a hectare, whereas vines irrigated 
with current drip-irrigation technology are now needing 
6.5 megalitres a hectare. To put this in perspective, block 
allocations were historically just above 9 megalitres a hectare.
It is difficult to be certain how much of the growth in the 
wine industry—and growth in the prosperity of cities such 
as Mildura—is the result of commodity price booms and 
how much is the result of water trading:
I don’t think the water trade has made any difference 
to growth at all. You’re talking about the town? The town 
and number of people? No, nothing at all. What the 
growth is about is, I suppose, the success of the table 
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grapes and the wine grapes, a lot of it. So water trade 
has had bugger-all influence on table grapes and total 
area of wine grapes.
I reckon it would be about half. A lot of completely 
new vineyards sprang up as a result of trade; the other 
half was probably the redevelopment from dried fruits.
Wine packaging is unaffected by the location of wine 
production (but is affected by the volume of throughput): 
‘If water shifted up or down stream from us the product 
would probably still come here … This is a good point for 
central distribution for Sydney, Adelaide, Melbourne … 
Once the wine is on a truck it’s pretty academic how far 
you take it … It’s the unloading and loading where all the 
expense is’.
Table grapes
After a few tough years the table grape industry is looking 
buoyant. Many of the people interviewed felt that a seismic 
shift might be imminent. Many also felt that smaller vignerons 
would start to think seriously again about table grapes:
I think we might be seeing a swap between table grapes 
and dried fruit in the small-block areas. Table grapes have 
high labour demand and resist mechanisation. Once they 
were mechanised dried fruits become much less labour 
intense. An increasing proportion of the (albeit decreasing) 
tonnage of dried fruits is coming from greenfield sites.
I think table grapes still offers a really great opportunity 
to expand, and it suits the smaller-type properties. It’s 
very much a return on labour and certainly a bit with 
your capital as well and can generate some serious money. 
Forgetting about the issues of allocation of water and 
the state of the storage and that sort of stuff, I’m more 
long-term optimistic about it … [grower] is a good 
operator: he’s at the top end of the market, [he’s] got two 
properties, about 50 acres of table grapes, and that’s 
pretty full on if you are doing a lot of the culture yourself. 
And that’s what they try to do, and they do that because 
they want to maximise the quality.
Table grape labour demands are spread over a longer period 
than is the case with dried fruit. The requisite skill levels are 
also higher:
Harvest will start pre-Christmas, and table grape growers 
can go to March. So there is quite a long harvest and 
packing period. Picking table grapes requires particularly 
high skill: you want people you can trust to make the 
right decisions—that sort of higher skill rather than just 
picking bunches of dried fruit. And I think there is a move 
out of the packing shed back into field packing, just to 
keep your costs down. Asian people are very good with 
their hands; they are excellent at pruning and grafting, etc. 
If you talk to the growers who use them, they say they 
are very, very good. And they work! You can’t expect 
an Australian worker to do that quality work generally.
Citrus
The traditional processing citrus industry (Valencia) was 
largely dependent on tariff protection. In the absence of 
protection, the Australian industry struggles to compete 
with countries such as Brazil on the Australian market:
The Whitlam Government had a 25 per cent drop in tariffs 
across the board, then in the Keating Government’s term 
they dropped protection for citrus down to 5 per cent, 
whereas the motor vehicle industry is still enjoying 
15 per cent. Major competitors like Brazil, which still has 
a 35 per cent tariff protecting their citrus industry, are 
sending not only frozen or concentrated orange juice 
over to Australian now but also frozen fresh orange juice.
The competitiveness of the fresh citrus industry (mainly 
navels) depends on changing prices, variations in grades 
and the prevailing exchange rate:
Citrus is different: probably halved in dollars per tonne. 
I’m talking the crop picked in ’04 and the crop picked 
in ’05, if we take one property, was up around 800 000 
dropped to 550 000 and probably back to 670 000 this 
year. But back in ’02 I think it was a million, so it’s up 
and down with the grades and the Australian dollar was 
the main thing.
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Other crops
Small areas of summer crops, winter crops and pasture 
are irrigated in Sunraysia. There is also a sizeable vegetable 
industry, including asparagus. One family outside Robinvale 
grows most of the carrots sold in Australian supermarkets. 
They grow them on greenfield sites that were brought into 
production after the advent of water trading.
Managed investment schemes
Managed investment scheme developments are greenfield, 
rather than closer (soldier settlement) blocks. Increasingly, 
the community is concerned that this clean start can give 
the schemes a competitive advantage over family farmers 
in the region:
You can’t put under-vine sprinklers on old trellises that 
are too wide, the plantings were all wrong, and there 
is no point putting a Rolls Royce irrigation system on 
clapped-out old plantings. Also, they manage their own 
water infrastructure rather than draw water from the 
water authority’s system. The difference is in the pump 
district; the water costs are higher because the growers 
have to contribute to the infrastructure and the pumping 
charges. But the cost for private diverters out of the river 
system is a heck of a lot less. It also lowers transaction 
costs for entry to the area. It’s too hard for them [MISs] 
to try and buy up 10 small farms when they can go up 
the river and buy one big one.
Managed investment schemes and tax
Many irrigators are concerned that the tax treatment 
of managed investment schemes gives them an unfair 
advantage over other farmers:
In terms of the MISs, of the management investments that 
put in large volumes of horticulture, there is an argument 
that they are tax driven, and that holds some weight in 
that people do invest. They will get to the end of the year 
and they might, say, you have a $30 000 tax bill to the 
Australian Taxation Office but if you invest in almonds 
and put $30 000 into almonds that is tax deductible so 
you reduce your taxable income, so basically they only 
risk half. Say their profit was $60 000 and say it was 
50 cents, then their tax bill would be $30 000. If they 
invest $30 000 in almonds that brings their profit down to 
$30 000, [they] only pay $15 000 tax. It could be 30 cents 
if they’re a company structure or somewhere in between, 
so they are only risking this amount. So that is why 
people say they wouldn’t do it unless that was involved, 
but that is available to anyone, not just MISs. You can go 
out and do it on your own bat. But where, I think, is when 
these MISs come out, it might be agri-horticulture, and 
they’ll come out and say well there’s 11 per cent, based 
on these price assumptions and expenditure assumptions 
for the next 15 years. They do an internal rate of return 
calculation and will come out with an 11 per cent return, 
which means, just on the cash flow and costs of monies, 
and the value of monies incorporated in that. Now if 
you’re only, if an almond or whatever—mangoes or 
grapes or dried fruit—comes out at 11 per cent, given all 
the risks in horticulture in terms of market, the Australian 
dollar, labour, whatever, to me that is not high enough. 
You’re just doing it for tax reasons. If you’re investing in 
agriculture or horticulture it should be 15–18 per cent 
or something like that. How do you police that and say, 
‘Well, no, we are not allowing that through, we are not 
giving that a product ruling’? Even if things work out pretty 
well it’s only 11 per cent, so it’s tax driven. People are 
only investing in it for tax reasons or they are not getting 
sound advice. So the levels don’t really get to that stage? 
Well, it could. But how you police that, because all they 
will do is up the price assumptions or yield assumptions 
and get it up to 15 per cent.
I have no difficulty, I can compete with … a 10 000-acre 
corporate farm whatever it is. In fact it’s all an aggregate 
of units: so many hectares per tractor per person … their 
unit size for a fully developed property with no young 
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vines, just in maintenance, spraying and irrigating and 
fixing the odd broken post, is 120 acres per person … 
Now when it’s actually all broken down … my farm is 
one of those units. One of the philosophies I’ve been 
looking at is to attain one of those units. If we can stay 
at one of those units or thereabouts traditional farming 
will stay in business. And we’ll do it easy because these 
guys here have a serious level of inefficiencies built in 
simply because of their sheer scale … The McDonalds 
run: hot days they get out and do what they have to do 
in the morning …[then] ‘Oh, we got to go to Mildura to 
get a fan belt’. So they fill in a requisition order, drive to 
Mildura in an air-conditioned car, round up the fan belt, 
call round at McDonalds to get some food on the way 
back, and clock off at 5 o’clock and go home. Over here 
recently they sent some bloke out on the tractor to go do 
some spraying. Didn’t come back for smoko or lunch, so 
they sent a search party out. They found him way out 
the back; got bogged at 9.00 am and waited all day 
for somebody to go and get him … [I can compete with 
them at the farm level but] there’s a limit to how much 
capital you can get hold of under this arrangement. If [I] 
could get money under [their] sort of arrangement then 
look out. If I could borrow, if the banks were deemed to 
be treated the same as these guys, and that’s my answer 
to this situation: treat the bank as the third party person 
the same as the career investor. And then we have a level 
playing field. I’m satisfied if it’s a level playing field. Either 
sever it or give us the same rules.
Managed investment schemes 
and the shape of the water market
Managed investment schemes are large enough to have 
considerable influence on the shape of the water market:
There are 7500 hectares of almonds and 900 hectares of 
olives, and half of them would be less than three years old. 
It’s just amazing. So there is a lot of water that is actually 
allocated that isn’t actually being used there yet. My 
understanding is that a few years ago there were some 
people—there was a bit of leasing of water going on while 
there have been occasions to establish development. 
They’re changed now. I think now they are in the situation 
to purchase the water, buy it all up front, and then put 
it back on the temporary transfer market.
For the last three years I’ve had an arrangement with 
some of the almond growers in Melbourne. It’s like a 
contract: we agreed on a price and that price stood for 
three years, which over that time has actually doubled 
what the water was going for, so we actually have done 
alright out of it. Now the almond industry has switched 
around; now they’re actually buying it all up front at a 
lower price and trading it back themselves now. I’m not 
actually sure what they are doing. Our agreement ran 
out last year and so I haven’t heard from them. 
Lately the MISs have been buying water mostly out of 
the Goulburn system. This probably hedges their risks 
with regard to water allocations over the long term, but 
I also suspect it has enabled them to get into the queue 
for back trade up the Goulburn and to move water into 
an area where they can claim Murray allocations in 
advance of the unbundling and source-tagging that 
will take place in July 2007.
Community reactions to managed 
investment schemes
Overwhelmingly, the irrigators interviewed expressed 
negative views about managed investment schemes:
For corporate farming to grow, it has to get water from 
traditional irrigators. This benefits only the corporate 
investors, and destroys family farms.
Managed investment schemes should be scrapped from 
irrigated agriculture. The quickest way would be to ban 
permanent water trade out of irrigation districts.
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Do you think we really need all those almonds? See, it is 
all these doctors, lawyers and all these people that are 
getting in there because the government is giving them 
all this huge, huge tax benefits on all these properties. 
They are just destroying it because at the end of the day 
if something happens—I’ll put it to you in rural Australian 
—if the shit hits the fan they will still be practising and 
doing their duties over there like doctoring and lawyering; 
they will still be working. But the true farmer who relies 
on that will just die. And that’s where they are bringing 
us, they are bringing us all down to our knees. 
They move on to the new crop. They’re already gutted 
this industry. Gutted like almonds, so they move on to 
another industry. They have total flexibility because of 
this capital-based resource at very much subsidised rates 
by the Australian taxpayer and the Australian Government 
to move at will from industry to industry and leave 
skeletons behind for whatever segment of the community 
has actually been operating for generations in that 
horticulture enterprise—be it grapes, almonds, 
oranges, table grapes, asparagus, whatever. 
They still don’t understand why these guys have got 
water. They don’t really understand how water trade 
works and what the rules are, and there are a lot of 
people who are anxious about MISs at the moment. 
And the wine industry is quite depressed; the dried 
fruit industry is always depressed. And a lot of it’s 
anger and misunderstanding.
There are a few issues; there is some terrible emotion 
running about those MISs. I don’t see how they are going 
to impact on table grapes, I just can’t see it. They couldn’t 
get the acres in the ground to have an impact, they 
couldn’t get the volume. And if they were going to do 
it for the export thing they are going to be competing 
overseas, against Chileans and South Africans. So they 
are not going to be taking market away from existing 
growers in the domestic market; most of it’s geared for 
export. And I think they’ll get a hell of a fright when they 
start … they’ve got labour for almonds and olives, but 
when they get into the table grapes, boy oh boy. And 
it’s just to get the sheer volume of people to do it. I just 
couldn’t imagine the logistics of getting 400 or 500 acres 
of table grapes and then having to get things in, which 
would require hundreds and hundreds of people. I just 
don’t know how you can; just setting up the toilet facilities 
would be like a bloody major show event. And they’ve 
looked to dried fruits, and there are some schemes but 
not so much MISs as such, but they’ll only do that if the 
returns are good. And I don’t’ know why anybody would 
get into horticulture just for the taxation breaks—a one-
off thing; they might as well donate it to charity. 
Water trading into the future
The effect of current trading activity
Participants observed that permanent trade into Sunraysia 
aims to secure the full future water demand for new crop 
plantings. The observed trade in temporary water in the 
other direction involves the sale of water that is not required 
during tree and vine maturation. This has implications for 
future trends in patterns of water movement. For example, 
the temporary trade, which currently acts to offset the 
reduction in water availability in regions selling water 
entitlements, could dry up.
Effects of future investment and industry growth
SKM (2006) expects further volumes of water to move 
into Sunraysia: 
Trade of water is occurring from the Torrumbarry 
and Goulburn systems to new and expanding irrigation 
developments in Sunraysia. Up to the start of 2004–05, 
65 GL of water had been permanently traded into these 
developments in Victorian Sunraysia. An additional 90 
GL of development is expected over the next five years. 
It is therefore possible that over the next five to fifteen 
Case study A: Sunraysia   73
years, there will be between 150 and 300 GL of water 
permanently traded into Victorian Sunraysia from 
upstream areas.
Recent changes to taxation arrangements for non-forestry 
managed investment scheme developments have created 
some uncertainty about future trading patterns.
Irrigators’ views
Perceived benefits of water trading
Irrigators in Sunraysia see benefits of water trading in a 
number of areas—business growth, capital productivity, 
opportunistic cropping, liquidity, and cash flow and debt 
management.
Business growth
Irrigators said private diverters have been able to increase 
the size of their businesses by buying more water:
Water trade has probably been an integral part of it 
because it has allowed me, for example, and others, to 
expand their holdings of water. I’ve been buying for 10-
odd years to keep growing the enterprise but at a much 
slower rate. The single biggest driver is the farm-gate 
price; and your return on your investment. Water would 
probably be the second-biggest driver. There is a bit of 
chicken and egg in this respect. You have got to get the 
water first and that is what I’ve actually done—gone out 
and secured the water. The minute you’ve got water you 
now have a visible asset and you’ve got equity; you’ve got 
the visible water and you’ve got the land, then the next 
biggest thing is funding issues. So your return on your 
investment, farm-gate price, your water, your funding and 
then your infrastructure are probably the … main … keys. 
Until recently district irrigators had expanded their business 
by buying neighbouring properties complete with water; they 
have not had to enter the water market as such. But this is 
changing. Increasingly, they are faced with the prospect of 
buying a property that has been stripped of its water and 
then having to buy the water separately.
Capital productivity
Water trading allows farmers to make conscious decisions 
about how much capital they invest in water. As one project 
participant put it:
Yeah, in terms of whether temporary or permanent, 
but normally, I think, last year we were trading for $50 
a megalitre so historically this year is an exception. I think 
’02 was an exception, so we might actually change our 
decisions from now on. But $50 a megalitre divided by 
paying $1400 for it, that’s like 3.5 per cent, and if you’ve 
got that sitting out at 8 per cent it makes sense, but this 
year at $250 a megalitre that’s sort of 17 per cent or so 
… There is probably one property I look after, they’re 
always probably 70 or 80 megalitres under what we need 
and that’s been a different case … We’ve opted to go and 
actually buy 80 megalitres as capital. Probably should 
buy because there is a lot of security in there.
Another irrigator saw it in similar terms:
If you work it out on a temporary basis we are not paying 
much more than probably paying 5–6 per cent on the 
water. So if you borrowed money to buy permanent 
water it’s equivalent to dealing in the temporary market. 
This year it will hit over 20 per cent, but on average the 
benefits of temporary trade definitely outweigh the costs. 
And … it doesn’t tie up capital to do other things: it lets 
us expand, and that’s what we have been doing. 
Yet another irrigator had been looking at things in the same 
light but, because of the uncertainty surrounding allocations 
for next year, is now second-guessing a recent decision to 
sell some water permanently: 
Yes we have sold off. We had 660 megalitres in total and 
we have sold 100 permanently. I wish I hadn’t done that 
now; it’s not worrying me that much but I wish I hadn’t 
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sold that much … It’s worrying me in terms of allocations 
for next year: if you had more you could get more, 
but between the six lots sold we traded up to 250–300 
megalitres a year. I knew how much water we used, but 
at the time I didn’t really think about what was coming 
up. At the time I sold it no one was really talking about 
that anyway; it might rain yet anyway. I think I’m getting 
by on that really low water use without really trying. I’m 
just using the probes and look at everything, what it looks 
like. I think I could get by next year with 50 per cent of it.
Opportunistic cropping
Most horticultural production in Sunraysia is based around 
permanent planting. Historically, there has not been a great 
deal of opportunistic cropping. But vegetable production in 
the region has increased dramatically since the introduction 
of the water trade. Large vegetable growers are increasingly 
contracted to produce constant throughput for the 
supermarket chains. They can, however, also adjust their 
operations in accordance with movements on the temporary 
water market:
Generally, we put in 300–400 acres of melons a year, 
which we haven’t done this year. We haven’t put one 
melon in the ground because we were worried about 
water restrictions. We anticipated that there was going 
to be a bit of a problem with temporary water … We 
employ between 50 and 60 people for seven months of 
the year, we have 14 permanents now—that’s packing 
and picking and growing the melons—and basically what 
it has done is that we are only using our permanent staff. 
It has knocked off about 45 jobs … There were two 
parts to the decision not to plant melons. One was the 
instability of the markets. We’ve got a direct deal, we 
supply Coles and Woolworths direct—straight to the big 
chains—and it was fine, but it was going to be unstable 
this year because the vines and that … the grapes are 
basically worth nothing. In a nutshell, most people are 
losing money on their grapes this year. If you have a look 
at every row that you drive past there’s black plastic laid 
down. I guess it was a financial decision that we would 
be in competition with every blocky around with the 
melons, and if the prices drop at all I can guarantee that 
whatever we pay for the water will be too dear. Yes, OK. 
It was a two-part decision, not a single-part decision—
only for cash crops and you don’t blame anybody for 
doing that. Everyone has to survive. 
Not all of Sunraysia is dedicated to horticultural production. 
Some growers with grazing enterprises—mostly in the in 
the eastern Mallee—have made the decision to base their 
businesses on temporary trade:
In temporary water, every year, very active. Permanent 
water—only once. One big sale … Well, it meant that 
we got rid of all of our debt, that we were able to build 
a new house … The temporary market has … it’s been 
cheaper every year except one to buy in temporary water 
than it was previously to own permanent water. So I’ve 
saved money by using the temporary market. Typically, 
I’m able to buy water in for less than 5 per cent of the 
capital cost. It’s really the timing that is the biggest 
consideration. Nearly every year it’s been dearer in 
spring and cheaper in the autumn. What we do with 
it has tended to evolve into where we can use water in the 
autumn rather than spring … We lamb our sheep in the 
spring and we try to finish our lambs in the autumn, so 
we use some annual pasture for finishing lambs. 
Liquidity
Water can be sold rapidly—with minimal advertising costs 
and very low transaction costs—virtually anywhere in the 
southern connected Murray–Darling Basin. There are willing 
buyers and sellers at all times. It is highly probable that the 
next trade will be executed at a price equal to the last one. 
Water is a very liquid asset. As one farm manager sees it:
Water trade has provided many farmers with a form of 
superannuation. Yeah, well it allows them to live … Their 
investment in land and water is more liquid in that they 
can sell off part. Generally farmland is not very liquid: you 
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have to sell the whole business or sell nothing, whereas 
you can sell off a portion of your water relatively easily at 
the moment. So is that super or is that working capital or 
is that taking money and investing in something else? I 
don’t know but it allows them to sell part of the operation.
It is this liquidity that is changing the dynamics of 
consolidation in the irrigation districts. People leaving 
farming no longer have to rely on the comparatively thin real 
estate market to realise the value of their remaining assets. 
Nor do they have to offload their assets at fire-sale prices.
Of course, some people can only envisage selling their 
farm as a going concern. That puts them in the thin real 
estate market, which is best inhabited by those wanting to 
consolidate their holdings. But it is also an invitation, for 
people with an eye for a bargain, to buy the property and 
sell the water separately: ‘There is one bloke in Merbein 
who has been buying up blocks, bulldozing the vines and 
stripping the water off’.
Cash flow management
The temporary market offers irrigators the potential to 
generate extra cash flow:
Water trade—probably people use that as cash or cash 
advance. They’ve sold off permanently their water. I don’t 
know what they are going to do in the future. They’ve 
sold it off, high-impact water, because they can get 
another $100 000 for the next five years. Temporary water 
trade was a pleasant thing: if you handled your water 
well, watched carefully, you could temporary trade off 
your water at the end of the season when you’re virtually 
finished with it. A nice little earner. But last year, of 
course, there wasn’t any trade. People didn’t have 
the money to buy. 
Very few irrigators in Sunraysia can invest in the market 
intelligence necessary to optimise their returns from 
selling on the temporary market:
You have to be pretty smart to pick the peak in the 
market. It’s not an easy market to read because they have 
put so many rules in place, and the restrictions on where 
you can trade. The information is there, but you really 
got to … Well, what I’ve worked out anyway is that the 
local brokers aren’t much good at selling it for you 
because they don’t know what the opportunities are 
outside the area. My gut feel is buy locally, sell out 
of town. That’s what I’ve been doing.
Debt management
The water market offers irrigators the potential to manage their 
debt. But people’s attitude to risk is generally asymmetric: 
they are prepared to gamble more recklessly in order to 
avoid a loss than to achieve a gain:
Water trade gives farmers flexibility in how they run their 
farms. I don’t know, I wouldn’t have thought it would 
have changed much. A good farmer has always had the 
ability to put his water on the temporary market; a bad 
farmer, if he sells his permanent water, won’t be able to 
buy it back, so I don’t see that as flexibility. You might 
argue it has got bad farmers out of the industry.
The human face of this attrition looms large in most 
irrigators’ minds: 
I’ve got a mate of mine who I really feel for … He’s had 
about 250 tonnes of wine grapes, but last year he didn’t 
get one berry in, not one berry. I said, ‘What’s happened, 
get any for next year?’ ‘Nah, I’ve got nothing’, he reckons. 
He has this water, which he still has to water his vines, 
so he is going to cut back on the water to see if he can 
get some money in with his water trading, which at the 
moment it’s not real big money but he’s trying to get 
some money out of that to keep it going. The thing is, 
he is just going to go down. I can see him going down. 
Behaviour in trading is strongly influenced by debt levels: 
‘Depends upon the individual level of debt. If they haven’t 
got much debt then just keep your permanent allocation, 
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but if they have … a lot of people have been forced to 
sell off surplus water because of their high debt levels 
and poor returns’.
Perceived costs of water trading
Irrigators in Sunraysia see costs of water trading arising 
in a number of areas—increased competition and market 
saturation, stranded assets, queuing for timely irrigation, 
the build-up of pests and diseases, and changing frost risk.
Increased competition and market saturation
Water trading has allowed for a net increase in irrigated 
horticultural production. The overwhelming majority of 
irrigators in Sunraysia are horticulturists. Many see water 
trading as having increased the competition. This is a big 
concern for quite a few of them. One irrigator explained:
I believe that in years to come with the amount of 
production they have put in, they are going to flood 
their own markets. I predicted this with the wine grapes 
10 years ago. Look where they are now. I predicted 
10 years ago that this was going to happen and … it’s 
happened. And those almond plantations … and look 
at the olives. They are all looking at being the big leaders 
in olives, they are going to make this and do this, but if 
you keep within supply and demand, then fine. But they 
are going to create a surplus amount of olive oil and 
peanuts; they are going to export them and this and that. 
Rubbish! It’s not going to happen.
It is not just the quantity of extra horticultural products moving 
into the market that is bothering them: the competitiveness 
of existing irrigators is being diminished because of the 
economies of size the new developers are able to take 
advantage of. Something in the order of 40–50 hectares is 
the unit of production capable of being managed by one 
person on new properties. As one irrigator sees it, ‘If you 
were at a unit size you have no problems. Now the problem 
with your 20- or 30-acre wine grape grower in Mildura he 
is only 25 per cent of that unit’.
Stranded assets
As water moves out of pumped districts, the delivery 
infrastructure becomes an under-used asset. These ‘stranded 
assets’ increase annual costs for remaining irrigators: ‘If there’s 
20 000 megalitres pumping and it drops back to 15 000, the 
pumping costs, the overheads and maintenance costs are 
almost still the same as the 20 000. The only savings are 
the energy costs to pump, so the water that is left behind 
becomes more expensive’.
Many irrigators—especially in Merbein and Mildura—are 
very concerned about the long-term viability of their districts. 
One Merbein irrigator said:
I’d hate to see or think we got to a situation where we 
didn’t have enough critical mass as a district to cover the 
costs—especially increases beyond the CPI—and, even 
worse, not have the confidence to go ahead with the 
re-pipe line. That would be game over … Although a lot 
has gone out of what is the constituted irrigation district 
there are quite a few other areas that, if they hadn’t got 
on board, we would have been in big trouble. I did some 
sums at one stage and I wouldn’t have been surprised if 
they had to put up the water rates to generate the same 
amount of revenue by 15 per cent over a three-year 
period, forgetting about what it costs to do it.
It is not just the effect on annual charges that bothers the 
remaining irrigators: they resent the loss of visual amenity 
and the abandonment of neighbourly obligation, and they 
deplore the loss of hope and the shattering of the sense 
that they are all in this together:
There’s farmers around here really struggling. And it’s 
happening already now, it’s happening right now as we 
speak. Where farmers are selling their water, keeping their 
house, and just neglecting their vineyards. See, and if 
that’s happening, it’s got to be stopped … The water on 
these properties should not be allowed to be sold. And 
I believe that whoever’s got land is entitled to buy water 
but it shouldn’t fall into the hands of people who just 
wanted to invest. … See it has happened now over at 
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my brother’s place. This guy went in, he needed the 
water—I think that property had about 80–90 megalitres 
of water—he bought the water off it, took it across to 
New South Wales … My brother really had to fight to 
get all those vines pushed up and burnt because he is 
getting pests and diseases there. The vines was just left 
there, so this guy … well, they put the pressure on him 
to go in and push it all up, heap it all up and burn it. It’s 
ruined my brother’s farm because right next to him is 
another 30 acres that used to be a fruit block: paspalum 
and grass and weeds, it’s all left there … Well, how would 
you be if you were living in the city, a bloke comes in 
there, buys a house, demolishes it, pulls it all apart, takes 
it all away? You have a beautiful home right beside it, and 
in there there is broken bottles and rubbish and it’s built 
up in there, rust that high. And you’ve got a nice beautiful 
home right beside it; well what does it do to the valuation 
of your property. My brother’s place over there looks a 
bloody disgrace. He has a beautiful farm there; he has 
this huge 30 acres there that this bloke took the water 
off and left it all there. 
Another irrigator drew attention to how water trading has 
made for a psychological difference between this downturn 
and previous downturns: ‘We’ve had some pretty tough times 
before, but the whole district, every acre, was productive 
even during those tough times. At the moment people have 
sold their water off, so they are not irrigating. They are leaving 
the snails and the birds and rabbits and weeds; it’s a different 
scenario than we are used to’. 
Some irrigators are more sanguine about both the downturn 
and the water trade and the effects on stranded assets:
I do see some problems with stranded assets in some 
of the districts; to a lesser extent in Robinvale because 
of the strength of table grapes. Basically, whilst there might 
be a few properties droughted off they won’t last long 
droughted off … The ability to look after that issue from 
the authority’s point of view is there. It’s a pricing 
mechanism that should be put in place, so it means it’s 
just not easy to run away from having a share of running 
the infrastructure. Even though you might be sitting there 
with a house and a big block you are still responsible 
for maintaining an asset to the boundary. And I think in 
the long run people that are sitting on that they’ll think 
this is not worth it and they’ll sell it. And they’ll sell it 
eventually to someone who will activate that land. It 
would be a fairly expensive hobby farm, I would have 
thought. I think it will be self-correcting.
Others are philosophical, seeing the changes as inevitable. 
They also see that both parties involved in the direct 
transaction come out of it better off:
What we had was a landscape where water was 
distributed according to best practice of 100 years ago. 
That’s clearly not the best outcome for today’s technologies 
and enterprises, so you have to have some sort of a 
mechanism to redistribute the water, and all the water 
trade [is doing] is lining up buyers and sellers to enable 
that redistribution to happen … The people involved in 
the change first hand are generally happy about it. It’s 
the people looking on and seeing their world change 
around them in ways that they have no influence or 
control over that feel uneasy about it. 
Queuing for timely irrigation
The Barmah Choke limits the amount of water that can 
be delivered to irrigators below the Barmah–Millewa Forest 
within a given period. In the past 20 years its capacity 
is estimated to have decreased from about 9400 to 8700 
megalitres a day. (This appears to have been largely the 
result of siltation, and the Choke’s capacity might be restored 
by a flood or a series of floods. It is unclear whether capacity 
is changing in the longer term (SKM 2006).) For this reason 
water entitlements cannot be traded from above to below the 
Choke. Trade from other parts of the system is ostensibly 
better, but this is not without its subtleties:
Most of the initial trade into Sunraysia came from the 
Torrumbarry system, which is on the Murray below the 
choke. Even so, historically, demand in Torrumbarry 
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peaked in spring and autumn. Sunraysia demand peaks 
in the summer, so what we are seeing now is a further 
concentration in demand and further stress on the Choke. 
But counterbalancing this is the more recent trend for 
water to be traded out of the Goulburn system into 
Sunraysia. In theory, we can draw on this strategically 
to use water from the Goulburn during times of peak 
demand, thereby taking pressure off the Choke.
SKM reported:
During the period between mid-December and April of 
each year, efforts are made to regulate flows at Tocumwal 
to not exceed 10 400 ML/d, which allows for the Choke 
capacity to not be exceeded after supplying the Edward 
and Gulpa offtakes that are downstream of Tocumwal 
… Most of the release requirements for the Murray Mouth 
can be met by making additional releases from Lake 
Victoria and the Menindee Lakes. This water therefore 
does not have to be passed through the Barmah Choke 
during the periods of peak summer demand but it can 
be transferred into Lake Victoria during spring or periods 
of lower demand over summer. (2006, p. 1)
To some extent, conditions on diversion licences, governing 
the maximum instantaneous extraction rate for each pump, do 
help to ration the shares of total extraction open to diverters 
and the pumped districts. There are also some underlying 
behavioural patterns that have been used to avoid problems: 
‘Most of the irrigators in the pumped districts irrigate on 
the weekend to take advantage of cheap electricity tariffs. 
We have narrowly avoided having to ration on a couple 
of occasions by asking some of the very biggest diverters to 
skew their irrigation towards the weekdays to give us more 
of a 24/7 use of the river’s capacity’.
Irrigators in the pumped districts are acutely aware that 
they might be disadvantaged by the new developments:
Water trading has actually eroded [our rights]. In recent 
years we’ve got more people drawing water off, which 
affects the migration of water down below, between here 
and Swan Hill. So there is more demand on that channel 
capacity of the Murray. And what that ultimately means is 
that we’ll be hit hardest when the existing high-security 
water which we use here is actually going to be reduced 
in security because we have more people drawing on 
that channel capacity … We always have an obligation 
to send water through to South Australia as well. So with 
this migration of water downstream it’s actually put more 
pressure on the channel capacity of the Murray River.
Of great concern to irrigators in the Sunraysia pumped 
irrigation districts, who are all downstream of the almond 
developments, is the Murray’s ability to supply the water 
required when it is required. Water traded in might not have 
been in use—so-called sleeper licence water—and will add 
to the volume that has to be transported downstream. It might 
have had a different regime of use; that is, water used for 
pasture might be used over six months, whereas for almonds 
and vines it would be used over four months, increasing the 
peak river flow. Water traded to the Sunraysia region would 
generally come from upstream and therefore have to travel a 
greater distance to its destination, increasing transport losses:
But if you are going to bring that water from everywhere 
else down to here, the river’s not going to cope. When they 
fire these pumps up, when you take October–January, 
when the really warm days get going, there is going to 
be a hell of a lot of water dragged out of the river, and 
its not designed for that. 
The short-term ability of the river to conduct water is 
limited. So what we find is, to counter that, a lot of these 
large developments are putting in 500-megalitre dams as 
buffer storage, but small growers can’t do that because 
their land is fully vined, so they go on water restrictions 
in those peak consumption times.
The [First Mildura Irrigation Trust] sees this as a hugely 
important issue. The trust has invested a lot of resources 
into building an off-stream storage to help make sure that 
FMIT irrigators have reserves available to them in the 
event that rationing is introduced.
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The FMIT has certainly spent a lot of money, but whether 
or not it is going to help is open to debate. The proof of 
the pudding will be in the eating, I suppose.
The build-up of pests and diseases
Unmanaged orchards and vineyards have a higher 
incidence of pests and diseases. This increases the 
inoculum potential for neighbouring properties.
Changing frost risk
Tall grasses and weeds growing in an unmanaged vineyard 
act as a dam to the movement of cold air. If the vineyard is 
in the lowest part of the landscape, this can in effect transfer 
the risk of frost to the next-lowest vineyard.
Cognitive dissonance in the irrigation 
community
Cognitive dissonance is the uncomfortable tension that comes 
from holding two conflicting thoughts at the same time. 
The theory of cognitive dissonance sees those contradictory 
thoughts serving as a driving force that compels the mind to 
acquire or invent new thoughts or beliefs or to modify existing 
beliefs, so as to reduce the amount of dissonance (conflict) 
between attitudes, emotions, beliefs or behaviours. In the 
extreme, people’s mental health can depend on their being 
able to reduce the conflict between those different thoughts. 
Irrigators are reconciled to the continuing amalgamation 
of properties. They know this means fewer farmers and thus 
fewer people in the area and fewer children in some of the 
local schools. Accordingly, irrigation communities rail against 
what they see to be the underlying reasons for people feeling 
they need to sell, but at the same time they have much 
sympathy for community members who can no longer 
continue in farming. There but for Fortune go we.
Property amalgamation is a familiar, if somewhat 
discomforting, part of the farming scene. The exit is mourned, 
and the purchase is made as dignified as possible. 
The change is understood to be an opportunity for neighbours 
as much as a loss for the community. No one can begrudge 
the purchaser their gain. Rather, there is almost a sense of 
noble obligation surrounding the purchase: someone must 
keep up the good fight.
Separating the sale of land and water changes this dynamic. 
It opens the possibility that the vendor will, in effect, cause 
irrigation to cease on that property. This, in turn, will bring 
about a net reduction in irrigation in the local area. 
The manifestation of these difficulties in Sunraysia is to a 
large extent masked by the growth of the major towns and 
by the contrasting fortunes of some of the satellite towns. 
Merbein, for example, appears to be in decline relative 
to Red Cliffs and Irymple.
Community views in Mildura
The city of Mildura is on the Murray River, 550 kilometres 
north-west of Melbourne and 400 kilometres north-east 
of Adelaide. The Shire of the Rural City of Mildura covers 
22 214 square kilometres and incorporates two statistical 
local areas—Mildura Part A, including the City of Mildura and 
a small surrounding irrigation district, and Mildura Part B, 
comprising the surrounding hinterland of both irrigated and 
dryland agriculture. This case study focused on Mildura Part A. 
Interviews were conducted with irrigators and residents 
of Mildura City and other townships in the region, such 
as Red Cliffs, Merbein and Irymple.
Mildura is one of Australia’s 10 fastest-growing regional cities. 
The estimated resident population of the Rural City of Mildura 
at June 2004 was 51 263, representing an average annual 
growth rate of 1.32 per cent between 2001 and 2004 
(SMEDB 2006). 
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Economic profile
The local economy is dominated by irrigation-based 
industries that produce wine grapes, table grapes, citrus, dried 
fruits, nuts, avocados, olives and vegetables, generating a 
net farm-gate value in excess of A$1 billion. There is also 
broadacre dryland cereal, lamb and wool production. 
Other important industry sectors in the region are retail, 
manufacturing (especially food processing), mineral sands 
mining, professional services, and tourism. Among recent 
developments are a $70 million marina on the Murray River 
and the world’s first solar power station. The district also 
services the extended wine regions of the Barossa, Clare and 
Griffith. Water is the limiting factor in the development of 
new land for horticultural use, but the introduction of water 
trading has provided opportunities to increase the area of 
land under horticulture (Thompson 2005; SMEDB 2006).
The agricultural industries are supported by a network 
of infrastructure and expertise:
• technical advice and extension officers 
from government agencies 
• research institutions—including CSIRO
• packing sheds and packaging facilities
• fruit processing operations
• storage facilities—including cool stores
• air, rail and road transport providers
• a substantial agricultural labour force and an 
employment services network specialising in 
seasonal labour (SMEDB 2006).
The strong agricultural and business services sector provides:
• chemicals and other farm supplies
• machinery and equipment 
• pumps and spraying equipment
• accounting, legal and marketing services
• several industry associations and peak bodies—for 
example, in dried fruits, citrus, and wine and table grapes
• contract farm services (SMEDB 2006).
Community services
Being a large community, Mildura is well served by hospitals, 
an airport, schools, banks, supermarkets, cinemas, doctors, 
lawyers, accountants, and sporting and recreational facilities. 
There is a base hospital and a private hospital, a community 
health service, 17 medical clinics and seven residential aged 
care facilities. There are 46 schools and several adult 
education providers, including a campus of La Trobe 
University, the Monash University Mildura Regional 
Clinical School, and the Sunraysia Institute of TAFE. 
Community profile
Figure A.4 summarises the community profile of the 
Mildura Part A Statistical Local Area.
Community strengths
Participants identified the greatest strengths of their 
community as the climate, the environment (with the city’s 
location on the river) and, until recently, the abundance 
of water. Also noted was the diversity of the people in the 
community—including the early Greek and Italian settlers 
and the more recent influx of people from Iraq, Iran, Turkey 
and elsewhere in the Middle East.
Several participants talked about the ‘critical mass’ in Mildura, 
which was sustaining the economy and population growth. 
Although most of the Mildura residents interviewed noted 
the city’s growth, few could pinpoint the cause. A local 
government official explained that this was because there 
were multiple and compounding reasons for growth:
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Figure A.4 Mildura Part A Statistical Local Area: community profile
NOTE: The blue circles on the bar graphs and the lines on the pie 
charts denote corresponding percentages for Australia in total.
SOURCES: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Google Maps.
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What you are seeing here is a regional city of 60 000 
people that serves a broader community of 100 000–
110 000 people. We’ve had people from Broken Hill, 
Swan Hill, the Riverland coming here to access retail, 
sporting and recreational facilities. So it’s generating its own 
growth. This is traditionally a very healthy agricultural 
sector, with horticulture based on the most efficient 
irrigation processes, getting good returns for water 
in a general year, which is increasing the area under 
horticulture development. That is bringing with it 
housing and transport industries to move products to 
market. So, in addition to that, schools, police, medical, 
all of those associated industries, plus the building 
industries, are coming. It’s really a dynamic place to be 
at present and that’s with three years of drought and a 
downturn in the horticulture industry for the last 12 or 
18 months. It’s a very resilient economy. 
Because it is an isolated and remote community it has 
a strength of character of its own. It doesn’t rely on a 
lot of external factors, but sometimes that can be seen 
as a disadvantage. It might at times be seen as being 
too insular, but the willingness to get on with the job 
and get things done means it really is a very big ‘can 
do’ community.
Community spirit
Although Mildura is a large and diverse community, it is not 
necessarily cohesive. Participants were asked to rate the sense 
of community on a scale of one to five, where one was weak 
and five was very strong. On average, participants rated the 
Mildura community at three. Almost 10 per cent of regional 
Victoria’s Indigenous population lives in Mildura (ABS 2001). 
The labour-intensive nature of horticulture means that a large 
number of permanent and itinerant workers are necessary. 
Many of these people are backpackers and seasonal workers 
from other countries who are drawn to the region for nine 
months of the year to help growers meet the demands of 
harvest. Seasonal workers are welcomed since a reliable, 
efficient workforce is essential for the local economy. 
One participant noted:
We just missed out on a proposal for a pilot program to 
ensure an ongoing Pacific Island labour force because the 
labour shortage wasn’t critical enough to justify it. I think 
it will get revised. The idea was for the workers that might 
be here for three months—if they were going to come 
back they would be trained to ensure a skilled work 
resource. [With] the Asian people … the whole family 
group moves in and the kids pick at the lower level and 
mum and dad higher up. Their community involvement 
in sport is probably a bit less because a lot of them are 
out working on the weekends. 
Community problems
The primary challenges for Mildura are the simultaneous 
downturn in all of the four main horticultural industries—
wine grapes, table grapes, citrus and dried fruit—and 
the drought, which is affecting the local economy. 
One participant commented:
Water was never an issue like it is now. If the wine was 
going down the gurgler, the citrus was doing well. So all 
of a sudden you have all four elements plus the drought. 
But with the floods people have been very resilient and 
they have survived. And I don’t see why they wouldn’t 
survive this one either. 
At the time of the interviews, a proposal to construct a facility 
for long-term toxic waste containment at Nowingi, near 
Mildura, was referred to by several participants as posing a 
major economic, social and health risk to the district. One 
participant concluded, ‘Mildura faces a whole cascade of 
things: you’ve got removal of trade barriers into Australia, you 
have water availability, hostile government action building 
a toxic waste dump in our backyard, and they all impact on 
the welfare of this community in various ways’. In January 
2007 an independent panel commissioned by the Victorian 
Government recommended against the proposed site.
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The impacts of water trading 
on the farming community
The Mildura district has enjoyed several years of economic 
growth and prosperity while at the same time being a big 
importer of water. As a consequence, the region is one of 
the prime food producing areas of Australia. Water trading 
has facilitated irrigation development there. It is estimated 
that capital investment in irrigated agriculture in the Mildura 
and Riverland regions increased by $466 million between 
1997 and 2001. In addition, there was a $301 million capital 
investment in food processing. Water trade has increased 
significantly in recent years, with sales of permanent water 
approximating half a billion dollars (SMEDB 2006). How this 
has affected the local business community and the lives of the 
people who live in the region was canvassed in interviews 
with a wide range of residents. The relatively recent downturn 
of the four main horticultural industries and the consequences 
for the local economy were participants’ primary concerns. 
Following is a summary of their responses.
A local government representative reported that the council’s 
primary concern was the current downturn in the horticultural 
industries. A study the council commissioned to determine 
the impact of this downturn found that the operations that 
will survive the downturn will be properties of 15 hectares 
or less (74 per cent of the businesses and 23 per cent of the 
area) because most operators have access to off-farm income 
and those of 50 hectares or more (6 per cent of the businesses 
and 52 per cent of the area) because they have economies 
of scale and access to capital. It was thought that farms  
of 15 to 50 hectares (20 per cent of the businesses and 
24 per cent of the area) will experience difficulty because 
there is less access to off-farm income and there are fewer 
efficiencies of scale. 
Concerns about the increasing amount of water being sold 
from the district, particularly in the pumped districts, led the 
council to investigate the possibility of a water bank to ensure 
that a reliable storage of water remains in the region for 
local irrigators. The bank would purchase water to enable 
irrigators to lease it as required. The local government 
representative explained:
There is water trading in and out of the municipality but 
I suspect that there is more water trading out at this stage 
because there is a downturn in the horticulture industry. 
I suspect once that changes around we will be trading 
water back in because of what is established here. There 
is a lot less water going out of this municipality than some 
other places. In fact, up until this year we have been 
water positive in trading. We looked at whether or not 
council could set up a water bank but it proved difficult 
to determine what the reasons were for farmers putting 
water on the market. It would be very hard to distinguish 
purchasing water from this property as opposed to that 
property based on financial circumstances. We never 
went ahead with it, but we know it was going to cost 
about $1.4 million a year. 
A focus group of six representatives of the First Mildura 
Irrigation Trust expressed concern about commodity prices 
for the four main crops produced in Sunraysia being at an 
all-time low. They argued that commodity prices influence 
where water is used, and the market has allowed water to 
move from lower value crops such as pasture to wine grapes. 
This has resulted in a boom-and-bust cycle in the wine 
industry. Furthermore, the economic downturn in the pumped 
irrigation districts has resulted in water being permanently 
traded out, reducing the rate base for authorities to recoup 
their operating costs. One representative said, ‘There is an 
assumption that people are purchasing rather than selling. 
No pump district has gained water. If neighbours either side 
desert their farm, your value falls. If the amount of water 
going out of the districts is not addressed, they will collapse’.
Many irrigators in these pump districts are taking the option 
of selling off their water and abandoning their properties. 
There were concerns that, if more customers leave, the 
irrigation system will collapse and this will increase costs 
to remaining irrigators and result in social dislocation:
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It’s hard to knock back $1.5 million for a block. Ninety-
five per cent of the water sold is coming from traditional 
family farms. If people leave a district you need to weigh 
the benefits of what these big corporation farms bring. 
If a family leaves, the towns decline. Water trade has the 
ability to speed up this process. But why increase trade 
especially in drought? Why invest $2 billion in upgrading 
irrigation infrastructure and then let people leave? Family 
farms in horticulture and dairy create employment in 
towns. Corporate farms are machinery intensive, which 
means less value-adding for the local community and less 
employment. There are less people for the football club. 
Family farmers spend money in the district; corporate 
farms extract money. They bring in seasonal workers from 
overseas, and their money doesn’t stay in this country. 
Foreign workers live in caravan parks, and this does not 
create community. The backpackers are a bit better. Their 
major objective is to travel. It is only in the last week that 
they save money to get to the next town.
Another irrigator saw the water trade as a form of social 
engineering: ‘Most of the water comes from pump districts 
where there are mostly soldier settler blocks and is transferred 
out to new areas. Was it done deliberately, was it planned 
as such?’
The focus group members agreed, however, that the 
Timbercorp olive project in Boort had benefited that area. 
It had brought water back into the district, and there have 
been opportunities for employment. The need to ensure 
that water does not leave their region had led this group 
to consider inviting Timbercorp to Mildura: ‘It makes sense 
to move corporations to where water comes from. People 
will adjust if water stays here. If water is taken away, much 
of the land here is poor and it’s hard to grow much else. 
Water is the asset’.
A local agronomist outlined some of the impacts of water 
trading on the farm families with whom he interacts. He said 
the greatest social impact has been a consequence of the 
decline in the dried fruit industry. There has been a significant 
drop in farm income and equity. Those most affected are older 
farmers who changed from dried fruit to wine grapes and 
then faced the loss of contracts with the decline in markets. 
Water trading has allowed many of these farmers to sell 
their water to meet their debts and leave farming by retiring 
on their property, in town or out of the district. He explained:
People have not harvested their wine grapes. They have 
basically left them on the vines. There’s a lot of vineyards 
that have been abandoned this year, and the water has 
been sold. And once the water goes it will be difficult 
to bring back. 
I think the blokes that are really hurting are the older dried 
fruit growers who got out of dried fruit, got involved in 
grapes, learned more about the irrigation system and the 
wine industry, specific pest and diseases, and now have 
an up-and-going winery but are struggling to find 
somewhere for their grapes. 
When things were good, 20 hectares would have been 
quite a good living. The value of the wine grape crop in 
the district has come from $200 and something million to 
$130 in the last three years. It’s been a really significant 
fall in income. The price of vineyards has gone from 
$45–50 000 a hectare to $25–30 000 with the water; 
and the water’s worth $15 000 of that. That’s a third 
of their equity.
He maintained that many of the problems faced by 
smaller producers were caused by inefficiencies of scale 
and adherence to traditional ways of farming that were 
no longer relevant:
The problem is that some of these smaller guys have gone 
in piecemeal, and they have 3 acres of this and 5 acres 
of this. You need a bit more critical mass to be able to 
diversify. But if you don’t and one variety goes down you 
have nowhere to go. Often the smaller vineyards have 
too much money tied up in capital. The average farmer 
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would have $200 000 worth of plant, a tractor or two, 
a sprayer, whereas I can use a contractor to do most of 
mine for less than the cost of leasing it. And that’s what 
a lot of people don’t get. I think that is one of the big 
issues—just getting the right amount of capital. The real 
challenge is to facilitate the property aggregation because 
people are growing almonds on 20-acre blocks but you 
need 1000 acres to pay for all the gear. 
He outlined several social impacts of farmers selling water:
I get extension enquiries about the bloke next door not 
spraying his block. Because some people have sold the 
water and given up, there is a real disease risk. If people 
have been there for 30 or 40 years growing grapes and 
don’t have enough money to get out and retire in town. 
The house on the block is where you are going to end up. 
A generation ago your vineyard was your superannuation 
and you sold that and bought a house in town and put 
the spare $50 000 in the bank and went on the pension. 
But that’s not there any more for these people.
When asked how he saw the future for the area, he 
responded, ‘Well, if nothing changes some blocks will be 
well run—best practice or close to best practice in grapes 
surrounded by barren wastelands. So something has got 
to change’.
Other participants discussed the compounding factor of 
drought and water trading. One resident maintained that 
horticulture would undergo the same restructuring as has 
occurred in dryland agriculture:
In pastoral and dryland farming, they are probably better 
geared to drought. The pastoral country, they’ve been in 
droughts for yonks and there has been rationalisation of 
properties. The same with dryland farming in the Mallee: 
properties have got bigger. All these industries have been 
adjusting for years; it’s not a new thing. This is a more 
of a water drought we are having in the Mildura area. 
Drought impacts on water availability.
Is it drought or water trade? I think it’s a compound thing. 
Certainly the water issue could be the straw that breaks 
the camel’s back, I suppose with a lot of people. Especially 
this reduction in allocations that is so late in the season. 
People have already traded their surplus water and it’s got 
them into real trouble. Whether they are allowed to draw 
on next year’s entitlements, like you can in New South 
Wales just to finish their crops off, I think that would be 
a great help. That is probably my message: carryover is 
very important for secure water. It could get worse for 
a lot of them next year. 
To gain an understanding of the way the finance sector 
viewed the impacts of the water trade, the authors interviewed 
regional agribusiness advisers of a large bank and a smaller 
credit union, as well as financial advisers. One of the bankers 
was concerned about the number of farmers who have been 
forced to sell their water entitlements or their contracts. Water 
trading has increased the value of water and offered farmers 
a way of alleviating short-term problems with debt, but there 
will be long-term consequences for farmers and for the 
local economy:
A lot of people have been forced to sell off surplus water 
because of their high debt levels and poor returns. The 
advantages of selling are that you get the money in straight 
away and pay off your debt. The disadvantage is that if 
further on, you don’t have that 100 per cent allocation 
then all of a sudden the farm becomes unviable. I’ve had 
a lot of people come and say, ‘Well, do we sell off and 
permanently transfer out water?’ I’ve just run through the 
benefits and disadvantages and at the end of the day they 
decided to keep it. It’s not something I encourage. It’s 
heading for disaster, because you can have allocated 
a million megs, but if the creek is dry you can’t get it. 
It’s mainly those in dried fruits or wineries who are 
considering their options.
When asked whether the bank had changed its approach 
in managing the situation, he replied:
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We are monitoring it. It’s hard when you come to make a 
credit decision if someone is not contracted. You can grow 
the best fruit in the world, but who is going to take it? 
Some people are actually selling their contracts, which 
is fraught with danger. 
We get a valuer to do the evaluations and then we 
actually only extend the value by 50 per cent to provide 
a buffer. If somebody wants to permanently transfer the 
water later we go and get a new evaluation straight away. 
Then we can say, ‘Yes, you can do that but the property 
is now worth so much and you need to reduce your debt 
by this amount’. We are fairly fortunate that the water goes 
with the title at the moment as we get notified straight 
away. They need our consent to transfer the water because 
we have a mortgage over the property. If someone is in 
trouble we send them to Centrelink to see what benefits 
they can get. We want to make sure the grower remains 
viable. The last thing we want to do is go and hang up 
the mortgage signs. That’s no good for anybody.
Local financial advisers reported they were extremely 
busy with the downturn in the industry. One said:
The service here has been operating since 1984 
continuously. It started as a result in a downturn in 
the dried fruit industry and the downturn hasn’t turned 
around. It’s just dried up really. A client of mine was here 
the other day and he equated it to when you skip a stone 
across the pond it makes a few ups but eventually sinks. 
The industry has gone from some 90 000 tonne of dried 
sultanas to goodness knows what they’ll get this year, 
it might be 25 000 and next year it will decline further 
because of the removal of plantings. 
He noted that local farmers were experiencing considerable 
angst because they confront many unknowns in relation to 
commodity prices, future water allocations, and the rules 
and regulations of the water market:
Most of our clients are exhibiting greater uncertainty than 
ever before. A couple of years ago they took a knock with 
poor commodity prices, and people were saying, ‘It will 
come round, it will come round’. They are now thinking 
of solutions, and some of it is long-term structural stuff. 
They are happy to have their wine contract cancelled to 
provide options for change. The lack of corporate trust 
is a big issue. They are saying, ‘I’ve got uncertainty about 
water next year and uncertainty about this thing called 
water trade because the government is going to take away 
my rights to water. We’ve got to get a site licence and 
it’s not too remote to think that one day the [catchment 
management authority] will say we can’t really give 
licences to flood irrigators. It’s not sustainable’. 
So everything’s changed. 
The reduced water allocations for farmers over the border 
have heightened this anxiety:
Our New South Wales irrigators have just had their 
allocation reduced by 20 per cent. Those growers at 
the beginning of the year worked out how much water 
they needed and then the government turned around 
with this decision to drop the allocation by 20 per cent. 
Now they have to then go out and buy water that is not 
attainable. So probably a lot of them will have to make 
a decision on what part of their property they are going 
to have to let go.
Another project participant also raised the problem 
of uncertainty:
We are talking about drought all the time, yet the 
government is still giving huge licences for estates to put 
in thousands of acres of grapes or whatever. So there is 
no trust in the government and how it’s managing the 
water. A lot of people round here are just everyday 
blockies; they are not rich people. In a good year they 
make a comfortable living; in a bad year they can survive. 
So when they get their water allocation taken away, or 
are only given so much, that’s reduced what they have 
budgeted themselves to survive. Alright, they can under-
stand there is a drought and everyone has to do their bit, 
they just don’t trust how the government manages the 
water. And that’s a huge issue. They say, ‘Well they are 
going to take the water because they need the water. 
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That’s fine, but why don’t they buy it back off us like we 
had to buy it in the first place’. And they don’t know if 
next year, if there is water around, if they will get their 
100 per cent again. 
Perceptions of water trading
The benefits
Participants were asked about the benefits of temporary 
and permanent trading. Most were accepting of temporary 
trading. One said, ‘It’s good both farming wise and 
commercially. Flexibility is the key to everything, in 
farming, in every business’. Another added, ‘It allows 
growers to iron out short-term deficiencies or surpluses’. 
Some approved of permanent water trading: ‘I think it’s 
a wiser use, or more sustainable use, of our nation’s water 
supply, which is finite’. A business manager reported, ‘For 
a start, it gives us work but it allows for separation of land 
from water and allows water to have a value where before it 
wasn’t valued. So there are incentives to use it more wisely 
or efficiently on site and also for it to go to the most efficient 
sectors or products’. Another echoed many residents’ belief 
that water should be made available to their region because 
their region was more productive than other regions: ‘There 
are huge changes in society because it enables the better use 
of water. You could have a water right on non-arid saline land, 
or you move that water right to rich land like here’.
The costs
Although the region has benefited from the importation 
of water from the sale of permanent water entitlements, 
participants expressed several concerns for communities 
upstream. They were aware that water was leaving some 
communities—particularly those with publicly owned 
infrastructure—with stranded assets. Towns were experiencing 
a reduction in employment opportunities and economic 
losses. The following concerns were highlighted.
Although most participants recognised the value of temporary 
trading, one participant explained that there had been a 
major adjustment in attitudes to water since the advent of 
water trading: ‘Prior to the water trade, water availability 
was not an issue, but over the last 10 years the rules have 
changed—really since 2000. You took it for granted that if 
you ran out of water you could keep going. No one cared’. 
Another noted that there can be problems with supply:
Temporary water trade is fine providing you can get it. 
There are people out there at the moment who are looking 
for temporary water. However, your bigger corporate 
players such as Timbercorp are taking up all the allocation 
and they are prepared to pay a premium for it. That’s 
a big issue. There are also issues with properties being 
purchased by businesses in South Australia who 
permanently transfer the water down there, 
leaving the properties here to decline.
Although one of the local business owners was in favour 
of water trading, he believed that uncertainty in the market 
caused by the current environmental and political climate 
stagnates productivity:
The water trade itself, I’m actually in favour of it. From a 
theoretical point of view the better utilisation of water is 
absolutely vital to the wellbeing of Australia. No question 
about that. And there were water rights that were not 
properly used, so the actual theory is good. What does 
concern me is that people are selling water rights to their 
farms because they are broke and then they are thinking 
they are going to rent back water and they can’t get water. 
This is a huge problem because even people with secure 
water rights have had those reduced. And just recently 
there have been instances where a particular person has 
sold, say, 10 megalitres of permanent water to someone 
else and they have paid for that, and then three weeks 
later the government [of New South Wales] has reduced 
the amount that will be delivered. Say it was 10 megalitres 
and then reduced by 20 per cent So … the buyer has 
bought in good faith 10 megalitres, the seller has sold in 
good faith, but in fact the government has stepped in and 
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said there are only 8 megalitres. And it’s no one’s fault, 
but there is this huge uncertainty. When you have crops 
like vines and trees, they are not yearly crops, they are 
things that need to be sustained. If you lose a wheat 
crop it’s disastrous but it’s only one year, but if you 
lose your eight or ten years of vines or trees you have 
a huge problem, so in terms of sustainability it’s a very 
serious matter.
Participants said the presence of large corporate 
developments has led to an increase in the cost of water 
in the pumped districts. These large developments are also 
able to install big, low-maintenance private water delivery 
systems, allowing them to deliver water to their property at 
a much lower cost than is the case with the ageing public 
infrastructure. Farmers must also compete with private systems 
in the delivery of water during the peak irrigation period.
One farmer said, ‘There has been a push to change to drip 
irrigation, but if you have to go one or two days without water 
you can lose a crop’. Another added, ‘A lot of these large 
developments are putting in 500-megalitre dams as buffer 
storage, but small growers can’t do that because their land 
is fully vined, so they face water restrictions in peak 
consumption times’.
Others raised further concerns to do with competition:
These tax-minimisation schemes entered the market 
but originally they were supposed to be for the timber 
industry. Water out of district takes away the ability for 
farmers to redevelop, diversify. Some would have gone 
into almonds—a gamble—but this option has been 
taken from us.
My biggest concern is Timbercorp and AlmondCo, which 
are predominantly solicitors, lawyers and accountants 
being able to utilise that for taxation deductions. I think 
that is actually wrong and affecting all primary producers. 
When Timbercorp gets their winery going, the small places 
are going to struggle. You have people who don’t really 
have the interests of the rural communities in mind, they 
are in it for themselves. 
There were also concerns about the role of the water trade 
in contributing to boom-and-bust cycles:
One of the disadvantages is the emergence of these big 
tax-based conglomerates. I have no problem with them 
having a tax advantage, but can they sell the produce? 
Wine grapes led to an oversupply and a massive slump. 
This is one of the biggest problems we have as it is a very 
big wine producing area. There are thousands of tonnes 
of wine grapes that weren’t harvested last year and won’t 
be harvested this year. 
Another participant agreed but argued that such schemes 
were a fact of life:
There is a great concern in the Australian psyche about 
the small farmer being overwhelmed by a large farmer, 
be it a large successful farmer or a conglomerate. This is 
just a continuation of the agrarian revolution: the bigger 
are going to get bigger and the smaller are going to pull 
out. It’s just a fact of life. Where once 30 or even 15 acres 
of dried fruit was a sustainable area, now I’d suggest 
100 acres is the base because of the capital equipment 
and investment. If you’ve got a small enterprise you can’t 
afford to experiment and put drips in or increase efficiency. 
The bigger groups are more likely to be forward thinking 
and more innovative than the small person. It’s a terrible 
thing but it’s the survival of the fittest, and it’s been there 
since time begun and it’s not going to change.
Yet another participant had a different opinion:
There is a strong perception that managed investment 
schemes are unfairly competing with small growers 
because of their huge tax concessions. So they are 
buying up water and inflating the value of water and 
flooding the market supposedly with products. But 
from where I sit most of the schemes produce almonds 
and olives that don’t compete with grape growers. 
Other participants were concerned about environmental 
flows. Although the majority of people were happy for some 
water to go to the environment, how, when and where that 
occurred was a concern in the midst of drought:
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The ability of the river to carry peak flows is in question. 
When we have a heatwave in January and February the 
river actually flows backwards at Mildura. So the short-
term ability of the river to conduct water is limited. 
One of the dangers is that a lot of the water being bought 
may have been licensed as sleepers or dozers, which is 
water that wasn’t being used, so the overall consumption 
has increased. 
There is concern about environmental allocation of 
water. I think they are talking about 14 gigalitres going 
into Hattah. Of that, five was donated from irrigators. 
People are prepared to donate any unused water to  
the environment. Now they have finished pumping the 
donated water, but there is an environmental allocation 
that they are putting in a couple of new lakes. There is a 
fringe group jumping up and down about that: they say we 
are on water restrictions and you are wasting it on trees. 
The impacts of water trading 
on the non-farming community
In order to gain an understanding of the flow-on impacts of 
the water trade, the authors interviewed owners of industries 
supporting agriculture as well as the local retail sector.
The associated industry perspective
One banker was very worried about flow-on effects 
of the downturn in agriculture for the local economy:
All of our clients are in the country, with 20 per cent 
in horticulture and agriculture, but the rest are also in 
businesses, which are also impacted upon—what you 
call a multiplier effect. I don’t think anyone will escape 
this. I’m certain of it. It’s gaining momentum daily. I’m not 
saying it’s the end of the world, but it’s a serious matter.
When asked if he had made any strategic changes in policy, 
he replied, ‘We are more judicious but, in looking at loans 
and business deals, we’re looking at the downside more 
than we would have before—much more careful, more 
discerning. As everyone is’.
An irrigation supplier identified three associated industry 
companies that had closed down in the last three years. 
Two he described as large companies. He reported, however, 
that his business had actually increased as a result of the 
water trade, although the down side was that it also faced 
increased competition:
Water trade is keeping us going. We do a lot of work for 
large corporate irrigation developments, and that’s a key 
source of our work, which depends on water trade. The 
scale of developments we are dealing with is huge. So it’s 
been positive for this business. I think the impact of water 
trade on this industry has come more from competition 
from large multinational companies moving here and 
becoming active here. In the last two years there is a 
couple of large companies and a number of smaller ones 
that are directly competing with us. 
The owner of one of the wine packaging companies reported 
that water trading had had little impact on his business:
Mildura is a good point for central distribution for 
Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney. Wine comes from 
all over, here, as well as Coonawarra, the Barossa, Griffith, 
Clare Valley. Once the wine is on a truck it’s pretty 
academic how far you take it. So we can take wine from 
anywhere and be competitive with other bottlers closer 
to the wine than we are. It’s the unloading and loading 
where all the expense is. So water trade is probably not 
a big influence on our business. If water is shifted up or 
down stream from us, the product would probably still 
come here.
Our business has three bits—the packaging, and we can 
supply the dry goods and bottles as we have better buying 
power than individuals have. Then there’s the storage 
of the wine, and we can also do a bit of bulk storage as 
well—about a million and a half litres if need be. As far 
as our company goes, as a contract packaging company, 
we’re doing a fair bit of cleanskin stuff, which is brought 
on by this glut of wine. In a way it has probably helped 
us a little as it has given us a little bit more work, but it 
can’t be sustained, that’s for sure. Because there is so 
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much wine around, to get any value out of it you have to 
package it. You get nothing for it by selling in bulk. A fair 
bit of it is going out in bulk and being packaged overseas.
He acknowledged, however, that there had been some 
industrial growth in the region as a result of the trade:
Those producing stainless steel, a lot of engineering works 
that do all the harvesters and that, and that stuff wasn’t 
here 10 or 15 years ago. I think these industries have just 
grown up to service this particular area, although some 
sell them fairly widely. There is a mob from Argentina 
building almond harvesters in town and they send 
them over to Western Australia and other places. 
When I first came here, about 20 years ago, Mildura had 
the highest unemployment in the state; it’s pretty low 
these days. Looking at the papers now there always seem 
to be a lot of jobs. Obviously, the building industry is a 
big part of it. It just never ends and I don’t understand it.
The central business area
Interviews were also conducted with members of the local 
business community who were likely to be experiencing 
change as a result of water trading. The shire representative 
reported that unbundling water rights from land will 
significantly affect the council’s rates income as 
permanent water leaves the district:
Certainly from the municipal point of view there has been 
a huge disadvantage from the loss of water entitlements 
from the area. We’ve lost $1.7 million in rate income as 
a result of the unbundling of water. We are now in the 
process of trying to get the state government to give us 
some transitional funding over the next four years to ease 
the burden on the ratepayers. If they don’t fund it or find 
alternative mechanisms to ease the burden on us, then 
council has to make a determination as to whether it 
wishes to forgo $1.7 million in rates or whether it wishes 
to transfer those rates across the wider community 
and increase the rates by about 8 per cent.
A further concern for the shire was urban encroachment on 
agricultural land and the growing number of deserted farm 
blocks in the landscape. The council was seeking to overturn 
legislation preventing property owners from excising their 
house block from the rest of the property so that they can 
sell off the remaining land. At present, house blocks can 
be separated only from properties of 10 acres or more:
At this stage the government said they won’t change the 
legislation because it will create a precedent across other 
areas. We’ve argued that Mildura is different and this 
hasn’t been accepted. What they have done is given us 
some money, which we are now matching, to do a study 
to see if we can justify why we believe we are different 
and why people on 10 acres should be able to excise off 
the house and sell the remainder of the block. What we 
will say is, if they want to do that, they need to sell it to 
somebody who would link it to their farming enterprise, 
so it doesn’t go out of agricultural production.
Although some farmers are leaving farming and moving into 
town, in general there has not been a rush of farms onto the 
market. A local real estate agent noted that sales of farmland 
overall have slowed. Even operations with contracts are not 
selling. Of those who are buying land, about half come from 
within the community and the rest from elsewhere in Australia. 
The ability to sell water entitlements has allowed farmers to 
scale down but continue operating. Land values have fallen, 
but there are few buyers as a result of increases in interest 
rates, drought and the downturn in agricultural industries—
particularly the local wine industry. The agents try to 
dissuade farmers from selling their water entitlements. 
Participants were also asked about business start-ups and 
closures in the district. One noted that, although there has 
been considerable growth in the community, there have 
been some business closures:
There are business closures. There is no doubt the 
downturn in agriculture is affecting that because people 
aren’t paying. Retail is mainly closing. Businesses are going 
broke. I’m not saying every day, but there is a marked 
increase in business failures. Anyone starting up would 
have to be very careful about which area to start up in. 
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And there is not the reliance there was 20 years ago on 
farming. There is more infrastructure here, professional 
services, schools, health, etc, which cushions the 
community, so the wider you get with the economy the 
less you rely on horticulture. It’s very important because 
it’s the barometer of community wellbeing. It’s being 
attacked for the first time. They are talking water 
restrictions for the first time in 20 years. 
The community
One consequence of the sale of water entitlements for health 
and welfare services concerns service delivery to the large 
number of elderly people who remain living in the house 
on the property after the water has been sold. One service 
provider explained:
The elderly on their 10 or 20 acres, they sell off their water 
rights and they just want to live on their block. But as 
they get older they find it harder and more expensive to 
travel in for services, particularly health care, and they 
can’t afford to move into Mildura because of the prices 
of housing. This is an issue for the whole Sunraysia area 
because they are demanding more outreach work, but 
with limited resources it’s difficult getting staff out there.
Meals-on-wheels delivery is also very difficult when you 
are dealing with ageing ethnic populations that are not 
used to pea and ham soup; they want their bowl of pasta. 
Now we are getting less and less volunteers because most 
are generally woman, 50+, their children have grown, 
they don’t want to work, they juggle it between being 
grandmothers and possibly their own interests, and they 
volunteer their own time but they have to use their own 
vehicles and petrol to do the rounds. They could easily 
use a tank [of petrol] a day trying to get to these isolated 
places and, at $60–70 to fill a tank, what pensioner can 
afford that? That’s just to feed the elderly. There is the 
social and medical element of it as well. Most GPs don’t 
bulk bill. Some people won’t go because it’s costly and 
the travel [is expensive]. We do have an organisation 
that picks up people and transports them to their 
appointments, but that’s a limited service. 
When asked about the older farmers who are still farming, 
she reported, ‘We don’t have much to do with them because 
they are healthy and fit and they are troopers that never say 
die. The only time they become our clients is if something 
happens and they need physio or podiatry, or they might 
have diabetes’. She said that these days there was a higher 
incidence of depression and mental health problems. 
She also noted an increase in the number of males seeking 
counselling. She attributed this trend to government advertising 
and agencies such as beyondblue, as well as some sporting 
heroes and politicians who have publicly discussed their 
depression. For younger farm families, the financial and 
emotional stress being experienced has affected the children:
What’s happening now is, if their crops have gone bad and 
they have had their water allocation reduced, they are 
moving from being quite comfortable to all of a sudden 
the purse strings have tightened. What we are finding is 
there is a little bit more aggression and truancy in the 
school system. I just don’t know how honest people will 
be about this. Parents aren’t looked upon favourably by 
the education department if they purposely keep their 
kids home. We’ve just had little snippets of this. But its 
something we make a mental note of so we can monitor 
it down the track. We may have a couple come in and 
there are issues with the drought, water trading and no 
income, and we ask about the children and they say, 
‘Well, they are not doing too well at school, they are 
getting depressed, they feel like they are being bullied, 
so we are keeping them at home’. If you dig a little bit 
deeper, yes there are elements of depression and bullying; 
but is it bullying or bad behaviour because things at home 
aren’t right or are the kids staying at home because dad 
can’t afford a picker and the kid is staying home to pick? 
It could be all these things. Mum probably can’t cope; 
she’s probably feeling it all and trying to deal with a 
partner and keep him positive, and then deal with 
the kids. It’s all too hard—just go with your father.
The influx of seasonal workers can create problems of 
additional demand on local health services if the workers 
are on drug programs. The service provider explained:
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We are only licensed for 20 positions, so in February, 
March when you have a lot of seasonal pickers and they 
are on methadone and they want to transfer here because 
they are here for two to three months, it can actually 
jeopardise our normal client load. And if we say no to 
them, which sometimes we have to, then they can’t stay 
in the area. We can only fit 20 people in a year. 
One project participant outlined the more general social 
impacts of trade on small communities, particularly in 
relation to managed investment schemes:
I think the philosophy of freeing up the market is good, 
but they need to revisit the reality of the impact. Some-
where you need to draw a line between economics and 
community and ask, ‘Do you want community or do you 
want development?’ These managed investment schemes 
don’t fill schools; they don’t help with health; they are 
a low-people-input industry, which means that they are 
not community builders. The efficiencies they set out to 
achieve are also being achieved by good growers. They 
invested in better irrigation technology, but they have also 
been the driving force of community growth because 
they invest back into local businesses and profits don’t 
migrate out of the region. If we can bolster that local 
home-grown input with education and good medical 
services, we will get more highly qualified people moving 
here and they will invest in the district more. 
There are problems getting labour, people travelling long 
distances to work, and poor services in the small towns 
between Mildura and Swan Hill. All those things and 
other issues tag along behind water trade. Some of these 
places, like Timbercorp, employ 50 Islanders that come 
into Robinvale. They get bussed 50 kilometres every day to 
work. Communities need houses and community support 
and all those things that come along with rapid growth. 
They have populations of low-income earners that can’t 
speak English because they are the only ones that want 
to live out there. Communities welcome development, 
but it puts undue pressure on their services. The rate of 
expansion is so rapid they have trouble keeping up. 
It’s interesting because you’ve got Swan Hill and Mildura, 
on one hand, rich because of the water trade and then 
you’ve got these geographically large but asset-poor 
dryland shires nearby that have declining populations, 
like Hindmarsh and Buloke, that are on their last legs 
because of low income. They have ageing populations, 
declining towns, declining everything. So you’ve got this 
inequity. I guess water trade might encourage some of 
those farmers to move—certainly those on the fringes 
that wanted to sell their land have made quite a good 
capital gain selling out to the large corporations. 
As part of the project, the authors interviewed police officers 
in each region in order to gain an understanding of changes 
in crime rates that might be attributed to the impact of water 
trading. The extent of crime is a measure of community 
wellbeing. Information was sought on crimes specific to the 
irrigation industries—such as the theft of water and irrigation 
supplies and cannabis production. In Mildura there had been 
a rise in petty theft and fuel theft from farms; local police 
attribute this to the decline in the local economy and an 
increase in unemployment. Drug abuse is a concern but 
‘not out of control’. Police reported cannabis production has 
slowed with the advent of aerial photography. Production 
now is smaller but harder to find. The officer interviewed 
suspected that, with the downturn in wine grapes and dried 
fruit, there might be an increase in cannabis growing. The 
only other water-related crime was water fraud: one person 
had been prosecuted for fraudulently trading water. There 
were some minor crime problems with seasonal workers. 
Discussion
Mildura has certainly benefited from water trading. Water has 
flowed into the area, facilitating rapid growth and expansion 
of the irrigation industries, which has created a secondary 
industry sector providing support services, although the 
down side is that it has also increased competition within 
this support sector. This growth has contributed to the city 
of Mildura becoming one of Australia’s 10 fastest-growing 
regional centres.
Case study A: Sunraysia   93
There are high levels of employment—particularly in 
agriculture and related industries (much higher than national 
averages)—which can be partly attributed to the water trade. 
Mildura’s residents talked about the city’s critical mass 
sustaining and perpetuating the economic and population 
growth. It is probable, however, that the city would have 
achieved considerable growth regardless of the water trade 
since the growth of regional centres at the expense of small 
rural towns is a trend common to much of regional Australia.
At present drought and a simultaneous downturn in wine 
grapes, dried fruit and citrus are having a negative effect 
on the local economy. As water has become a valuable 
tradeable asset, a number of smaller operators have sold 
their permanent water entitlements in order to cover debt, 
retire or leave the industry. This has led to concern about loss 
of water from the region and the sustainability of smaller 
outlying communities. It is also a problem for increased 
frost risk and feral animals, disease and weeds on farm 
land that has been abandoned.
Closer settlement has meant that the size of properties in the 
area is 4 to 10 hectares, which seriously disadvantages farm 
operations in the current economic climate. The presence of 
so many of these small blocks causes concern for the health 
and wellbeing of the families living there—especially if they 
are elderly. It is important that resources be made available 
to help these families.
Community views in Robinvale
Robinvale, with about 4500 people, is situated on the Murray 
River 85 kilometres south-east of Mildura, 136 kilometres 
north-west of Swan Hill and 473 kilometres north-west of 
Melbourne. The town is within the Rural City of Swan Hill 
– Robinvale Statistical Local Area. It is connected by a bridge 
to the town of Euston in New South Wales. The two towns 
function as one, servicing a large irrigation district. Among 
other smaller settlements in the district are Wemen, Boundary 
Bend, Annuello and Bannerton.
The project fieldwork in Robinvale involved a focus 
group with a cross-section of the community and some 
additional one-to-one interviews with several key people 
in the district.
Economic profile
Through a series of pipes and channels, Lower Murray Water 
delivers water directly to individual farms in the Robinvale 
Irrigation District, which covers 2700 hectares. There is now 
more irrigation outside the district than in it. ‘Private diverters’, 
pumping their own water directly from the Murray, irrigate 
the area between Wemen and Nyah. More than 60 different 
agricultural and horticultural products are grown in the area. 
The main crop is fresh table grapes, but there is also large-
scale production of wine grapes, citrus, almonds, olives, 
carrots, pistachios, avocados and other vegetable crops, 
as well as barley, wheat and sheep production to supply 
an export market valued at millions of dollars annually. 
Thousands of hectares of land that is suitable for further 
new horticultural development and is close to reliable 
water have been identified for future investment.
Many of the original soldier settlement blocks have been 
consolidated into larger family holdings. At 10 to 12 hectares, 
the blocks around Robinvale are larger than the 4–8 hectare 
blocks in the closer settlement schemes around Mildura. 
The larger blocks provided more opportunity to sustain a 
family farm operation into the latter part of the 20th century.
An olive grove established in 1951 is now one of the state’s 
largest olive plantations and a major supplier of the country’s 
olive products. The area has also seen large-scale corporate 
development in horticulture—for example, Boundary Bend 
Estate. These industries rely on a local labour force supple-
mented by seasonal workers. In the next two years 
$661 million is expected to be invested in 15 horticultural 
projects in the Robinvale area, which will create 1057 jobs 
directly and indirectly (Swan Hill Rural Council 2006). A 
$40.5 million project funded by the Victorian Government 
and Lower Murray Water will begin in 2007 to upgrade 
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ageing water delivery infrastructure in the irrigation district. 
In short, the economy of this district is vibrant because of the 
climate, the soils and the potential for large-scale private 
diversion irrigation close to the river on land currently used 
for dryland farming (The Robinvale Sentinel, 20 July 2006).
As an agricultural service centre, Robinvale provides for 
local irrigators and dryland farmers rural supplies, irrigation 
supplies and equipment, harvesting and spraying equipment, 
packaging and transport facilities. National suppliers of 
agricultural services, machinery and equipment have 
outlets in the town. 
Community services
The Robinvale Resource Centre is the office of Swan Hill 
Rural Shire and is a one-stop shop for several government 
services (such as Centrelink), a booking office, and an 
employment agency specialising in farm labour. In the town 
there are three banks, two pre-schools, one private and two 
public primary schools, and a secondary college. There is 
also a hospital, medical clinics, a nursing home, dentists, 
a pharmacy, allied health professionals and a veterinary 
surgeon. The local health service provides services to the 
surrounding district and into New South Wales. There are 
good sporting facilities and the river offers many recreational 
opportunities for locals and tourists.
Robinvale is one the fastest-growing small towns in rural 
Victoria. This has placed increasing demand on local services 
and facilities. A recent needs analysis of the area found 
that the town needs public transport, childcare, drug and 
alcohol services, youth services and recreational facilities 
(Success Works 2005). 
Community profile
Figure A.5 summarises the community profile of the Swan 
Hill – Robinvale Statistical Local Area.
Community strengths
Participants in the focus group were invited to discuss 
the best things about Robinvale. Diversification within the 
horticultural industries, rather than total reliance on dried 
fruit, contributes to the strength and stability of the local 
economy. The larger size of properties in the district also 
provides stability. Participants compared Robinvale with 
Mildura, where smaller blocks that are unviable have been 
abandoned. Robinvale is also less reliant on the wine grape 
industry. One focus group member said, ‘I think we are in 
a unique situation because we have people that are pretty 
upbeat about how the industry is going in Robinvale. 
People are not walking off the land as in places like Merbein’. 
Another claimed that rural communities elsewhere would 
envy Robinvale’s opportunities, innovativeness and 
new industries:
Mildura hasn’t got the industry that we’ve got around 
here. They rely a lot on wine grapes and we’ve got the 
almonds and pistachios, carrots, olives. They are huge 
industries. Then you’ve got all your table grapes, your 
dryland farmers. We’ve got a lot more in the way  
of supporting businesses. 
Growth in the agricultural industries has led to improvements 
in education, new buildings being constructed, improved 
sporting facilities (including a newly renovated swimming 
pool) and a wide range of sporting activities. 
The high demand for manual labourers for the horticultural 
industries has produced a culturally diverse community. The 
town was described as a ‘vibrant and interesting community’. 
One person said the community was a ‘frontier town’ that 
was exciting to live and work in because the farmers and 
business people were ‘can do’ people. One of the older 
farmers added:
Robinvale has the ability to resurrect itself. If you look 
where we were and where we are now. The dried fruit 
trade, it died. We have basically done it on our own. 
We invented fresh fruit. We’ve had no support from 
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Figure A.5 Swan Hill – Robinvale Statistical Local Area: community profile
NOTE: The blue circles on the bar graphs and the lines on the pie 
charts denote corresponding percentages for Australia in total.
SOURCES: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Google Maps.
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state governments or anyone else. Our hospital was 
gone, all our services dispersed to Mildura, Swan Hill, 
all over the place. But our local dried fruit industry 
people resurrected the town to what it is now. 
Community cohesion
The high demand for labour has created a community made 
up of people of as many as 40 nationalities. Over 20 per cent 
of Robinvale’s population was born overseas (ABS 2001). 
In addition, at peak times there are itinerant fruit pickers and 
foreign backpackers. Italian and Greek migrants came to the 
district in the 1950s to work in the horticultural industries. 
Many of the properties in the district are now owned by 
second-generation Italians whose parents worked the land 
and then bought it. New workers are now brought in from 
the Pacific Islands, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Africa, 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Census data show that 25 per cent 
of people speak a language other than English at home 
(ABS 2001). 
Pacific Islanders, predominantly Tongans, arrived in the 
1980s and now form a sizeable part of the community. 
They generally do unskilled work, and many do not speak 
English. The Tongan community has extensive community 
structures, including their own church, but this means they 
tend not to engage with the wider community. Although there 
were traditional owners of the land, the current Indigenous 
population originated from elsewhere, settling at about the 
same time as the soldier settlers. About 500 Indigenous 
Australians live in Robinvale. 
Robinvale has limited social cohesion because of the 
number of different cultural mores and values. There is 
tension, particularly between the Tongan and Indigenous 
communities (Success Works 2005). Participants interviewed 
for this project were asked to rate the level of community 
cohesion; the average rating was two (where one means 
not cohesive and five means highly cohesive). One of the 
residents interviewed reported:
The Vietnamese sort of tend to keep to themselves. We 
have two Asian groceries up the main street. I was there 
the other day, and it’s really fascinating to see some of 
the locals shopping there. Probably five years ago they 
wouldn’t have gone in. There are a few issues between 
the Kooris and the Tongans, which are beefed up as racial 
problems, but its usually a family thing with intermarriage. 
There are certain Koori families that don’t get on with the 
others. But the rest of the population I really honestly 
believe we co-exist quite well. Its just a matter of time; 
you know, the original Italians and Greeks, they are Aussies 
now. They are the old generation, so now we have the 
Vietnamese and the Cambodians and all the rest. It will 
be interesting to see in 20 years where we are.
She added:
We have around 60 temporary protection visa holders 
from Afghanistan that came here about five years ago. 
Other than the girls here, they probably don’t know any 
other Australians. They tend to keep to themselves, but 
they are gorgeous. A lot of the ones we dealt with have 
stayed here. Some come and go. When we first knew 
them they used to come in and cry because they didn’t 
know if their wife and kids were dead or alive. So we 
cried with them, but now their families are coming and 
that’s really pretty special. The community is fragmented, 
but then at the bridge opening there was a couple 
of thousand people there and in that sense there is 
a community to get that amount of people to turn 
up for something like that.
One person who was interviewed commented on 
how difficult it was to engage the entire community 
in sporting activities:
I was involved in the football club. And it just gets harder 
and harder to put a football side on the field because 
there are just not the races of people that play Aussie rules 
football. The odd Islander or Tongan or Maori will play, 
but the Asian, Middle Eastern people don’t even come 
and watch a game. We used to run days where we would 
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give out 50 to 100 tickets to the Asian community. They 
would come along and would have a lovely time because 
they love having a beer or a sausage on the barbeque, 
but they would never pay and bring their family to come 
watch the footy. It’s just not in their culture.
And not many Italians or Greeks play footy. Actually, our 
local coach for three years was of Italian descent. And 
if only he was probably six inches taller he would have 
played for an AFL side, but he was just too little. But that’s 
the problem. About 16 years ago when I first moved here 
there were 10 cricket teams in a competition—eight in 
Robinvale. Now they struggle to have two teams to play in 
the regional association. And there are fantastic sporting 
facilities. Great golf course; great cricket facilities.
Community problems
On average, the population of Robinvale grew by 
1.6 per cent between 1996 and 2001. As at June 2004 the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics estimated that Robinvale had 
a population of 4042, but it is widely believed that the actual 
population is double this figure. A study commissioned by 
the Swan Hill Rural City Council (Success Works 2005) found 
that census data did not reflect the true population counts 
for three reasons. First, the census is taken in August, a quiet 
time for the horticultural industry, when much of the itinerant 
labour force is absent from the area. Second, many casual 
workers board with others or live in picker’s huts or caravans 
and are unlikely to be identified by census collectors. Third, 
many new migrants have a distrust of government officials 
and might not complete the census form. Despite attempts 
by the local council to encourage people to complete 
the census form, before the 2001 census the Immigration 
Department came to the town looking for workers who 
had outstayed their visa or were working illegally.
Census figures determine service provision, so the town 
is underserviced, particularly in relation to public housing. 
Using a range of data—birth and employment records, 
hospital admissions, school enrolments, supermarket 
transactions, and so on—the Success Works study estimated 
that the true population for Robinvale was between 6000 
and 8000, rising to 10 000 at the peak of the harvest season, 
from February to April. Furthermore, there is considerable 
population instability as workers regularly leave to follow the 
harvest (Success Works 2005).
The lack of housing for the large workforce required to 
sustain local industries is but one of the problems faced by 
this community with its large numbers of migrants. Just 
over half of all dwellings in Robinvale (58.9 per cent) are 
privately owned or are being bought; this compares with 
66 per cent nationally. Over 30 per cent are rented, 
compared with 26 per cent Australia wide (ABS 2001). 
Success Works (2005) found that, although there is land 
available, many local people cannot afford their own home. 
Investors were not inclined to invest in the rental market 
because of the expected low returns and the possible calibre 
of tenants. They viewed housing in Robinvale as a government 
responsibility. A local real estate agent reported that at any 
one time there are 100 people on their rental waiting list. 
In peak season some workers live in uninhabitable structures, 
and multiple families of up to 20 people occupy some homes. 
Pickers’ huts, built to provide temporary accommodation, are 
now used for permanent accommodation for families. Sheds 
in the industrial area also become homes (The Robinvale 
Sentinel, 4 August 2005). One resident reported:
We keep fighting for extra public housing or low-income 
housing, but everything is based on the census figures 
but we can’t get a true figure. Robinvale is made up of 
soldier settlement blocks of about 25 acres. They don’t 
exist anymore. People now might have two blocks and 
some of the bigger growers have amalgamated several. 
They all have picker’s huts on the property so the workers 
live in those. One of the bigger growers is putting in 
accommodation units that accommodate 100 people. 
The growers know that if they want the workers they 
have to have accommodation because there are no 
backpackers hostels apart from an old hotel in Euston.
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Success Works found Robinvale to be very dependent on 
retaining a substantial workforce. At times in the peak season, 
only half the available positions are filled. Jobs are primarily 
seasonal and unskilled. Nevertheless, there is a sizable group 
of long-term unemployed—particularly in the Islander and 
Indigenous communities. Although developing projects in 
the region will provide over 1000 jobs, there are concerns 
that, although local people will take up some positions, 
many new residents will be employed. This will place further 
pressure on existing services. It is believed that newcomers 
are unlikely to settle permanently in the town and contribute 
to the sustainability of the local economy because of the 
lack of appropriate education, housing and services (Success 
Works 2005). This current project revealed similar concerns. 
One farmer reported, ‘At the moment we are two people 
short on our property. We process and pack pistachios for 
most of Australia. We can’t find people to come and work, 
and I’m sure other people are short as well. I interviewed a 
person a few weeks ago; we got them over the line, but they 
couldn’t get a house’.
Success Works also found there were low levels of English 
language skills and literacy among the immigrants. Confusion 
about immigration provisions contributes to a low level of 
compliance with official requirements such as the census. 
Some immigrants were living in the country illegally; others 
did not have a valid work visa. There is also concern that 
casual labour and low pay create high levels of poverty. 
People working illegally might be most vulnerable in this 
regard. A lack of childcare and adequate parenting was 
another problem. Some children are cared for by older 
siblings while parents work; these children begin school 
lacking basic skills and discipline.
In addition, Success Works found there was a lack of strong 
leadership in the community because of the social difficulties 
that must be overcome; the consuming nature of horticulture, 
which leaves little time for civic commitments; and, for 
many, a lack of ‘attachment to place’. This could, however, 
be improving: this current project found a strong sense of 
commitment to the community and leadership—especially 
among residents who participated in the focus group. 
The local Progress Association is very proactive. 
Population instability and ethnic diversity are factors that 
are predictive of increases in crime rates in a community 
(Sampson & Groves 1989). Police officers interviewed for 
this project noted that the increase in the population had led 
to an increase in the incidence of crime. Assault, domestic 
violence, petty theft, and alcohol and drug abuse were the 
main types of offences occurring. There are also thefts of 
irrigation equipment from the large managed investment 
scheme operations. Recently, $8000 of sprays and seeds 
had been stolen; another theft involved sprinkler heads. 
The offenders were found to be locals. The officers noted 
there were no reports of water theft or drug production.
The police acknowledged that there was friction between 
Indigenous and Tongan groups—particularly among young 
people. Several project participants referred to a recent 
incident in which young people had vandalised trees that 
had been newly planted in the town. The local council has 
called for a 24-hour police station to control problems with 
graffiti and malicious damage in the town. This has led to the 
town receiving some negative publicity, the media describing 
it as ‘another Redfern’. Police are working with Indigenous 
community leaders and with young people to redress 
the situation.
Focus group participants were defensive about the bad 
press the town receives in relation to ethnic tension in 
the community. They insisted that the problems with the 
Indigenous population are overstated. They were, however, 
concerned that new arrivals (immigrant workers) should be 
given long-term opportunities and be welcomed into the 
community since there is potential for social disruption.
One police officer argued that crime was not a problem 
in comparison with neighbouring towns such as Bendigo. 
He noted that the majority of immigrants are there to do 
the manual work in the horticultural industry and are not 
interested in causing trouble: ‘Trouble comes from those 
who are more educated, are less inclined to do manual 
labour and have more time on their hands’.
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The impacts of water trading 
on the farming community
Of all the communities studied for this project, Robinvale 
appeared to be the most vibrant in terms of a rapidly growing, 
affluent horticultural industry. The area has been a major 
importer of water, which has attracted and sustained 
significant investment in the area. As noted, the diversity of 
commodities produced in the area has provided economic 
growth and security. Project participants were proud of their 
community and its achievements:
Robinvale is a community that most communities of this 
size in Australia would be absolutely envious of in this 
time of drought and water losses because its a community 
that is going ahead. It has heaps of opportunities and 
stability, even though there is a move in industries from 
dried fruits to table grapes. These new industries will 
be able to take on new technologies, which will put 
Robinvale at the forefront. I think the challenge for 
Robinvale is to self-promote. It has a lot going for it; 
it has a bright future and the young growers are 
certainly evidence of that.
Of note was the retention of younger farmers in comparison 
with surrounding areas. Two focus group participants were 
farmers in their late-20s; one said:
I think one of the best things is the retention of young 
farmers. You look around at other industries and other 
regions; you are looking at a lot of old farmers with 
no one to take over their farm. There are a lot of young 
farmers staying in Robinvale who can see the benefits 
of farming here, and that’s definitely going to be strength 
to carry the community forward.
These values reflected the strong work ethic prevailing in the 
Italian community, as identified in previous studies (Success 
Works 2005). One young Italian grower of table grapes 
questioned the provision of exceptional circumstances 
payments to people in the dried fruit and table grape industry. 
He wondered if these farmers were facing exceptional 
circumstances or just tough times. His view was that people 
should be able to pull themselves out of these situations and 
prepare for extreme weather events by taking out insurance:
Our industry has really been through a rough trot,  
and it just took a lot of hard work by a lot of people to 
pull themselves out. It’s disappointing to hear that the 
exceptional circumstances scheme is being extended to 
dried fruit and wine grape growers. It’s only really been 
the last two or three years that table grapes have been 
good. There have been tough times, and it was up to us to 
pull ourselves through. A few of the farmers experienced 
frost damage, but most were lucky enough to have 
a successful year and insure their crop. Now in the 
Shepparton district where they have been frosted, the 
government has been there to support them. In Robinvale 
farmers have taken the initiative to insure crops. 
Robinvale has gone from a wine and dried fruit area 
because the local people took the initiative to convert 
to table grapes because it was perceived to be more 
beneficial for them. If we’d stuck with wine and dried 
fruit we’d be a basket case like other areas. If we didn’t 
generate wealth for ourselves and move into areas 
that are going to be more profitable, we wouldn’t be 
employing people who would be spending in the town.
When questioned about the value of supporting farmers  
to sustain rural communities through difficult times, 
he responded:
I don’t disapprove of the assistance that’s been given. 
I’m saying that when the table grape industry was having 
trouble you never heard of it. It’s frustrating. I’m not 
saying that farmers should or shouldn’t get something. 
I’m just saying we pulled ourselves through. Robinvale 
is the way it is not because of good luck but because 
of hard work and initiative.
Participants described Robinvale as unique because more 
people have benefited from water trading and fewer people 
are leaving the district compared with other towns in water 
trading zones of Victoria. One participant commented that 
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it is better for water to be used on more productive land 
around Robinvale than on degraded and unproductive land. 
Salinity-affected land near Kerang was cited as an example.
The focus group discussion centred on the large number 
of managed investment schemes in the area that have 
evolved since the advent of water trading. Participants 
believed, however, that there was an inherent risk for 
the community should these schemes elect to move 
their operations elsewhere:
The managed investment schemes, if the government 
knocked that on the head that would certainly make a 
difference. Because the economy is based on horticulture, 
there is always a certain element of risk, particularly with 
grapes. There are so many things that can affect you—
frost at the wrong time, rain at the wrong time … heat. 
If it gets too hot and people can’t irrigate at the right time 
the grapes can suffer heat stress. There are a lot of things 
that can go wrong. If the river dried up it would be fairly 
grim—the end of all of us I’d say. 
Perceptions of water trading
The benefits
One of the project participants advised that water trading in 
the district is primarily in permanent entitlements. The reason 
for this is that the type of horticultural production demands 
a consistent, reliable amount of water. He also noted there 
was a trend for local farmers to own their own land and their 
own plant, and they therefore prefer to have their own water. 
A small amount of temporary trade is conducted for farmers 
who have sold their permanent water. Temporary trading is 
mainly out of Robinvale to grazing operations downstream. 
In his view, the market has allowed the industry to diversify 
and ride out commodity boom-and-bust cycles. Permanent 
trade has allowed farmers to repay debts or retire. Others 
have been able to build up their enterprise by buying out 
a neighbour who has sold water. The people who have 
benefited most from the market are the well-organised 
family farm businesses. He maintained that the managed 
investment schemes have brought many jobs to the district— 
jobs that would not normally exist. This trend will continue, 
along with opportunities for young people wanting to 
enter farming. 
Focus group participants agreed that water trading had 
brought wealth and growth to the area and many people 
have benefited. One added, ‘It’s all about confidence; 
it’s confidence that is keeping it all buoyant. Yes, we are 
making money, but in reality market forces are controlled 
by confidence’.
The costs
An irrigation industry representative spoke of the danger 
for producers who sell part of their entitlement and, with 
reductions in allocations, do not have enough water to 
function. The people most disadvantaged by water trading 
live in the areas that have lost water. He maintained there 
was a mistrust of government assurances in relation to 
water allocations.
Project participants were concerned that large managed 
investment schemes consume a great deal of water and 
place stress on the river and associated delivery systems, 
especially during peak times (summer). The schemes are 
considered an unwise use of water in a time of drought. 
One participant said:
I think the biggest issue to do with the water is that we 
have tax minimisation schemes coming into the area and 
using a lot of water to irrigate dryland farms. Water is 
brought in from other districts or from sleeper licences, 
which places stress on the river systems. With the drought 
as it is at the moment, it’s illogical the amount of water 
that is being used and is still brought into the area to 
be used on totally unirrigated properties. In the heat 
of summer it is going to be a problem for everyone.
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Another argued, however, that these large corporations have 
done much to improve water conservation:
Can I say something positive about MISs because I think 
we always seem to be kicking them? Now there was a lot 
of water used in the flats near Boundary Bend as flood 
irrigation. The MISs are taking all that over, so we are 
not using the floodplains anymore to create that water 
loss. Water is deployed in low-impact zones and I think 
that is a plus. Those kinds of places like the river bends 
are given back to the environment—planting more trees 
and everything. It’s great. 
Participants mentioned the Barmah Choke, concerned about 
what will happen to irrigators in Robinvale when the drought 
is over and New South Wales irrigators want water. Smaller 
operators are unable to compete:
The drought obviously is extremely important. The 10 or 
11 inches of rain, which is our average; as long as that 
falls at the right time, the broadacre farms are going to 
do pretty well. But if it doesn’t rain up in the mountains, 
horticulture will be dead. I would hate to be the person 
telling some of our really strong and good table grape 
growers they would only get 50 per cent of their water. 
I suppose the more established wealthier ones will find 
some water to buy, but blokes that are struggling and 
wouldn’t have money to go out and get an extra 
50 megs … will be in deep trouble.
The impacts of water trading 
on the non-farming community
The impacts of water trading on local industries that support 
agriculture as well as the local retail sector were discussed 
in the focus group.
The associated industry perspective
Local industry supporting dryland cropping and horticulture 
has expanded in keeping with the increase in horticulture in 
the region. The presence of large corporate operations and 
large family farm businesses has contributed greatly to 
the local economy. One participant described the growth: 
‘Irrigation places, machinery places, and tyre places: they are 
all new. The industrial sections over the railway line in Moore 
Street … eight years ago there were only 10 businesses’.
Another participant noted that some of the businesses in 
irrigation supplies, fuel, and car and machinery mechanical 
repairs were doing very well. When asked about the impact 
of water trading on his business, he replied that, where once 
he had been the only agency in the area, with the growth in 
the economy four years ago he suddenly found that within 
a six months he had three competitors:
It’s really tough, the competition. Businesses across the 
road and next door that keep selling so cheaply make 
it twice as hard. With places like these 30 000 acres of 
almonds, all their business is quoted. They never walk 
in and say I want this. If they get a particular type of 
fertiliser for the season it’s not $10 000 worth, so the 
margins we make are so small because everyone wants 
a bit. Even some of our table grape growers, instead of 
having 25 acres, they now might have 8 or 10 of those 
properties and, because the inputs in table grapes are 
fairly substantial, they almost become corporate growers 
themselves. So they are tending to shop wider as well—
not so much out of town but certainly because there 
are four of our type of business here. We are all in 
the same street and, because we know that we have 
to compete, we keep prices down. 
Yet another participant noted that tradesmen were being 
monopolised by large operations: ‘Robinvale has about 
eight plumbers, which is amazing for a place this size. 
But they are working flat out and you just can’t get 
anyone when you need them’.
Some businesses benefit more than others, though. 
Some services—particularly manufacturing and engineering 
businesses that compete with those in the regional centres of 
Swan Hill and Mildura—have been bypassed by the larger 
operations. The owners of a local engineering business 
reported that their business had dwindled from employing 
11 people to employing only three family members. This 
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business was not supported by the larger farms. Similar 
businesses in the industrial area have all but disappeared. 
Focus group participants said managed investment schemes 
also source tradesmen from Mildura, instead of using locals. 
This is reducing Robinvale’s manufacturing and service 
capacity: ‘The big concern now those MISs … they have 
millions of dollars and are bringing in huge contractors 
from outside to put that infrastructure into the ground, 
and we don’t get any of it’.
A representative of one of the large operations pointed out 
that outsourcing is the way business is done now: people want 
the best deal and the most competitive price. He also noted 
that many products and services are not available locally. 
For example, there is only one car dealership, which limits 
choice for people wanting to buy a new vehicle. He added:
In terms of buying locally, we just put a roaster in. 
Robinvale can’t supply the roasters to us. It came from 
Spain; the bloke flew out. Swan Hill engineering built 
our shed. It’s a large shed but we did it locally; the local 
builder did the concrete work. We could have got an 
outside contractor—could have done it better—but as 
we went down we got closer to town and used what 
we could. 
The central business area
The central business area is also doing well, although some 
businesses—such as those providing essential services—
might be doing better than others. There appears to be some 
instability: 12 of the local businesses changed hands during 
the year leading up to this project. Some of the businesses 
are owned or managed by Asian immigrants, and two Asian 
supermarkets have recently been established. One participant 
observed, ‘Over the last six years, people have been looking 
for shops in the main street of Robinvale. There is not one 
empty shop, and that’s unbelievable in a small Mallee town’. 
Another added, ‘I think the supermarket does pretty well, 
and one or two Asian supermarkets in town are going OK. 
And the takeaway food shops do pretty well’. Participants 
attributed this advance to the water trade: ‘The water trade 
has only meant good things for Robinvale and over the 
river at Euston. Without water trade, none of this 
development would have happened, and it’s still happening’. 
Focus group participants felt that the wealth created in the 
region should stay in the region. They acknowledged that 
some money is spent in town but said immigrant workers 
send a great deal of money home, and short-term workers 
take their earnings with them. One business owner reported 
that some businesses were not well patronised:
The people who have been brought in as the labour force 
for this growth are not renowned for spending their money 
in the towns; more of their money goes overseas. So the 
business community as such is probably at the lowest 
period it has ever been in Robinvale in about 30 years. 
Somehow we have to try and get the labour force to be 
more permanent so that the community can thrive.
Participants expressed a wish for research to explore the 
long-term impacts of water movement between regions. 
They were aware that economic prosperity and employment 
in their region have come at the cost of economic decline 
in other regions, as water is sold from one place to another:
As far as Robinvale is concerned, the change appears to 
be all positive, but often the positive changes have their 
harmful side in the sense that it has a social impact far 
beyond Robinvale. The removal of water from other 
communities is very painful for businesses, and we did 
not expect it to be exacerbated by more general water 
shortages. It’s a finite resource. The more you take out 
from the water source and convert into income dollars in 
terms of almonds etc … those are benefits which are felt 
by the market, by the economy, but they are not benefits 
felt by people who can no longer water their gardens 
for their recreation or enjoy the other social things 
that water brings.
Consideration of this led to concerns about the potentially 
transient nature of the large managed investment schemes, 
since there is potential for water to be lost from the Robinvale 
region if these businesses move elsewhere or fail and are 
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forced to sell their water entitlements. There is also the risk 
that investment in infrastructure to meet the needs of the big 
schemes could be unwise: they can easily ‘walk out the door 
if they don’t consider it worthwhile to stay’. Investment in 
infrastructure could therefore be ‘putting the cart before the 
horse’. One participant elaborated:
There are intrinsic risks for the community. We have seen 
the effects from development on other places. In our case 
it’s the availability of transferable water and tax leverage 
developments. But the benefits could also walk out the 
door. There are risks associated with political issues and 
the possibility that the population at large will say that’s 
enough of new developments. There is a serious question 
mark about the deployment of long-term commitment of 
water. And if we are going to be exposed to the possibility 
of actual losses of water entitlements, and these rights 
start to evaporate, well, that’s a risk factor that really needs 
to be worked on. We can’t afford to have a community 
going ahead with big infrastructure commitments and all 
sorts of things if your basic reason for being there might 
be taken away even in small increments. Consistency and 
certainty in investment are pretty fundamental, and the 
big companies know that but they are not going to worry 
if all of a sudden Robinvale goes south. That’s why I think 
the diversity of economic development is pretty crucial.
The community
A number of social considerations arise as a result of 
new arrivals flocking to the town to take advantage of the 
employment opportunities created by the rapid economic 
growth resulting from water trading. One participant noted 
that the opening up of the water market has had positive 
effects such as increased prosperity and employment. But 
there have also been some negative effects, such as the 
shortage of housing and professional and health services. 
He noted that the changes have come so quickly people 
have been caught off guard. Although the community 
is seeking to resolve these difficulties, they should have 
been dealt with before water trading began. 
Another participant added that ‘social responsibility  
needs to be built into these schemes’ so that they provide, 
or contribute to the provision of, local infrastructure. A further 
concern was that people employed by managed investment 
schemes do not integrate with the local community: ‘They 
are not going to sit on the school board’. Yet another 
participant commented:
We are a mining town of sorts on some level. The 
contractor comes in, does the job and leaves, and they 
will not bring their family [here] until they know if they 
are going to settle. Therefore they are not spending their 
money, their kids aren’t going to the school, they are not 
playing at the sporting club. Their money is not coming 
into the town; it is going into their pocket. The owners 
of small family farms are more involved in the local 
community.
A member of a large operation responded, ‘We are a 
family-run business, and my direct boss is on the board. 
His ethos to me is to get involved in the local community, 
be on the tennis court, the local growers’ groups’. Another 
noted there were opportunities to turn things round:
Robinvale is moving from being a receiver of services to 
potentially being an exporter of services and expertise. 
And some of the service industries have yet to reach their 
full potential. It is an exciting opportunity for government, 
business and service agencies to invest and start to plan 
appropriately. Given that they missed the front-door entry, 
they still have an opportunity to make a real difference 
and support the continued growth and development. 
But there are inherent risks that if governments don’t 
focus on it businesses do not work in collaboration 
and the community doesn’t get engaged. It could fail.
A shire representative added that these organisations are 
beginning to consider their impact and said council is 
developing a master plan to deal with social concerns:
We are actually working with the big horticulture growers, 
and they’re basically the ones pushing this. They have 
agreed that they really should have been sitting down 
earlier and looking at the social impacts of what they are 
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doing. So we are working with community groups and 
looking at doing a master plan. The consultants are just 
about to start, and it will be a process of speaking to 
the community groups to try and map out where things 
are going and get services in place as soon as possible 
by lobbying governments and private enterprise for 
investment.
These points were nicely summarised by a focus group 
participant: ‘Economics will take care of water allocation, 
but government and we [the people of Robinvale] will need 
to look after the social impacts associated with it’.
Discussion
Like Mildura, Robinvale has benefited greatly from water 
trading into the district. With good soils and a good climate, 
the area represents the quintessential ‘place of higher valued 
use’ of water. Several large corporate horticultural operations 
are established in the area, and the town is growing rapidly. 
Robinvale is an example of the heterogeneity of rural 
communities in Australia. It is a complex community that 
faces major social problems that are a direct consequence 
of the rapid economic growth in the irrigation industry that 
has been facilitated by the availability of water through water 
trading. The high labour demands have placed great strain 
on the town’s infrastructure and caused difficulties with 
community cohesiveness and crime. The community faces 
a challenge in meeting the needs of a diverse range of people 
and lifestyles. 
Despite this, there is a buzz in Robinvale because of the 
economic growth and the perceived unlimited possibilities 
for the horticultural industries. Perceptions of the benefits of 
this economic growth differed, however, between project 
participants. For the large managed investment schemes and 
the wealthy family businesses in the district, along with some 
of the businesses that support them, the water trade had been 
most beneficial. Some businesses have benefited more than 
others. Immigrant workers tend to send a large amount of 
money home, and short-term workers ultimately take their 
earnings with them, which means the local economy is 
deprived of some income.
Robinvale has experienced uneven social development 
as a consequence of uneven economic development 
(Furuseth 1989). A greater concentration of capital and 
development alters the quality of places, labour and industry, 
leading to greater opportunities for some while others are 
excluded. These inequities cannot be corrected by the free 
market (Furuseth 1989) because water markets are concerned 
with the efficient allocation and use of water rather than the 
perceived equity concerns associated with such a distribution.
There is a need for more support for communities such  
as Robinvale, which have undergone rapid economic 
development yet do not have sufficient resources to sustain 
such a large immigrant labour force. The community has been 
trying to accommodate and meet the needs of a diverse 
range of people and lifestyles. This is a daunting—perhaps 
impossible—task when the demands of the mobile population 
outstrip the publicly funded resources they require.
Local case study: a Robinvale fruit producer
History of the family farm
Phillip Natale represents the second generation of his family 
to farm in the Robinvale Irrigation District. His father, who 
emigrated from Italy in the late 1940s, bought the original 
farm in 1964. Phillip has expanded the property by buying 
Rows of vines on the Natale family farm
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an additional six blocks, giving him a total of 90 hectares. 
For many years this land was used to produce fruit for the 
dried fruit industry, but when that industry went into decline 
Phillip’s family experimented with wine grapes for a short 
time and then switched to table grapes. Phillip manages 
the property with his two sons and intends that the farm 
will be passed on to future generations of his family.
Involvement in water trading
The land Phillip farms was bought under the old system of 
water licensing, where water was attached to land title and 
was traded with the land. Phillip considers his current water 
allocation sufficient for his property and has no interest in 
participating in the permanent water trade. He is adamant 
that water should not be sold separately from land and speaks 
of the ‘unforseen down sides’—for example, when property 
owners sell their water and leave the land unmanaged. His 
brother has a farm adjacent to an unmanaged block of this 
kind: the vines have not been cleared and the land now acts 
as a source of weeds and disease.
Phillip is also concerned that outside investors in the water 
trade are too removed from the local area to understand 
the impacts of water trading on the Murray River and the 
communities that live along its banks.
Life along the Murray River
Phillip has lived on the banks of the Murray all his life and 
has memories of boating along the river and its smaller creeks. 
He worries about the permanent water trade having serious 
consequences for the health of the Murray because the high 
price of water has removed the incentive for irrigators to 
allow unused water to remain in the river for environmental 
purposes. He said of himself, ‘[I] still had 50 or 60 megs left 
last year, and I gave it to the environment rather than selling 
it … I could have turned it into dollars and I thought, no, I’m 
not using it. Leave it there. It will flow on to the trees and 
keep the old red gums going’.
Phillip has further concerns about to the river’s ability to 
transport high flow volumes to downstream users. And he 
An irrigation channel 
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is anxious about the over-allocation of water, the impacts 
of which will be felt as previously unused licences become 
active. As he put it:
What’s going to happen to this river? I’d like to see 
my grandchildren see it through, and the way they are 
handling it, believe you me, I reckon in 50 years’ time 
there won’t be a river, the way they are going. You can’t 
drag so much out of it. No one puts nothing into it. 
What’s going to happen to it?
Life as a resident of Robinvale
Phillip has no plans to leave the Robinvale district. Most 
of his immediate family also live in the district. He is proud 
of the area:
Good lifestyle, it’s alright. It’s a nice place, very nice place. 
I don’t mind it. Plenty of work, we get a steady income, 
that’s all we want. It’s a great community—got a football 
side, got swimming pools … We’ve got [an] absolutely 
glorious little club up here … Got the river around us …. 
And it’s a lovely little community.
Summary
Water trading has had a significant impact on the Sunraysia 
region in the last decade or so. A large amount of water has 
been traded permanently into the region at the same time as 
temporary water has been traded out. Private diverters have 
been the buyers of water entitlements, and water has been 
permanently traded out of the pumped districts.
Various factors were seen as contributing to the observed 
patterns of water trade in the region; for example, the ups 
and downs of the wine grape, table grape, citrus and dried 
fruit industries have been a central influence. Further, the 
development of greenfield sites by managed investment 
schemes has increased the demand for water.
Irrigators in the region see a range of benefits and costs 
associated with water trading. On the plus side, they recognise 
the ability of the water trade to facilitate business growth, 
help them manage their capital and adjust their cropping 
practices, and assist with cashflow and debt management. 
On the negative side, irrigators were concerned about 
increased competition in horticulture, the risk of stranded 
assets, and the adverse impacts of unmanaged vineyards. 
They are also concerned about the impact of the managed 
investment schemes.
Importing of water into the region has led to considerable 
growth and expansion of major centres in the region. 
This growth has contributed to Mildura becoming one of 
Australia’s 10 fastest-growing regional centres. At present 
it has a population of 51 263 and is an important service 
centre. There are high levels of employment—especially in 
agriculture and related industries (much higher than national 
averages), which can partly be attributed to the water trade. 
Mildura’s residents spoke of the city’s critical mass, which was 
sustaining and perpetuating the economic and population 
growth. Mildura’s growth cannot, however, be attributed 
entirely to the water trade: the growth of regional centres 
is common throughout rural Australia.
Drought and a simultaneous downturn in wine grapes, dried 
fruit and citrus are currently having a negative impact on the 
local economy. Water has become a valuable tradeable asset, 
and a number of smaller operators have sold their permanent 
entitlements to cover debt, retire or leave the industry. This 
has led to concern about loss of water from the region and 
the sustainability of smaller outlying communities.
The other centre of focus in the region was Robinvale, 
with a population of 4042. Like Mildura, Robinvale has 
benefited greatly from water trading into the district. With 
good soils and climate, the area represents the quintessential 
‘place of higher valued use’ of water. Several large corporate 
horticultural operations are established in the area, and the 
town is growing rapidly. It is an exciting place to be because 
of the economic growth and the perceived unlimited 
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possibilities for the horticultural industries. For the large 
managed investment schemes and the wealthy family 
businesses in the district—along with some of the businesses 
that support those enterprises—the water trade has been most 
beneficial. Some businesses have benefited more than others. 
Immigrant workers tend to send a large amount of money 
home, and short-term workers ultimately take their earnings 
with them, which means the local economy is deprived  
of some income.
Robinvale is a typical boom economy, and with that boom 
has come social structural change. The high labour demands 
of the horticultural industries have led to considerable in-
migration of workers from diverse ethnic backgrounds, and 
this has strained the town’s infrastructure and services and 
created problems associated with community cohesiveness 
and crime. The difficulty of obtaining census returns from 
these in-migrants means that, although the town has an 
official population of about 4000, it is thought the actual 
population could be twice that.
In summary, the case study revealed a mix of views on the 
impacts of water trading: while it was widely recognised that 
water trading has underpinned much of the growth in parts 
of the region, there was also widespread concern about the 
consequences of changes in land use associated with the 
trade. Many people also said they had difficulty untangling 
the effects of the water trade from other factors, such as 
drought, commodity price changes, and the trend to  
farm aggregation.
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Case study B: Pyramid–Boort
Introduction
This case study is one of three studies to form part of a 
project examining the social and economic impacts of 
water trading, with the objective of informing policy in this 
regard. The project focuses on regions where water trading 
is prevalent—the irrigation districts of Goulburn–Murray 
Water and Lower Murray Water, on the Victorian side of 
the Murray. In particular, it seeks to quantify and report 
on, through the case studies, the actual impacts of water 
trading on individual water entitlement holders, industries 
and communities in the Murray Valley, in order to test the 
assumed beneﬁts and perceived concerns arising from the 
trade. The information examined was collected through 
a series of interviews and consultations in the case study 
regions, involving irrigators and the broader community.
Apart from Pyramid–Boort, the regions studied were 
Sunraysia and, as a group, Rochester, Central Goulburn 
and Kerang–Cohuna. Much of the material presented for 
the Pyramid–Boort study reﬂects local people’s views about 
their experience of water trading, rather than the authors’ 
views and analysis, which are presented in Part One.
This case study is structured as follows. After a brief 
description of the Pyramid–Boort region, the pattern of 
water trade into and out of the region in the past decade is 
described. Focusing ﬁrst on irrigated agriculture, the study 
then examines the main forces—irrigation history, institutional 
settings, and the changing fortunes of particular products and 
industries—affecting this water trading and the costs and 
beneﬁts of the trade, predominantly from the perspective 
of those in the affected industries. The study then looks at 
the experience of those in Pyramid Hill and Boort, again 
largely from the perspective of the people interviewed. 
The main lessons from the case study are brought together 
in the concluding summary.
Location
The Pyramid–Boort Irrigation District covers 166 215 hectares, 
of which 126 400 hectares are suitable for irrigation. Among 
the townships in the area are Tandarra, Dingee, Calivil, Bears 
Lagoon, Durham Ox, Boort, Pyramid Hill and Macorna. 
The Loddon River ﬂows through the area. Goulburn–Murray 
Water supplies the Pyramid–Boort Irrigation District by 
gravity-fed channel water from Lake Eildon, via the Waranga 
Western Channel. About 1250 properties are serviced in the 
area, by means of a network of 150 kilometres of natural 
waterways and 1391 kilometres of constructed distribution 
channels. Water entitlements in the area amount to 
234 729 megalitres (Goulburn–Murray Water 2006).
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Patterns of water trade
Compared with the other regions studied, the Pyramid–
Boort sub-district of Goulburn–Murray Water has had a 
very different trading history in that it has been selling both 
temporary water allocations and permanent water entitlements 
in most years. In 2004–05 and 2005–06 there was a change 
in the trend of temporary market (net) selling. Less water was 
sold out in 2004–05 and then water allocations were traded 
in in 2005–06; this compares with the approximately 
10 000 megalitres traded out of the district in each of the 
seven preceding irrigation seasons. In the irrigation seasons 
of 2003–04, 2004–05 and 2005–06 the permanent trade of 
water entitlements out of Pyramid–Boort accelerated above 
the average of previous years, as can be seen from the 
increased slope of the cumulative permanent trade chart 
in Figure B.1. Consistent selling of both temporary and 
permanent water has meant that, in aggregate, water 
reallocations through trade have moved water out of the 
region, and the history of permanent trading outweighed 
the effect of the temporary water (net) purchases in 2005–06.
Source: Murray–Darling Basin Commission.
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Figure B.1 Pyramid–Boort water trading, 1995–96 to 2005–06
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Key drivers in irrigated agriculture
The Pyramid Hill district mainly produces wool and fat lambs 
on annual pastures. Dairy products, hay and some summer 
and winter crops are produced in the Yarrawalla, Calivil and 
Dingee districts. The Boort district also has a large area of 
annual pastures, and lucerne production has increased 
substantially in recent years (Goulburn–Murray Water 2006).
Irrigation history
A series of privately owned waterworks trusts began diverting 
water from the Loddon River in the late 1880s and early 
1890s. When these trusts failed financially the State Rivers 
and Water Supply Commission gradually improved water 
supply to the district. Importantly, the commission diverted 
water from the more reliable Goulburn River system, 
making the district less reliant on the variable flows 
of the Loddon River. 
Water is now released from Waranga Basin into the Waranga 
Western Channel to supply the Pyramid Hill district, east 
of the Loddon River. The Boort district is supplied from the 
Loddon River, and additional supplies are regulated through 
the Waranga Western Channel to the Loddon Weir at 
Fernihurst. This water supplements the limited capacity of 
the Loddon storages and improves water quality. Pumped 
supplies are also drawn from the Loddon River and 
Serpentine Creek.
Initial distribution of water entitlements
As an irrigation district, the Tragowel Plains differ 
from irrigation districts to the east of the riverine plain. 
In the Goulburn Valley the State Rivers and Water Supply 
Commission set about creating new communities to use the 
new irrigation water. It bought land, subdivided, supplied 
water and found new settlers to farm the land. Each block 
was allocated a legal right to enough water to irrigate the 
entire block—about 1 acre-foot of water per acre, equivalent 
to 30 centimetres of rainfall a year. On the Tragowel Plains 
the commission supplied water to the existing settlers.
Farm size on the Tragowel Plains had been set by the 
minimum subdivision area allowed for in the Selection Acts, 
and the Water Supply Commission supplied water to the 
existing settlers. But it could not supply enough water to water 
all the land on any given farm. So, rather than supplying a 
few farms with all the water they needed, the commission 
shared the available water between all the farms with access 
to its channels. It granted water rights at the rate of 1 acre-
foot for every 5 acres. This was insufficient water to irrigate 
a whole farm. The channel system distributing the water to the 
larger Tragowel Plains farms was longer and more complex 
than the channel systems in the Goulburn Valley; it was 
harder to manage and the water delivered to the Tragowel 
farms arrived more irregularly than water in the Goulburn 
Valley (Barr 1999).
The difference in supply to the two areas had profound 
implications for the way farming developed on the 
Tragowel Plains (Barr 1999).
The legacy of the original settlement patterns
According to Barr, farmers in the Pyramid–Boort area have 
a long history of investing in extra land, particularly when 
commodity prices are low:
History showed improved profitability was more likely 
to come from buying extra land rather than improving 
existing land. Not everyone was able to follow this 
strategy. A minority able to save cash for the right time 
built up very large undeveloped properties irrigating 
extensive annual pastures. (1999, p. 20)
The Tragowel Plains Salinity Management Plan encouraged 
further property amalgamations. It also encouraged the 
concentration of irrigation activities on the least salinised 
soils (described as A and B class soils) and the cessation 
of irrigation on the more saline soils (described as C and 
D class soils).
Today there are 737 irrigation services, managed as 
583 businesses, which is about 150 less than seven or so 
years ago. The trend towards increased size reflects the trend 
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in agriculture in general: economies of scale and diminishing 
terms of trade, coupled with increased productivity, continue 
to promote growth in business scale (RMCG 2006).
About half the businesses in the region use over 
250 megalitres of water a year, and a quarter use more than 
500 megalitres. Modelling suggests that about 70 per cent of 
the water is used on independently viable businesses—about 
30 per cent of Pyramid–Boort businesses. The remaining 
businesses depend on off-farm income. Dual incomes are 
common, and off-farm income is, quite legitimately, an 
important part of many farmers’ ‘portfolio’ of income 
streams (RMCG 2006).
Drought management
As a result of a series of years of low water allocation, 
maintenance on the supply system has been cut back to 
reduce price pressure on irrigators already financially stressed 
by increasing costs in their businesses (RMCG 2006).
Institutional settings
The 2 per cent rule
When permanent trade was introduced, the Victorian 
Government limited total annual permanent trade out of any 
irrigation district to 2 per cent of total entitlements for the 
district. The purpose of this ‘2 per cent rule’ was to keep the 
rate of change in manageable bounds and to ease revenue 
pressure on the water authorities.
Permanent trading of water out of Pyramid–Boort has reached 
the 2 per cent limit several times in the last few years, and 
significant trade is likely to continue for some time. There is 
a backlog of requests to trade out, and under the National 
Water Initiative the limit is being increased to 4 per cent 
(RMCG 2006).
Reconfiguration
Victorian legislation now provides scope for irrigation 
districts to be ‘reconfigured’ to improve their economic 
efficiency. The pressure for reconfiguration is strongest when 
water has been transferred away from smaller spur channels 
and pipelines, leaving small volumes to be delivered at 
high cost to those remaining on the spur system. 
Relative to other parts of Victoria, there is very high pressure 
for reconfiguration of the Pyramid–Boort region. Over 
25 per cent of water originally tied to land—and therefore 
tied to the related supply infrastructure—in the region is now 
used on other properties, in or outside Pyramid–Boort. 
This means there is a growing mismatch between where 
infrastructure is and where water is needed (RMCG 2006).
Moreover, as enterprises change—for example, as more 
horticulture moves into the Boort area—irrigators are starting 
to seek different levels of service. At present there is nominally 
a single level of service, although some variations do exist 
in practice. 
The Future Management Strategy that is being prepared 
is not based on the need for change being promoted by 
existing users. It assumes the following:
• Most recent developers have adequate service and 
security because they have invested near carriers 
and trunks.
• Channel capacity share and exit fees should resolve 
difficulties associated with the legacies of future trade.
• Projected prices for water will still not be high relative 
to other areas.
• Many ‘last-generation’ farmers will be comfortable 
with the system as it is and will simply wait out their 
time until selling (RMCG 2006).
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And it sees the need for change as revolving around 
four factors:
• the need to be competitive in attracting more development 
and securing the finance required for this development
• avoiding the need to spend money on under-used assets
• enabling irrigators to stay abreast of technology changes 
and capture the services that come with that
• avoiding being left behind—becoming a living 
museum—and becoming uncompetitive (RMCG 2006).
Interim delivery shares
‘Unbundling’ of northern Victorian water entitlements on 
1 July 2007 will result in district irrigators holding delivery 
shares that entitle them to specified volumes being delivered 
per unit of time during periods of peak demand for the 
delivery of water. The delivery shares will also confer on 
irrigators the liability to keep paying for their access to 
the delivery system even if they sell their water.
To reflect these changes, access and delivery tariffs have been 
changed in advance of unbundling. This will help protect the 
revenue base of water authorities, act as a disincentive to 
permanent water trade out of districts, and allow for setting 
exit fees based on the present value of this revenue stream.
Source-tagging
After unbundling, the ‘water shares’ being used in 
Sunraysia will be identified as coming from either the 
Goulburn system or the Murray system. Depending on the 
season, these different water shares might have different 
allocations attached to them. The prospect of this change has 
precipitated much recent trade out of the Goulburn system 
into Sunraysia. This is largely because allocations on the 
Murray system have been higher than those on the Goulburn 
in the past 10 years and, before unbundling, water traded 
out of the Goulburn to the Murray was assigned the higher 
allocation of water coming out of Murray storages. Some 
of these allocations have then been traded back up the 
Goulburn system. This will not happen once the water 
shares are ‘tagged’ to the source storages.
Further, on 18 December 2006 it was announced that 
permanent trading rules for trades between systems will 
require that a seller’s allocation of water be at least equal 
to the allocation levels that apply in the buyer’s system for 
the remainder of the 2006–07 irrigation season (Goulburn–
Murray Water 2006). Trade out of the Goulburn into the 
Murray was probably accelerated to take advantage of the 
difference in allocations before unbundling.
Industry concerns
Mixed farming
The history of the Pyramid–Boort system is based on mixed 
farming, producing unassisted wool, lambs and crops. This 
contrasts with neighbouring irrigation settlements, which 
were originally based on assisted products such as dairying 
and processing fruit. That assistance has now largely gone, 
but echoes of this past are guiding the current views of 
many irrigators:
The overall attitude of the rest of the community to water 
trade? Pretty much the same line, some would perhaps 
be a little more negative than me, but I think I reckon I’m 
probably more middle of the road. Yeah, I reckon it’s a 
positive thing and it’s the way to go providing it doesn’t 
isolate the community or get to the stage where you are 
shutting areas down. That is just not on. But a lot of people 
will argue you shouldn’t be watering pasture anyway. 
I’d argue you can do your studies or whatever but I can 
show you just as many studies—for example, the biggest 
profit per megalitre used two years ago was prime lambs. 
Beat grapes, everything else but they won’t publish 
that because it doesn’t fit with their scenario. The most 
profitable use of water two years ago was to water grass 
for prime lambs, not grapes, capsicums or olives or 
anything else. It was prime lambs but they don’t tell 
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you that. And OK, it was one year, when lambs were 
$140 but so was the grapes, the grapes only lasted one 
or two years too, so olives will be the next things, then 
nuts up at Robinvale. But, if you want to create a 
system that is sustainable and long term and going to 
ride the peaks and troughs, that system’s got to be 
designed around your generic prime lambs, dairy, 
cropping scenarios. Otherwise you can’t build a 
system. I don’t think you can build a system around 
fads and fashions.
Dairying
Dairy farmers in Pyramid–Boort send mixed messages about 
the future. Some are optimistic and are expanding; others 
report an overall decline:
No, they are all selling up. There are very few dairy farmers 
left now and they are all quitting pretty quick. There was 
one dairy farmer, [name]; they stopped three to four years 
ago. There were probably six or so down on the river 
that have gone in the last five years. And there will be 
another two to three in the next couple of years down 
on the river. We will be one of the only dairy farms left; 
there is probably two on the corner that will probably 
shut up shop in the next five years. Say there will be four 
gone in three to four years and that changes the face of 
the community in 10 years from now. And all the jobs 
that go with it. 
Processing tomatoes
The processing tomato industry is not the force it used to be 
around Boort. This has more to do with competition from 
imports than it has to do with water trading:
This is probably the first year in 35 years that we haven’t 
grown tomatoes. Is that because of water shortage? In 
hindsight, not so much because of the water issues; it’s 
pretty fortunate we didn’t grow tomatoes, very fortunate, 
because of imports and higher running costs, everything 
else going up and the price is still going down. We lost 
40 acres last year of 250 acres through the locusts that 
came through. There was a swarm that came through 
and wiped out 40 acres; we lost about $300 000 just 
through that … It’s year-by-year contracts, and about 
four years ago we got our contract just sliced because 
of the imports, etc, and that was about 3500 tonnes. 
We had four other contracts at that stage—SPC, Berry 
and Rosella. Anyway, up until now they’ve just been 
cutting us back, cutting us back because they think its 
too dear to buy our product when they can import it 
through China. This is where it really started. My family 
was one of the original families that started growing 
tomatoes in this area. And so that developed from there, 
so with Dad and his brother and then I got into it in 2000 
when new contracts were really hard to get and there 
was no water and the drought started, so it hasn’t been 
a good five or six years for me.
Managed investment schemes
As in other irrigation communities, the people of Pyramid–
Boort are sceptical about the growing involvement of 
managed investment schemes in irrigated agriculture. 
They see it as the taxation system distorting the markets 
for land and water, and they are especially concerned 
about the impact it will have on river health as large 
volumes are moved downstream and demand is 
concentrated into shorter periods of the year.
Unlike Sunraysia irrigators, Pyramid–Boort irrigators do 
not see managed investment schemes competing with 
them in commodity markets. Consequently they are less 
concerned about the schemes flooding markets; rather, 
they see them as evidence of a misplaced government 
enthusiasm for ‘high-value crops’. 
In that context, local irrigators will feel vindicated if the 
schemes prove unprofitable. There is, however, one such 
scheme—the one inside the Pyramid–Boort Irrigation 
District—they would like to see survive for a long time yet.
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Community action
Community leaders in irrigation areas most affected by 
the potential for stranded assets are starting to look beyond 
government for salvation of the community values they prize. 
While still lobbying for controls on the permanent water trade, 
they are also introducing what they see as a safety net:
The drought is masking things because it distorts the 
price of water. Under the current situation, there’s no 
opportunity for the normal succession process to go on. 
Many farmers are coming to an age where they might 
like to pass the farm on, but suddenly their water’s gone. 
They might have a genuine desire to sell it within the 
district, so something we’ve been doing to try and address 
that is this water bank concept. It will give farmers the 
opportunity to become irrigation farmers, by financing 
them into water. It’s not to control water markets or 
anything like that, but it gives people a chance to get 
started in this district. It’s got widespread support—
community support—from milk companies, to shires, 
to local business. 
We’re basing ourselves on the Bendigo Bank model. 
There’ll be three levels of investment. We’re expecting 
that some people will make donations or buy shares. 
They can state whether they want an immediate return, 
or if they are looking more at the long term; say, ‘Here’s 
some money. Give me something back in ten years from 
now’ or whatever. Or say, ‘Yeah, I don’t want a lot. Just 
give a moderate rate of return’. Or you can have full 
investors. The only difference between this water bank 
and a normal bank would be that the money is secured by 
water instead of capital. Our intention is to do something 
that’s significant, something large enough to attract the 
mum-and-dad investors. We want to attract the sort of 
people who would say, ‘I’ve got a hundred dollars here. 
I want to put it away for the kids’. Definitely there’s an 
opportunity to give a good rate of return on that hundred 
dollars. A little bit more affected by droughts and floods 
and all those sort of things, but if you look at the average 
rate of return, it’s pretty good. For water, the average 
return over the last 10 years was over 8 per cent, 
which is better than anything else. 
One government employee cast an interesting perspective 
on the move to create a ‘community water bank’:
I think the thing that might make it work is that it gives 
the people who would like to sell a going concern an 
opportunity to reduce the arbitrage between what they 
would like to do and what a ‘rational’ investor might do. 
I think a lot of people would wear a bit of a discount on 
realising the full value of their assets if they felt they were 
doing something positive for their community. It might 
give those people a bit of a halfway house between doing 
what they think is the right thing by their community 
and being made to look like fools by people with an 
eye for a bargain.
Irrigators’ views
Perceived benefits of water trading
Irrigators in Pyramid–Boort see benefits of water trading 
arising in a number of areas—business growth, capital 
productivity, opportunistic cropping, liquidity, cash flow 
and debt management, drought management, easing of 
channel congestion, and reduced costs for others through 
trade into the region.
Business growth
Irrigators have been able to increase the size of their 
businesses by buying more water. This has been especially 
noticeable among horticultural businesses around Boort, 
but it is also the case for other irrigators.
Until recently, district irrigators had expanded their business 
by buying neighbouring properties complete with water: they 
did not have to enter the water market as such. Many of the 
irrigators interviewed said this was still their preference, but 
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the market dynamics are changing. People are increasingly 
faced with the prospect of buying a property that has 
been stripped of its water and then having to buy the 
water separately.
Capital productivity
Water trading allows farmers to make conscious decisions 
about how much capital they invest in water. As one 
irrigator put it:
We needed water and at the time we didn’t want to 
expend the money required to purchase it, that’s why 
we are leasing with an option to buy … It’s for capital 
management … It was a strategy put in place to basically 
delay the investment over a few years, rather than do it 
all up front and borrow more money for it. We could do 
with the cash and we satisfied ourselves with the security 
of the arrangement.
The trading also allows farmers to consider how much 
of their capital portfolio should be tied up in farming:
I won’t be buying more water at the present time, but 
as far as I’m concerned there I’ve got enough exposure 
to agriculture. I think I’d be better off putting it into BHP 
than farming. But I’ll continue to utilise the surplus water 
either for on-farm production or if the market’s available 
to trade it temporarily, I’ll just take advantage of that—
much smaller. But I’ve certainly got no problems utilising 
it mainly as a temporary seller where there is value 
in doing it. 
Are there costs to the local community in terms of 
temporary trade? There mightn’t be costs, but there are 
risks. People have a tendency, when something happens 
for four or five years in a row, they think it’s a permanent 
feature of the world, and many of them have now based 
their systems on water being $40 to $60, and all of 
a sudden you get something like this, and you’re out 
of business.
Opportunistic cropping
In many ways Pyramid–Boort is to Victoria what New South 
Wales is to the Murray–Darling Basin: it is that part of the 
system where water is used most opportunistically:
I’ve got no problem with the fact that water should be 
going to higher value users. I’ve got no problem with 
the fact that pasture-based industries, like my father 
utilises, should at best be opportunistic things—that 
take advantage of water if the infrastructure is there 
when the water price is cheap. When there are sales 
allocations and so there’s less demand, less competition 
for the resource; it’s a bit like in New South Wales this 
year there is hardly any rice being grown … So you’ve 
got these other agricultural uses which start soaking up 
extra water as it becomes available at a commercial value.
Liquidity
Water can be sold rapidly—with minimal advertising costs 
and very low transaction costs—virtually anywhere in the 
southern connected Murray–Darling Basin. There are willing 
buyers and sellers at all times. It is highly probable that the 
next trade will be executed at a price equal to that of the last 
one. Water is a very liquid asset: ‘I bought an extra farm 
a couple of years back, which as it turns out I probably 
shouldn’t have bought. I’ve got it on the market now, but 
until it sells really the only thing that is keeping me afloat 
is that the bank will keep lending me money against the 
value of my water’.
It is this liquidity that is changing the dynamics of 
consolidation in the irrigation districts. People leaving farming 
no longer have to rely on the comparatively thin real estate 
market to realise the value of their remaining assets. Nor do 
they have to offload their assets at fire-sale prices.
Of course, some people can only envisage selling their 
farm as a going concern. That puts them in the thin real 
estate market, which is best inhabited by those wanting 
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to consolidate their holdings. But it is also an invitation, 
for people with an eye for a bargain, to buy the property 
and sell the water separately.
Cash flow management
The temporary market offers irrigators the potential to 
generate extra cash flow. In the current drought, with 
seasonal allocations being low, many mixed farmers 
in the Pyramid–Boort region see their returns being 
higher if they sell their water on the temporary market: 
You do get this stigma effect of people thinking well 
they are selling water off, being a farmer should be 
using it, that sort of the thing, without realising the 
financial benefits of it. If you drive down the road 
and see someone’s wheel going and watering a crop or 
something and you think, ‘Well, so either they haven’t 
done their sums or they know something we don’t know’. 
Or they got that big green crop out the back …They got 
this enormous good-looking wheat crop or something and 
yours has died and you think, ‘They’ve got a nice crop 
but is there a financial benefit to doing it?’
Very few cash flow concerns are directly related to farm 
production:
My daughters were due to go away to school. And I 
couldn’t find the funds to send them. And I believed 
there was no point in ten years’ time saying, ‘Well now 
I’ve got the money—now you can go to school’. I sold 
a couple of hundred megs to put them through school. 
So I was a most reluctant seller … but it was something 
I did for the girls at the time. It was my aim, one day, to 
buy it back, but that is a vision that won’t be realised 
the way things are going. 
Debt management
The water market offers irrigators the potential to manage 
their debt. But people’s attitude to risk is generally asymmetric: 
they are prepared to gamble more recklessly in order to avoid 
a loss than to achieve a gain.
Some irrigators with high debt levels have found water trading 
useful for returning their situation to equilibrium. Others have 
found it part of the process that leads to the end of their part 
in farming. Yet others find it a release, even when they have 
avoided formal debt by living off their depreciation:
In terms of selling, that’s one of the things that farmers 
have been doing with uneconomic farming enterprises: 
they have zero debt and live off their depreciation. My 
father is a perfect example; he has more money now 
than at any other time in his life. The continuing capital 
appreciation value of water has been a godsend to that 
type of farmer … That’s one of these water things: you 
bag the blokes that sell it until it gets personal, and then 
you are glad you can do it.
Drought management
Water trading has made a big difference to the way 
farmers in Pyramid–Boort go about the business of 
drought management:
It’s also helped in years like this, a heck of a lot of people, 
especially the mixed farmers who can pull their head in. 
Some people have decided to use the small allocation—
once they fill their dams and secure their house supply, 
depending on their stock levels and how they manage 
that. But there are people this year who will be selling; 
say, they got 23 per cent allocation they will be selling 
15 per cent, probably three-quarters of that, and if they 
started early still price averaging at $400–$500 a megalitre. 
So to that extent they are not really losing as much as they 
otherwise would in a drought year like this if they weren’t 
allowed to trade. 
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Easing channel congestion
The Pyramid–Boort delivery system is atypical of systems in 
most gravity irrigation districts. Rationing of channel capacity 
during the peak of the irrigation period has been a feature of 
the system in recent years. To some extent water trade has 
alleviated this problem:
We have a problem here with rationing in high peak 
use times, we have to actually ration our system as to 
how much we can get at any one time. And because a 
lot of water has gone out of the area that actually helps 
my ration … That’s fairly unique to this system; it’s a local 
thing. Never happens on the Murray system; no such 
thing. They had a little bit of rationing last year … That’s 
because their channels are bigger and shorter.
Concerns about channel capacity can also increase the 
demand for water trading:
The bloke next door is a big megalitre consumer, so he 
could easily buy enough megs to hold this channel and 
take control of his channel. In fact, I think he’s come to 
a point where he can’t get any more megalitres because 
he can’t get it down the channel anyway; the channel’s 
got a limit. We may be squeezed out of that in the future, 
we just don’t know … for probably channel capacity, 
that’s the only thing. Because he’s bought a lot of water 
and chopped the channel up … He surrounds us and is 
putting the pressure on us because he wants his channel 
capacity and all this sort of stuff. He said, ‘What summer 
crops are you going to put in this year?’ (This is earlier in 
the season.) And he said, ‘You have to be careful because 
I’ll be taking most of it’. He grows a lot of summer crops. 
Yep, I admire him for the way it’s going; it’s probably 
the way a farm should be run, in the big scale.
Reduced costs for others through trade into 
the region
Pyramid–Boort is unique in that managed investment scheme 
developments have occurred inside the irrigation district. 
Their presence has reduced costs for the other district 
irrigators, but it is also putting some strain on the policy 
of maintaining a single level of service for all irrigators:
Having Olivecorp here has kept everyone else’s water 
bill down by about $3 a meg.
Look, none of us like the idea of MISs, but if we have 
to have them, it is better that we have them inside the 
irrigation districts than outside them.
Horticulture in this area is an interesting one because 
there are differential levels of service. It’s an accepted 
thing that tomato growers will get a higher level of 
service; Olivecorp last year got out-of-season watering. 
The season ends and everyone else had to stop irrigating 
but Olivecorp could keep irrigating. If you want to keep 
investment in the region the worst thing you can have is 
your single biggest water user being grumpy. But by the 
same token the mixed farmers don’t want to put that 
differential level of service in writing; they accept that it 
happens but they don’t want to put it in writing because 
they say, ‘Well, if we document it, well they will expect 
and demand it’. So they are saying they are happy with 
the current practice. We’ll cop it, but don’t write it down. 
But that’s the big thing about the reconfiguration is this 
idea of differential level of service. If someone is happy 
to pay for water on demand then maybe they’ll get it. 
Perceived costs of water trading
Irrigators in Pyramid–Boort see costs of water trading arising 
in a number of areas—stranded assets, competition with New 
South Wales and whether exit fees are attached to land or 
water, the non-validity of dryland farming, managing the 
reconfiguration, degradation of the river channel, and the 
build-up of pests.
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Stranded assets
As water moves out of irrigation districts, the delivery 
infrastructure becomes an under-used asset. These ‘stranded 
assets’ increase annual costs for the remaining irrigators. 
They were the number one concern for all Pyramid–Boort 
irrigators interviewed for this study:
There are benefits to permanent trade. It allows people to 
realise, in the event they are selling their property, there 
is no doubt that the net worth of their property, the asset 
vale of their water, has made the asset value of their 
property substantially higher than would otherwise be 
the case. And if it is in the local area, if it’s a regionalised 
thing, then presumably it’s leading to new investment in 
irrigated infrastructure and irrigated industry within your 
district … It might be just a dairy farmer going from 200 
cows to a 1000-cow dairy, new layout and rotary; he is 
going to be consuming more and more resources and so 
to that extent, if you like, it’s reinvestment in irrigation 
infrastructure in your area. The problem is, though, if 
it’s going outside your area … I suppose that’s where 
the costs basically are. The impact on the remaining 
irrigator base is the main cost as I see it.
Some irrigators are philosophical about what has happened 
so far but fearful about the future:
Permanent trade? I think there have been big winners, it’s 
hard to know. Look, it has certainly given farmers big cash 
to get out if you like. We haven’t had it, but for a lot of 
people they have worked all their life and all of a sudden 
they have something to sell which probably wasn’t there 
ten years ago. But on the other hand I think a lot of the 
corporates and those guys are winners as well. Up until 
this stage, unless we start getting a bit of a meltdown 
within the area, I think there’s probably not a lot of losers. 
However, if it gets to the stage where that much water 
goes out that we are unsustainable, then there are 
huge costs, huge ramifications. 
Most of the irrigators interviewed were strongly opposed 
in principle to the concept of permanent water trading. 
They saw this as the greatest threat to the future of their 
district. Most were, however, very supportive of the principle 
and practice of temporary trading: ‘Permanent water trade 
is wrong, plain wrong. It is going to ruin this district and 
for no other reason than to satisfy a government fad. It is 
going to bugger up this community and it’s going to bugger 
up the river. They could have had all of the benefits of 
trade and none of the down side if they’d just stuck with 
temporary trade’.
Competition with New South Wales and 
attaching exit fees to land or water
Pyramid–Boort farmers are particularly mindful of their 
competitive position vis-à-vis what they see as comparable 
districts in New South Wales:
The Victorian Government have been really good in their 
approach, with the exception that they put themselves 
up as the gurus—‘We are the leaders in water reform’ 
and we are not. Every other state is sitting back laughing 
at us: you go for your life Victoria, you sell us all your 
water, you do all this, you get rid of your water … New 
South Wales just sits back and lets Victoria get everything 
right and make all the mistakes and they will move in 
when they have to.
The farmers are conscious that New South Wales irrigation 
companies are seeking to have their exit fees set high and 
for the fees to be attached to the water, not the land. They 
see this having a profound influence on whether or not the 
Pyramid–Boort system will survive:
When you look at it in respect to what’s happening with 
interstate trade as far as I am aware, Murray Irrigation 
is still being allowed to keep their $495 a meg exit fee, 
and it’s on the water, it’s not on the land. With an active 
transfer rate of about 0.6 megs from Murray Irrigation 
to 1 meg in Victoria, their exit fee is equivalent to about 
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$700–800 a meg. Victoria, the last I heard, they are talking 
about nothing higher than $300 a meg if it’s brought in. 
And it’s attached to the land. How competitive is it to 
attach it to the land because then if the farmer doesn’t buy 
up the exit fee he’s got this rating of $25 a meg attached 
to his land, even if it’s a dryland farm? So the who the hell 
is he going to sell his farm to? He will essentially have to, 
once it’s been in place for a while, what’s going to happen 
is the whole structural collapse of this district within five 
years because it’s totally unsustainable in a district where 
the water is continually traded out … So what that means 
is that those guys are continually going to come into my 
area in preference to New South Wales unless that 
standardisation occurs. In about five to 10 years’ time 
New South Wales might be forced into line with Victoria—
and in the meantime all the water that is going to be 
bought by developers will come from here because 
it’s too dear over there.
Partly because they are aware of what ‘the competition’ 
is doing in New South Wales—but partly, too, because 
they worry about the future viability of their farms as either 
dryland or irrigation—many irrigators interviewed were not 
happy with the tariff changes designed to reduce the risk of 
stranded assets:
I just think it is too little too late. It might have worked 
if it had been in place from the word go, but now it just 
reduces the options you’ve got for using the land. It puts 
a tax on the land. It actually makes it harder to work out 
the best thing to do because you are locked into servicing 
that bit of land when the bigger job is thinking about how 
things should be in the future.
One irrigator summed up the view expressed by many—
that attaching the ongoing fees to water rather than land 
would better protect Goulburn–Murray Water’s revenue base:
The only way they can do it is to actually have a cap, and 
I don’t know whether that cap involves a cap within the 
Pyramid area and each of the other five GMW districts 
such that the water movement cannot be any more than 
that. Alternatively, it’s a cap across the whole GMW zone 
so we might go back to the olden days where there was 
one water rate across the whole district. They can still 
go along with their infrastructure restructuring as a 
management strategy perhaps because in the private 
sector asset restructure goes on year on year and it’s only 
a big deal if you are in the public sector and haven’t 
thought of it in the past because you are bloody made of 
stone … The whole issue revolves around revenue base 
and the fact that unless they come up with an exit fee, 
maintain infrastructure access fees, that’s how they are 
looking at protecting the revenue base of the area because 
the revenue base is determined at the present time by the 
megalitres of water delivered to the area. It’s essentially 
the main driver for revenue base and as this water is lost 
what that means is that unless those come into place, 
revenue base, these systems are predominantly overhead 
based in running costs. There are not too many variable 
costs. Things like automation, reconfiguration, all they are 
doing is basically in the short to medium term, all they 
are doing is reducing the pressure on the balance sheet, 
but it is taking materials off their balance sheet, therefore 
reducing infrastructure maintenance costs and therefore 
on that particular component of the price. 
Dryland farming: not an alternative
Irrigation farmers in Pyramid–Boort believe that, if the 
irrigation system is not maintained in its present condition, 
dryland farming is not a viable alternative:
There are two distinct soil types: one you can farm 
dryland, one you can’t. Well, this side on the heavier black 
soils you can’t dryland farm; you need water. On the 
other side of the system the redder country you can farm 
dryland, no worries; it’s just the heaviness of it. There has 
been plenty of country de-watered through here and its 
basically useless now. You can’t farm it unless you have 
an exceptionally wet year, which we don’t get very often 
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any more. They are just not viable the way they have been 
left without water. And there is starting to become more 
and more of it. 
If this area here lost all its permanent water, this place 
would be vacant because this area—this strip through 
here—really needs water. You can’t farm as dryland, so if 
permanent water went off here it would be just a desert, 
and you lose all the infrastructure around you, too.
If this area became dryland it would need huge amounts 
of consolidation because the economic size of farms 
around here in a dryland situation—if you use the Powlett 
Plains as an example—is probably about 4000 or 5000 
acres. The average landholding here is about 500 or 
600 acres.
Managing reconfiguration
Uncertainty was the prevailing mood among the irrigators 
interviewed. Although involved in Goulburn–Murray Water’s 
efforts to think through reconfiguration, one irrigator 
contrasted that with his long involvement with the Tragowel 
Plains Salinity Management Plan: ‘When we were working 
on the Salinity Management Plan it became really clear what 
we had to do next. It opened our eyes to how to get the best 
out of our land. It gave us certainty. This reconfiguration stuff 
does the opposite: it makes it really hard to decide on the 
next thing to do on your own farm’.
Farmers are also extremely conscious that what their 
neighbours do will have a profound effect on the continued 
viability of their own businesses—especially as Goulburn–
Murray Water rethinks the future viability of its infrastructure:
I’m in a situation where I am at the north end of one 
of these pod-type operations where I’m at higher risk of 
stranded asset type of arrangement than someone who’s 
just on the trunk channel, further south. And I’m in a 
situation where I’ve got to spend another $50 000, and 
whether I do it out of cash or borrowing some, now I have 
a bit more capacity to do this than others in the district. 
But why would I? And I don’t know if you have spoken 
to a bloke at the very end of my channel; he used to 
have a big family partnership, he just bought his brother 
out, he is probably paying a [considerable sum] of money 
for water and hay at the moment. He is going to have a 
couple of million dollars of debt after this. So if we have 
another couple of bad years he might just say, ‘I’ve had 
enough’, give it the flick and walk away with a couple of 
million in the pocket. In that situation they are the things 
I have to talk about before I go re-investing. And that 
fellow is in a worse situation because he probably has 
a million-dollar dairy, all this pasture development, and 
some of it might have been written off for tax purposes, 
but from an asset perspective replacement value, he’s 
probably sitting on, aside from his water, $3 to $4 million 
worth of asset. And he will never sell that as a dairy 
probably. So, if he wants to go and reinvest in it or 
double his herd and he’s already very frustrated about 
water delivery of the system, what’s he going to do?
Many irrigators were also critical of what they see as 
retrofitting a rational rating system onto an infrastructure 
system that was not designed with economic efficiency in 
mind. One irrigator drew attention to what many see as the 
unfair result of recent changes to tariff charges:
GMW has started to put a service charge on every 
outlet. It’s fair enough in a way, except that they have 
been running it as basically a socialised system for the 
best part of a century, where everyone pays a flat amount 
for water. I’ve got a very big water holding and I’m lucky 
I get all my water through just three wheels. A good friend 
of mine over the way has five times as much water as me, 
and he’s got something like 50 or 60 wheels. It’s no 
fault of his it’s just the lay of the land. He’s made all his 
investment decisions based on the water charges of the 
past. Now, at $200-odd a wheel, his bill is going to go 
up and mine is going to come down.
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Irrigators are conscious that if there were to be ‘postage 
stamp pricing’ then, no matter how the lines are drawn, 
50 per cent of outlets will be above average and 50 per 
cent will be below average in terms of cost-effectiveness.
Given these tensions, irrigators were very critical of 
Goulburn–Murray Water’s mooted investment in improved 
metering systems to help bring about water savings. One 
irrigator summarised it: ‘It just doesn’t make sense to me. 
For one thing it is a pea-and-thimble trick: it’s not actually 
going to save any water. But the main thing is this: why on 
earth would you spend an extra $1500 on every outlet 
when you’re trying to rationalise your assets in the first 
place?’
Degradation of the river channel
The Barmah Choke limits the amount of water that can be 
delivered within a given period to irrigators on the Murray 
below the Barmah–Millewa Forest. The demand for new 
developments is mostly below the Choke. The Torrumbarry 
system, which is below the Choke on the Murray, is 
therefore a source of water to be traded. Water from the 
Goulburn River, which services Pyramid–Boort, is also 
increasingly being traded into the Murray. Irrigators in 
Pyramid–Boort noted the potential environmental impacts 
of this trend in order to highlight their concerns about 
water trading:
All the development is taking place in a little zone 
between Swan Hill and Hattah. And what would 
happen if, say, half Goulburn–Murray Water’s water—
let’s say 600 000–700 000 megalitres—were allowed to 
go down the river. Suddenly what you’ve got is all that 
water has got to go down in a 120- to 140-day period 
because nearly all the water is used in that three 
months. And then you’ve got this increased pressure, 
and at that stage the Murray is going to be really stuffed 
really quickly—not to mention the fact that they’ve 
have rooted the [Goulburn–Murray Irrigation District]. 
There is no rule that says the land that was originally 
developed for irrigation 100 years ago is the most 
appropriate land for more development now. And the 
set of circumstances have changed, so I’ve got no 
particular problem with that. I just don’t think the 
change should be laissez-faire … It’s not about capital. 
The approach up to now is that basically it’s capital. 
Well, bloody pump it uphill if we can; you can take it 
anywhere you like. It’s not capital, it’s a natural 
resource and it should be utilised where it is sustainably 
available, and in a lot of cases that doesn’t necessarily 
relate to the fact that I’m at Pyramid and I’m a redneck 
and don’t you bastards take the water away from 
Pyramid. There are also sound environmental reasons 
… I didn’t invent the Living Murray, [but] why don’t you 
comply with it? I didn’t write the Murray–Darling Basin 
Agreement clauses 46 and 47, which say that the states 
aren’t allowed to increase flows in the Murray without 
consulting the Murray–Darling Basin Commission.
The build-up of pest plants and animals
Agricultural land that is being managed neither for 
irrigation nor for dryland farming has a higher incidence of 
pest plants and animals. This increases the inoculum 
potential for neighbouring properties.
Cognitive dissonance in the irrigation 
community
Cognitive dissonance is the uncomfortable tension that comes 
from holding two conflicting thoughts at the same time. 
The theory of cognitive dissonance sees those contradictory 
thoughts serving as a force that compels the mind to acquire 
or invent new thoughts or beliefs or to modify existing beliefs, 
so as to reduce the amount of dissonance (conflict) between 
attitudes, emotions, beliefs or behaviours. In the extreme, 
people’s mental health can depend on their being able to 
reduce the conflict between those different thoughts. 
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Certain about the future potential of their 
enterprise but uncertain about the future 
of the district
Many irrigators in Pyramid–Boort are prospering. Some of 
them are doing so in inconvenient parts of a delivery system 
that is being subjected to much scrutiny in relation to its 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness. One Goulburn–Murray 
Water employee gave an example: ‘There’s one big farmer; 
everyone around him has just about disappeared and he is 
right up the very end of the system, but he’s got a heap of 
water. So we have to put 18 megs down the system so he can 
take 10 megs, so he’s where we’re getting big losses but he’s 
also a massive customer’.
Farmers contemplating major on-farm investment must take 
account of the potential outcomes of reconfiguration:
When we built the rotary we were positive for the future. 
You don’t spend three-quarters of a million dollars just on 
hope. But, given there are some limitations, the decision 
we had to make—whether we build it or not—wasn’t 
about the economics of it; it was about the viability of 
the area. That was the decision we had to make: In 20 
years is that channel going to still have water in it? The 
decision wasn’t: Is our business capable of financing it or 
capable of growing fast enough to sustain it? The decision 
was: Are we going to be here in 15 years as a community? 
And are we going to be here as an irrigation district? 
That’s the decision we had to gamble on … And it’s very 
hard for the shire, or anybody, to attract development 
and new business with this hanging over our heads: 
Are we going to be here in 10 years’ time? … OK, the 
government can come out and say, ‘We are not going to 
shut anyone down’, but everyone knows that in reality, 
if the pendulum swings far enough, one day they will 
say, ‘Righto’ and change their minds. 
Farmers have investment cycles, and ideally reconfiguration 
timetables should take account of these. One farmer who 
is involved in the reconfiguration process described his 
dilemma in these terms:
Look, I’ve got my own investment decisions to make. 
There are investment cycles on my farm, just like there 
are investment cycles for Goulburn–Murray Water. If I 
am growing lucerne I need to plough it up every five to 
10 years and think about the irrigation layout at the same 
time. I know exactly what I would do if I only had to 
worry about the farm. The trouble is I have no bloody 
certainty about whether GMW is going to invest in the 
upkeep—let alone the improvement—of the infrastructure 
to get water to my farm. If they don’t, I’ll quite likely lose 
a lot of money on what I’m sure would otherwise be a 
good investment.
Another irrigator thought more recognition of these on-
farm cycles should be built into the reconfiguration process:
I’ve got no problem with the fact that water trade should 
occur. I just think, because of the fact that we are starting 
from a socialist-based system, there should be more rules 
and regulation with respect to protecting the business 
interests of the people who are continuing to farm 
profitably. If you are going to shut things down, 
do it in timing with our business cycles.
Wanting to farm but knowing there is more 
money to be made trading water
People like to be busy. It is sometimes hard to sit still, even 
if that is demonstrably the best option:
The thing is, even with this water trading, all this depends 
on the age of people. The old boys, you talk to them 
around here, and there’s a lot of probably over-60 farmers 
right round me, I’m the only one under 40 or 45. And all 
those blokes just do the same old thing if they got 25 megs 
or 200 megs: they just tip it out. It’s just what they’ve 
done all their life—like my old man; I had to really nut 
him down. I can’t make any money out of growing wheat 
with water; we only pay $35 a meg for it but if we sold it 
on the open market we’d get $400–$600 for it. We can’t 
make money putting it out on our lucerne or our wheat 
crops because you still have to get the crops off. And it 
124   The economic and social impacts of water trading
took me probably three years for Dad to start seeing that. 
Whereas these other old blokes they haven’t got the young 
blokes on their farm, so they are stuck in this mentality 
of doing the same thing every year because that’s what 
they have always done. The bottom line doesn’t really 
come into it. If they’ve got some crop to strip at the end 
they are bloody happy because that’s their life. They love 
getting out on the old machines.
Wanting to expand and maintain the community
Many of the irrigators interviewed have conflicting emotions 
about the depopulation of rural areas. They speak with a 
sense of loss about the demise of the local footy club or the 
dwindling numbers at the local school, but in the next breath 
they speak, with justifiable pride, about the way they have 
survived in farming and how they have managed to build up 
their holding of land and water by buying out other farmers. 
Some even speak of their ambition to buy more farms.
Empathy for those in trouble but disdain  
for those who do not sell a ‘going concern’
Irrigators are reconciled to the continuing amalgamation  
of properties. They know this means fewer farmers and thus 
fewer people in the area and fewer children in the schools. 
Accordingly, irrigation communities rail against what they 
see to be the underlying reasons for people feeling they need 
to sell, but at the same time they have much sympathy for 
community members who can no longer continue farming. 
There but for Fortune go we.
Property amalgamation is a familiar, if somewhat 
discomforting, part of the farming scene. The exit is mourned, 
and the purchase is made as dignified as possible. 
The change is understood to be an opportunity for neighbours 
as much as a loss for the community. No one can begrudge 
the purchaser their gain. Rather, there is almost a sense of 
noble obligation surrounding the purchase: someone must 
keep up the good fight.
Separating the sale of land and water changes this dynamic. 
It opens the possibility that the vendor will, in effect, cause 
irrigation to cease on that property. This, in turn, will bring 
about a net reduction in irrigation in the local area. 
In all districts social norms have emerged to guard against 
this. But at the same time there is also a ‘game of chicken’ 
going on. Most do not want to sell, but if things start going 
that way they do not want to be the last to sell because that 
would probably mean selling at a discount.
In Pyramid–Boort the spectre of reconfiguration has converted 
this underlying tension into a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’. In game 
theory, the prisoner’s dilemma is a game in which a player 
can ‘cooperate’ with or betray the other player. Each player’s 
sole concern is maximising their own benefit—without having 
any regard to the other player’s outcome. The two prisoners 
are arrested, are placed in separate cells, and are unable 
to communicate with each other. Each is given the same 
proposition: ‘If you confess and your opponent says nothing, 
I’ll drop your charges and make sure that your opponent gets 
10 years. If your opponent confesses and you remain silent, 
they’ll go free and you’ll get 10 years. If you both confess 
you’ll both get two years. If you both remain silent, you’ll 
both get six months’.
The dilemma is that, in equilibrium, rational choice leads 
each player to choose to defect (betray), even though both 
would be better off by cooperating. The game illustrates the 
conflict between individual and group rationality. A group 
whose members pursue individual self-interest can all end 
up worse off than a group whose members appear to act 
contrary to their individual rational self-interest. 
In the real world of Pyramid–Boort, those irrigators that 
remain after each permanent water sale understand the 
attraction of ‘defecting’, but they put pressure on each 
other to ‘cooperate’. There are opportunities to punish 
non-cooperative acts:
We had a couple on the Water Service Committee that 
traded—permanently traded—their water. And at the 
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next election they were booted off. So I think there’s a 
measure of what the community thought. And not only 
that, but the community then got concerned because 
they thought, ‘Heck, here’s two of our representatives on 
the Water Service Committee. They’ve permanently traded 
their water. What do they know that we don’t know?’
The subtlety and sophistication of the dilemma are not well 
understood by the nearby townsfolk. They are affected by 
the ultimate decisions, but they are free of the burden of 
continuously weighing up the pros and cons of defecting 
or cooperating.
Wanting to sell a going concern but mindful  
that the buyer might separate water and land
The prisoner’s dilemma comes to the fore whenever a 
Pyramid–Boort irrigator is confronted with the decision 
to sell. One irrigator described the difficult thought 
processes involved:
There is a property over the channel that a mate of mine 
actually bought. Anyway he bought the water with the 
land, sold the water to the olives, and then about a year 
later sold the property. And now that place is just vacant. 
I agree that that shouldn’t really happen … but then it 
depends on the property. Like, you get some salty ground, 
the water should be taken off. If we sold our property 
with the water on it, and we get x amount but then a 
mate buys it and sells the water off it and gets as much 
as what he bought the property for, and he walks away 
and then sells the property. Then we’re thinking we did 
the right thing by selling the water with it, but old mate 
doesn’t care and he made bloody $100 000 more. So we 
think we are doing a service by keeping it all together, but 
people just don’t care. But it’s not right to sell it separate, 
it’s probably right to keep it together but people don’t 
do it. It depends on the ground. People are going to 
do it, though.
Community views 
in Pyramid Hill
Pyramid Hill is a small township situated at the foot of a 
hill that is almost an exact triangular pyramid of granite. 
The town lies 40 kilometres east of Boort, 84 kilometres 
north of Bendigo, 50 kilometres south of Kerang and 
252 kilometres north of Melbourne. It is in Loddon Shire 
and is administered through the shire office in Wedderburn, 
which is 72 kilometres away. The 2001 census found the 
population of Pyramid Hill to be 492 people; it is now 
estimated to be around 400 people.
After an initial general description, this chapter presents 
the findings of interviews conducted with a cross-section 
of Pyramid Hill residents. 
Economic profile
Pyramid Hill is surrounded by the Tragowel Plains, which 
support mixed dryland cropping, beef and sheep grazing, and 
irrigation enterprises, particularly dairying. Average annual 
rainfall is 350 millimetres, producing in dryland cereal crops 
yields of about 2.5 tonnes a hectare and 1.3 tonnes a hectare 
for canola and peas. Irrigated areas also produce wheat, 
barley, triticale, canola and maize, with higher, consistent 
yields averaging about 4.5 tonnes a hectare for cereals, 
2.5 tonnes a hectare for canola, and 10 tonnes a hectare 
for maize. Among the new crops to the area are walnuts, 
cherries, apples, pumpkins, watermelon, potatoes, 
peppermint and forestry (Pyramid Hill 2006).
Farmers in the region were some of the first to successfully 
manage their operations within the constraints of a saline 
water table that was rising. The Pyramid Salt Company has 
dealt with the salinity problem by producing high-quality salt 
and in the process reclaiming farmland in the surrounding 
area. A million litres of bore water are pumped each day 
into a series of 13 solar evaporation ponds in which the salt 
crystallises. This salt is then harvested, purified, dried, sifted 
and bagged. A profitable sideline is the production of brine 
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shrimp, which are grown in heated tanks and sold to the 
aquarium industry and fish farms (Pyramidsalt 2006). Other 
industries in Pyramid Hill are Pyramid Quarries, a pet-food 
company and an abattoir. Rural supplies, mechanical repairs, 
small machinery, hay baling, laser levelling, excavating and 
cartage businesses support the local primary producers.
Community services
The Pyramid Hill community has a preschool, a primary 
school and a secondary college. There is a neighbourhood 
house, a golf club and a swimming pool, as well as several 
sporting clubs. The four churches are managed by lay 
people and supported by clergy from neighbouring towns. 
Rail and road access to Melbourne is good, and there is a 
community bus.
Service provision is very limited in the community. There are 
no banks—only agency services. Community health services 
are available, but there is no doctor or hospital. There was a 
hospital and a full-time doctor, but these have been replaced 
by district nursing available five days a week and a doctor 
who visits for one-and-a-half days a week. The hospital has 
become a modern aged care facility, which allows older 
residents to remain in their community.
One of the service providers interviewed said the 
community had adapted well to the reduction in services, 
which had the potential to have a significant social impact. 
In the absence of an ambulance service, the community 
has formed an emergency response team; the members are 
volunteers who have received basic first aid training and are 
rostered to respond to any emergency that arises. They have 
a vehicle equipped for emergencies. The older people in the 
community now feel more secure. The community has access 
to a range of counselling services and programs to support 
local farm families.
The service provider maintained that, compared with city 
areas, health services in the country are quite good: there are 
no waiting lists; district nurses can attend five times a week 
if necessary; and nurses have flexibility because there are 
fewer patients. People do acknowledge that they would not 
receive that level of nursing care in the city. If things are bad 
enough, people can get in to see a doctor. Accommodation 
and travel can be arranged for people who must travel in 
order to receive specialist care.
Community profile
Figure B.2 summarises the community profile of the 
Loddon North Statistical Local Area.
Community strengths
When asked what were the best things about Pyramid Hill, 
project participants focused on the friendliness of the people, 
their tenacity, and their strong commitment to the community. 
One participant said, ‘It’s the climate and the friendly 
people—it’s a very good community. We can do what 
we like. There is a lot of freedom’. Another responded:
It’s a good community—probably because I’m involved 
in a lot of things in town and my husband is involved in 
even more. When we had to raise $8000 this year to cover 
the wages of preschool staff because the government 
won’t give money, the whole community helps. When 
we go to build a new hall or do something else, everyone 
gets in and helps. This Friday night we are holding a street 
event for Christmas to launch a community bus. The 
Lions [Club] will run a talent quest. We have a community 
response team because we don’t have an ambulance. 
They are going to take over the scout hall. People were 
just giving them a donation to fix up the scout hall. 
People are just great.
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Figure B.2 London North Statistical Local Area: community profile
NOTE: The blue circles on the bar graphs and the lines on the pie 
charts denote corresponding percentages for Australia in total.
SOURCES: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Google Maps.
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Community cohesion
Pyramid’s core community is a traditional, conservative rural 
community of farming families and town residents who are 
predominantly elderly retired people, often from farms in 
the region. No Indigenous Australians live in Pyramid Hill. 
Although participants stressed the strength and dedication 
of the community, it was evident that these characteristics 
are confined to only one section of the community. Labour 
requirements for the town’s factories have seen an influx of 
workers from outside the community, many of these people 
having come from other countries. Some live in the town, but 
many are transient, travelling daily from elsewhere. They form 
a sizeable ‘other’ group in the community.
One participant explained, ‘The community is a mixture 
of working-class and farming families. There are a number 
of labour-intensive industries—abattoirs, pet-food factory 
and salt works—and the workers have a strong working-
class background’. Another observed, ‘There are different 
communities within the whole. Pyramid has got 20 or 30 
families that are the core of the place and they are the ones 
who are out there involved in things. There is another welfare-
dependent community that tend to keep to themselves and 
don’t contribute to the town’. The core community was, 
however, celebrated as a caring, united group. One woman 
spoke of the overwhelming support she and her partner had 
received from the community when they faced a crisis: 
‘Growing up here was hard because everyone knows 
everyone else, but they are the first people to help’.
A nurse described how her farm family had bought the 
neighbouring farm in order to extend their operation. The 
owner of the farm they bought was an 85-year-old and wanted 
to continue living in the farmhouse. But the property was 
50 kilometres from Kerang and the only ‘meals on wheels’ 
provided were frozen meals, and he had no microwave oven. 
So the nurse and other neighbours provided the support 
he needed. She said the shire is very supportive of the 
community, despite limited resources, and raises funds 
for a community meal that is held weekly in one of the 
community halls in the district to provide a social outing 
and sustain community connectedness. Two cars travel 
from Pyramid Hill each week.
The local Progress Association was cited as an example 
of community pride in the town. The shire representative 
observed: 
In Pyramid Hill there are some people who are very 
passionate about that community; they are small in 
number and probably not sufficiently sophisticated in 
their community processes to build community support 
behind them. Nevertheless, there is a traders group that 
is very passionate about their town and want it to prosper 
and be a nice place to live and put a lot of their own 
personal time and energy into pursuing that.
A Progress Association member supported this: ‘Our 
development committee has members in their 30s and we 
are in our 50s. So we feel we are a bit lucky because we have 
some young people who are willing to learn. They are the 
ones driving the basketball and other things, and that’s a big 
thing in a small community’.
Community problems
Several residents described the loss of water in the district 
as ‘a challenge that affects everyone’. One added, ‘Water 
is life. No water, no production. I’m very concerned that 
water is leaving this district. This is an important town but 
the businesses are struggling. Medical services are not as 
good as they used to be’.
The local shire representative said population loss was the 
main challenge:
The Mallee towns of Sea Lake, Manangatang have emptied 
out of people. Towns that were thriving 30 years ago 
have now lost their policeman, their doctor, and may 
have one student in Year 12. It’s not really viable to 
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maintain those services. We don’t want it to happening 
to our towns, and we see the depopulation of rural 
Victoria progressing south—and as a municipality 
it’s our objective to arrest this. 
Employment for young people in the district was limited to 
the pet-food factory, the quarry or the abattoir. There are few 
opportunities for apprenticeships, and few young people 
remain in farming.
Another problem is the lack of housing:
The greatest challenge is housing. It’s a huge problem. 
Most of the labour for the pet food company and the 
abattoir is imported from Bendigo, Kerang and 
Wedderburn. The abattoir is actually bringing in people 
from overseas, from South America, New Zealand, to work 
there. Allied to that is the difficulty of getting professional 
people to live in the community due to the size of the 
town and very poor housing stock. 
The lack of accommodation in the community is one of the 
reasons workers travel in from other towns, something that 
is costly for them and also for the town because they do not 
spend money locally. A few have relocated to Pyramid Hill. 
Since many of these workers are immigrants or people of 
lower socio-economic status, they come with support needs. 
There have been problems with violence, which has caused 
anxiety among many of the older people in the community. 
One resident explained:
The only thing wrong with our community is that we have 
a pet food factory and an abattoir that brings a lot of 
itinerant workers who are not interested in the community. 
So we have to carry them. Every community has that: you 
have to carry some people. The biggest challenge is that 
governments are putting more and more responsibility 
on communities. You have to get things done in your 
community and it’s hard work. 
The impacts of water trading 
on the farming community
The Pyramid Hill district has witnessed considerable 
movement of water out of the district. One project 
participant provided an overview of the status of the 
local industry:
Pyramid Hill has its roots in agriculture. Irrigation came 
earlier than Boort. The soil types are less fertile. They are 
heavier clays and it has suffered more from rising water 
tables and associated salinity than Boort has. There is 
certainly some country that should never have been 
irrigated. And a lot of that is no longer irrigated, and that’s 
something that water trading has allowed to happen. 
Growing not much more than irrigated barley grass to 
fatten lambs is not a sustainable use of irrigation water. 
The loss of water from the Pyramid–Boort irrigation area 
is a significant challenge for both towns. And that’s a loss 
of water brought about by water trading. In one way, the 
agriculture sector in Pyramid Hill has benefited greatly 
from the spell of dry years because it’s reduced the water 
table in the Pyramid Hill area. I have to say that the 
country has never looked better. But last year and this 
year have been the crunch because water allocation has 
been reduced drastically. It’s got to the point where the 
dry years aren’t helping the community.
He added:
In a lot of these towns their fortune swings and turns 
on the agriculture sector around them, and they are in 
a bit of strife at present. There is a lot of dairying around 
Pyramid Hill, and in my view that is the industry most 
exposed to this drought. Dryland farmers are used to 
going through tough years with no rain and no water. 
Cropping irrigation farmers are similarly used to it and 
more geared to tough times. Dairy farmers have had 
regular income streams until recently and usually carry 
much higher debt exposure, to the point where some 
will borrow up to 90 per cent of next year’s milk cheque. 
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There is not going to be a milk cheque next year. I think 
they are the least prepared financially for what we are 
going through. I think this sector will show the first signs 
of distress from this drought. We are already seeing it. 
There are some very good dairy farmers out there, but 
some of them have folded up. 
Local farmers also provided their observations. One was 
proud of the farmers’ achievements in overcoming salinity:
There is no question that salinity has been huge factor 
impacting on this community. This has been the big 
success story of this community. Twenty years ago it 
would have been written off as a saline wasteland. But 
the community, with the assistance of government, has 
this land-clearing project and salinity is no longer an issue 
here. People know how to manage it. It’s been a big 
turnaround. It just shows what people can do. We now 
have to lever off the back of that success to get the 
irrigation system reconfigured.
Another farmer, with a 3800-hectare property producing 
dryland crops, irrigated lucerne, sheep and stud animals, 
had elected to ride out the dry times by putting in a feedlot 
and buying grain to sustain the stud breeding stock. Water 
is now used just for stock and not for pasture. She said:
I tell my husband, ‘Don’t feel you have to stay’. We have 
always considered the farm to be a business. We aren’t 
focused on the kids taking over. But we are committed 
to the area and involved in the community, so we are 
committed to making it work. But we can get up and go 
if we want to. I feel sorry for those farmers who are close 
to retiring. They are stuck, and I understand why they sell 
their water. Some stay on their blocks and some move 
in with their families. 
When asked about drought-assistance packages, she 
commented:
The viability of a farm needs to be assessed. We are just 
treading water. We don’t get any assistance. We put in 
this feedlot a year ago and there are subsidies for feedlots, 
but we are not eligible. It’s frustrating. It seems those who 
are progressive and good managers are not supported. 
Those who are not viable put their hand out and get it. 
In the long run they will survive. Some people need to 
be made aware there is a life after farming. If a farm is 
viable, they should be given some support. 
Perceptions of water trading
The benefits
One of the local farmers offered a positive perspective on the 
costs and benefits of water trading: ‘There are big farms in 
this area, with a lot of land laid out for irrigation. The ability 
to bring water in when the price is right—and especially in 
autumn when the price of water is lower and use that to start 
winter crops—is a huge advantage’.
Another participant agreed:
The benefits of permanent trade for farmers are the ability 
to reduce some debt and retire from farming with dignity. 
The fact is that water rights have given farmers a source of 
superannuation that they wouldn’t have otherwise have 
had if there hadn’t been water trade. There have been 
some environmental benefits. Water has left land that is 
the least desirable for irrigation, and that has reduced 
problems with the rising water table and meant that 
irrigation is conducted on better class lands now by 
people who really value the water they receive.
The costs
One longstanding member of the community, a retired dairy 
farmer, echoed the fear of many residents that water would 
be taken from the community. He argued for uniform 
development, as it had been in the past, rather than having 
communities such as that of Pyramid Hill left desolate.
A member of a large farm family noted that many farmers 
in the area are against the sale of permanent water:
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It is against their principles and values, but they need the 
money and do what they have to. The crops are in, but 
they are really only good for hay. The water trade is a 
better option. Business is business. But when the water 
is gone it devalues the land. The properties look awful, 
terrible; it is not attractive aesthetically and productivity 
wise. People might buy the land but they can’t afford the 
water. It’s a snowball effect. So trade is OK for short-term 
finance but not for the long term.
There was talk of profiteering: ‘One fellow bought 20 farms 
and sold all the water from them. Those farms are overstocked, 
blowing dust; he hasn’t hired anybody. It’s a disaster’.
Another participant was concerned about stranded assets: 
‘The costs fall hardest on the community as a whole as 
services retreat. Also on irrigators as there are stranded assets, 
and the cost of managing those assets increases’. He was, 
however, able to conclude objectively:
If you look at it from the point of view of a small 
community then the costs outweigh the benefits. 
But if you look at it from a macro perspective the 
answer is different. The fact of the matter is it might ruin 
this community, but where the water goes that community 
will be strengthened. Any discussion about water trade 
has to look at the difference between the micro and the 
macro. Water trading is all about price and pricing signals, 
and water is always going to move to highest value and 
higher value goods [and] the community is better off than 
if it was produced locally. That’s the macro-economic 
argument but one that must be born in mind.
The impacts of water trading 
on the non-farming community
The associated industry perspective
One business that received 60 per cent of its income from 
local agricultural operations reported that the business had 
fluctuated in the last few years. There were good returns in 
2003. Water trading had had an impact on the business 
because where there were five farm families now there is 
one. Local industries—the abattoir and pet-food factory—
were providing enough work to sustain them. In the past six 
months, though, business had been very slow: ‘Normally we 
are flat out at this time of the year. But there are no crops. 
Still, we are better off than the Mallee area’.
A company owner noted that since 2003 farmers had reduced 
their spending, and 2005 had been a very quiet year. Even 
if farmers were able to produce a crop, the prices received 
were down. At the time the business was stable. 
A contractor reported:
Ninety-five per cent of our business is farms, but the 
number of farms has halved. We cover a big area, from 
Cohuna to Boort and right down to Dingee, because 
there is no other service around. The East Loddon School 
has lost 80 children over the last two years with dairy 
farmers moving away. With deregulation and farmers 
buying out their neighbours, dairy farmers and share 
farmers have gone. We are worried about a company 
that looks like they are cutting back. We’ve done their 
maintenance for 25 years, but as things break down 
they are not fixing them. The olives at Boort have been 
really good for our business. The town is missing the 
farmers that were there because these people don’t use 
the same supplies as the farmers did. 
Asked what were the greatest risks for the business, 
she responded:
Farmers having no money and can’t pay their bills. 
It’s hard not being able to do what they want done. 
The [power company] has just been around and some 
of the farmers have just been hit with fairly big defects. 
We had one farmer who had a major job and he just 
didn’t have the money. And he is one of the bigger dairy 
farmers. We worked with the power company to see if we 
could do the least we can. I think we got the price down 
to about a third and he is paying it off. It puts pressure 
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on everyone. It puts pressure on him because he has to 
do it. We have pressure because we have to pay suppliers. 
We have to say we might be a bit slow this month because 
we are waiting on this other fellow to pay.
The owner of one of the larger businesses in town had 
recently placed the business on the market:
Years ago, I probably traded 50–50 with dairy farming and 
dryland beef and local businesses, and it would lucky to 
be 15 per cent of dairy now, largely due to deregulation 
and farms downsizing. But the biggest influence is water. 
People have just sold water and got off the farm. Most of 
the dairy farmers that have sold have either stayed on the 
farm and are dryland farming or they are selling and 
moving to other areas, and along with that goes their 
share farmer and workers. So far, business is stable. After 
Christmas it might change. If the conditions are the same 
we will be reducing staff. It’s hard to keep positive.
The central business area
When asked how water trading had affected the Pyramid 
Hill central business area, the shire representative observed:
Pyramid Hill has two or three substantial factors that 
influence it. To draw a picture of what Pyramid Hill will 
look like in 10 years is hard. It’s very dependent on the 
pet-food factory: there is substantial employment there. 
It’s reasonably reliant on the abattoir, although that’s 
generally a transient workforce. It has opened and closed 
at times, and Pyramid Hill pushes on regardless. The 
pet-food factory has recently undergone a large upgrade. 
That’s gives us a bit of confidence that there is a future 
for the factory … Pyramid Hill supports the agricultural 
sector around it but the number of people living in 
the agricultural sector is reducing, and I can see that 
continuing in the next few years. So, unless there is an 
injection of people from a different source, the town is 
going to lose population. The housing stock is probably 
not likely to attract active people into the community. 
Houses are coming on the market and staying on the 
market a long time. No one is buying in Pyramid Hill.
The owner of a local business was finding it difficult to 
compete when people were shopping out of the town 
because, he believed, they preferred cheaper prices over 
quality. His business was down because there were fewer 
people in the district, and those remaining had little to spend: 
‘If the farmers get no money we don’t get money. It’s difficult 
because people expect credit’. He also noted that many 
people working in the town were transient and rarely spent 
money in the community. He said the neighbouring town of 
Leitchfield had lost several businesses, including a cheese 
factory, whereas Pyramid Hill had remained fairly stable 
despite turnover having stagnated. He remained optimistic, 
though: ‘I’ll play it by ear for the next 12 months. But if there 
is no rain next year …’
A business manager noted the ageing of the population and 
said the business tended not to carry many unnecessary or 
expensive items because people tend not to spend money 
on those things. Another participant observed:
The threat to Pyramid is water trading out of the district. 
It is inevitably going to mean fewer farms, bigger farms, 
and one of the things linked to that is the need for us to 
have decent housing and a nice town for all the people 
who are going to work on these farms. People haven’t 
invested in housing because rural house prices haven’t 
risen to the point that you can make money. If you want 
to put up a nice house you are up for a minimum of 
$200 000, and there is not a house in Pyramid Hill 
that has ever sold for that.
The community
The local schools have also been affected by changes 
in water allocation. One of the headmasters reported:
We got a $50 000 grant last year to put in an irrigation 
system on our sports ovals on the basis of our allocation 
of 17 megalitres, and now they are saying we will only 
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get 20 per cent. So we have a very expensive irrigation 
system but we will have to buy water at a very high cost 
to maintain the playing facilities for our school and for 
our community. 
One participant concluded that the town would persist 
despite the challenges it faces: ‘There is huge resilience in 
this community—the ability to knuckle down and do what’s 
required. Nothing will hinder them’. Another added, ‘Tough 
economic times and drought conditions don’t help us. Having 
towns that look like they are deserted because their lawns 
are dead and there’s no greenery in the main street is working 
against us. Our focus is to drive economic development. Its 
tough, but it brings jobs and people’. And, as one of the most 
senior residents argued, ‘The more we can do for ourselves, 
the better we are placed to resist the abandonment of this 
community’.
Discussion
The benefit of water trading for Pyramid Hill has been 
the reduction in salinity and the emergence of innovative 
ventures such as Pyramid Salt. Some farmers in the district 
have been able to maximise the benefits of water trading, 
but the community has not fared as well. 
Of all of the case study communities, this was the saddest. 
The loss of water from the district has meant the loss of 
farms and productivity and a consequent loss of people 
and income for the town. The traditional residents who 
remain are passionate about their community, committed 
to sustaining what they have, and deeply concerned that, 
should water be totally removed from the district, the town 
will die. Unemployment is relatively low because of the job 
opportunities at the factories. Further reductions in water 
allocation could affect supplies for the pet-food factory and 
the abattoir. Being within an hour’s drive of larger regional 
centres, many workers would probably leave in search of 
other employment opportunities. 
In most respects Pyramid Hill can be described as a typical 
rural community. The only factor that perhaps distinguishes 
it is the large cohort of transient workers, who form a distinct 
‘other’ group. Members of the core community of Pyramid 
Hill choose to live there. They accept that there are 
compromises that must be made as a result of that choice. 
They understand that not all services and facilities will be 
available, but basic services that sustain the fabric of the 
community are justifiably expected. As is the case for the 
Cohuna community, health services at Pyramid Hill are 
under threat because of the continued population decline. 
This could lead to the loss of a doctor and the aged care 
facility. With no ready access to medical services, many 
people will leave. Once services are withdrawn it is 
difficult to have them reinstated.
There is a strong attachment to place among the residents, 
many of whom are elderly and would prefer not to leave 
the district. But by all accounts this community is tenacious, 
and ventures such as Pyramid Salt are evidence that it is 
also creative.
Community views in Boort
Boort is about 100 kilometres north of Bendigo, 52 kilometres 
south of Kerang and 250 kilometres north-west of Melbourne. 
Like neighbouring Pyramid Hill, it is part of Loddon Shire 
and is managed through the shire office in Wedderburn, 
which is 40 kilometres to the south.
At the time of the 2001 census, the population of Boort 
was 760. It is now estimated to be 800, with 1600 people 
in the immediate district. The town is built around a group 
of waterways and lakes, including Little Lake Boort, which 
is a popular attraction for water skiers, the owners of power 
boats and sailing craft, birdwatchers and bushwalkers 
(Loddon Shire 2006).
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As part of this project, a small group of residents participated 
in a focus group. Harvest had begun in the district, which 
prevented many interested farmers attending. As a result, 
several face-to-face interviews were conducted in order 
to obtain additional information. After an initial general 
description, this chapter presents a summary of the findings. 
Economic profile
Agriculture—dryland and irrigation cropping and sheep and 
cattle production—forms the basis of the local economy. 
Vegetable growing, primarily tomatoes, occupies a very 
small area but is important in economic terms.
Boort’s climate and soil quality, as well as access to water 
via the Waranga Western Channel, have resulted in 
Timbercorp establishing a 2777 hectare olive plantation—
one of largest single olive groves in the world. An onsite 
olive oil–processing plant can process more than 50 000 
tonnes of olives a year for premium extra virgin olive oil 
and employs over 100 people. Among other new types 
of farming are a 143-hectare vineyard and aquaculture 
(Loddon Shire 2006). 
Associated industries in Boort include a hay mill, agricultural 
machinery supplies and repairs, and other rural supplies. 
Community services
Boort has a district hospital that offers medical care, 
minor surgery, residential aged care, dental services, and 
community health and support services. There are three 
doctors who service a wide area; one of them is stationed 
in Boort. There is a primary school and a secondary college. 
The Boort Resource and Information Centre is the Loddon 
Shire office and acts as a rural transaction centre. It provides 
a wide variety of services—adult education, a gymnasium, 
Centrelink access, and so on.
The town does, however, lack access to some services. 
For example, there are no physiotherapy services and there is 
no public transport, which particularly affects older people. 
Travellers need to take a bus to Durham Ox in order to 
connect to train services.
Community profile
Community strengths
Participants in the focus group were asked to define the best 
things about the Boort community. They were proud of the 
strength and unity of their community, which had remained 
steadfast despite drought and the downturn in agricultural 
industries. One explained:
In many other towns populations have gone backwards, 
but the population of this town has stayed strong. There 
are a great number of young people. The numbers in 
preschool, playgroup and schools have increased. I think 
it’s the unique location, the peace and quiet, and it the 
greenery around it; and it’s a strong community. 
Focus group participants were also asked what factors were 
contributing to population growth. One of the local business 
owners responded: 
There is a hay mill here, olives and 600 acres of grapes, 
which we never had before. The mills have been here 
about 25 years, and the amount of trucks that come 
through and bring hay here is enormous. But the 
drought’s had an impact on them. 
There is employment with the olives, and that flows 
into the town and to other businesses and they require 
employment. People have come here; they find a quiet 
and reasonable place to stay, and they are getting jobs. 
There have even been kids that have gone away to uni 
and got jobs and got married and started to have a family; 
then they have come back on farms. I can see what comes 
through my business, which wasn’t there before. 
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One rural business owner highlighted the value of the area 
for agricultural production:
The area north of Boort has the maize record—21 tonnes 
a hectare. You don’t do that on bad ground. It’s probably 
one of the biggest hay production areas. Plenty of fat 
lambs. Unfortunately, people drive through the worse 
part of the district on the Loddon Valley Highway, on 
the true Tragowel Plains, but there are some very diverse 
operations, dairying and horticulture. I would say with 
the soil and climate here, you could grow anything. 
A Loddon Shire representative observed:
Boort has a very strong history of dryland and irrigation 
farming. It’s a community that’s adapted very well to 
irrigation because of the soil types there and has done 
very well out of it. There are some quite substantial farming 
enterprises, particularly west of Boort, which provide 
great wealth to that community. There are tomato farmers 
north of Boort, which is a very successful industry. There 
are lucerne mills and specialist hay growers supporting 
those mills, which has also added to the economy. So 
it’s generally a very healthy economy. It’s a very proud 
community, parochial and rightly so: there is a lot to be 
proud of. They have put a lot of effort into beautifying 
the town and making it a nice place to live. 
Residents were very proud of their lake and its surrounds for 
what this brings to the community by being a place for people 
to come together, relax and have fun, as well as the tourist 
revenue it brings. The local caravan park is very popular 
during holiday periods but also provides accommodation 
for seasonal workers. One focus group participant said, 
‘The lake is the hub of the town, and in summer it makes the 
difference between just being a Mallee town and a tourist 
centre really. Harvest finishes in Mallee towns and nothing 
happens after that. They are just dead. But this is a hive of 
activity. The town’s population doubles in summer time’.
Another added:
It’s not only the people that use the lake: we have just had 
a rugby tournament, and people who hadn’t been to 
Boort before were really taken with the place. They said 
the aspect of a town with water—they will be back again. 
It’s a really good sporting town, too, because of the water. 
A lot of towns around us haven’t got water for their footy 
and cricket grounds, tennis and all that. Because we have 
the water, sport is really strong. We play north–central 
league. We have 17 teams in the competition; it’s pretty 
strong. They are all Mallee towns—Wedderburn, 
Wycheproof, Donald and Charlton. And there is netball 
and hockey.
An interview with one of Boort’s young people, who was 
about to leave for university in Melbourne, confirmed these 
observations. He valued the Boort community, the lake and 
the environment. A promising musician, he has had to travel 
to Kerang for music lessons for some years and now must 
go to Melbourne to continue his studies. He said fun for 
young people, such as going to the cinema, meant having 
to travel for one hour to Bendigo. He valued the local school 
and believed he benefited by being educated in a smaller 
school: ‘Everyone knows you. You can’t keep a secret, but its 
very friendly. You get used to what’s available. There is a lot 
of sport, tennis hockey and netball’. What he really missed 
as a result of living in a small community was access to 
broadband internet. Although the school had access, he 
found studying for Year 12 difficult without access at home.
Community cohesion
Most participants emphasised the strong community spirit 
in the town. One said:
I can remember back in 1990s when things were down 
in the dumps—the amalgamation of the shires—we lost 
confidence and everybody said, ‘How am I going to get 
out of here?’ But the community got together and got 
going again and tried to keep it at the high level it 
always has been.
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A health professional demonstrated the caring, supportive 
nature of the community. Because of the lack of services 
in town, hospital staff are careful not to ask people to leave 
hospital if they are not sure whether they have someone to 
care for them at home. The staff will ensure that someone 
provides post-operative care such as meals on wheels or 
home help—‘even to tucking them in at night if the 
patient chooses’.
As with the other communities studied for this project, 
churches play an important role in sustaining the Boort 
community. A local minister in Boort reported that the church 
was very strong: 100 people regularly attended services, and 
a youth group had 25 regular members. Home groups that 
meet regularly have provided support for individual families 
who were struggling. Recognising how important it is for 
people to get away from the farm, the church organises 
social events to allow people to come together. The minister 
reported, however, that, with the downturn in agriculture 
in recent years, up to 50 people had left the congregation. 
Young people also leave to attend university or work in 
the city. Sometimes their families follow them. 
The shire representative also acknowledged the community 
cohesion in Boort:
Boort is very cohesive. It’s not necessarily homogenous. 
There are quite a lot of differences amongst the people. 
But as a town they manage their affairs from within, and 
when Boort talks to us it speaks with one voice. It’s a 
consistent, solid message. They are very well organised. 
I think it comes from strong leadership in the town. That’s 
born out of a strong pride and a genuine desire by many 
in the town to make sure their town succeeds. 
Community problems
Boort faces many of the problems small communities face 
in Australia, among them a decline in local business, the 
loss of farm families from the district, an ageing population 
and, currently, the effects of drought and water restrictions. 
The shire representative observed, ‘Population loss is the 
greatest challenge. In fact, that’s the greatest challenge for 
this municipality and for all of rural Victoria—certainly 
northern Victoria. Farms are amalgamating. The farming 
sector is reducing in size’.
Crime was not a concern in Boort, although there were 
some minor problems with domestic violence and affray. 
The local police officer had been in the town for 19 years; he 
was well liked and respected and has obviously worked out 
how to police a small community effectively: ‘It’s a clean-
living town. If I come to them, they know there is a problem. 
They know how I operate. Stretch the rubber band but don’t 
break it. I might give someone a warning for a broken tail-
light, but if a month later it’s still not fixed they get a $150 
ticket’. He maintained that the crime rate was low because 
there was no public housing and he was adamant that theft of 
water or irrigation equipment would not occur in the district 
and that cannabis production was unlikely because of the 
lack of sufficient water: ‘It won’t happen here—not with 
the people I know’.
The impacts of water trading 
on the farming community
Participants described their experiences with water trading 
and the impact of the market on farming in the district. 
One began, ‘In our district we have two very distinct soil 
types. One is just hopeless without irrigation water; that’s 
our heavy black clay. Where a lot of water has been sold 
from is the red soils; they can farm them dry. But on the 
black soil it takes so much water just to get them wet’. 
Temporary trade in the district was seen as a valuable option 
if irrigators wanted to retain capital ownership of their water 
while generating an income by selling water. Market forces 
acting through the trade in water entitlements were, however, 
perceived to have major consequences for the district. One 
participant described permanent trade as ‘an elephant in the 
lounge room’; he continued:
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Economic rationalism has serious consequences for rural 
communities. It is the single biggest threat to this district. 
Pyramid and Boort irrigation area is a viable irrigation area. 
Permanent trade will see water from this area stripped out 
and leaves the water authority with significant stranded 
assets, with farming properties in an unviable situation 
at the end of a channel. While there is an economic 
argument that water should go to the highest economic 
use, the market is saying that grapes and citrus is the 
highest end use, which strips water from grazing, dairy 
and cropping country. But we have seen how feeble that 
market is if we look at what has happened to grapes. 
Meanwhile, the irrigation water from the Loddon is gone 
and will never return. It’s not a perfect market and the 
effects on micro-economies are devastating for the 
communities. 
A local agronomist agreed:
Permanent trade within the district is probably not an 
issue. But as soon as it leaves the district, every other 
irrigator has to pick up the bill for the infrastructure and 
the service. So you have the same cost spread across 
fewer people. It’s probably going to get worse with the 
removal of the cap. In an area like this, if farmers aren’t 
making money from their water and they have debt, the 
obvious thing is to sell the permanent water to get rid of 
the debt and trade on temporary water. But it’s a continual 
downward cycle. The whole district could be based on 
temporary. Get a year like this, GMW might not deliver 
a megalitre to the district. The security of the area is at 
severe risk. 
Participants in the focus group were united in their opposition 
to water leaving the district. They were also apprehensive 
about the long-term consequences for the community. 
One of the farmers explained: 
We have only got a small irrigation lot; most of our farm is 
dry. With the year that it was, it just wasn’t feasible to put 
water out on our crops because we only had 21 per cent. 
You couldn’t follow it through so it was better for us to 
sell some of that water temporarily so that we could have 
an income. It’s paying part of your water rates anyway. 
The permanent trade: I don’t think they should be 
separating the water from the land because the land where 
we are, without water, would be useless, you just can’t 
grow anything on it. 
Another continued:
In 2002 we only got 57 per cent of our allocation and the 
water was reasonably valuable and this year, of course. 
In other years, with 100 per cent allocation, it is OK 
because the price is not way up here. So people were 
still using it, still producing products. The problems arise 
when we have low allocations: well, it goes out because 
the fruit people have got to keep their trees alive, no 
matter what it costs. A lot of dairies have got into trouble 
because they have sold their water right and just live on 
temporary water and now it’s gone through the roof and 
they don’t have the water …
I think with the selling of water out of the district there will 
be changes. There seems to be people outside who are 
telling us—or seem to be leading us into a water policy 
that they really don’t know what the final outcome will 
be. There are people who perhaps haven’t had actual 
farming experience influencing the policy and we feel 
pretty helpless. 
People can’t afford to buy water, so it’s sold off separately. 
But people have to go on and live, so you can’t blame 
them for doing it. It’s too late now. The horse has bolted. 
I think the water still shouldn’t be allowed to leave the 
district, because that’s left farmers with the maintenance 
of channels. I don’t know what the future is for our district. 
With our irrigation season, our summer cropping program 
is just starting. But there is not going to be that income 
from lucerne, tomatoes, etc. because water allocations 
are so low. There is no commodity out there that we can 
grow that is worth $600, roughly the equivalent of a 
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megalitre. So water will be sold on the temporary market. 
I’d say you will start to see the cash flow problems early 
in the new year. 
He believed water trading in concert with the drought had 
affected the town:
This drought—well, we are in uncharted waters because 
we not only have a dry country drought we have an 
irrigation drought as well, so it’s going to be a double 
whammy. A lot of businesses around here are geared 
to irrigation with plant and staff, and that’s all sitting 
idle because we have an irrigation drought and that 
effect hasn’t kicked in yet. Probably the maintenance-
type spending is happening now. It’s a bit quiet. After 
Christmas, spending on new stuff and improvements 
is just not going to happen because there won’t be the 
cash there to do it. There are a lot of farmers out there 
that aren’t going to see a lot of income until this time 
next year.
Concerns were raised about stranded assets and uncertainty 
about continuity of the water supply: ‘I worry about the 
future implications of it. If too many people sell water off 
our channel I don’t think we will get our supplies. That is 
everyone’s problem’. One of the business owners added:
We own the water, not the government, but they 
keep changing the rules and the structures. Everyone  
is frightened the costs will go through the roof and we 
wont be able to use water. I don’t think I have many 
customers who are confident about buying more 
permanent water. They’re keener to sell because there is 
so much uncertainty at the moment. A lot of people are 
worried we could wake up tomorrow and the government 
will take our water. Governments, state and federal, have 
done so much to put uncertainty there, you couldn’t 
invest with confidence. 
The Timbercorp olive plantation was seen as a mixed blessing:
Because we have got the water coming in for the olives, 
it is a huge benefit of keeping the water in this area. 
It keeps your infrastructure and all that in place, like in 
the employment of water bailiffs etc. But the down side 
is that small irrigation properties … are selling their water 
and that’s going out of the district. They are not producing 
as much as they normally do and that leads to a loss of 
employment. We have sort of a mix here, the trade allows 
them to bring 18–20 000 megs into the area, which has 
been good for us, but the other side is that the water that 
is going out is a loss.
The impacts of water trading 
on the non-farming community
The focus group participants were asked about the impact of 
water trading on their local economy. Business owners were 
asked whether water trading had affected their business and 
about their perceptions of the impact on other businesses 
in the town. 
The associated industry perspective
One local business operator asked why more investment 
does not come to the area. He saw positives and negatives 
associated with managed investment schemes:
I can’t understand why water is moving to investment 
on the Lower Murray. Why isn’t the investment coming 
to the water? They create a bit of a false economy: they 
can pay whatever they like for water. Temporary water 
is currently $650 a megalitre. It would be interesting to 
see what it would be if the MISs didn’t exist. 
He explained:
They [the managed investment schemes] have a negative 
impact on towns. They don’t spend any money locally. 
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They bought out 10 of our customers and we would have 
dropped our turnover by half. As a result, we downsized 
staff. We only just got back there in the last three years. 
We offer more services; we travel further out to pick up 
more business. Several other businesses in town have 
suffered the same. Then the services—the doctors, the 
hospital and schools—they all suffer as well. They try 
and tell us that they do a lot for the town, but I’ve yet 
to see it.
We’ve only got one MIS here. Our type of business, they 
tender for nationally. There are really only two companies 
that can tender for it because they have locations at all 
their sites, which means that we can’t compete. They 
employ some locals and they would be spending money 
in town, but that’s limited. 
They have done more harm than good. The positive is 
they do bring in a lot of water. With that there is a lot 
of headaches. Customers below them get a lot of service 
issues when they start pumps. They don’t get any water, 
their wheels stop.
Fieldwork for the project coincided with the onset of 
harvesting dryland crops in the district. Although the harvest 
was small because of the drought, it was enough for local 
farmers to begin. The manager of a local tyre company 
reported that he was not noticing any downturn in his 
business with the restrictions in water, particularly at harvest 
time, because the dryland farmers need tyres to operate. The 
owner of a large, long-established agricultural machinery 
company with branches elsewhere in Victoria and in New 
South Wales did report that business had slowed, although 
he had not yet reached the stage of standing down staff. He 
was concerned, however, that he might have to consider this 
if the lack of rain and water persisted. He noted that there 
were some small pockets in the district that had crops and 
that the situation was far worse in New South Wales. He 
remained optimistic: ‘It will rain eventually and everything 
will return to normal’.
The central business area
In the central business area there were a number of 
empty shops. One resident explained that the town had 
lost businesses because people had left the district and 
because small local businesses are unable to compete with 
larger regional centres:
Boort over the last five years has really taken a big dive in 
local businesses. There are about eight shops in the main 
street in Boort, like craft and opportunity shops, that have 
moved in as other businesses have closed down, but 
they are shops that really have no impact on our local 
economy. All they are doing is filling up the space. We 
have lost our main electrical shop and the main clothes 
shop. It closed six months ago. We’ve lost one bank, our 
printing works, our motel and Elders. We are now back 
to one machinery dealer, and he is struggling, and we are 
down to two garages. We used to have a Holden dealer, 
a Ford dealer, a Nissan dealer and a Toyota dealer; they 
have all gone. 
He added:
I guess it’s all because farms have rationalised over the 
last 15 or so years. Once upon a time a 1000-acre farm 
was sufficient. Nowadays you need 3000–4000 acres. 
Farms have to get bigger to survive. For every four farms 
that are sold we lose three families. A lot of those families 
have moved on to bigger regional centres like Bendigo, 
Melbourne, Geelong, Ballarat and Echuca. People have 
come to expect more, and Boort is just a small rural town. 
Man can’t live on olives alone; we need more than olives 
in our community. I think it’s just a sign of the times. 
There’s really nothing bad that has happened in Boort—
there’ve been a lot of good things happen—but the fact is 
that the pressure is on small rural communities to survive. 
People nowadays have fast modern cars; they can travel 
to Kerang, Swan Hill, and Bendigo to do their shopping. 
Most of the businesses that are housed in a small town 
really have to compete with some of the larger ones in 
bigger towns, and it’s just too costly for businesses to stay 
open. They don’t make enough; they don’t sell enough.
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These concerns were echoed in the focus group:
The businesses that stay strong are the necessary ones, 
like the supermarket, the chemist, the hardware, or some 
other service that is important to the community. More 
shops may start, if people are just looking for something 
to keep them occupied. But it will be hard to get it back 
to where it was in the 1970s—the bottle shops, the 
bakeries, three milk bars and all that. 
A shire representative said:
The hay mill has just put off 15 employees because 
they don’t have the hay to process this year due to the 
low irrigation allocation and effectively no spring rain. 
There used to be two hay mills, but they have now 
amalgamated. If you work in a hay mill in Boort and get 
put off, you are not going to find other work in Boort. 
There is no industry, agricultural or other, that would be 
expanding. The olive plantation has their numbers pretty 
well secure I suspect. There could be some potential work 
with the harvest season, which starts in late March and 
goes through to the end of June, but that’s a long time 
between pay cheques for families. So the risk is those 
families will leave and they won’t come back.
A health worker in the town noted that the loss of jobs 
from the hay mill meant the hospital would probably lose 
two of its nurses because their partners were among those 
retrenched. 
The manager of one local business reported that his turnover 
was very dependent on the lake. In summer, if the lake is full 
the tourists contribute a great deal to the town’s economy. 
If water in the lake is down, though, the number of tourists is 
down and so is his business. When asked about the impact 
of Timbercorp on business, he said employees leave early in 
the morning and return home late at night and so tend not 
to spend money in the town.
Asked if water trading had affected council rates, the shire 
representative replied: 
Rates have remained reasonably stable because generally 
water retention has been reasonably stable. Within the 
irrigation region it’s moved around. It’s generally moved 
from small farms to larger corporate operations and large 
family farms. We might have lost a bit, but it hasn’t been 
substantial. However, we are about to lose a heap with 
the unbundling of water from land, which is a huge issue 
for us. We are about to have 12 per cent of our capital 
improved value removed from our rate book, which 
means if we don’t put our rates up we will lose revenue. 
We have been busy preparing our community for this 
increase in 18 months. The irrigation farmers will get a 
rate reduction because water from their land is removed. 
Their capital improved value will reduce so their rates 
will reduce. But dryland farmers, town, commercial and 
industrial properties will go up by about 10 per cent. If we 
don’t do that we will have to reduce services. There is not 
the fat in our budget that we can absorb that. We don’t 
think the community can stand a 10 per cent increase 
given that in 18 months they will still be recovering 
(or hopefully recovering) from severe drought.
The community
Drought and water restrictions have threatened Lake Boort. 
In 2005 the community petitioned authorities to ensure that 
the lake remained filled for the summer. The shire introduced 
a levy for boats and jet skis to meet the $15 000 cost of 
replacing the 500 megalitres of water lost to evaporation. 
The lake is seen as one of the few sporting lakes in the 
state with enough water left to operate. 
It was interesting to note that farmers were aware of the social 
value of the lake for the community and ‘parked’ their water, 
or stored it, in the lake until they needed it. There was a 
recognition that the area provided a release for people in 
the district who needed to escape from the pressures of the 
farm, particularly in times of severe drought. One resident 
explained:
The lake has only got 23 per cent, the same as the 
irrigators. We lose about 600 megalitres for the year 
through evaporation. Evaporation is a killer. In October 
this year we lost more water than we did in January 
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last year. Goulburn–Murray can use this lake as storage 
because we can get it back. We have put a pump in so 
that they can park 100 megalitres there and we can get 
it back. We can borrow to keep the lake full at its peak 
time and give it back in off-peak. The problem we had 
this year is because water has become so valuable and 
most of the water in the channel system has been sold. 
Hopefully, because of the drought and the social impact 
of not having water here, because this is the only lake 
within a huge area, we can convince the government to 
look at it. We have an excellent track record; we have 
always given back the water that we have borrowed—
never missed. The [Country Fire Authority] have come 
on board too because there is a huge fire risk with the 
drought. There is no other water in this area where they 
can pick up using their new choppers. There are no lakes, 
farm dams, whatever, that have any water, which makes 
this lake a huge asset for firefighting.
The focus group was asked, assuming normal climatic 
conditions, where they saw Boort in five years’ time. 
One replied: 
It should be good apart from this hiccup. It was improving 
all the time really. Boort is pretty wealthy; there is a lot 
of old money here. There are a lot of established people 
here. It is slightly breaking down at the moment, but just 
talking with others from different towns, there is a different 
ethos here. Kerang has a lot of children dropping out of 
school but we don’t have that problem. There is a good 
support system in the high school to encourage students 
to stay on with their studies. Pyramid is just too small 
to be really viable. Wedderburn has a lower social-
economic base and houses seem to be a lot cheaper. We 
don’t get that because the houses here are dearer. When 
you look at the actual farming areas around Wedderburn, 
its only grazing country not cropping like here. That’s the 
beauty of Boort. There are so many different things we 
can grow here because we have really good soils, water, 
and infrastructure like the Warranga channel which runs 
right through the place.
Discussion
Although Boort is only 40 kilometres west of Pyramid Hill, 
the two communities are very different. Boort does have 
the advantage of being a larger town, and certainly some 
of the soils are better, allowing more income from dryland 
agriculture. There is more wealth in the district, attested to 
by the attractive homes surrounding Lake Boort. There is a 
strong attachment to place, largely because of the long and 
prosperous history of traditional farming in the district. The 
community is also very cohesive: most people are local to 
the area and share similar values and goals. The lake is the 
town’s greatest attribute. The social benefit it provides for 
the town and for the wider district is vitally important and 
something that should be kept in mind in any future policy 
development for this area.
The Boort district is unique in that it has been both a 
significant importer and a significant exporter of water. 
The presence of Timbercorp has had positive and negative 
effects for the town. It has brought income for some local 
people and some local businesses, but the central business 
area has suffered a major loss of businesses, and empty shops 
do nothing to make the town appealing. Local industry is 
faring a little better, sustained by dryland producers, although 
the loss of suppliers such as Elders is a concern.
Community members
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Summary
Water trading has had a big impact on the Pyramid–Boort 
region in the last decade or so. A large amount of water has 
been traded permanently out of the region, reducing the 
amount of water available for irrigating crops. This has, 
however, allowed for better management of salinity.
A range of factors were seen as contributing to the 
observed patterns of water trade in the region. For example, 
the influences on dryland and irrigated industries have had 
an important effect.
Irrigators in the region perceive a variety of benefits and 
costs associated with water trading. On the plus side, they 
recognise the trade’s ability to facilitate adjustments in their 
cropping activities—especially opportunistic cropping—and 
assist with cash flow, debt and drought management. On the 
negative side, irrigators expressed concerns about the risk 
of stranded infrastructure assets, being forced into dryland 
farming, degradation of the river channel, and the potential 
for build-up of pest plants and animals on vacant land.
Exporting of water from the region has been accompanied 
by the decline of major centres in the region. 
In Pyramid Hill, a community of 400 people, the continued 
loss of water has led to the loss of farms and production and 
the subsequent loss of people, income and services from 
the town. Local business owners were finding it difficult to 
compete with people shopping out of the town. Returns were 
down because there are fewer people in the district and those 
remaining have little to spend. Furthermore, transient workers 
in the town rarely spend money locally. The traditional 
residents who tenaciously remain are passionate about 
their community, committed to retaining what they have, 
and deeply concerned that, should water be removed totally 
from the district, the town will die. To their credit, some 
innovative ventures have been established to sustain the 
local economy. Among these are an abattoir, a quarry, a 
pet-food factory and Pyramid Salt, a company that is using 
the region’s salinity to extract and market salt. There is a 
social divide between the large cohort of transient workers 
and the traditional farming community.
Boort, with a population of 800, is unique in that it has 
been both a significant importer and a significant exporter 
of water. Some of the better soils around the town provide 
income from dryland agriculture. Water trading contributed 
to Timbercorp establishing a large olive plantation in the area, 
which has had positive and negative effects on the town. The 
families that owned the farms Timbercorp bought have gone. 
And, although the company has provided some employment 
and income for the town, much of its business is conducted 
away from Boort and there are many empty shops. Never-
theless, the long-established and wealthy farming community 
that remains is cohesive and committed to the town’s 
wellbeing.
The case study brought to light a mix of views on the impacts 
of water trading. There is widespread concern about the 
consequences of changes in land use associated with the 
trade, although it was generally recognised that drought had 
greatly affected all agriculture in the region. Many people 
said they had difficulty untangling the effects of water trading 
from things such as drought, changes in commodity prices 
and the trend towards farm aggregation.
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Introduction
This case study is one of three studies to form part of a 
project examining the social and economic impacts of 
water trading, with the objective of informing policy in this 
regard. The project focuses on regions where water trading 
is prevalent—the irrigation districts of Goulburn–Murray 
Water and Lower Murray Water, on the Victorian side of 
the Murray. In particular, it seeks to quantify and report on, 
through the case studies, the actual impacts of water trading 
on individual water entitlement holders, industries and 
communities in the Murray Valley, in order to test the 
assumed beneﬁts and perceived concerns arising from 
the trade. The information examined was collected through 
a series of interviews and consultations in the case study 
regions, involving irrigators and the broader community. 
Apart from Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–
Cohuna, the other regions studied were Sunraysia and 
Pyramid–Boort. Much of the material presented for the 
Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna study 
reﬂects local people’s views about their experience of 
water trading, rather than the authors’ views and analysis, 
which are presented in Part One.
Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna are 
presented as one case study in order to consolidate the 
similar experiences found in the three areas. Dairy farming is 
the main irrigated enterprise in each of them; mixed farming 
is the next biggest use of water in each, and horticulture comes 
third. Economically, the areas are similar; geographically 
they are different. Kerang–Cohuna is on the Murray below 
the Barmah Choke. Rochester and Central Goulburn are on 
the Goulburn. The proportion of land suitable for irrigation 
is higher in Central Goulburn than in Rochester.
This case study is structured as follows. After a brief 
description of the Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–
Cohuna regions, the pattern of water trade into and out of 
the regions in the past decade is described. Focusing ﬁrst 
on irrigated agriculture, the study then examines the main 
forces—irrigation history, institutional settings and the 
changing fortunes of particular products and industries—
affecting this water trading and the costs and beneﬁts of the 
trade, predominantly from the perspective of those in the 
affected industries. The study then looks at the experience 
of people in the towns of Rochester, Kyabram and Tatura 
(Central Goulburn) and Kerang and Cohuna, again largely 
from the perspective of the people interviewed. The main 
lessons from the case study are brought together in the 
concluding summary.
Case study C:  Rochester, Central Goulburn 
and Kerang–Cohuna
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Location
Rochester
The Rochester Campaspe irrigation system provides water to 
1290 customers via the Goulburn, Murray and Campaspe 
Rivers and some 664 kilometres of distribution channels and 
476 kilometres of drains. The main sources of water are 
Lakes Eildon and Eppalock; supplementary supplies come 
from Greens Lake. Water entitlements amount to 187 396 
megalitres in the Rochester area and 20 202 megalitres in 
the Campaspe Irrigation District. The Rochester Irrigation 
District covers 107 750 hectares, of which 61 700 hectares 
is irrigated; the Campaspe Irrigation District covers 
9300 hectares, of which 5010 hectares is irrigated. 
The Waranga–Mallee Channel, built just after the beginning 
of the twentieth century, runs for 480 kilometres from the 
Waranga Basin near Rushworth to the Eastern Mallee area 
west of Boort. The Campaspe Syphon takes the Waranga–
Mallee Channel under the Campaspe River through three 
90-metre concrete pipes (Rochester.org 2007).
Source: Murray–Darling Basin Commission.
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Central Goulburn
The Central Goulburn Irrigation District covers 
173 053 hectares, 113 106 of them irrigated, and is one 
of the largest irrigated areas in northern Victoria. It extends 
south and west from the Goulburn River and takes in the 
towns of Ardmona, Echuca Village, Girgarre, Kyabram, 
Lancaster, Merrigum, Mooroopna, Murchison, Stanhope, 
Tatura, Tongala, Undera and Wyuna. 
More than 2800 irrigated holdings are serviced via 
an extensive network of 1460 kilometres of distribution 
channels and 882 kilometres of drains. Water rights in the 
area account for 385 000 megalitres, supplied mainly from 
Lake Eildon, which has a capacity of 3 390 000 megalitres 
(Goulburn–Murray Water 2006b).
Source: Murray–Darling Basin Commission.
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Kerang–Cohuna
The Torrumbarry Irrigation Area extends along the River 
Murray from Gunbower in the east to Nyah in the west and 
southwards to include the towns of Cohuna, Kerang and Swan 
Hill. It covers 167 000 hectares, of which 150 000 hectares 
are suitable for irrigation. The irrigation system supplies 
about 2650 irrigation customers and a further 600 domestic 
and livestock customers. 
Water for the Torrumbarry area is released into the River 
Murray at Hume Dam. Water from Dartmouth Dam, 
on the Mitta Mitta River, provides supplementary 
storage for Lake Hume.
Source: Murray–Darling Basin Commission.
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Patterns of water trade
Rochester
Since trading began Rochester has been consistently 
transferring (net) annual water allocations into the region 
through temporary trading. In most years the amount has 
been about 10 000 megalitres, but in 2000–01, 2001–02 
and 2005–06 the net transfer of water into the region far 
exceeded 20 000 megalitres. The region’s experience in 
permanent water markets has been more varied: between 
1995–96 and 2002–03 water entitlements were generally 
transferred into the region (with the exception of 2000–01), 
with net transfers in many years being about 1000 megalitres; 
in the three years from 2003–04 to 2005–06 there were net 
transfers of water entitlements out of the region, exceeding 
3000 megalitres. These three strong years of selling water 
entitlements meant that the cumulative effect of permanent 
trade since 1995–96 has been to shift about 4000 megalitres 
of water entitlement out of Rochester. However, purchases 
of temporary water more than offset this in terms of the 
available water in the district: the combined effect of all 
trading was to reallocate water into Rochester through 
trade—an increase of nearly 25 000 megalitres in 2005–06 
compared with available water in the absence of trade.
Central Goulburn
Central Goulburn has had an experience similar to that 
of Rochester in the temporary and permanent water trades. 
This region has been consistently making net purchases of 
water allocation in temporary markets; 1996–97 was the 
smallest of these, while 2001–02 and 2005–06 were among 
the largest. A notable contrast with Rochester’s temporary 
trading behaviour is that Central Goulburn transferred in 
large volumes of water allocations in the drought year of 
2002–03. It transferred in permanent water entitlements from 
1995–96 to 1998–99, but this trend reversed from 1999–00 
to 2002–03, such that the net cumulative effect of permanent 
trading was to leave the region’s total water entitlement 
broadly unchanged. As with Rochester, the three years from 
2003–04 to 2005–06 saw significant net permanent trades 
out of Central Goulburn—greater than 5000 megalitres. This 
has led to a cumulative amount of about 20 000 megalitres 
of water entitlement being traded out of the region since 
1995–96, which was only just offset by the temporary 
water net purchases in 2005–06.
Kerang–Cohuna
Kerang–Cohuna appears to have been increasing the volume 
of water allocations it transfers in. In 1995–96 and 1996–97 
volumes were relatively small; from 1997–98 to 2002–03 
temporary trading brought in 10 000 to 15 000 megalitres 
(except for 2000–01); and then from 2003–04 to 2005–06 
net temporary transfers were greater than 30 000 megalitres. 
Meanwhile, permanent trading has been reallocating water 
entitlements in the other direction: since 1998–99 the 
Kerang–Cohuna region has been consistently (net) selling 
water in permanent markets, such that a total of nearly 
30 000 megalitres has left the region since trading began. 
This selling of entitlements has, however, been outweighed 
by large temporary water (net) purchases in terms of 
reallocating water to the region.
148   The economic and social impacts of water trading
Figure C.1 Rochester water trading, 1995–96 to 2005–06
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Figure C.2 Central Goulburn water trading, 1995–96 to 2005–06
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Figure C.3 Kerang–Cohuna water trading, 1995–96 to 2005–06
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Key drivers in irrigated agriculture
Dairying is the main enterprise in Rochester, Central 
Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna. Tomatoes are also grown, 
and there is mixed farming such as summer cropping and 
sheep and cattle grazing (Goulburn–Murray Water 2006a). 
Farm production has many similarities in the three regions, 
and their experiences have been similar.
Irrigation history
Initial distribution of water entitlements
Broadly, each block in the Goulburn–Murray Irrigation 
District was allocated a legal right to sufficient water to 
irrigate the entire block. This was about 1 acre-foot of water 
per acre, equivalent to 300 millimetres of rainfall a year (Barr 
1999). In metric terms that is about 3 megalitres a hectare.
Development of the districts
Goulburn–Murray Water describes the districts’ development:
Dr Elwood Mead, a distinguished American engineer, was 
Chief of the Irrigation Investigations Bureau in the US 
Department of Agriculture when, on the recommendation 
of the Victorian Minister of Water Supply, the Victorian 
Government offered him the Chairmanship of the State 
Rivers and Water Supply Commission. He accepted and 
served as Chairman from 1907–15 when he resigned 
to return to the USA.
It was on Mead’s recommendation that charges  
for water rights, based on payment per unit volume, 
were introduced to cover the costs of operation and 
management of the irrigation and domestic and stock 
water supply system. The charges had to be paid 
regardless of whether or not the water was used. The 
compulsory charge was bitterly opposed by the majority 
of landholders. Dr Mead appreciated the reasons for the 
hostility, but told delegates at a Farmers’ Congress at 
Bendigo in 1909 ‘The inclination of the individual runs 
counter to the welfare of the State’.
Mead was also an advocate of ‘closer settlement’ and 
intense culture methods of irrigation. After years of his 
urgings, and the recommendations of a Royal Commission 
appointed on Closer Settlement in Victoria, legislation was 
passed in 1918, transferring permanently to the [State 
Rivers and Water Supply Commission] the responsibility 
for land purchase and settlement in irrigation areas. Finally 
the unified control of land and water that Dr Mead 
advocated became effective and remained in force 
for all soldier and civilian settlement following WWI. 
(Goulburn–Murray Water 2007, p. 1).
William Cattanach served as chairman of the State Rivers 
and Water Supply Commission from 1915 until his death 
in 1932:
His period of Chairmanship was one of great develop-
ment of water supply in general. Substantial additions to 
storage capacity totalled nearly one million acre feet and 
included enlargement of Lake Eildon and Waranga Basin. 
The area irrigated annually had risen more than 50%.
The period of Mr Cattanach’s Chairmanship was also 
dominated by the administration of Closer Settlement 
under irrigation. In the Commission’s 1915–16 Annual 
Report it was noted that due to subdivision some 1500 
families had been settled where 120 had previously lived. 
The Closer Settlement Act 1918 provided for the [State 
Rivers and Water Supply Commission] to administer 
settlement of discharged soldiers from WWI in areas 
irrigated, or likely to be irrigated. Such areas in the 
Goulburn and Murray Valleys included Shepparton, 
Tongala, Stanhope, Swan Hill and Nyah.
Another notable feature of Mr Cattanach’s administration 
was the leading role he played in the establishment 
of the great co-operative canneries of the Goulburn 
Valley—pioneering the field of orderly marketing before 
establishment of today’s marketing boards. Ironically his 
death followed what seemed to be a fairly small injury 
while on an inspection of one of the Goulburn Valley 
canneries. (Goulburn–Murray Water 2007, p. 1).
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The legacy of the original settlement patterns
A Royal Commission on Soldier Settlement in 1925 found 
that the scheme was mostly a failure due to settlers’ lack 
of capital and experience, the inadequate size of blocks 
and drainage problems. The War Service Land Settlement 
Agreement of 1945, however, continued to establish 
soldiers returning from World War II on farms … Soldier 
settlements were provided in the Murray–Goulburn 
Irrigation Area around Cobram and Numurkah with 
the development of 120 000 acres of irrigated blocks 
for fruit growing and dairying. (VEAC 2006)
The yeomanry ideal and closer settlement did not disappear 
after World War 2: the Campaspe Irrigation Area was 
developed after the completion of Lake Eppalock in 1964. 
It originally consisted of land holdings of about 40 hectares 
with 160 megalitres of water entitlement.
The size of the initial holdings in each irrigation area and 
the way the land was laid out are still having effects on 
farm viability and on the water trade. A farm management 
consultant interviewed for this project described the legacy 
of soldier settlement in considerable detail:
We had waves of soldier settlements after the two wars 
when the government acquired land and subdivided it 
into small units; they acquired land on some of the best 
soils in the region. 
But you need an understanding of what drives the 
profitability of farm businesses in this region. It’s got 
nothing to do with land—land’s only the thing you put 
the water on. It wouldn’t matter if you had a 1000 acres 
if you’ve only got 100 megalitres you only have a 100 
megalitres of productivity. So managing water in this 
environment is about maximising the return from the 
water you have available. 
Some people have the mistaken understanding that you 
need to use every square inch of this land, but land’s not 
the limiting resource, so what tends to happen is that 
their flexible capital is tied up in water, livestock, plant, 
machinery and the house and curtilage. 
Permanent trading, in part, has been the major tool 
for rationalisation of small holdings in the dairy industry. 
There are lots of people who have gumboots on at 80 and 
who would not have anything to sell without permanent 
trading. More than half the value of their enterprise is in 
the water. Those small dairy farms are just not saleable as 
going concerns. They’re viable for the existing occupants, 
who are very often an older couple with low or moderate 
expectations of lifestyle. They are quite happy to live that 
humble existence. But if you are talking about a young 
family trying to buy in with significant debt—buying what 
is often poor infrastructure—then they’re just not viable. 
They are viable for the existing occupants, unviable 
for others.
If the council allows it, a couple in that position can 
often subdivide out the house. They can then sell off 
the water, sell off the livestock, and self off the unused 
portion of the land to a neighbour so the neighbour 
can do something with it. 
Up until the extreme conditions on the Goulburn this year, 
when those older couples have split their assets up, the 
major resources have ended up back in the dairy industry. 
The land’s gone to grazing and is either producing fodder 
or grazing for replacement livestock; the water’s gone to 
another user, very likely in the dairy industry, and the cows 
have gone into another herd, so there’s been very little 
net loss out of the region.
It is the redundant capital—capital that has no value to 
another person—that is the problem. You could argue that 
1960s irrigation layouts—small bays and 6-inch clay 
pipes—actually detract from the value of the land. The 
labour requirements are ridiculously high and the water 
efficiency is poor, so someone coming in who wants to 
use it has to pay more than the value of the land to turn 
it into something worthwhile. They would be better off 
with bare land.
Logically the water will move to an area where someone 
will use it more profitably. You could argue that we will 
go through a phase where water will move off the better 
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land—soldier settlement areas, small units with poor 
layouts. It will go to more extensive areas, generally poorer 
land, where people have laser-graded to reduce labour, 
not to improve water use efficiency. Water will leave some 
of the best land and end up on some of the poorer land, 
but in the long term it will swing back the other way. 
The water will, eventually, swing back to better soils of its 
own accord, but it will be inhibited by the sheer number 
of houses and small holdings. The government does its 
best to interfere in economics and usually makes a mess 
of it. It’s going to take 50 years to overcome the legacy of 
soldier settlements, and there are lots of people locked 
into soldier settlement blocks who have nothing viable to 
sell. The only way they can get out of it is to strip assets, 
so they sell water and the subdivide the house. We will be 
left with soldier settlement areas with lots of subdivided 
houses, patchwork blocks of land and poor irrigation 
infrastructure. It will be a very expensive operation to 
redevelop that land and it will take quite a long time. 
Economics will drive it. People will see a profit in 
doing something different. In the long term we will see 
conversion of some of that land to spray irrigation. The 
cost of land-forming is much the same as the cost of spray 
irrigation. There’s no difference in capital cost between 
the two. The only justification for spray irrigation, on 
most soils in this region, is labour saving. If you have 
a centre-pivot or lateral-move you can reduce labour 
costs significantly. I have been working on a project at 
Tatura where we looked at the efficiency of irrigation 
systems for dairy farms. For 97 per cent of the soils in 
the region the estimated saving, in converting from an 
efficient bay irrigation system to a spray system, 
is half a megalitre per hectare. So you couldn’t justify 
it economically just for efficiency’s sake.
Overall, it is probably best if the government stays out 
of the move back into soldier settlement areas. But one 
thing the government could do to speed it up would be 
to remove some of the obstacles to subdivision. Some of 
the people who are locked into small farms at the moment 
are locked in because they don’t fit in with the 40-hectare 
subdivision limit. They can’t subdivide the house and 
curtilage sell it for $100 000 or whatever which means 
they’ve got to sell the whole lot. So the buyer has to buy 
this useless house. Who wants six settlement houses on 
the square mile? It might be an argument for buying the 
houses and pushing them over.
Local government’s argument for limiting subdivision to 
40 hectares has to do with the provision of service and 
uncontrolled development. Maybe, if they weren’t so 
rigid, they might go along with a one-off thing where 
no other houses were to be put on the land.
Drought management
Dairy farmers and fruit growers have been very active buyers 
on the water market during the drought. Mixed farmers have 
been active sellers. With the exception of the extreme seasons 
of 2002–03 and 2006–07, dairy farmers have been more 
affected by the drought than fruit growers. Dairy farmers are 
more reliant on ‘sales’ water, which traditionally has been 
expressed as a percentage above water right but is set to be 
unbundled as a separate entitlement in 2007.
Most fruit growers do not have access to sales water, so 
the drought affects their water availability only if seasonal 
allocations drop below 100 per cent of water right. 
Dairy farmers have conventionally budgeted on sales water 
accounting for nearly half of their total water. Water trade has 
therefore been an important tool for drought management: 
‘Dairy farmers are traditionally 180 per cent water users, but 
since 1997 they [Goulburn irrigators] haven’t had a year of 
more than 100 per cent. They had 57 per cent in 2002–03, 
23 per cent this year and its not likely to go up. So, yes, there 
has been very heavy trading on the Goulburn’.
Very low allocations in 2002–03 caused many farmers 
to take on towering debts. This coloured their approach 
to the even lower allocations in 2006–07:
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After 2003 we had a good long think about how 
we would handle that sort of situation next time. 
We completely revised our mix of pastures, revised 
our agistment strategies and revised our approach to 
temporary trade. This season has probably come too 
soon for us—our pastures aren’t to the stage we’d like 
them to be—but we are a hell of a lot better prepared 
this time around. At the start of the season we sat down 
and worked out how much we were prepared to pay 
for water. Basically, the main question we had to ask 
ourselves was: are we planning to be dairy farmers in 
the long term? Once we had answered that—and the 
answer was yes—once we had answered that, the rest 
was straightforward. We went out and bought what we 
thought we needed early in the season, at a price that 
was in our budget. We see so many people agonising 
over whether or not they are prepared to buy water at 
the current price. The worst thing is when they agonise 
over it for ages and then, when they finally convince 
themselves it is the right thing to do, the price has gone 
up and they have to go through another round of agony. 
Being in limbo just cripples people.
Institutional settings
The 2 per cent rule
When permanent trade was introduced the Victorian 
Government limited total annual permanent trade out of any 
irrigation district to 2 per cent of total entitlements for the 
district. The purpose of this ‘2 per cent rule’ was to keep the 
rate of change in manageable bounds and to ease revenue 
pressure on the water authorities.
Permanent trading of water out of Rochester, Central 
Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna has reached the 2 per cent 
limit several times in the last few years, and significant trade 
is likely to continue for some years. Under the National Water 
Initiative the limit was increased to 4 per cent for 2006–07.
Reconfiguration
Victorian legislation now provides scope for irrigation districts 
to be ‘reconfigured’ to improve their economic efficiency. 
The pressure for reconfiguration is strongest when water 
has been transferred away from smaller spur channels and 
pipelines, leaving small volumes to be delivered at high 
cost to those remaining on the spur system. 
Before 2003 there was very little pressure to think about 
reconfiguration in Rochester or Central Goulburn. The very 
low allocations in 2003–04 precipitated a reversal of trends, 
and those districts became net exporters of water. Moreover, 
the promoters of managed investment schemes started to see 
advantages in buying their full water requirements at the time 
of planting and then, while the trees were small and using 
little water, trading the balance on the temporary market. 
Goulburn entitlements were especially attractive because, 
once they were permanently traded out to the Murray, they 
increased the capacity for back-trading Murray seasonal 
allocations into the Goulburn, where allocations were lower. 
Reconfiguration pressure is now building in Rochester 
and Central Goulburn. Relative to other parts of Victoria, 
the pressure for reconfiguration in Kerang–Cohuna is high. 
The demand for permanent trade out of Kerang–Cohuna has 
been relatively constant since 1998. Because the district is on 
the Murray but below the Barmah Choke, it was an obvious 
source of water to supply horticultural developments 
in Sunraysia.
Interim delivery shares
‘Unbundling’ of Northern Victorian water entitlements on 
1 July 2007 will result in district irrigators holding delivery 
shares entitling them to specified volumes being delivered per 
unit of time during periods of peak demand for the delivery 
of water. The delivery shares will also confer on them the 
liability to keep paying for their access to the delivery system 
even if they sell their water.
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To reflect these changes, access and delivery tariffs have been 
changed in advance of unbundling. This will help protect the 
revenue base of water authorities, act as a disincentive to 
permanent water trade out of districts, and allow for setting 
exit fees based on the present value of this revenue stream.
Source-tagging
After unbundling, the water shares being used in Sunraysia 
will be identified as coming from either the Goulburn 
system or the Murray system. Depending on the season, 
these different water shares might have different allocations 
attached to them. The prospect of this change has precipitated 
much recent trade out of the Goulburn system into Sunraysia. 
This is largely because allocations on the Murray system 
have been higher than those on the Goulburn in the past 
10 years and, before unbundling, water traded out of the 
Goulburn to the Murray was assigned the higher allocation 
of water coming out of Murray storages. Some of these 
allocations have then been traded back up the Goulburn 
system. This will not happen once the water shares are 
‘tagged’ to the source storages.
Further, on 18 December 2006 it was announced that 
permanent trading rules for trades between systems will 
require a seller’s allocation of water to be at least equal 
to the allocation levels that apply in the buyer’s system for 
the remainder of the 2006–07 irrigation season (Goulburn–
Murray Water 2006b). Trade out of the Goulburn into the 
Murray was probably accelerated to take advantage of the 
difference in allocations before unbundling.
Community action
Community leaders in irrigation areas most affected by 
the potential for stranded assets are starting to look beyond 
government as the means of salvation for the community 
values they prize. Although still lobbying for controls on 
the permanent water trade, they are also establishing what 
they see as a safety net:
The whole concept of the community water bank is to 
try and hold permanent water in our district. We want to 
allow younger people to come into farming; we want to 
give them a chance to start. A lot of them are finding now 
that when they want to buy a farm the water has been 
stripped off it and they can’t afford to buy the water as 
well. So we are trying to set up a system that allows them 
to buy the farm and then, perhaps through a longer-term 
lease–buy arrangement give them the water to get them 
going. In the future we might want some sort of set up 
where say if I’m ready to retire I might be happy to lodge 
a couple of hundred megs with the water bank—hang 
onto it as a capital investment and let them sell it 
temporarily or lease it out or whatever. I might be happy 
to do that if, for example, I eventually sell the farm to 
someone that doesn’t want anywhere near as much water 
as I’ve been using or if we have a change of direction 
from permanent pasture just to summer crops. In those 
situations I might be happy to hike some water in the 
water bank. So might Joe Bloggs down the street or maybe 
the local milk factory or the local milk bar or any of the 
local businesses. It might be ordinary mums and dads 
with a few hundred dollars to invest for the kids. They 
might want to invest it in the water bank because all that 
money will be secured by a megalitre of water. We’re just 
sort of floating it out there now. We’ve been doing a bit 
of work with a solicitor, pro bono, to get the vehicle set 
up to do it right across the north. 
One government employee cast an interesting perspective 
on the move to create a ‘community water bank’:
I think the thing that might make it work is that it gives 
the people who would like to sell a going concern an 
opportunity to reduce the arbitrage between what they 
would like to do and what a ‘rational’ investor might do. 
I think a lot of people would wear a bit of a discount on 
realising the full value of their assets if they felt they were 
doing something positive for their community. It might 
give those people a bit of a halfway house between doing 
what they think is the right thing by their community and 
being made to look like fools by people with an eye for 
a bargain.
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Managed investment schemes
People are very sceptical about the growing involvement of 
managed investment schemes in irrigated agriculture. They 
see it as the taxation system distorting the markets for land 
and water: 
Those management investment schemes are a whole 
other issue. They’re getting big tax advantages compared 
with the rest of us. If I had the tax advantages they’ve got, 
I’d be laughing. 
One of the big issues that people see—and I support 
this—is that it’s not pure market forces that are in 
operation. The people that have the money to buy the 
bulk of the water downstream from here are MISs and 
they are gaining tax incentives and capital from places 
we cannot access. So it’s not trading apples with apples; 
it’s not a level playing field. And there is a very strong 
resistance to the idea of people owning water who don’t 
have land. Again, I’m less than convinced that that’s a 
big issue because if you are going to make money out of 
water someone’s got to buy it. And we are going to be the 
bunnies who are going to buy it and if we are not willing 
to pay the big price they think they are going to get for 
it, well, they will have to drop the price. 
Irrigators’ views
Perceived benefits of water trading
Irrigators in Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–
Cohuna see benefits of water trading arising in a number 
of areas—business growth, capital productivity, security, 
opportunistic cropping, liability, cash flow and debt 
management, and drought management.
Business growth
Irrigators have been able to increase the size of their business 
by buying more water. Until recently they have expanded 
their business by buying neighbouring properties complete 
with water: they have not actually had to enter the water 
market. This is still the preference of many of the irrigators 
who were interviewed, but the market dynamics are changing. 
Increasingly, irrigators are faced with the prospect of buying 
a property that has been stripped of its water and then having 
to buy the water separately:
We disagree with the whole concept of permanent trade, 
but we’re in the process of taking over my family’s farm, 
so we have to deal with the way the world is, not the 
way we would like it to be. Our farm’s not big enough 
for the long term, and the farm we’ve just bought has 
had most of its water sold off, so we are going to have 
to buy permanent water. 
Water trade’s been critical for our business. As we’ve 
bought extra farms, even when they still had their full 
water right, we’ve asked ourselves, ‘What’s the optimum 
amount of water for this property? How much should we 
hold permanently? How much should we be looking to 
buy on the temporary market?’
We have just bought another 140 acres, which was dry, 
so we’re going to have to buy water to keep up our plans 
to expand. With the trade there, you have no alternative. 
You’ve got to enter the market and take advantage of it 
where you can, to keep your business going. We’ve been 
buying at up to $1100 a megalitre, but at the moment it’s 
trading around the 2000 mark. At that price, I’m out of 
the market. I don’t think that dairy farmers can justify it 
at that price.
Capital productivity
Water trading allows farmers to make conscious decisions 
about how much capital they invest in water. As one farm 
management consultant put it:
I’d say 20 per cent of dairy farmers at the outside, 
probably less, are involved in the permanent market 
and they are nearly all buyers; a few of them are sellers 
particularly this year. The ‘opportunity cost of capital’ 
versus interest arguments are becoming more understood. 
Case study C: Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna   157
So $1000 per megalitre today at 8 per cent interest; it 
owes you $80 a megalitre per year … If the water itself 
costs $40 you can pay $120 for temporary water and you 
are no worse off, other than the risk aspect, and farmers 
increasingly understand that argument. We had a client 
last week that had an offer to buy 400 megalitres of his 
water at $2100, and he was very seriously considering 
that. That’s $800 000 you can do something else with. 
So at the very least you can reduce debt at 9 per cent. 
That’s not a bad return. Plus the capital gain, which is 
pre-1985, so tax is not an issue.
One irrigator commented:
In the old days we had a set number of megalitres of 
water right and we just accepted that that was what 
we had and we lived within it. Once permanent trade 
became possible, we started thinking, ‘Well, just how 
much more could we get out of this property?’ We started 
to ask ourselves, ‘What is the best amount of water to 
hold?’ We had been thinking about buying another farm, 
but in the end we figured we were better off just buying 
water instead.
I don’t think we would still be farming here if we hadn’t 
been able to buy in extra water.
Water trading also frees farmers up to consider how much 
of their capital portfolio should be tied up in farming:
We bought 50 megs not last year but the year before, 
2004. There are financial benefits, yes, because this year, 
with the lower allocation, we have less we have to buy. 
There are disbenefits: under the new tariff we’ll be 
contributing more generously than others to the running 
of the system. But on a capital basis it’s amazing. We paid 
$900 for it and it’s now selling at $1800 a meg. Again, 
the benefits are much greater than the costs, and as a 
security thing—we are averse to risk—we prefer to know 
how much water we are going to need and we like to 
have as much shored up as possible. Other people have 
made decisions and said to us you could have put that 
money somewhere else for a better return, but I think 
at this stage we probably couldn’t. The capital gain in 
three years; nowhere else you could have done that … 
We won’t be buying any more permanent water I’m 
fairly confident, but at the moment at $400 a meg for 
temporary water it’s cheaper to buy permanent water and 
pay interest only … We worked out that if you went into 
the market now and bought 100megs at $2000—yeah, 
there’s some for sale at those figures—so that’s $200 000 
and then the interest on that is, say, talking $20 000 
a year, and if you held it for three years that’s $60 000. 
And if you had to buy water at $400 a meg this year and 
next year you would come out ahead. Well, I think we are 
nearly getting to the stage where next year’s allocation 
can’t look nice … The amount of permanent water sold 
out of Kerang–Cohuna is less than the amount bought in 
on the temporary market; we traded in more than we sold. 
So Kerang–Cohuna is a very strong area for that; even 
though people have somehow decided they wanted 
to free up their capital by selling their permanent water 
they haven’t necessarily changed their enterprise. And 
because of that, because it’s strong, because people have 
obviously worked out how to use the temporary market 
pretty well, the irrigation industry in this community 
is very strong. 
Security
Many farmers derive peace of mind from knowing they 
have enough water to meet their needs:
One of the benefits of buying permanent water is that 
you don’t have to worry about all the hassles of buying 
temporary water. Permanent trade means you don’t have 
to live with the stress of—something which gets discussed 
here literally every day, every single day—what are we 
going to do about water? But the problem is can we get 
enough benefit out of paying 1200–1300 bucks a meg 
at our stage in life? If we were 30, with all that get-up-
and-go that we had at 30 ... which is why we have a farm 
… why we have three properties now, because we did 
have it. It’s just wearing thin now.
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Opportunistic cropping
Mixed farmers in Rochester respond to the price of 
temporary water in the same way as their counterparts in 
Pyramid–Boort. When water is cheap they use it to grow 
crops or annual pastures. When water is dear—that is, when 
the market price is higher than what they could earn by 
irrigating—they sell it to dairy farmers or horticulturists. 
Mixed farming is the buffer in the Victorian water industry. 
It allows full use of consumptive resources each year, but it 
also reduces the risk that the dairy and horticultural industries 
will run short of water.
Liquidity
Water can be sold rapidly—with minimal advertising costs 
and very low transaction costs—virtually anywhere in the 
southern connected Murray–Darling Basin. There are willing 
buyers and sellers at all times. It is highly probable that the 
next trade will be executed at a price equal to that of the 
last one. Water is a very liquid asset.
It is this liquidity that is changing the dynamics of 
consolidation in the irrigation districts. People leaving farming 
no longer have to rely on the comparatively thin real estate 
market to realise the value of their remaining assets. Nor do 
they have to offload their assets at fire-sale prices.
Of course, some people can only envisage selling their farm 
as a going concern. For them, doing so validates their life’s 
work. It also puts them in the relatively thin real estate market, 
which is best inhabited by those wanting to consolidate their 
holdings. But it is also an invitation, for people with an eye for 
a bargain, to buy the property and sell the water separately.
Cash flow management
The temporary market offers irrigators the potential to 
generate extra cash flow. In the current drought, with seasonal 
allocations being low, many farmers in the Rochester, Central 
Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna region see their returns being 
higher if they sell their water on the temporary market. 
A farm management consultant said:
On the odd occasion you do get even dairy farmers 
selling water on the temporary market. There are people 
considering [selling], or there have been people who have 
sold, temporary water this year. Farmers increasingly 
understand the opportunity cost of capital. So, with 
temporary water on the Goulburn system at $650 a 
megalitre, no one can profitably grow pasture at that 
price. So you say, well, you have 60 megs left: if you sell 
it at $650 a megalitre you can buy a large amount of feed 
or invest at 8per cent. It’s a pretty simple argument.
One dairy farmer who was interviewed remarked, ‘Our 
business is geared on water. It’s all dependent on the return 
from the product we make, which is milk, and the price of 
the water, and the relative value of other feed stuffs. So if hay 
and grain were cheap as chips and water was dear, we’d buy 
hay and grain’.
Debt management
The water market offers irrigators the potential to manage their 
debt. But people’s attitude to risk is generally asymmetric: 
they are prepared to gamble more recklessly in order to 
avoid a loss than to achieve a gain.
Some irrigators with high debt levels have found water 
trading useful for returning their situation to equilibrium. 
Others have found it part of the process that leads to the 
end of their role in farming: 
I’m a bit worried, seeing as how we are in the middle of 
a drought. I’m a bit worried that the financial institutions 
are going to start putting pressure on people to sell their 
water to get themselves out of trouble. People say, 
‘The banks wouldn’t do that. It’s worth more to have 
the property with the water still on’. But a bank doesn’t 
give a bugger if the water is sold off as long they’ve got 
no exposure to the risk any more. 
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I think there has been a lot of people who’ve been able to 
get out with a bit of dignity as a result of water trade. They 
are a lot better off than they would otherwise have been.
Drought management
Water trade has made a big difference to the way farmers 
go about the business of drought management:
Temporary water trading has made it so much easier 
to deal with the year-to-year minor discrepancies in 
the demand. We don’t use the same amount each year 
because of seasonal changes but do irrigate the same 
area and produce the same amount of grass every year. 
In 2002 we used 930 megs which is miles above any 
other year—nearly 100 megs more—and that was simply 
a climatic or weather thing. There was no rain, and this 
year looks like being similar. 
Water trade has allowed us to maintain our productivity 
through the drought. I don’t know what we would have 
done without it.
Irrigators must judge the optimum permanent water holding 
for their properties. They do this in contemplation of the risk 
of having very low seasonal allocations in the future. They 
must also make judgments about who else is going to be in 
the market at different levels of seasonal allocation:
The dairy industry has started to see itself in the pecking 
order. You’ve got orchardists, who should be able to pay 
more for permanent water than dairy farmers because 
they can actually get better value out of it. Say, in the 
Goulburn system we’ve got 10 per cent water use to 
horticulture, 60 per cent to dairy farmers, 30 per cent 
grazing and cropping, and a lot of that ends up in the 
dairy industry as well. So logically that’s the first target—
the water from grazing and cropping. But the dairy 
industry has a long tail of very inefficient water users. 
We have friends who sold large amounts of their 
permanent water three of four years ago to free up 
capital for various reasons. How are they feeling now? 
Well, they are a little bit stressed because they haven’t 
got any water and it’s so difficult to get at the moment. 
So on average those things are all right. Nine years out of 
10 is the theory. But this year a few people have come 
undone because they are willing to pay a lot of money for 
it but finding it really difficult to actually source water. 
Perceived costs of water trading
Irrigators in Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–
Cohuna see costs of water trading arising in a number of 
areas—stranded assets, depopulation, the collapse of an 
integrated system, effects on the water table, institutional 
risks, and the build-up of pest plants and animals.
Stranded assets
As water moves out of irrigation districts, the delivery 
infrastructure becomes an under-used asset. These ‘stranded 
assets’ increase the annual costs for remaining irrigators. 
They were the number one concern for all the irrigators 
interviewed for this study.
Most, but not all, of the irrigators interviewed were strongly 
opposed in principle to the concept of permanent water 
trading—particularly permanent trading out of irrigation 
districts. They saw this as the single greatest threat to the 
future of their district. Most were strongly supportive of 
the principle and practice of temporary trading.
The recent tariff changes designed to protect the revenue 
base were generally seen as positive. Irrigators could also 
see the sense in thinking through reconfiguration plans. 
These were seen as introducing some uncertainty about 
the future, but the level of uncertainty was relatively low 
in Rochester and Central Goulburn:
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Uncertainty is a bigger issue in districts like Torrumbarry 
and Pyramid than it is in districts like Central Goulburn 
and Rochester. Torrumbarry and Pyramid are out on the 
end of schemes. I’m comfortable with reconfiguration in 
Rochester simply because our major carriers, our major 
offtakes, will always be there. Sure we may have some 
ends of channels or spurs where we might pipe off that 
channel or close down that spur altogether, but they’re 
not major, they’re just tinkering around right at the 
ends—which we probably should be looking at doing 
irrespective of reconfiguration plans. At the moment 
I think it is a different issue for us compared to those 
other districts. 
There’s been an awful lot of water traded out of here in 
the last couple of years, but at this stage I can’t see them 
making big changes to the channel system.
And it is not just the effect on annual charges that bothers the 
remaining irrigators. They are also upset by the loss of visual 
amenity and the effect that has on community optimism:
There are people here in particular areas that sold out 
their water and sold their land or sold their land and the 
water has been taken off … There are reasonably strong 
pockets in Koondrook and Murrabit where there is 
dryland. It’s no longer farmed basically … It’s perceived 
as a problem by a lot of people. There is an element of 
community optimism that is based on productive-looking 
landscapes, and the neighbours of those areas find it 
concerning because it possibly undervalues or devalues 
their own property. And, in general, land value has 
probably gone down as water’s gone up. It’s had an 
effect on smaller communities, where the tennis and 
cricket club and fire brigade are all that exist; it’s just 
that sense that people are exiting.
Depopulation
Many irrigators worry that permanent trading out of their 
irrigation areas will reduce employment opportunities and 
therefore cause people to move elsewhere: ‘Permanent trade 
out of irrigation areas—even if you can protect the assets of 
the irrigation community through the tariff changes—is still 
going to affect the local community. I don’t know if you’ve 
read the report done by Farmanco for the Campaspe district: 
we lose one job for every 95 megalitres leaving the area’.
Most irrigators interviewed for this project were very 
concerned about the flow-on effects the water trade 
would have on schools, small businesses and sporting clubs. 
Others talked about positive demographic changes they see 
as a by-product of farm consolidation and the associated 
water trade:
Soon after we moved here I took one our vehicles to the 
mechanic, and he had a go at me: ‘I hate it when blokes 
like you start buying up farms and driving my business 
away’. But a year or so later he quietly conceded that the 
people who’d moved into the houses we bought generally 
had two cars, whereas the mostly older couples that 
we’d bought from tended only to have one car. So, if 
anything, we’d helped his business. It’s the same with the 
schools: most of the people who’d sold up were ‘empty 
nesters’ and the people who moved into the houses 
mostly had young families. The school numbers are 
looking better than they have for quite a while. 
The collapse of an integrated system
There is a general sense of grieving for what many see as 
the imminent collapse of highly integrated primary and 
secondary industries. The interdependence of milk factories 
and dairy farms is a good example:
The whole thing was originally set up as an integrated 
system. You had supply channels, water rights tied to 
the land along the channel (they justified the channel 
and made the running of the channel viable), service 
businesses (mechanics, whatever) sprang up around those 
farms, but most importantly the processing industries were 
set up to process fruit or milk reasonably locally. Now a 
massive amount of water from the Goulburn system has 
moved downstream of Echuca, and the people in Tatura 
Milk Products are beside themselves about where the 
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milk is going to come from. And it’s only five years ago 
that dairy farmers would do all sorts of things to become 
suppliers to that company. A friend was showing me in 
that area a 5-mile strip of road where there were only two 
functioning irrigation farms left. And it is such beautiful 
country. So much effort went into making sure that the 
whole integrated system centred on the best soils close to 
where the water was harvested. Now the water is going 
hundreds of kilometres away from the storages to areas 
of poor soils, and then the produce is being transported 
miles back to the processing works. 
Effects on the water table
Irrigators in Kerang–Cohuna are mindful that permanently 
high water tables in their areas require careful management. 
Increasing or decreasing the amount of irrigation in an area 
can either increase or decrease land salinisation.
Stopping irrigation can remove vegetative cover. Lack of 
vegetative cover on the soil surface can cause salty water 
to rise to the surface through capillary action, and when 
the water evaporates it leaves the salt behind:
I think salinity may ultimately be an issue. The hydrology 
of the water table around here is that the water table 
is less than a metre everywhere you go and, if it’s dry, 
evaporation and transpiration bring it up. But I haven’t 
actually seen that happen. One farmer sold five years 
ago, four years ago, and that farm sat dormant for three 
years. Eventually it was bought by another farmer, and 
now it is fully occupied. 
Increasing irrigation can increase pressure in the groundwater 
system responsible for the water table. In low-lying areas this 
can bring salty water to the surface:
Just across the corner here is a farm that hadn’t been 
irrigated for some time. He’s now irrigating and producing 
really good pasture from it, so it’s obviously aesthetically 
better, looks productive, but probably from a water table 
point of view it’s not a good thing—putting more pressure 
on the water table here. But it’s well drained in this area, 
so it’s really not a big issue. 
Institutional risks
In the light of the market disruptions caused by mid-season 
reductions in New South Wales allocations, many irrigators 
are concerned about the security and integrity of the trading 
system: ‘Private brokers need to be accredited and have 
auditing of their trust funds. Some of them don’t even have 
trust funds. There needs to be some formal approval process 
for them and investigation into what they are doing’.
The build-up of pest plants and animals
Agricultural land that is being managed neither for irrigation 
nor for dryland farming has a higher incidence of pest plants 
and animals. This increases the inoculum potential for 
neighbouring properties:
The biggest problem with the place that I’m trying to 
buy is that he’s gone out of dairying. He’s sold off the 
bigger percentage of his water, so he’s probably got his 
money, but bloody noxious weeds and thistles … they’ve 
become a bloody nuisance. I look at all the dry blocks 
around me—they don’t worry about cutting their thistles 
any more—and, as an adjoining neighbour, it’s a 
bloody disaster.
Cognitive dissonance in 
the irrigation community
Cognitive dissonance is the uncomfortable tension that comes 
from holding two conflicting thoughts at the same time. 
The theory of cognitive dissonance sees those contradictory 
thoughts serving as a driving force that compels the mind 
to acquire or invent new thoughts or beliefs or to modify 
existing beliefs, so as to reduce the amount of dissonance 
(conflict) between attitudes, emotions, beliefs or behaviours. 
In the extreme, people’s mental health can depend on 
their being able to reduce the conflict between those 
different thoughts. 
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Wanting to expand and maintain the community
Many of the irrigators interviewed have conflicting emotions 
about the depopulation of rural areas. They speak with a 
sense of loss about the demise of the local footy club or the 
dwindling numbers at the local school, but in the next breath 
they speak, with justifiable pride, about the way they have 
survived in farming and how they have managed to build up 
their holding of land and water by buying out other farmers. 
Some even speak of their ambition to buy more farms.
Empathy for those in trouble but disdain for 
those who do not sell a ‘going concern’
Irrigators are reconciled to the continuing amalgamation 
of properties. They know this means fewer farmers and thus 
fewer people in the area and fewer children in the schools. 
Accordingly, irrigation communities rail against what they 
see to be the underlying reasons for people feeling they need 
to sell, but at the same time they hold deep sympathy for 
community members who can no longer continue farming. 
There but for Fortune go we.
Property amalgamation is a familiar, if somewhat 
discomforting, part of the farming scene. The exit is mourned, 
and the purchase is made as dignified as possible. 
The change is understood to be an opportunity for neighbours 
as much as a loss for the community. No one can begrudge 
the purchaser their gain. Rather, there is almost a sense of 
noble obligation surrounding the purchase: someone must 
keep up the good fight.
Separating the sale of land and water changes this dynamic. 
It opens the possibility that the vendor will, in effect, cause 
irrigation to cease on that property. This, in turn, will bring 
about a net reduction in irrigation in the local area. 
Wanting to sell a going concern but mindful 
that the buyer might separate water and land
The ability to sell water separately from land creates a tension 
in many people’s minds. Most people feel that selling their 
farm as a going concern would be a validation of their years 
of hard work, but they also realise that the total value of 
their land and water might be greater if the land and the 
water are sold separately: 
If you were a 60-year-old farmer with a small farm and you 
were looking to retire, but you couldn’t get the money 
you wanted because no one wanted to buy the farm 
as a going concern, you’d think to yourself, ‘I’ve been 
given an out’ … They’d think, ‘I ought to be able to sell 
the farm with the water on it for half a million dollars, 
but I can’t even get anyone to look at it. But if I were to 
subdivide, I’d get a couple of hundred thousand dollars 
for the house. I might have $300 000 worth of water on 
it. I can sell that, so I’ve got another $300 000. I’ve got 
a neighbour who doesn’t mind buying the land without 
water, so I might get another bloody $300 000’. All of a 
sudden, they’ve packed up shop and moved into town 
with an additional $200 000 in their pockets. I’m realistic 
about this: if you were up to retiring age why wouldn’t 
you look at it? You can’t blame them. That’s the system. 
And the system allows them to do it. So you can’t be too 
bloody critical of the ones that are trying to get out, and, 
as you know, the average age of farmers is pretty high. 
We’re waiting to see whether our son wants to come back 
on the farm. If he doesn’t we’ll sell up in a few years. 
There are only three other farms on this channel, so if 
we sold the water separately we know that would put 
the rest of them at risk. On the other hand, if we sell the 
water with the farm, whoever buys it might sell the water 
off anyway … It’s a lovely view out there … Anyway, we 
don’t have to worry about all that for now. We’ll see what 
our son wants to do first.
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Community views in Rochester
Rochester is on the Campaspe River, 180 kilometres 
north of Melbourne, 28 kilometres south of Echuca and 
63 kilometres north of Bendigo. The town is in Campaspe 
Shire, which is based in Echuca, and is the main service 
centre for a diverse agricultural region in the central part of 
the shire. At the 2001 census there were 8216 people living 
in the Campaspe–Rochester Statistical Local Area, 2600 of 
whom were living in the town of Rochester. A focus group 
was held in Rochester with a cross-section of community 
residents, and interviews were conducted with some local 
residents, as well as some key people in Echuca.
Economic profile
Dairying is the main industry in the district, but there are 
also grapes, tomatoes, cattle and sheep production, and 
cropping. Rochester is the centre for a long-established 
farming community; it has several heritage-listed buildings 
and provides a range of retail, business, community and 
recreational services. Among the associated agricultural 
industries are Murray–Goulburn, Lely Australia, Humes 
CSR, Nelson Manufacturing, and the Rochester and Elmore 
Consolidated Herd Improvement Service. The Murray–
Goulburn dairy processing factory is the largest employer, 
and there are several other smaller industries involved  
in concrete production, agricultural machinery and 
manufacturing. Lely Australia is an international company 
based in Rochester; it distributes dairying and fodder 
conservation equipment, plus robotic milking systems.
Community services
Rochester has private and government schools and a district 
health service, including a hospital and a neighbourhood 
centre. The hospital is undergoing a $21 million upgrade, 
which, among other things, involves the development of 
a new operating theatre. There are new doctors’ rooms, 
a nursing home, and hostel and aged care facilities. There 
are doctors, a chemist, a dental surgery, four banks, six 
churches, three hotels, a tavern, and various community 
and sporting facilities such as a bowling club, two golf 
courses, a motorsports complex and a swimming pool.
Community profile
Figure C.4 summarises the community profile of the 
Campaspe–Rochester Statistical Local Area.
Community strengths
Rochester is a typical small farming community, displaying 
a strong sense of community pride and with a long history 
and a high level of social cohesion and organisation. Project 
participants talked about the amenities of the place but they 
also emphasised the strength and support of the people 
in the community as Rochester’s greatest asset. One said, 
‘The facilities, the amenities, you have everything here, great 
young people, good schools. People come here and set up 
business, and even if they leave that business they stay on. 
The proximity is great. Echuca is 20 minutes away, Bendigo 
is 40 minutes’.
The diversity of the local agricultural industries was seen as 
a major strength:
If the dairy farmers had a bad year, the wheat farmers 
had a good year, and if the tomato farmers had a good 
year, someone else would have a bad year. We are very 
diverse; we don’t rely on one thing. I have been told 
that the ANZ bank here was the only country branch 
that funded itself. In other words, it had deposits in that 
bank that equalled the loans it had out. Even when other 
banks were closing down we still had a National and a 
Westpac bank. The secondary college is up to 550 kids 
this year. It’s not an old town; it’s a young town. The 
pre-school needs a bigger school with more classes. 
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Figure C.4 Campaspe–Rochester Statistical Local Area: community profile
NOTE: The blue circles on the bar graphs and the lines on the pie 
charts denote corresponding percentages for Australia in total.
SOURCES: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Google Maps.
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Community cohesion
Persistent lobbying by the community led to the Victorian 
Government granting the $21 million to redevelop the health 
facilities, doctors’ rooms, community health services and 
hospital. The community reacted strongly to the closure 
of the hospital’s operating theatre. More than 1000 people 
turned out to a community protest meeting because they 
feared they would lose their hospital, doctors and health 
services. All the project participants referred to this as an 
example of the cohesiveness of the community.
The local neighbourhood centre was cited as a further 
example of community cohesion. Residents had recently 
petitioned for a ‘men’s shed’ to provide a facility for men to 
socialise. The shire provided a building for a neighbourhood 
centre to cater for a wide range of community groups, and 
at the rear a shed provides woodworking equipment, tools 
and other things so that men can meet and work together. 
One of the local farmers gave an example of the 
supportiveness of the community:
I think it’s a vibrant community. It fights very hard for 
what it really needs—like the hospital. And one of the 
nicest things about Rochester is that you will always be 
supported in a crisis. If that involves being away from your 
community you really appreciate it when you come back. 
Our eldest son was diagnosed with a serious disease when 
he was young, and that’s when we learnt what it was 
like to be in a community like Rochester. In Melbourne, 
people don’t know their neighbours. We came home and 
someone had done the ironing and looked after the dogs, 
and the fridge was full for weeks on end. We left in the 
middle of shearing because we had to get to Melbourne 
quickly, and the shearers that normally abide by every 
rule and are pretty fixed on what they do, were shedding 
sheep and doing things because we weren’t here.
Farmers also talked about support between neighbours:
There are some great young people. Our sons have a 
network they have built up of more young people than 
we expected to know in the district. There’s nothing formal 
about this; it’s all mates and friends but, as my son says, 
what they did without mobile phones he will never know. 
If one has heard of a good contract going on grains or hay 
or something, they will be on the phone and they will all 
know about it. 
Community problems
Crime was not a concern for this community. The local police 
explained that the community was conservative and that 
very few problems occurred. The challenges for the Rochester 
community arise mainly from the town’s small size and its 
inability to maintain local industries and services. A local 
bank manager explained that one of the difficulties for the 
community was over-reliance on agricultural industries for 
business and employment. Most bank agribusiness is now 
managed by regional offices, leaving local bank branches to 
operate only as an agency. She added, ‘Ten years ago this was 
a leading bank. The majority of our day-to-day customers are 
retired people, but it’s still important to provide a service 
to the area. People like to come in and see someone’.
The main concern is the loss of water from the region. 
One farmer commented:
Surviving the loss of water is really one of the major 
problems. Since the amalgamation of councils, I think we 
have to battle even harder to get recognition for roads 
and services. Really it’s just keeping our business centre 
going, because if we lose that we are just going to have 
to travel so much further. 
Another mentioned that in one of the smaller communities 
in the area a one and a half–teacher school is likely to close 
because of the loss of farm families from the district: ‘It’s a 
concentrated dairying area; the only thing that will keep that 
school open is hobby farmers that buy out dairy farmers 
when they can no longer go on’.
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The impacts of water trading on the farming 
community
The focus group and the interviews with residents  
revealed four major concerns about water trading for local 
farmers—stranded assets, uncertainty about future water 
allocation, the changing rules and regulations for trading, 
and the inability of local farmers to compete with large 
corporations for water. One of the farmers said:
Water trade is here to stay there is no doubt about that. 
We’ve had 2000 megs of water taken out of our district in 
the last three weeks, although they say it’s not a big issue: 
the net trade out of the whole Rochester area at the 
moment is less than 1 per cent. For the first few years of 
water trading, even though there was a little bit of water 
going out overall we were a net importer of water. I think 
we even increased. People who had 100 per cent of water 
right said that wasn’t enough for them to run a dairy farm 
efficiently, and over a period of time people developed 
their farms on no less than 150 per cent of water right. 
What water trading gave them the opportunity to do was 
shore up their security by buying more permanent water 
in. If you had 100 meg and you were only going to get 
50 per cent of that 100 meg people couldn’t survive, 
but if you had 200 meg and were only going to get 
50 per cent of that 200 meg you could survive. I’m not 
sure why it turned around and now we are an exporter. 
The mighty dollar rules these days.
Another explained:
The west side of the Campaspe system is an area known 
as the Rural Finance, which developed in the 1960s. 
There used to be about 80-odd dairy farmers out there 
and now there is only 18 or 20. Because the majority 
of people have sold their water off, it has brought it 
back to the very minimum number of people that are 
now responsible for maintaining the system. In the rural 
finance area, some of those channels have had it now 
because the water has been sold. So how viable is it to 
run the water to the guy down the road? The trouble is 
once you do that damage how do you change it? I would 
think that in a very short period of time there will have 
to be some serious discussion go on as to whether that 
system remains at all. 
A representative of local industry observed, ‘Farmers are 
very, very concerned that they won’t be able to afford the 
water because the large corporations will have lots of money 
for developing country, growing crops with a high return, and 
your average dairy farmer isn’t going to be able to compete’.
Concern about stranded assets in the area was also evident. 
One participant believed stranded assets were self-propelling, 
in that, once more than two farmers sell water on a channel, 
others feel the pressure to follow:
The problem on the open system where you might 
have a spur channel with three or four irrigators on it, 
and if two or three of those irrigators decide to sell, are 
the business people going to start saying, ‘Is it viable to 
send water down this channel to that person?’ It puts 
those remaining in a bind to sell as well to get out 
while they can. 
Another added:
The other big issue that I would like to bring up is 
‘higher value’. OK, water has to be traded to its higher 
value. What Mildura—where they are letting the grapes 
rot on the vines, oranges are dropping on the ground—
that’s higher value? Or is it our managed investment 
funds, is that higher value. Oh, my word it is. Now I 
heard yesterday that one of the almond plantations are 
stockpiling water on land wherever they can because the 
tagging comes in with unbundling. Once it’s tagged if we 
on the Goulburn system are only on 23 per cent, they can 
only use 23 per cent, but it’s certainly advantaging the 
Murray system farmers, whereby they buy 100 per cent 
of the water here. You have zero off Campaspe and they 
take it into the Murray System and they get their full water 
right. Now how fair is that?
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One of the farmers added, ‘I think it needs to go to 
reliability as well’.
Another participant commented:
Initially, when water trading was brought onto the scene 
I didn’t think it was a bad thing. Water trading in its own 
right I thought was OK, but the restrictions that we had 
on water trading were far too open and they were wrong. 
There is some very marginal land in the Pyramid Hill area 
and people were pouring water onto that land in the hope 
that something would grow. I think that was just a waste 
of a valuable resource. I didn’t have an issue with the 
Pyramid Hill people when they had marginal land like 
that being able to sell their water and perhaps bring it 
back into the Rochester area, but at least it remained on 
the Goulburn system. The unbundling is going to make 
it much worse again, so from that point of view I don’t 
think that permanent trade in its own right is a bad thing, 
but the rules are totally wrong. 
He drew attention to drought and water trading:
I think we really have to differentiate between the drought 
and what was occurring normally because the drought 
certainly has fast tracked this incredibly. If we hadn’t had 
hit drought, if there was still water for that Campaspe area, 
would people have sold their water? So we need to put it 
into context. The temporary water trade was really good 
because it allowed it to be moved within districts. Once 
we have these water barons and managed investment 
schemes, which create an unfair playing field, they get 
a 50 per cent tax break etc. They take water from this 
area where we are paying $46 a meg and take it up the 
river to Merbein or one of those places, [where] they are 
paying $11 a meg for water that we have to pay $46 for.
The impacts of water trading 
on the non-farming community
Several of the focus group participants were local business 
owners. They were asked if water trading had affected their 
business and about their perceptions of the impact on other 
businesses in the town. 
The associated industry perspective
Rochester was described as a town that in the past had 
a strong local economy but where drought and the water 
trade have had an impact. One participant explained:
Rochester has been growing now for the last 15 years. 
The factory at the end of the street [the butter factory] 
employs a lot of young people who help with the business 
houses of Rochester. Obviously, there are companies in 
Rochester who rely heavily on the agricultural industry 
and they are the ones I would be concerned about. 
He noted, however, that the factory had recently stood 
down some workers:
Without that dairy factory, we wouldn’t be doing that well. 
We have young families working at that butter factory, the 
husbands or the wives, and sometimes both, and they 
are getting $50 000–60 000 per year income. Now that’s 
not bad. A lot of young people come into my shop to buy 
because of that. There are a lot of casuals that they usually 
put on this time of year. Now I heard that they were not 
putting any people on, they are actually putting people off. 
A representative of an international company based in 
Rochester said, ‘One of the reasons that we are based 
in Northern Victoria is that it’s one of the biggest dairying 
regions in Australia. Rochester is a top place, we have great 
people based here, but if everything is happening elsewhere 
we will have to shift the expertise elsewhere’.
When asked to isolate the impact of trading from other trends 
in agriculture, he responded:
You tend to get bigger equipment, bigger holdings, the 
mum and dad family farm seems to be a dying trend, 
which is very bad for areas like this. People depend on the 
number of families that are out there. I was at a regional 
dealers’ meeting and the major concern was the insecurity 
caused by water trading and whether the farmers will be 
able to afford to buy the water and compete in an open 
market and make a dollar out of it. We sell expensive 
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machinery such as robotic dairies, but its very hard for 
farmers to make a decision to spend that sort of money 
when they really don’t know what is going to happen 
next. People are saying, ‘If this guy sells the water and 
I’m over here how much is it going to cost me and what 
are the implications of getting that water to me when I’m 
on the end of the line?’ I talk to families and they are 
saying, ‘How long is this going to last?’
When asked if the cause was drought or the water trade, 
he responded:
Well, they were talking more so about water trading and 
the future—whether they could afford to pay the money 
for the water and whether the water would be available. 
It’s the uncertainty. It’s very difficult not to get the drought 
and trade mixed up, because we are in a shocking set 
of circumstances. We were going all right until it 
stopped raining.
The central business area
The owner of an electrical business reflected businesses’ 
concern about the downturn in the local economy:
September was the worst month we have ever had in my 
shop in 30 years. The Rural Finance farmers were buying 
things out of my shop on a regular basis. In the late ’70s 
the area out there was booming; there were about 100 
farms out there. I can remember in ’82, and I think it was 
drought then, we sold two to three airconditioners a week 
out there. One farmer would get one, then the next door 
neighbour would get one, because they had the money.
We were also servicing their dairy equipment. It started to 
slow down a few years ago, and I can’t remember seeing 
a dairy farmer from that area coming into my shop and 
buying things that weren’t a necessity. We haven’t hit a 
brick wall yet, but we have to be very careful. The best 
way for us to manage this is to control the amount of 
stock we bring in.
When asked how much of the downturn could be attributed 
to the water trade, he replied that, while there were fewer 
farmers around, it was difficult to disentangle the effects 
of the trade and drought:
One of the positives of the area has been the grapes 
down the road because they are labour intensive. For 
nine months of the year there are people employed out 
there and they use a relatively small amount of water for 
what they do. They can pay a lot of money for a megalitre 
of water because they are going to get a return from it. 
Plus if you have $3 million of grapes in the paddock and 
if you have to spend $50 000 to save them, you will. 
Drought-wise we are all affected. One of my staff is 
pregnant, and you think that’s great, that’s one less. 
We had a guy leave last week and in the past you would 
have automatically put someone on, but we are thinking 
about it. What is happening now is definitely drought 
related and it changes your whole tack: you look for 
better bargains. I don’t know if we can understand the 
impact of water trade on our business. You can relate it to 
drought and six out of the last 10 years it’s been terrible. 
If it rains at the right time of year, the week after that rain 
it is just incredible what happens at work, the number of 
people that walk into the shop and start buying things. 
There are probably a lot of businesses in Rochester 
that don’t understand water trading—don’t want to 
know about it and don’t understand it. Everyone says 
when the rains come everything will return to normal. 
Unfortunately, that won’t happen because the effect 
of water trading will start to dig in. There’s no doubt a 
town like Rochester relies on the farming community. 
If the farmers have money they spend it and everybody 
benefits from it. As soon as things go bad the farmer shuts 
up shop and everybody feels the effect. Last year was 
a really good year in the dairy industry. So I would be 
concerned that if it was a really good year for farmers that 
business has been slowing down over two or three years; 
39 per cent water for the Campaspe area, 31 per cent 
the next year and zero this year, so I think there may 
be a pattern. 
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Loss of permanent water from regions has caused concern 
for local shires because of the significant drop in rate income. 
A representative of Campaspe Shire reported that this was 
also a concern in the Campaspe municipality:
They didn’t do any socio-economic studies on the impact 
of water trading on rural communities prior to it occurring. 
They have just gone ahead and now we have this 
juggernaut that just keeps chugging along, irrespective of 
people being against it. The unbundling of water means 
a loss of revenue to our shire of $1.3 million. The Shire 
of Gannawarra will lose $800 000, and Mildura I have 
heard is about $2 million. I suppose council has got two 
options—either increase rates or cut services, which the 
community really won’t want. The state government has 
completely ignored any pleas for assistance. They have 
given them 12 months’ grace to bring in this unbundling 
and, I think the very words were, ‘to adjust’. So money-
wise for the councils it is a huge problem, but our main 
grievance has been that they have gone ahead with this 
without any well credentialed, good sound practices 
of a socio-economic impact study, and we can see 
the impact on our communities already. 
The community
The stringent water allocations within the system have a 
social consequence for people’s gardens and the aesthetic 
appeal of the town. One farmer displayed her once-beautiful 
garden, which had been her pride and joy and her source of 
relaxation. She was struggling to maintain a few plants with 
grey water from the house and was most anxious about how 
they would manage with the impending loss of stock and 
domestic water. One of the focus group participants spoke 
of the impact for the golf course:
We also use the Campaspe system to water the golf 
course, and if there is no water we can’t water the course 
and that’s another aspect of the affect on communities. 
There are less people playing golf because the course is 
not as good as we would like it to be. We certainly find 
less people from the Rural Finance playing golf because 
there are not so many people out there any more. 
I was asked my point of view about water trading 
at a meeting and my answer was that I disagreed with 
permanent water trading because I would hate to see 
permanent water go from the Campaspe system because 
it could shut it down and that will affect Rochester 
businesses. About two days later a lady came into my 
shop and she swore at me—and this lady is not prone 
to swearing at the best of times—and told me I had no 
right to tell her that she couldn’t sell her permanent water 
right. I said that as a business person I’m against selling 
permanent water rights because it affects our community. 
She was really distressed about this. 
Another agreed: 
The stress is leading to distress and people are acting in 
ways that they would not normally act. The government 
here in Victoria loves to use the term ‘willing sellers’. Now 
what is a willing seller? A person who has got the bank 
breathing down their neck, has got lots of outstanding 
debts? Their option is they can sell their water overnight; 
it might take years to sell their farm. So they sell their 
water. Now, to me, that is not a willing seller. I think 
that’s a very crass way of making out that people are 
just voluntarily selling their water. They are not. 
Dairy farmers, Kerang
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In a similar study of this region Fenton (2006) found there 
was considerable social pressure on farmers who chose to 
sell their permanent water. Eighteen months on, however, 
with severely reduced water allocations and intensifying 
drought, participants in the present study maintained that, 
while the majority of people were against the loss of water 
from the district, they appreciated that farmers were often 
forced to sell and they were afforded more sympathy. 
One of the farmers interviewed said:
The selling of permanent water out of the district has been 
very bad for the district because of the social impacts. 
I think some people who have sold have been left very 
isolated from the rest of the community. It’s frowned upon. 
People have been ostracised and isolated if they have 
done it, and I feel very sorry for them because everyone’s 
economic circumstance is different, and for most people 
it’s been an economic decision. Now there is a greater 
acceptance, I think.…
I also think [about] the impacts of water going out of the 
district’s flows because the number of dairy farms closed 
in this area. It flows through to our business centre—
our factory. They have just put off 10 workers in the 
last few weeks, and I’d say that’s only the beginning. 
I think the costs fall hardest on the young farmers who 
are trying to establish themselves. They have no spare cash 
to go out and purchase. And their assets are all tied up. 
We’ve only been able to purchase by using our asset as 
security, we’ve never had the spare cash for the little bit 
of water that we have bought. The young farmers aren’t 
in that position. 
Discussion
Rochester has been an importer of water for many years, 
but recent trade out of the district, significant reductions 
in water allocations, and the subsequent loss of productive 
irrigated agriculture in the district are a major concern for 
residents. Structural change is occurring, and residents fear 
the loss of more people from the area. The existence of 
dryland agriculture in the region does offer some alternatives, 
but the current drought has meant that the downturn in the 
irrigation industries is felt more keenly. It was difficult for 
project participants to differentiate between the influence 
of drought and that of the water trade. In short, it can be 
concluded that the water trade exacerbates the impact 
of drought. The dairy factory is a big employer in the town, 
and the lack of water for the dairy industry is affecting it.
There is a feeling of warmth and friendliness throughout 
the town of Rochester. The residents spoken to displayed 
a genuine regard for people and an attachment to their 
community. Of all the communities studied, this appeared 
the most cohesive, largely as a result of the fact that most of 
the residents are long-established members of the community 
and share similar values. There is little need for structured 
community support services because informal community 
support is already in operation. This quality represents a 
special mix of people, community structure and environment 
that is less common in rural Australia than it was in the past. 
What threatens Rochester residents is the feeling that the loss 
of population could lead to the loss of existing community 
services such as their health services.
Dairy, Central Goulburn
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Community views in Kyabram
Kyabram, an attractive town 39 kilometres from Shepparton, 
42 kilometres from Echuca and 200 kilometres north of 
Melbourne, is situated between the Goulburn, Campaspe and 
Murray Rivers. A substantial and growing community of 6000 
people in the town and a further 16 000 in the surrounding 
district, it is part of Campaspe Shire, which is based in 
Echuca. A major local attraction is the Kyabram Fauna 
Park, a 55-hectare reserve housing 500 species of wildlife.
Economic profile
Campaspe Shire’s second-largest town, Echuca, is an 
important centre for commerce, industry and employment 
in the eastern part of the shire. Dairying and fruit orchards 
are the main industries; manufacturing and engineering are 
important secondary industries. Processing of fruit (SPC–
Ardmona Ltd) and dairy foods has become increasingly 
important. Nestlé (Tongala), Heinz (Girgarre) and Bonlac 
(Stanhope) have food processing plants in the district.
Community services
Kyabram is important for service delivery, particularly health 
services, in the surrounding rural district. The town has a 
46-bed hospital with an attached 30-bed home for the aged, 
a retirement village, an infant welfare centre, an ambulance, 
11 doctors, three dentists, a chiropractor, massage therapists, 
and practitioners of alternative medicine. There are three 
primary schools, a secondary college, a community 
college, and two preschools. There are churches of many 
denominations, an extensive community centre, a swimming 
pool, excellent sports facilities, a cinema and a licensed club. 
Community profile
Figure C.5 summarises the community profile of the 
Campaspe–Kyabram Statistical Local Area.
Community strengths
The long-established farming district surrounding Kyabram 
is a wealthy area, and the town reflects this. One project 
participant said this wealth base is the main strength of the 
community; he added, ‘There is a lot of money in and around 
Kyabram. Real estate prices are always good. Probably as dear 
as Shepparton; not as dear as Echuca’. Other participants 
focused on the facilities in the area. Kyabram was described 
as a ‘big sporting town’: ‘Its got good schooling and an 
exceptionally good hospital. Good sporting groups, there’s 
plenty of sport in the town. And probably the easy access 
to Melbourne’.
Community cohesion
Participants were proud of their community spirit. One said, 
‘I’ve travelled around a bit and it’s as good as I’ve seen’. 
Another said, ‘… a small, tight-knit community that is very 
community minded. There are a lot of service groups, and 
participation is good. Good youth groups and support for 
people. Churches are very strong. They recently organised 
a barbeque for farm families as a social outing’. Another 
participant spoke of community support for a family who had 
suffered a tragedy, concluding, ‘Everyone knows everyone 
and rallies around when needed’. Another agreed: ‘It’s a 
warm and friendly town and is a town that has got where it 
has without much help. It’s a community that works together’. 
He also noted, however, that some of the non-farming 
community do not really understand the difficulties the 
farming community faces: ‘They don’t realise the seriousness of 
the water shortages for farmers and how this will ultimately 
impact upon the local economy. They read about it but 
don’t understand’.
Community problems
Crime was not a concern in this community. The local police 
maintained, ‘Most folk are decent hard-working people’. 
The greatest challenges for the Kyabram community are 
stagnating population growth, loss of young people to bigger 
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Overseas 7%
Figure C.5 Campaspe–Kyabram Statistical Local Area: community profile
NOTE: The blue circles on the bar graphs and the lines on the pie 
charts denote corresponding percentages for Australia in total.
SOURCES: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Google Maps.
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centres, and lack of employment and opportunities for future 
economic development. One community leader said, ‘Trying 
to keep the kids employed in the town is the main concern. 
We lose kids to Melbourne or wherever. But every country 
town’s the same’.
Many of the participants referred to water as the ‘big 
issue’. One participant noted that it pervades every topic 
of conversation in the community; another maintained that 
drought is the challenge. Yet another participant qualified this: 
‘The drought is depressing, but that won’t be there forever. 
Water trade has certainly impacted on the district—not 
Kyabram as much, but certainly the district, particularly 
small communities like Tongala’. 
The impacts of water trading 
on the farming community
A banker provided an overview of the current status of 
agriculture in the district and the impact of the water trade. 
Drought has had a big impact on local dairy farms:
This year is throwing up lots of challenges. Hardest hit 
are irrigators on the Goulburn system because water 
allocation is so low. Not to say people on the Murray 
are not affected. In terms of feed shortages, we have 
seen panic buying because of the dry conditions. The 
flow-on effects are far more compressed this time than 
the previous drought of 2002–03.
Feed prices reached record highs in a few weeks and 
water prices have gone sky high in a very short time 
frame. It’s having a big impact on their cash flow and 
for next year’s outlook and their long-term viability. 
He said the bank had been exceptionally busy reviewing 
loans and clients’ ability to carry debt. People’s whole 
business plans have changed with the water shortages:
While the Murray guys have 95 per cent water right at the 
moment, they have budgeted on grain prices of $200-
plus a tonne, and it’s now up to $300-plus. And many are 
locked into contracts. Often these are farmer-to-farmer 
contracts, long-term arrangements at mutually acceptable 
prices between buyer and seller over a long term of 
association. But those contracts are falling down because 
growers don’t have the crops to sell. So the farmer who 
had it locked in has to enter the market to replace that 
grain at current market prices, which are massive. So that 
is hurting people and causing constant replanning. The 
big unknown is what will it be like in autumn next year. 
Are we going to get a break so people can get annual 
crops and pastures sown? Are we going to return to 
normal feed prices or will water be short again? There 
could be a great deal of restructuring that will occur.
For the Goulburn guys it’s happened very quickly … and 
more severely. Their allocation opened up at 7 per cent 
and increased to 23 per cent, and it is unlikely to get any 
higher. A lot of people have had to make pretty rapid 
decisions and change the way they are farming. Those 
that have debt have had to maintain a level of cash flow 
to cover their fixed overheads including debt. A lot have 
cut back cow numbers, scaled back production by around 
30 per cent. That has been achieved by parking cows, 
which is an avenue open to small operators. But the 
drought is widespread and there are limited options to 
get rid of cows anywhere now. Other regions are doing 
it tough. Also, in the last drought a lot of people had 
negative experiences parking cows because they returned 
in poor condition. So a lot of people have reacted 
differently this time around as a result of the emotional 
and financial baggage they carry from the last drought. 
We have seen a lot of scaling-down of cow numbers to 
match it to the amount of grass they can grow. Dairy 
farms cannot afford to be buying massive amounts of 
hay and grain to fill the feed gap. Some can more than 
others. It’s really a loss-making year for most dairies.
Yet he remained optimistic:
This region has been a long-term food bowl for the 
country and I am sure it will continue to be so. If water 
continues to be a scarce resource there will be a fair bit 
of adjustment to occur with water moving to high-value 
crops. Horticulture will continue to get a fair cut, and 
dairies that remain will be those that can extract the most 
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efficiency out of the resource. There are still a lot of dairies 
that are hanging in there, but they are marginal in terms 
of scale and management ability. If you draw a bell curve, 
there is a lot at the tail end that will be victims. The 
industry is contracting at 7 to 8 per cent a year, and 
events like drought just cause acceleration in the numbers 
that exit … continue. I think this drought will push 
a number of the smaller farmers out of the industry. 
Dairying has been an industry with an ageing base, and 
getting young people into it has been a real challenge. 
Dairying has been a good cash flow business, but kids 
are not all that keen to come back on the farm and work 
as hard as mum and dad. So the parents’ retirement will 
be to sell the farm, and that farm typically, if it is close 
to a regional centre, is small and is likely to drop out of 
the system and become a lifestyle block. This is happening 
a lot in this area. Most of the investors going into dairying 
don’t want a 100-cow farm: they want a 500-cow farm. 
So they are putting together small farms to create large 
holdings. That’s just the way agriculture is going. So that 
attrition will continue. And the shortage of water will 
accelerate that. In the Goulburn system the bulk of water 
licence holders are small farmers or lifestyle or hobby 
farmers. There is only a small percentage that has a water 
entitlement over 300 meg. So while they have only 
23 per cent they are not doing a lot with it. As bankers, 
we are a bit cynical about the latest government assistance 
in terms of the $5000. It may cover 75 per cent of those 
affected, but it’s of little benefit to them. On the Goulburn 
system, many of those small licence holders are sellers 
in the market. They sell their few megs of water at $650, 
and the ones buying are the commercial-scale producers 
who are making money for the region. It was clearly 
politically motivated. 
A farm adviser had a similar perception of the local industry:
If you go back to ’02–03, irrigation was a bit of a given. 
That’s what we did, and it was taken for granted. Now 
irrigation has stopped being something you do and water 
has become another feed input. In late spring ’02, 
temporary water hit $500 and dairy farmers said, ‘We 
are not paying $500 for water; we will buy grain or hay 
at $350 a tonne and feed our cows that way rather than 
buy water’. As demand dropped off, the water price came 
back to $380 a meg and the dairy farmers said, ‘At $380 
a meg, I’m probably better off buying water than buying 
hay at $400 or grain at $380 a tonne’. And, of course, 
the price went back to $500. The key outcome was that 
farmers looked at water quite rationally. In tough years 
they are saying, ‘OK, to produce milk I can feed them 
pasture or grain or hay or any combination. I need to 
lower input costs. If water is there at $650, I’m not 
going to enter the market. If it comes back to $300–
400, we will go back in’. 
I think this is how farmers should look at it. In these 
drought years they are not going to make money 
whatever they do. It’s all about minimising loss. When 
water is reasonably priced, irrigated pasture is their 
cheapest form of feed. It’s what they know and what 
they are good at and what they do. 
After ’02–03 farmers went two ways. Half sold a lot of 
stock and dropped their stocking rate right back to do a 
better job with a smaller number of cows and reduce risk. 
The other half went the other way and installed feedlots 
as a back-up plan. If you do a good job of either you will 
make money, but irrigated pasture is still the cheapest 
and best option for dairy cows when water is normally 
priced and you do a good job of grazing management. 
One of the local business owners, who also had 
a property, noted:
This time last year we cut 1500 rolls of hay and this week 
we cut 96. I’m normally flat out now, doing hay, and it 
lasted one week. Normally it goes over six weeks. We 
bought our own seeder this year and put 250 acres of 
crop in—nothing. We will get some use out of it, but 
a month’s feed and it’s gone. 
A stock agent was very concerned about local farm 
businesses. He said farmers began watering in August 
and ran out of water in November:
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How they are a going to survive? Hay is very dear. They 
can’t buy it locally; they have to buy it out of the district 
and there is freight on it. A lot of them had to sell half 
their cows because they can’t feed them. Normally, any 
other year, they would grow feed but they haven’t had 
any water. All they have been doing is using water to 
keep pasture going to feed their cows. Grain has gone 
through the roof as well. Grain will go up $20 to $50 a 
tonne in the next few weeks. If you haven’t got paddock 
feed all you can do is feed hay in the bales at night. Then 
milk levels drop down. It’s costing them money to keep 
cows going. So they dry them off. A lot are trying to keep 
their cows going so they can get them back into calf. 
So they have to keep them cycling. If they can’t get the 
cows in calf they are gone for next year. A lot of them are 
still way behind [with debt] from the drought three years 
ago … because they had to buy hay in then. Then for the 
next 18 months they had to restock.
Another participant found it difficult to separate the effects 
of trade and drought:
Farmers sell their water and their farms become 
unproductive and you wonder whether is it a combination 
of the water trade and the drought or just solely the 
drought. I’d say it’s probably a combination. The average 
dairy farm’s got 200 acres with 200 megalitres of water. 
Things get tight so the easy way out is for the farmer to sell 
his water off. It’s been making around $1500, so straight 
away he has $300 000 to clear his debts and he can try 
to get a job somewhere. The down side of this is that the 
farm is closed up: without water it’s not going to produce 
anything apart from a bit of dry land cropping. So, if the 
water is traded off and sold downstream never to return, 
we’re getting more unproductive land. I could take you for 
a drive around this area where there used to be just dairy 
farm after dairy farm. There might be one every square 
mile now, whereas there used to be 10 per square mile.
Perceptions of water trading
The benefits
One of the local agronomists made observations about the 
benefits of temporary trade:
The benefits of temporary trade are enormous for this 
district. There is a strong dairy industry, and a lot of 
businesses have set themselves up to run at somewhere 
between 130 and 180, sometimes 200, per cent of water 
right. So, over nine to 10 years on the Goulburn system 
without sales water, the dairy farmers are really embracing 
temporary trade, and it has been a means for them to 
continue to grow the cheapest source of feed, which is 
pasture. With temporary trade, the water still remains in 
the district, and that tends to keep farmers happier. 
Another project participant agreed:
Temporary trade is fine—yes, it’s good. It’s making full use 
of the water that’s available. For years the older farmers 
may have had, say, 500 megalitres. They would never use 
it; It would just sit there. So there would be no income 
earned from that water. Temporary trade puts all the 
water out there and allows it to be used. And for every 
megalitre that’s being used you hope that it would 
produce some sort of an income somewhere, and that 
flows on through the town. For the old farmer to let it 
sit there and never be used, it’s no good to anyone.
One of the bankers believed temporary water trade 
was a necessity:
The tenfold increase in the price as a result of the 
shortage is interesting. But it is really supply and demand 
dynamics kicking in. While we might sneer at the small 
operators out there, the system is reliant on them providing 
the trades. The market is so complex with rules with what 
can be traded one year to another. This is the system that 
has evolved and in most years it does work. I’m not in 
favour of any form of regulation or subsidy or whatever.
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The farm adviser offered a regional perspective:
Areas around Boort that have been opened up—the 
benefits are huge for that little community, because there 
is so much more work and employment. If you went to 
Pyramid or somewhere like that where they have lost a 
lot of water, it is not so sure because of the social issues 
there. The people are so passionate about it because it 
makes them so frustrated to see water leave their district. 
But, holistically, the benefits outweigh the costs. But the 
costs are hard to articulate because a lot of the costs are 
people costs; the way they feel and what’s happening 
to their schools, the number of kids, etc. So it is easy to 
say the benefits are this because we are now producing 
all this extra stuff because the water is moving from lower 
to higher value uses, but it’s harder to say what effect it 
has on schools where numbers are halved or on 
towns that can’t field a football team because there 
are less people.
The costs
One regional adviser believed the cost of water was the 
main disadvantage of temporary trade: 
If they have to do a lot of temporary transactions, farmers 
don’t necessarily like the $65 fee. I think that is a pretty 
minor thing in the scheme of things; probably more 
nuisance value than anything. Benefits outweigh costs 
especially in years of low water allocation: it just frees up 
water to people who can make money out of it. Although 
it’s pretty frightening this year that people are still buying 
water at $650 per meg. I suspect it’s mostly orchardists 
who are trying to get a harvest or keep trees going. There 
are not many dairy farmers who would enter the market 
to spend $650 to grow grass.
One of the bankers interviewed observed:
There are number of people who have taken good 
advantage of permanent trade. It has given some more 
security, and there are others that realise the capital that 
was tied up in it and then trade water temporarily. They 
have the potential to come unstuck when the new water 
reforms are introduced. But others have used permanent 
trade to better their business but they don’t necessarily 
like the idea. If you make a gross generalisation people 
say, ‘Permanent trade into my district is good. If water 
leaves the district, it is not so good’. 
A farmer insisted that there needed to be a moratorium 
on the sale of permanent water out of the district.  
Another resident also had a strong opinion:
Droughts are preventable, manageable, if farmers 
have the resources for hard times. Governments have 
not increased storage and have bowed to political 
demands for too long. Temporary trade should be 
allowed in moderation. Farmers should trade only a 
proportion of temporary water. Everyone needs a buffer 
in water. Permanent water trade should just not exist!
One farmer described his position and his concerns about 
the loss of water from the district:
I believe the water can be traded within a system but not 
outside the system. Our channel is 50 kilometres long as 
we follow the creek system. We’ve got a dairy farmer who 
wants water every couple of weeks and then we’ve got 
cropping blokes that might want it in the spring and 
autumn. The fellow at the top end might want 10 megs 
of water so we might pump 11 megs so he can pump 
10 megs out because he loses 1 meg through seepage 
and evaporation. We have to pump 50 megs into the 
system for the bloke at the bottom end so he can get 
20 megs. We’re selling water to Mildura and they’re 
buying 100 megs from this system and they’re getting 
100 megs at the bottom end, so the seepage and 
evaporation over that distance has got to be two or three 
times. The annoying part for me is that the Eildon and 
the whole system were set up to irrigate the Goulburn 
Valley. The farmers paid for all that infrastructure over 
the last 50 years and now they’re sending all the water 
downstream. I think it’s there to be used for the 
Goulburn Valley.
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For others, weeds on abandoned dryland properties caused 
concern: ‘Dairy farms that are now dryland, all it has done is 
encourage noxious weeds. When you drive around the shire 
you see a lot of scotch thistle. A lot of lifestyle farmers don’t 
care about weeds and maintenance’.
Concern was also expressed about proposed exit fees:
With unbundling coming in 2007 and exit fees applying 
for delivery, people who have been viewing their water 
as their superannuation feel that they have been really 
compromised. In July 2007 even if they sell water off 
permanently there is an ongoing delivery charge that 
they have to pay year in and out or pay an exit fee. 
The suggestion is that it will be worth $300 a megalitre. 
If I had water for superannuation and was going to sell it 
off and use that capital to retire, that will be compromised 
by these exit fees. Those remaining in the industry—
remain in the area and remain irrigating—think exit fees 
are great because it prevents price rises for maintaining 
infrastructure with the decline in the number of users, and 
they wish that fees had been brought in when water was 
first traded. It depends on your outlook and what your 
plans are. 
One participant suggested that there should be regulations to 
ensure that at least half of the permanent water entitlement 
remains with the land: ‘If a farm holds 200 megalitres of 
water, 50 per cent should be tradeable, 50 per cent should 
stay with the farm. That way the farm is always reasonably 
productive. Half and half. It gives them room to move’.
Although most people rejected permanent trade, participants 
were aware that people reluctantly agree with people using 
this option:
I’ve heard people say they don’t like people selling but 
understand why they are doing it because people are 
seeing the value of water. If you’ve got it, it’s your asset 
that you can do what you like with, but they hate seeing 
it leave their district. Many think we should try to retain a 
certain amount of water in their district, but the 2 per cent 
rule has been a bugbear for those wanting to sell. 
A farm adviser observed:
Permanent trade seems to create more angst among 
farmers. The farming community doesn’t like to see water 
leave their district. It’s not uncommon to hear about those 
so and sos down the river taking all our water. It raises a 
number of concerns in the community. People see farms 
that were once productive dried off and not being used 
to their full potential, and there are problems with weeds 
and rabbits.
One of the bankers observed that uncertainty in the market 
was affecting farm management:
Farmers are good at looking ahead and structuring their 
business according to what sort of resources they have 
available. They like nothing more than putting plans in 
and having them come off and nothing irks them more 
than having the goal posts shifted. The irrigators on 
the Murray system in NSW have had to change their 
enterprise mix. They may have purchased water only to 
have that removed by the government overnight. It’s hard 
enough for people running their businesses battling these 
constant changes. People won’t invest in this region if 
they don’t see stability, and that stability comes through 
good governance. 
An extension officer in the region said that allaying farmers’ 
anxiety about uncertainty was one of his main objectives. 
The officers conduct small group workshops for farmers to 
explain the new rules and regulations. Three years ago they 
held focus groups with farmers across the state to discuss 
their concerns. The responses centred around four themes:
• What are the new rules and how are they going to 
affect me? 
• What’s that going to mean for allocations and trading? 
• How should I best use my available resources? 
• How will I know if it’s going to be profitable? 
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Subsequent programs have been developed to address 
those questions and explain water reform:
We have had to change tack a bit because farmers are 
just in survival mode. They are not interested in anything 
else except how to get through this drought with their 
business and their farm and family intact. In the July–
September quarter we spoke to 18 farmers groups about 
the White Paper on water. Since then we spoke to one. 
Uncertainty is the big-ticket item—whether it’s drought 
or water reform. That’s what makes farmers nervous and 
less likely to invest. 
He added:
Sometimes farmers have difficulty attributing cause and 
effect: is this the effect of drought or the effect of water 
reform? One said to me the low allocations are because 
we are going through water reform and Goulburn–
Murray Water’s mismanagement of our water and the 
environment. But we can’t allocate water that’s not there. 
We have had 10 really tough years and water reform. It’s 
unfortunate but it’s all been rolled into one in people’s 
minds. The best way to explain water reform and engage 
farmers is one to one or small groups such as channel 
meetings, where we meet irrigators on a particular section 
of channel and explain water reform and look at their 
figures. When you have 15 000 customers, it’s resource 
intensive to do that. If we only see a third, what happens 
to the other 70 per cent? More resources would allow 
us to get to the breakfast table; but by the time you got 
round to everyone unbundling would be here and gone. 
The impacts of water trading 
on the non-farming community
Participants discussed the impact of water trading on 
associated agricultural industries as well as on the local 
retail sector.
The associated industry perspective
Participants noted that some businesses had been established 
in Kyabram as a direct result of the water trade, among them 
four water brokers and an irrigation company. On the other 
hand, the loss of water and the downturn in agricultural 
industries was seen as responsible for a local engineering 
company downsizing and the closure of three big canning 
factories in the district. In 2005 the Tongala milk factory 
stopped producing milk powder; it now manufactures 
only liquid milk products. One participant noted:
The more farmers that sell their water and move away, 
the less productivity you have in the area and the jobs 
are going to become more scarce. It’s a catch-22 because 
all of sudden the farmers are throwing themselves into 
the job market and milk factories aren’t getting the milk. 
The canneries aren’t going to be getting the fruit this year 
so, whereas there might have been 1000 jobs in the past, 
there’ll only be 500 this year.
Drought was blamed for the downturn in businesses. 
A manager said:
After Christmas it is going to be a big challenge. We do a 
fair bit of cattle—farmers have still got a bit of water now, 
but they are going to run out of water and are going to 
be forced to sell after Christmas. I reckon in January and 
February we may as we’ll go on a holiday for 10 months 
or more. If we can get rain again and fill the catchments 
again everything will kick off again, even though there’s 
been a heap of water sold out of the area. It’s going to 
have its effect, there’s no worries about that. But nowhere 
near the effect if we don’t get rain.
The central business area
Interviews with local business owners revealed that some 
were downsizing:
Because the money world is not spinning as quickly, it 
doesn’t come in. I’ve just put off a full-time staff member. 
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He was basically here so I could help on the farm. If I 
wanted to start late or go early there was someone here 
on a full-time basis. I sat him down on 1 August and said, 
‘If it doesn’t rain by the end of September I don’t think I’m 
going to have a position for you here’. I was prepared to 
make moves early on because there was a time before 
when I had a young fellow here who had a family and 
he didn’t want to leave. I said to myself, ‘If this happens 
again this is what I’m going to do’. This young kid didn’t 
have a family and it worked out well.
When asked how water trading had affected his business, 
one manager replied:
We’re actually about the same as last year. But I can’t 
yet give you a true indication because there was another 
similar business down the other end of town that closed 
in August. I could be 10 to 15 per cent down, but at this 
stage I’m happy with the way things are going. I’ll still 
have a Christmas but I think that will be it. Most irrigators 
in the area have got one or two waterings left and that 
will get us through Christmas. What we did notice was 
that everything that is selling was between $20 and $50. 
So I think people will still buy Christmas presents but the 
dollar value will be low. They are not willing to spend. 
I can’t blame them; I’m doing the same.
The community
Other aspects of the community were stable, but there 
was concern that the lack of water would affect local 
sporting facilities:
The sporting clubs are still good. It worries me if it gets 
that bad that we can’t water our ovals and tennis courts 
and things like that. The kids won’t play sport. If the 
footy ground’s dry then they’re not going to play footy. 
The footy club is battling. There’s no money in the area. 
If it’s a dry old footy club, for the lawn tennis courts and 
soccer grounds, the kids are going to walk the streets and 
get themselves in to trouble. 
Asked about the loss of community with the decline 
in the number of small dairy farmers in the region, 
a banker replied:
It’s reality; it’s an inevitable consequence. By the same 
token, we need a region of strong, viable businesses 
that are growing and expanding because it does create 
employment and spin-off businesses. It will be a bad thing 
if it’s all carved up into lifestyle hobby blocks with people 
out of Melbourne buying up for a sea change. I don’t see 
that as the future. There is a reason agriculture has been 
a core part of this region for years. But the dynamics are 
changing rapidly as a result of water. But this can change 
rapidly if it rains and we get the water storages back up 
again, and people will have very short memories of how 
grim it looked. 
Project participants said drought and unemployment were 
the main factors affecting Kyabram and that the water trade 
has had a minor impact compared with these two factors.
One farmer noted that the decline in the number of 
farmers in the district was having an effect on small outlying 
communities: ‘Water has left the district and there are now 
more dry farms. A lot of people left the district and school 
enrolments have declined. Smaller dairies have gone. 
Dryland farms cut hay and agist stock and raise calves. 
It’s mostly older people. There are not many younger 
people under 40’.
St Vincent de Paul centres have been active throughout 
Campaspe Shire, providing support and conducting 
information days to tell farmers about the assistance that is 
available. But most of this support is in relation to drought 
relief. They noted that many farmers are unaware of all aspects 
of the available support. The manager noted, ‘We are seeing 
different families than we encountered in 2002. There is more 
stress. They had more resources, more energy and more 
money in 2002; now it’s all spent’.
Several of the residents of Kyabram were concerned about 
the stress the farmers were experiencing. One story, told in 
several of the case study communities, concerned a dairy 
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farmer who shot all his stock and then himself. Although 
regional health service providers expressed concern about 
mental health, the mental health service in Kyabram reported 
no increase in their client base in recent times. To raise 
awareness of their services and assess need, they conducted 
a doorknock in Kyabram and Rochester. They had no programs 
specific to farm families because they saw no need.
Discussion
Kyabram is a picturesque community with a 95 per cent 
water allocation. Drought is the main factor affecting the 
community. Nevertheless, the water trade has allowed dairy 
farmers to trade out of the area, and project participants were 
well aware of the negative effect such a trend can have on 
a community. Water trading has led to the establishment of 
water broking firms and an irrigation supply company but 
also to the downsizing of an engineering company and the 
closure of three canning factories in the district. Participants 
were opposed to permanent trade but acquiescent about 
temporary trade. The growing number of hobby farms in 
the district is a concern for community structure, for the 
environment and for the loss of agricultural productivity.
Community views in Tatura
Tatura, a community of about 3000 people located 
167 kilometres north of Melbourne and 17 kilometres west 
of Shepparton, is part of the Greater Shepparton municipality. 
The district is famous for the development of the Dethridge 
Wheel, which is used to measure the amount of irrigation 
water released from a channel to a farmer’s property. 
Dethridge meters were installed on irrigation properties 
after World War 1 (DNRE 2006).
Economic profile
The Tatura district produces cereal crops, fruit, vegetables, 
dairy products, fat lambs and beef. In Tatura there is a tomato 
processing factory, a milk products plant and an abattoir. 
Tatura Milk is an important manufacturing enterprise; it is 
owned and supplied by about 350 dairy farmers and produces 
a range of products—cream cheese, milk powders, infant 
milk formula, and so on. Snow Brand, another company in 
the area, produces cheese and infant milk formula that is 
exported to the Asia–Pacific region and Japan. The Unilever 
plant employs 150 people in manufacturing foods such as 
soups and sauces. 
Tatura is also home to several government agencies, 
among them the Institute of Sustainable Irrigated Agriculture 
(Victoria’s centre for research into irrigation management–
related issues) and the Tatura Research and Extension 
Centre of the Victorian Department of Primary Industry. 
Goulburn–Murray Water’s head office is also there.
International Dairy Week is held in January each year at 
Tatura Park, which is a state-of-the-art exhibition centre and 
showground. This is the largest annual dairy cattle sale and 
show in the southern hemisphere, attracting more than 6000 
visitors from Australia and overseas. 
Community services
Tatura has a primary school, four churches, a swimming 
pool, a recreation reserve and caravan park, an aged care 
facility, several social and sports clubs, a golf course and a 
shopping centre. There is no hospital or high school. Children 
attending high school must travel to Shepparton or Maroopna. 
This is a concern for community leaders, who believe such 
facilities are important to the future growth of the town. One 
service provider noted that the lack of public transport was 
another problem, especially given the high proportion of 
elderly people in the population.
Community profile
Figure C.6 summarises the community profile of the 
Greater Shepparton Part B West Statistical Local Area.
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Figure C.6 Greater Shepparton Part B West Statistical Local Area: community profile
Overseas 8%
NOTE: The blue circles on the bar graphs and the lines on the pie 
charts denote corresponding percentages for Australia in total.
SOURCES: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Google Maps.
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Community strengths
Tatura differs from most small rural communities in that it 
offers plentiful employment opportunities, mainly with local 
agricultural industries such as Tatura Milk. One of the focus 
group participants explained:
There were some figures that came out recently, 
quoted by the shire, that Tatura has a population of 
3000 and there were 3000 jobs in the vicinity with 
natural resources, the water commission, the abattoirs, 
the structural engineering etc. I know a lot of people 
come into the town to work but, with a population 
of 3000 and 3000 jobs, it’s a pretty unusual town. 
Recent new housing developments have been a response 
to the increasing number of retirees moving into Tatura. 
Many of these people come from farms in the 
surrounding district.
Community cohesion
Participants described the community as small and friendly. 
The farming district has traditionally been quite wealthy, and 
this has sustained the local community. One participant said, 
‘Because we have such a great agricultural industry around 
here, it’s a fairly affluent town. The sporting facilities in the 
town have all been built through contributions from the 
working population in the town. The cricket and tennis 
clubs—they’ve all been community funded’. Another added:
It’s a wonderful town: every facility you’d need. When 
you compare Tatura [the satellite city] to Shepparton, the 
vitality of the tennis club, churches, blue-light disco, adds 
so much value to this town. In a big city you get lost and 
people just don’t support these types of things. In small 
towns you can be seen; you get a bit of kudos for 
being involved. 
Community cohesion was demonstrated by one service 
provider’s account of the support afforded local farmers 
during the 2002 drought. When the drought appeared to 
break, the farming community held a barbecue for all the 
local services to thank them for their support. 
Community problems
The main obstacle facing the community is its proximity to 
the large regional centre of Shepparton. Many people who 
work in Tatura elect to live in Shepparton and commute daily. 
One participant explained:
Because we are really close to Shepparton it influences 
what happens in our commercial area. We’ve struggled; 
we are right at the brink of becoming a satellite to 
Shepparton. The stream of people that travel to this town 
to work in this town is quite amazing. Only 15 per cent 
of the 300 people in the [a government department] 
actually live in the town. People like to live in big regional 
centres for the 24-hour shopping.
The impacts of water trading  
on the farming community
Tatura was a receiver of water in the early years of water 
trading, but more recently there has been trade out of the 
district to areas further down the Murray River system, such 
as Robinvale. Participants were concerned about the impact 
on their district of this loss of water and the subsequent loss 
of farm production and people from the district. As in the 
other communities, concern was expressed about stranded 
assets and the environmental consequences of this trend. 
The owner of an agricultural business said: 
My particular beef is the seemingly clear government 
policy of promoting irrigation development (often 
through managed investment schemes) downstream of 
established irrigation areas. These developments take 
agriculture to areas where there is minimal infrastructure, 
processing or community development. The tax breaks 
offered make them attractive against mainstream 
agriculture. In other words, we are exporting our water 
to areas which provide tax benefits—which doesn’t 
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necessarily equate to efficient agriculture—at the cost of 
previous government expenditure at the regional level. 
By sending water downstream, environmental benefits 
are often reduced … The remaining irrigation communities 
are lumbered with failing infrastructure and the inability 
to fund stranded assets.
A financial adviser commented:
The concern I have is the dramatic shifts in water moving 
into different regions. Areas that used to have significant 
irrigation infrastructure are almost being disbanded. 
Katandra West is a good example: there’s been a lot 
of trade out of that area and, historically, this was 
an excellent area for dairy farmers. 
Even a water trader echoed these concerns: ‘I’ve moved a 
lot of permanent water out of these districts over the years. 
I prefer to see water stay in a district because of the social 
impact that it will have, and is having, on communities’. 
Focus group participants also discussed the subject. 
One farmer said:
There is a chap here who sold all his water. I don’t think 
he’s even got stock and domestic. That 320 acres goes 
out of production as far as Tatura Milk goes. I don’t think 
he’s going to be able to live there so he’ll move out 
and that’s a loss of kids from the school, spending in 
the town—that’s all because of water trade. Ten years 
ago he would have sold the farm and the water would 
have stayed with the farm, and someone else would 
have bought the farm and had a go. 
Another agreed: 
When water trading started we all thought, ‘What a 
sensational idea’. We had all this water over at Pyramid 
Hill, which should never had been irrigated, and of a 
lot of it came here, which enabled farmers to expand to 
make more money and spend more money in this area. 
Now it’s bypassing here and going down to the [managed 
investment scheme] storages on their farms so they can 
spend their money and develop in another area. Robinvale 
has kicked on—it’s fantastic. There are new houses and 
blokes with machinery moving in there and they all have 
jobs and it’s going well. Poor old Tat. There are a few 
second-generation farmers around here, but young 
fellows are going down to Melbourne, getting other 
jobs, and are not interested in farming any more. Farmers 
have the opportunity to sell their water, pick up some 
sort of superannuation, and either stay on the dry farm 
until they die or sell the farm cheap and move into town.
When asked if the loss of people could simply be a 
reflection of the common trend in rural Australia towards 
farm amalgamation, participants claimed that this was not 
occurring in their district: ‘The expansion and buying out 
the next-door neighbour has gone—finished. That was a big 
option up to two years ago. Even after the drought it was 
still happening, but now it’s reversed. People are subdividing 
into smaller blocks’. One participant explained:
I’ve been hay contracting for 25 years. In the past some 
farmers had a bit of laser work done but down the back 
they might have had 40–60 acres of pretty rough sort of 
country. Whacked some water on if they had some, but 
most of the time they didn’t worry about it. But over time 
farmers have farm-planned the lot, lasered the lot, sown 
the lot to try to get their productivity as high as they could 
to remain viable. The fact is they can’t expand any further. 
The commodity prices haven’t helped them. Their children 
have left the land and they really have no option but to 
retire on their farm or sell their farm cheaply. 
Asked whether water trading was responsible for these 
changes, a participant replied:
You have a whole lot of things happening and water 
trading is only one. How big an influence it has is another 
issue. At the moment some see it as a negative. They 
might be right. We might be grateful for this trade to reboot 
these dry areas in the future because the infrastructure 
will be still here. Flexibility, that’s what we have to retain 
if it proves that dairying is going to be OK for the next 
five years.
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A financial adviser was asked his opinion about the number 
of farmers leaving farming in the district:
Regardless of what is going on with drought, the fact is 
smaller farmers need to be larger to be viable. You get 
economies of scale, and lesser quality farmers in marginal 
areas will continue to be marginalised and will continue 
to exit the industry. Drought probably hastens their 
decision, and in some cases the banks, to move 
away. It’s a natural progression.
There are some very well established operators, and 
they don’t find themselves with their hands forced in 
any way. They have the appropriate level of equity. I’m 
disappointed in the way Exceptional Circumstances is set 
up in that it is limited to $100 000 for an interest subsidy. 
That’s only $1.0 to $1.5 million of debt. Many farmers 
have more debt than that. The assumption is that if they 
have that much debt they can look after themselves. 
I disagree with that to some extent. If an enterprise has got 
themselves into a pretty robust position that they can 
borrow that much debt, they are probably top operators. 
They are the ones we should continue to support—
perhaps even more so than those that are more marginal. 
The marginalised ones are going to exit the industry 
anyway. I don’t think we should be decreasing support 
for the top end.
When the farmers in the group were asked if they were 
participating in the market, they responded, ‘Very little. 
It’s too expensive’. One farmer played the market on one 
occasion, which proved to be a bad decision:
Two years ago I paid $1100 for permanent water because 
I thought it would go to $2000. I bailed out this year 
because of exit fees and channel capacity. I only did it 
once as a punt. All the rest of our water purchases were 
for continuance. We have bought permanent water over 
a long period of time because we only have a small water 
right. We didn’t have to rely on sales. They were there for 
tough times. If there was a dry break you weighed into 
your sales. It was never a problem. Prior to water trading 
most dairy farms were reliant on sales for 180 per cent 
allocation. That’s changed big time because water hasn’t 
been available to us as sales because it’s gone down the 
river or whatever. That’s put pressure all the way along 
the line because sales have not been available. I don’t 
think we will ever see those sales again. 
Another added that drought had hastened these changes. 
Before 1990 farm plans were based on 80 per cent sales. 
He added that as laser levelling became more expensive 
farms required more water to grow more feed to become 
more viable. A financial adviser noted that there had been 
other major adjustments in farming practices as a result of 
the water trade:
Farmers have adjusted their production systems 
considerably. Dairy farmers used to rely heavily on 
a spring-based production system—such as calving in 
spring—but there has been a significant turnaround in 
that there is a lot of autumn calving with more winter-
based production systems drying off in summer, when 
you get poor utilisation of water. I think that better 
utilisation of water has a long way to go. The way the 
government subsidy is set up is not quite the best. You 
might get a subsidy to do a whole-farm plan, which is 
essentially based on flood irrigation, but if you set up 
a travelling irrigator or subsurface drip irrigation system 
you get no support. Both of those are essentially more 
efficient than flood irrigation.
When focus group participants were asked how they saw 
the future of the district, they expressed concern about the 
unbundling of water rights. One said:
I was talking to some fairly influential people who had 
done research on where water will be in 2010. With 
unbundling, this person said he can foresee that people 
like superannuation funds and insurance companies will 
buy large tracts of water, then sit on it, and then sell it to 
towns and will make very good returns on it. 
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Another agreed: ‘It’s happening in Nanneella and around 
that area. Managed investment schemes are buying farms 
now. They are using farmers, supplying them with money to 
buy farms, and parking water on them. And they will lease 
it to Bendigo at a huge cost’. 
Although the participants agreed that the 30 000 megalitres 
required for the city of Bendigo was insignificant considering 
the 1.6 million megalitres available in the Goulburn, they 
were concerned that, should the price of water reach $5000, 
people might discontinue farming: ‘I think some will and 
some won’t. I think the infrastructure to supply water—it 
won’t be sustainable. That’s the worry I have’. 
One participant said supply and demand would not see 
water at $5000 and that drought tended to cloud the issue. 
Someone else concluded, ‘We are on excellent soils; we 
are high up in the landscape as far as water goes. We have 
ground water control. This is an area that will be reconfigured 
positively. And we need to make sure it is reconfigured’. 
Perceptions of water trading
The benefits
One participant argued that water trading could be 
beneficial for the district: ‘People are buying water, taking 
opportunities and being flexible. We are saying it’s bad but 
I’m not sure that putting a moratorium on or having no more 
trade is the best way to go’. 
An agribusiness consultant noted that trade in permanent 
water could be seen as drought insurance:
In some situations, when things are tough financially, 
farmers may offload some permanent water to alleviate 
debt. It devalues their farm and makes their farming 
system much riskier thereafter and prevents the capacity 
to turn around quickly. But it can get them out of a 
difficult situation brought on by a severe situation such 
as drought. Permanent water on the face of it is a pretty 
poor investment but it is an excellent insurance policy 
for a dry year like this. If you had someone with a very 
high allocation of permanent water entitlement and they 
might have different water sources—they might have 
groundwater or a diversion licence—that is very secure. 
They might have a turkey’s nest or a bore, then offloading 
might be a wise thing.
The costs
Participants talked about the negative impacts of permanent 
trading associated with stranded assets and the proposed exit 
fees. One was concerned about the environmental impacts 
of increased flows in water channels: ‘Before water trade, if 
you were a blockie or a farmer that didn’t use all your water 
or it was a wet year, you paid for your water but it stayed up 
in the hills. Now every meg that is allocated is used. The 
entire Pyramid area—there were thousands of megs of 
sleeper water sold and used’. 
The uncertainty surrounding water policy was the main 
concern of focus group participants. One farmer said:
You don’t know what the government is going to put 
through next. There is all the legislation the government 
hasn’t put in the fine print. We are sitting on water, which 
is the lifeblood of this area. It’s everything. The way it’s 
going. Everything’s been set up to trade water out of here. 
Nothing’s been done to keep it here. We have to grow 
something that makes money. The reason we haven’t got 
youth in this district is because we haven’t got money.
Another added:
What is making trade difficult is the uncertainty of it. 
Why haven’t they nominated the exit fee? Why don’t they 
set the fee right here and now? The lack of knowledge, the 
insecurity and unfairness. You sell 100 meg downstream, 
permanent or temporary, either way. You will get 23 per 
cent of that and they take it down the river and they 
get 95 per cent. Talk about insecurity. That typifies the 
unfairness. We don’t understand it; we get knotted up 
about it. 
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The impacts of water trading on 
the non-farming community
Focus group participants were asked about the impact 
of water trading specifically on industries that support the 
agricultural industries as well as on the central business area.
The associated industry perspective
Participants noted that, unlike some neighbouring 
communities, Tatura has not experienced any major loss 
of industry. Recent changes in local industry practices and 
reductions in employees were, however, a concern:
By having those government jobs here it insulates the 
town to some degree, but I feel the drought and water 
trading are starting to take effect now because as the 
water leaves so does the income, which affects this 
town. Unilever is no longer expanding their factory, 
Tat Milk store has been curtailed. Tatura Milk will 
have to amalgamate with someone else to go ahead. 
And that’s totally water related. 
When asked about agribusiness start-ups and closures in 
the region, a Shepparton-based financial adviser reported 
that he was unaware of any closures. He maintained local 
businesses were ‘hanging on at the moment’ but were 
experiencing tough times, particularly with suppliers 
failing. As for business start-ups, he noted the increasing 
number of water brokers in the district, adding, ‘They will 
become more important, too, as the complexities of the 
market system increase rather than decrease. Water brokers 
will be in a good position to capitalise on that’.
One impact of water trading that has benefited the local 
economy was an influx of New Zealand dairy farmers coming 
to the district, investing in an area they consider to be very 
cheap for milk production.
The central business area
When asked if the water trade had affected the local 
economy in any way, one person questioned whether the 
effects would be related to the water trade or to drought: 
‘If we had 100 per cent or 120 per cent water at the moment, 
which is nearly inconceivable, but we still had trade going 
on, it would be a different scenario. The drought has just 
brought these issues together’.
In recent times five businesses have closed in Tatura’s 
main business area. Among them were a chemist, a hotel, 
a furniture shop, and a hairdresser. Project participants 
reported that the town’s proximity to Shepparton had 
the greatest effect on the local economy. On participant 
contended that the chemist had been unable to compete 
with wholesale businesses in Shepparton whose prices 
were 15 per cent cheaper for most items. He continued:
There is enormous pressure from a regional centre. 
We haven’t got any tourism. The Goulburn Valley isn’t 
tourist oriented. This is a service centre for the dairy 
industry and a construction town combined all together. 
Its never had to, or needed to, try to sell other things. It’s 
never had to expand. In many ways it has the appearance 
of a town that doesn’t worry about it. Towns that are 
on about tourism have different views about tidiness 
and streetscape.
The fact that a large proportion of the town’s workforce 
commute from Shepparton and Bendigo means that few 
spend locally. One focus group participant explained: 
It’s the agricultural sector that really supports the town. 
The people who come into town to work and live 
elsewhere aren’t going to spend very much money in the 
town. They are going to spend it in the bigger regional 
centres. What’s happening is starting to take effect now 
that some of the places are closing down because people 
on the land can’t sustain any spending here.
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The community
Participants were concerned that the population 
was not growing. One said:
We can’t keep losing our youth, and the school is 
struggling in the area where we come from. It was a 
vibrant community. People are selling their farms and 
leaving. Where there were six farms, there are now 10 
hobby farmers, but they don’t seem to become part 
of the community: they like to live on their own. 
As a community, we seem to be going backwards.
Community organisations have difficulty finding people for 
committees. One participant explained: ‘It doesn’t matter 
what committee you are on, it is not getting any easier. 
The hospital committee just welcomed a new member who 
is in her 80s. The footy club is struggling’. Another added: 
Two things that the town has lost are young farmers groups 
and Apex. They folded 20 and 10 years ago. That’s where 
your leaders of the community were born. It all comes 
down to youth. This being an agricultural area it doesn’t 
matter if it’s a footy club or a dance club, or whatever, 
you can always tell how healthy an area is by the number 
of young people coming through. If you look at the 
agricultural industry, we don’t have the young people. 
When I was young if you went into farming, you had it 
made because farms made heaps of money. If you went 
into a trade, it was a mediocre life because tradies didn’t 
make much money. Now it’s reversed. These kids go to 
Melbourne and if they get a degree they make money 
that I dream about. My kid went from uni—$62 000 
straight out. He’s 22. How do you get a kid to come 
back on a farm with a $2 million investment at least 
to make $25 000. This is what we are up against.
When asked where the community would be in five years’ 
time, a participant responded:
Tatura will survive but in a different form. There may not 
be the amount of things up the main street. The income 
of the town will be generated more by retirees. Tatura 
will still be a nice town to live in; it just won’t advance. 
There are 3000 people here now and there will still be 
3000 people then. We will just be older.
Discussion
As for Kyabram, for Tatura the impact of the water trade is 
secondary to other impacts such as drought, the loss of young 
people from the district and, most importantly for Tatura, 
close proximity to Shepparton. Drought and the prospect 
of becoming a satellite town were central to participants’ 
discussion. The water trade has been the vehicle for farmers 
to leave farming, and the flow-on effects of that are being felt. 
Proximity to Shepparton has led to a growing number of 
hobby farms as farmers move on. Tatura has not experienced 
any losses in associated industries, but recent changes in 
local industry practices and reductions in employee numbers 
were a concern. 
Community views in Kerang
Kerang, a town of about 4000 people, is on the Loddon River, 
279 kilometres north-west of Melbourne on the Loddon 
Valley Highway. The regional centres of Echuca, Bendigo and 
Swan Hill are within an hour away by road. A commercial 
centre for the surrounding farming district, Kerang lies in 
Gannawarra Shire and houses the shire offices. The town 
is surrounded by an important wetland system of about 
50 small lakes and swamps that provide habitat for 
thousands of waterbirds.
Economic profile
The main agricultural activities around Kerang are dairying, 
livestock, cropping, viticulture and horticulture. Dairying 
is one of the primary agricultural industries in Gannawarra 
Shire, producing about 350 million litres of milk annually. 
Piggeries in the area are a significant employer, producing 
30 per cent of Victoria’s total pork output. There are irrigated 
pastures as well as dryland production of beef cattle, prime 
lambs and goats.
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Dryland and irrigated grain—including cereals, oilseed, 
legumes, lucerne and rice—is also grown throughout the 
shire. A range of hay products are produced: lucerne hay, 
oaten hay, pasture-based hay, straw, vetch and chaff. 
As for horticulture, Golden Rivers Country incorporates 
15 growers and approximately 1000 acres under cultivation. 
Both navel (winter fruit) and Valencia (summer fruit) oranges 
are grown; the district is also one of the largest grapefruit 
growing areas in Australia. The Border Packers juice packing 
and juice works in Koondrook employs 30 people. 
A wine grape growing area at Kangaroo Lake and Lake 
Charm, north-west of Kerang, includes Brown Brothers 
vineyards, where 250 hectares are currently planted and 
another 400 hectares are under development. A new 115-
hectare cherry orchard at Kerang is one of the largest cherry 
orchards in Victoria. Chirnside Horticultural, south-west of 
Kerang, is one of Victoria’s largest processing tomato growers, 
producing about 20 000 tonnes annually. 
Other crops grown are walnuts, jojoba, apples, olives and 
vegetables. The harvesting of red gum began with the early 
settlers and has proved a sustainable industry. There are 
several red gum furniture manufacturers and craftspeople 
in the district. 
There is also a considerable amount of manufacturing 
linked to the agricultural industries—for example, the 
manufacture of milk, fruit and grain products and of 
agricultural equipment—as well as a centre for testing hay 
and grain. Among other enterprises are irrigation equipment 
suppliers, surveyors, farm planners and water traders 
(Gannawarra Shire 2007). 
Community services
The town has a hospital and medical, dental and aged care 
facilities. The doctors service a large surrounding district, 
and the area is considered under-resourced. There is no 
public dentist. There is a preschool, a primary school and 
secondary colleges, plus a number of churches of various 
denominations.
Community profile
Figure C.7 summarises the community profile of the 
Gannawarra Statistical Local Area.
Community strengths
Project participants said the diversity of the agricultural 
industries was one of the district’s strengths. As one service 
provider explained, the combination of dryland cropping, 
grazing and irrigation provides security:
If you go west of Kerang it is all dryland farming. You go 
north, there is a mixture of dairy, horticulture and dryland 
farming. And there are a lot of traditional irrigation graziers 
there as well. You go east of Kerang and it is all irrigation, 
lots of dairy farms, tomatoes, grapes and olives. And 
south of Kerang there is a mixture of dairy, irrigation and 
dryland. The town itself has been sustained by irrigation. 
There are a lot of support industries because of the 
irrigation—Goulburn–Murray Water, Departments of 
Primary Industry and Sustainability and Environment—
and because of that there are schools and hospitals. 
One resident believed the location was everything: ‘It’s a 
great little community. It has a bit of everything. If you’re 
into fishing and outdoors stuff it is great. Within half an hour 
we can be picnicking on the Murray or out on the lake fishing 
or whatever we want to do’. Another agreed: ‘It has lots of 
churches, a lot of pubs, and 101 things to do with a ball. 
Sport is the main thing that brings people together’.
Community cohesion
Kerang’s community is characterised by a mix of nationalities 
and beliefs. Most project participants rated community 
cohesion as a three (where one represents an absence of 
cohesion and five represents a high degree of cohesion). 
Many argued, however, that, although there are separate 
groups within the whole, there is nevertheless a strong 
commitment to the town. One participant said:
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Figure C.7 Gannawarra Statistical Local Area: community profile
Overseas 5%
NOTE: The blue circles on the bar graphs and the lines on the pie 
charts denote corresponding percentages for Australia in total.
SOURCES: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Google Maps.
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There is a mix of traditional family farms and people new 
to the industry. There is also a mix of types of farming. 
There are different communities within the whole. 
The Italian community is fairly involved in horticulture, 
particularly in tomatoes. They are long established 
and as Aussie as the rest of us. There is a strong Turkish 
community here as well. The community involvement 
and spirit is tremendous.
One of the farmers added:
Kerang’s community is pretty good, but it is a diverse 
community. Up until the last four years we had relatively 
cheap housing, so we have a reasonably high population 
that are unemployed and probably aren’t seeking 
employment, and I can’t help but think that’s on the rise. 
You give them every opportunity to come out and work 
and they don’t turn up. 
Of interest is a large community of Exclusive Brethren 
who live in the town. The group owns and operates a 
manufacturing and exporting company, and many of those 
interviewed obviously saw this group as the ‘other’ in the 
community. One explained, ‘They are very good business 
people, but they are very insular. They aren’t part of the 
community. Apart from business interaction, they don’t 
mix in at all’. Despite this, another resident gave an 
example of community unity:
I’ve just come from a community meeting to do something 
about the state of the river. We had all the government 
people there, and it was a perfect example of people 
power. Things that were absolutely taboo suddenly could 
be done because there were 30 irate people. Yes, I would 
say it was a good community. I wouldn’t say we were a 
really tight community, but it’s pretty good.
One of the farmers told a similar story:
There have been a lot of issues in relation to the water and 
rates. Five years ago our land rates were going through 
the roof, and there was a group of farmers and they got 
their rates cut or reset at a more reasonable rate. So when 
things need addressing, as a community they do get 
addressed. But I think you will find a lot of the same 
people are pushing those sorts of things most of the time, 
so it would be nice to have some new drive and input.
A shire representative gave an example of community 
action to increase cohesion:
We have Asian, South American and Sudanese workers 
here, and they have fitted in extremely well. The local 
Lions Club mentor them. They teach them English, take 
them to soccer games and organise sports for them. 
We have a couple of Sudanese men who were refugees 
in Melbourne for four years and now we have brought 
them out to the country. They have fitted in extremely 
well too. One works on a dairy farm; he’s been in every 
magazine that goes. The people who have hired him are 
a young couple, and [they] are very pleased with him. 
I visited him and he told me when he was in Sudan they 
had a dozen cows and they used to hand-milk them and 
take the milk to a market 6 kilometres away. They used 
to have bags of grain to feed the cattle. He came here 
and there is a truck full of grain and a rotary dairy with 
about 400 cows; he just looked and said, ‘How are we 
gong to milk all those cows?’
Community problems
Drought, salinity and water restrictions were the primary 
concerns of the people interviewed. One of the farmers said, 
‘We are all anxious, all praying for rain. It is OK this year but 
next year it will hit. At least this year we have stock and 
domestic water. It is hard to stay optimistic with the industry 
down. There have been 10 years of drought. It is frustrating 
not being able to pay shire rates and fuel bills’.
Other concerns were the loss of population, particularly the 
district’s young people. A shire representative maintained 
that population loss was the greatest concern:
Our population has been declining; we are waiting on 
the latest census figures. There have been a lot of people 
moving in here, but we also have a proportion of people 
moving out. Farms are amalgamating. Young people in 
Case study C: Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna   191
that 17–25 age group go away to university, training or 
employment, and getting them back is really difficult. 
The greatest challenge is to grow our population, provide 
employment and development to support that population 
growth, retain and increase agricultural production, and 
diversify and specialise. People say we shouldn’t be 
so reliant on the dairy industry, and I say but the dairy 
industry is a specialised industry that requires a lot 
of add-ons. 
He added, ‘Another challenge that we have to overcome 
is the separation of land and water. That will take a huge 
amount out of rate revenue. The sustainability of the red 
gum forest is another major challenge in this area’. 
Farmers in the district reported a shortage of reliable labour:
In this shire we have some socio-economic issues. 
We are third from the bottom in the country. We have 
a workforce that is not particularly skilled. There are a 
lot of people that haven’t been to high school or tech or 
TAFE or haven’t had a job. It’s a bit of a challenge when 
training people sometimes. There are people that could 
work but to skill them to the point of being able to milk 
cows in a million-dollar shed sometimes falls apart. 
Farming is not for the kid that did not do well at school. 
It’s for the one who can run a business and one with 
people skills, and you need an economics degree as 
well just to make sure.
The impacts of water trading on the 
farming community
Most project participants referred to the drought as the 
greatest factor affecting Kerang at present, but the long-term 
trade of water out of the district was also a big concern. 
A service provider defined the difference in the impact 
of water trading and drought:
The drought impact is really big because it affects all the 
industries. The dairy industry relies heavily on the dryland 
farming to provide a lot of fodder and even agistment. 
Since the 2002 drought, dry stock have been agisted 
off farms, so that every acre is put into milk. So, when 
the drought hit, it hit everywhere. Water wasn’t such 
an issue initially. For a lot of irrigation farmers it was like 
cooking a frog. They didn’t get into boiling water in the 
same way as a dryland farmer did in 2002. When the 
drought really hit, they still had water. As there was still 
a capacity to farm, they got into hot water more gently. 
If you put a frog into boiling water it jumps straight out 
but if you put it into cold water and gradually heat it up, 
you cook it. The water did lull people into a false sense 
of security, thinking this is the one-in-100-year drought 
and it will be fine again in a few years. But it didn’t get 
better, and it wasn’t fine, and the water just got hotter 
and hotter.
One of the farmers noted that drought heightens concerns 
about the water trade:
If we weren’t in the worst drought, would we be having 
this discussion? We’d have sales water and it would be 
OK. There would certainly still be some concerns about 
permanent trade. But we’ve had trade for about 10 years 
now, and all of a sudden people in Rochester and 
surrounds have stood up and said, ‘Hold on! We can’t 
have all this trade of water going out’. Up to now they’ve 
had either positive trade or neutral water balance, and 
Pyramid has been the big loser. Now the pendulum 
has swung. 
A shire representative was supportive of the trade: 
I don’t believe we should try and stop water trade. That 
cat is well and truly out of the bag, and we need to make 
it work. Obviously, they are trying to encourage the most 
efficient use of water, but there are people issues in that 
and a very liberal interpretation of what the best uses of 
water are. A simplistic view is you put it all into high-value 
horticulture but then, when the bottom falls out of the 
market, what happens then? Life isn’t that simple; markets 
always move. There is a range of perceptions about 
whether flood irrigation is a good or bad thing, but there 
has been some research done that says in the right place 
in the right kind of soil it is actually very efficient, and 
at this stage there are no better alternative technologies.
192   The economic and social impacts of water trading
An extension officer summed up the general perceptions 
of water trading in the local farming community:
In one of the local areas that had most of the water sold 
off permanently, the remaining farmers talked about the 
land being unproductive and cheaper and undesirables 
moving in. They felt that their sense of community had 
been eroded by water moving out and less agricultural 
and less community minded people moving in. When 
they see land sold and families leaving the district they 
link that strongly to permanent trade. Sometimes you 
hear farmers reject economic rationalism and the need 
to move water to higher value uses. They don’t see it 
being good for their industry or their community. Farmers 
don’t like the managed investment schemes and the tax 
benefits they enjoy. They feel they can’t compete in that 
kind of market place. These schemes drive the price of 
water up; water leaves the district and bad things follow.
One of the farmers demonstrated this perception:
I reckon water trade is a positive thing, and it’s the way 
to go providing it is not at the detriment of communities 
and it means irrigation areas are shut down. That is just not 
on. A lot of people will argue you shouldn’t be watering 
pasture anyway, but the most profitable use of water two 
years ago was to water grass for prime lambs—better than 
grapes, capsicums or olives or anything else. OK, it was 
one year, when lambs were $140. The grapes only lasted 
one or two years, too, so olives will be the next things 
then nuts up at Robinvale. This huge place going up at 
Boundary Bend, on the sand, if it was in the US no way 
they would let them do it. Because they are putting on 
14–15 megs a hectare to grow almonds, and that is way 
above any other use. And everybody is saying exactly the 
same thing. In the US it would not happen because it is 
not efficient: all they are doing is watering sand. So don’t 
give me this argument that it is best practice. If you want 
to create a system that is sustainable long term and ride 
the peaks and troughs, that system has to be designed 
around your generic prime lambs, dairy, cropping 
scenarios. I don’t think you can build a system 
around fads and fashions.
An agribusiness consultant agreed:
One of the things that I really have a beef about is this 
talk about sending water to a more efficient use. Who’s 
buying the water? Almonds, olives and grapes? What are 
we going to do next? Are we going back to the vine-pull 
subsidies? They’re talking about it in South Australia. So, 
all we’ve done is shifted water from basically productive 
family farming to tax-driven enterprises creating gluts for 
worthless products. I don’t see any sensible planning 
in the system that allows that to happen. Is that good 
management? It certainly goes under the guise of 
good management, but it’s ridiculous.
One of the shire representatives was, however, supportive of 
managed investment schemes:
Managed investment schemes are great if they are in our 
shire; if they are in anyone else’s shire they are terrible. 
At the end of the day, managed investment schemes are 
a reality; they are out there and we have to compete, it is 
as simple as that. And they are an option for development, 
so we are looking at new portions of irrigation land 
that we can open up to suit these managed investment 
companies to try to attract them into particular areas. 
One participant reflected community concerns about the 
future of irrigation in the area: ‘The biggest challenge the 
district faces is the demise of the irrigation industry. Kerang 
is in a pretty difficult position because it has generally 
poor soils and it is at the end of the irrigation system’. 
Another added:
By the time the water gets to Kerang it is at the end of 
that system. Between here and Swan Hill the soils get 
really bad, and there has been all sorts of talk about 
retiring land from the irrigation system. One of the other 
problems is that the water that’s being sold off is leaving 
stranded assets, so you get farms with no water on them 
anymore. Once the unbundling of water comes in, that 
removes the last obstacle for the water authority for 
shutting the whole thing down because at the moment 
they still have the obligation to supply stock and domestic 
water and keep the system going. Once unbundling 
comes, that’s it.
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A further concern was the lack of management 
of environmental flows:
I’m of the age where I’m a bit more open minded and 
understand a little bit more about keeping water for the 
environment. But we’ve got a lake behind our properties. 
In a dry year they put water in it, but it might only last 
eight weeks. The birds go there and nest, but the water 
evaporates so quickly. It’s like giving someone a house 
and then burning it down on them two months later with 
all their stuff in it. I don’t think there is much practicality 
in their decisions a lot of the time. Probably does the 
environment more harm than good. I’m not going to 
jump on the bandwagon and say there shouldn’t be 
environmental flows; it just needs to be managed better. 
Perceptions of water trading
The benefits
As in the other districts studied, participants were 
supportive of temporary water trading:
The temporary trade—to a certain extent it is fine. At 
least the water is not gone forever, so all the infrastructure 
and everything will stay whilst there’s temporary trade. 
It’s allowing people to get out of jail at $300 a megalitre 
or whatever it is at the moment. That’s just money for jam. 
And whilst we still actually have some water to sell, 
as opposed to the poor people in the Goulburn Valley, 
people who have none. 
There were very few positive statements about permanent 
trade, although there was reluctant acceptance of the reasons 
farmers sell their entitlements. One participant said, ‘The 
benefits are—what do they call it? “Leave the industry with 
dignity”—rubbish. It’s not leaving the industry with dignity: 
it’s selling out. But it has allowed people to get out of 
trouble’. Another added:
There are a lot of people who do it as a justified 
business decision. There is no doubt it is warranted on 
an individual basis. Sometimes it is a way of managing 
individual debt; sometimes it’s a way of retiring; sometimes 
it’s a way of just managing a farm better. I know there is 
one guy who deliberately sold his water right because he 
was in a better financial position if he sold it and brought 
water in on a temporary basis. Farmers can get just as 
much for their water right as they could for their property 
10 years ago.
The costs
Participants noted that temporary water trading can reduce 
productivity:
While farmers are selling off their water, they’re not doing 
anything to their farm. In fact, some farmers take the 
opportunity to laser grade and do some stuff while it has 
gone. The drought skews everything. Ignore the drought 
and, for people who need to trade water temporarily, 
I think it’s been a boon.
The price of water was a further negative: ‘All it has done is 
created debt for most people because they’ve had to buy the 
water. But that’s only because of the drought. Water trading 
has given water a real value, but it’s a lot higher than it used 
to be. I would like to have 1000 megalitres of water to sell 
temporarily’. Another observed, ‘Water’s dearer than fuel. 
If you go and buy a bottle of water and get your fuel, its 
$1.80 for 600 millilitres of water and $1.20 for your fuel, 
and people complain about that. That’s reality’.
A participant noted the social cost of permanent trading: 
‘The disadvantages are huge because we lose a major asset. 
People, industry, activity—it just all goes. The land without 
water rapidly becomes fairly ugly in this part of the world’.
Another focused on the social cost of managed 
investment schemes:
Everyone says the managed investment schemes are great. 
They bring jobs, they bring new investment, but they also 
bring a lot of baggage with them. Look at what happens 
in an area where the water goes. Look at Robinvale 
because there have been a lot of negatives said about 
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Robinvale with all of those cultures coming together. 
The media called it a ‘social train wreck’. That’s one of 
the difficult areas to manage when you have a lot of these 
big horticultural projects. You need that labour force, and 
the only way is to use a migrant labour force, but that 
comes with social issues.
One of the water traders interviewed was also against 
permanent trading because of the social cost:
I’m in a difficult position. I’m against water trade 
and I do it. It’s terrible isn’t it. Morally bankrupt. It’s 
opportunistic. We’re in the irrigation industry and it’s 
practical do it. It gives people a great opportunity to get 
out of trouble. I’m more concerned about the long-term 
effects and I’m really cheesed off about the way it’s going. 
The fact is that it is getting wasted downstream and 
causing us huge amounts of cost and angst. We’ve got 
to put in infrastructure, build a new Murray to get more 
water down there. For what? They’ll all be bankrupt in 
three years’ time. What are we going to do then?
The loss of farms from the district raised the problem 
of stranded assets and diminished aesthetic appeal:
Because of permanent trade, people walked off and left 
the district. The population decreased, income went down 
with water taken off the land. It flattens everyone. You 
drive past a beautiful, thriving farm and see it just let go. 
It upsets people.
Those at the end of the line are responsible for the 
maintenance of the channel to get water. We will see a 
time when water won’t get to them. With open channels, 
they lose water through evaporation and the costs of 
delivering water make it unviable. But when the pipeline 
was put in Normanville, the farmers have filled in dams 
and there are no birds or wildlife. Channels do waste 
water but they provide an ecosystem. And water 
attracts water. 
Uncertainty about the future of irrigation in the district 
and about water allocations and drought was expressed:
With so much uncertainty, you can’t move forward. 
We are hobbled as a community and area because this 
is hanging over our head. OK, the government can come 
out and say we are not going to shut anyone down, but 
everyone knows that, in reality, if the pendulum swings 
far enough, one day they will change their minds. 
The impacts of water trading on the  
non-farming community
Participants were asked about the impact of water trading 
on associated agricultural industries as well as the local 
central business area.
The associated industry perspective
One service provider explained how a downturn 
in agriculture would affect the town of Kerang:
Kerang is here because there is an agricultural community 
around it. Although there are other industrial things 
coming, which are great, most of the businesses here 
are associated with the farming industry. When you lose 
permanent water and then have a very bad drought 
for the big dryland farms out to the west of us, it puts 
pressure on the town.
But the shire representative was positive about the impacts 
of water trading:
The impact of the drought is one of the biggest challenges 
a community can ever face. Ten times bigger than water 
trading will ever be. When we look at Kerang most people 
say, ‘Wow, you’ve lost all this water. Gee, things must be 
going bad’, but its not the loss of water that people should 
be focusing on: it’s the amount of water that’s used on 
farms because that’s where your production is. Because 
the capital cost of water has risen so much, people that 
once bought their water for $150 a megalitre can now 
get $1200 a megalitre for it. That’s huge capital growth. 
What they are doing is selling their permanent water 
right and buying in temporary water. So, if you look at 
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the water-use figures for the Torrumbarry Irrigation Area, 
while the permanent water held in the area has reduced, 
the water that’s actually used in the area hasn’t reduced 
that much, so the production capacity is still here. This 
town, where a lot of water is traded out, we should be 
going backwards, but we are not, we are going forwards. 
You go and look around town, everything looks quite 
vibrant. It’s a beautiful-looking town.
He spoke of a number of new businesses that had recently 
opened in the town:
We have had a new Toyota dealer and a new Korean 
car dealer open. The supermarket changed hands two 
years ago, and they have made a significant investment 
in upgrading the premises. We have new businesses, a 
ten-pin bowling centre, a real estate agent, a hairdresser, 
and a feed test centre which tests hay and grain. We’ve 
had significant development in the industrial estate: we 
have probably sold about 14 industrial blocks, and we 
are doing another 12-lot subdivision there to cater for 
new development. We have had businesses move in from 
Melbourne and new Goulburn–Murray Water offices just 
up the road. You can’t get a parking place in town during 
the day, but that doesn’t mean that we are absolutely 
safe and secure: we still have to keep working hard to 
make sure we grow our business sector and diversify our 
farming sector.
He said the shire had been active in developing irrigation-
based industries in the area:
We also have agricultural development—a new 250-acre 
cherry orchard, and the Brown Brothers development 
[one of the larger vineyard operators in Victoria] currently 
has about 800 acres planted, so that’s significant. The 
cherry farm has been there about four years. Council 
found a fruit company that wanted to expand their 
operation and needed land and water and investment 
dollars, so we found a farmer prepared to put land and 
water into the project and a developer wanting to put 
in $400 000, and they formed a company and got that 
development going. 
One of the local farmers acknowledged the expanding 
industrial centre but reported that most of his business 
was conducted in the larger regional centres:
All our machinery and spare parts come from Swan Hill or 
Echuca, because we don’t have those sorts of services in 
town. There is very minimal local purchase of machinery. 
You try to support the locals but they are always fairly dear. 
I suppose they are doing it tough and are not selling as 
much as they could or should. There are some wonderful 
things there, but a lot of them are not targeting local 
farmers. There is a rural supply shop in the area, chemical 
and herbicide and fertiliser places, but when it comes to 
machinery, hydraulics, trucks and spares there really isn’t 
anywhere in town for that. 
Horticulturalists were having difficulty finding seasonal 
labour: ‘It’s hard to get labour in this vicinity because it’s 
a new venture that no one has much in the way of skills 
to handle the horticultural stuff. A lot of it is pretty much 
no-brain work, but getting the sheer numbers and people 
to stick at it is an issue’.
The central business area
One project participant provided an overview of business 
in the town:
To look at the positives and the negatives of water trading, 
we really do have to understand what water trading does 
to communities. Because I live at Boort and work in 
Kerang, I always compare the two places. Boort has taken 
a big dive in local businesses in the last five years. People 
are dealing in Kerang and Swan Hill and Bendigo and 
Cohuna. Because Boort has the olives, everyone thinks 
that it is fantastic, but they don’t look further. In 10 years’ 
time they might have a big olive grove there, but they 
might not have any business community. People see 
Boort as the shining light, and they just don’t understand 
that poor old Kerang is not really poor old Kerang. Boort 
has had development and water trade come in, but what 
has it created? Has it helped these businesses? Has it 
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helped the community? Has it helped the town? Kerang 
is a town that has had water trade go out, yet it has got 
business development, it has growth. 
When other participants were asked about the impact 
of water trading on local businesses, one replied:
The International tractor place in Kerang closed recently. 
That’s probably more the drought that finished them off. 
Kerang has traditionally been a pretty solid sort of place. 
We’re on the edge of the Mallee, and irrigation, dairy, 
prime lamb industry is very strong around here, or it was. 
The water trading has killed that off. I know that the 
local stock agents are really feeling it. A mate of mine 
is actually worried about his job. All he does is handle 
sheep, but he hasn’t got sheep to handle anymore. The 
drought has obviously made it worse. Kerang was quite 
a major lamb producing area once, from irrigated annual 
pastures. It’s just not worth it any more. They can make 
more money trading water permanently than they’ll 
ever make out of sheep. I was looking at Google Earth 
yesterday and it was just amazing how little irrigation was 
left in the area. Drive up the highway now and what used 
to be irrigation, there’s nothing there. 
Participants were also asked to identify any factors other than 
drought and water trading that have affected the economy. 
One responded:
In the long term I guess you would have to say loss of 
services generally. There used to be a big electricity place 
here and a big Telstra depot, so we’ve lost those people. 
Downturns in the dairy industry; commodity pricing is 
the other one generally. For every broken-down dairy 
farmer, I could show you a rich one. There are still plenty 
of farmers who are well organised, well managed, very 
efficient. At the moment there are huge opportunities 
around here. The fact that we have 95 per cent water 
allocation; hay has gone through the roof. You can sell 
a small square bale of hay now for $12. That’s in the 
paddock; you don’t even have to bale it. A small square 
bale of lucerne hay is selling for $25 to horse people 
in Melbourne. 
One of the service providers observed:
Kerang does look prosperous, and it is prosperous. 
Because of the water, the irrigation, everything is green 
and lush. Lots of people are coming up from the cities 
to retire. But drought impacts on that; businesses are 
floundering because they become the third bank. Mum 
and dad businesses have to collect on bad debts, so they 
go broke. So the empathy that the business people have 
for the farming community is huge, but then they don’t 
have the business acumen to be hard-nosed and ensure 
they survive.
The impact of the unbundling of water on shire rates was 
a concern for residents. One said:
The unbundling is going to have repercussions on the 
shire. Fifteen to 20 per cent of their rate base is going 
to disappear overnight because they will no longer be 
able to rate properties on their water value. As water 
gets transferred out, the valuations of the properties 
change. The townspeople will have to carry a far 
greater rate burden. 
An examination of rate income from the farming community 
revealed that the loss of water had already had an impact. 
The shire representative explained:
Rates for the shire are 41 per cent from farms, 31.6 per 
cent for irrigation and 9.3 per cent for dryland. Those 
figures are based on irrigated farmers getting a 17 per cent 
differential, so that they pay 83 per cent of the general rate. 
And that’s up a bit from last year, which was a 14 per cent 
differential. So last year it was 47.4 per cent, 35 per cent 
per irrigation and 9.7 per cent dryland. Not a huge 
difference, but certainly there has been shifts in the 
values with less permanent water included as part 
of the rate base. 
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The community
A financial adviser highlighted one social impact 
of water trading as being farm succession planing:
Most farmers have pressure coming from the past, present 
and future generations. Those in a strong position have 
established succession plans. But the trouble is that 
permanent water is so expensive that the price interrupts 
the planning. Farmers are so busy running to catch up 
because they have got somebody breathing down their 
neck. Banks need to take the pressure off, to set aside 
debt so that farmers can then generate cash flow and 
have the resources for better management. 
Then again, I had a phone call from a son saying, ‘Dad 
has just sold all the water—$3 million worth of water’. 
Paid off all the debt and bought a Winnebago. How 
can a son buy $3 million worth of water!
We need to be really creative to support farmers. I recall 
going out to a dairy farm and these people couldn’t do it 
anymore; they had got to the end of their working life. 
But they couldn’t sell their farm. It had been on the market 
for two years. And so they said, ‘Look, we haven’t got a 
choice; we will just have to sell the water. The farm will 
just sit there and go to waste; but at least we will be out of 
debt and have somewhere to live’. They were devastated 
to have to do that, but where else could they go? So I 
suggested that they lease the farm to their neighbour for 
a dollar. The neighbours pay the insurances, council rates 
and water rates and leave the owners with a house to 
live in. So at least the farm has stayed on the market and 
it looks good. They couldn’t afford to milk, so there was 
a deal done with the stock as well. As in the wine grape 
industry, people can’t afford to do it anymore. If they have 
a contract with the winery, then lease the farm to someone 
who can do it. They’re not making money, but you can 
have happy people.
Say you have a $200 000 debt on the farm. The family 
can go out and get jobs. That $200 000 debt is the same 
as a home loan for someone that has a job in town. I have 
been able to go to the banks to restructure the debt, 
extend it over 30 years and get a lesser interest rate; pay 
that monthly and it’s the same as a home loan. So that’s 
what I’m saying, ‘Think outside the square’. The farm is 
not ruined. This person doesn’t go bankrupt and the status 
quo is maintained. And then when the droughts are all 
over, the rains are back, then in five years’ time we revisit. 
Lakes in the district were highly valued as a social and 
recreational outlet. Lake Merran, a popular attraction for 
tourists, had dried up. It had not been dry since 1850. One 
farmer noted the impact drought and water trading had on 
access to the lake:
The only blessing is that it’s quieter without all the 
speedboats. But the water licence has doubled since it 
became dry. The cost has increased from $800 to $2030 
to fill it. Even if it is paid there is no assurance of delivery. 
And if they put in environmental flows, I doubt if they 
will allow speedboats. 
Another participant demonstrated how much water 
coloured people’s lives and thinking:
At a meeting about the state of the river in town … we 
wanted something done because it’s choked with rubbish 
and willow trees. And during that meeting, because we 
had all these government people there, an elderly lady 
stood up and said, ‘This is nothing to do with the river 
but we’ve got to do something about permanent water 
trading. It is a terrible thing’. Why it should worry her I 
have no idea, but because there was a forum available 
she took the opportunity to say permanent trade 
is a bad thing. Water is in their minds all the time.
Health service providers in the region said water pervades 
every aspect of service delivery and program development for 
people in the district. Furthermore, service delivery needed 
to take account of the fact that water and drought affected 
each community in different ways. One provider said:
To quote John Humphreys from Monash University, 
‘When you know one community you know one 
community’, and for each of our communities their issues 
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are their issues. Within that context, the ways in which 
community identity, their sense of belonging and social 
capital is sustained, maintained and even strengthened 
is unique to each of those communities. 
Discussion
Kerang’s central business area and the industrial estate 
are impressive. Although some of the retail businesses—
the clothing retailers—were starting to feel the effects of 
drought, the secondary industries were doing well, competing 
in national and international markets. In addition, the number 
of businesses in the town has grown. Much of the drive 
and enthusiasm in Kerang can be attributed to a confident, 
proactive council. This is an example of how individuals in 
a community can significantly affect the way their community 
experiences and perceives change. Council’s role in assisting 
agricultural businesses such as the Brown Brothers vineyard 
and establishing the cherry orchard is an example of that 
enthusiasm. These ventures maximise the use of water trading.
The crops are doing well, which confirms that the land in the 
district can be very productive if farms have access to water. 
Kerang people strongly resent the assumption that their land 
is less productive than land further downstream. This is 
accompanied by a fear that, with future water shortages, 
the trend to send water to places of ‘higher value’ will 
mean the eventual closure of the ageing irrigation 
infrastructure in the district. 
There has a been pattern of trading water out of the Kerang 
district for many years, which has helped to mitigate problems 
with salinity in the region. Perhaps this is why the community 
has adjusted to some extent. There is still great resentment 
of the continuing trade in permanent entitlements out of the 
district among residents, particularly as drought intensifies 
and more farmers are forced into selling their entitlements. 
The negative impact of the trade is that it leads to a loss 
of productivity and subsequently a loss of people from 
the district. 
The town itself is not as cohesive as other small communities 
as a result of the presence of different groups with differing 
values. Yet the community is able to present a united front 
when faced with major difficulties such as preservation of the 
health of their river and wetlands, which are highly valued. 
It was interesting to note the degree to which the question 
of water was at the forefront of the lives and minds of the 
people of Kerang. Loss of people from the community—
particularly young people—was also a concern for almost 
every person interviewed, although this is characteristic 
of virtually all rural communities.
Community views in Cohuna
Picturesque Cohuna is 20 kilometres south-east of Kerang 
and 265 kilometres north of Melbourne. The regional centres 
of Echuca and Bendigo are an hour’s drive away. The town 
has a population of about 3000 and is in Gannawarra Shire.
Cohuna is bordered by Gunbower Creek, which is an 
anabranch of the Murray River. Gunbower Island, a flora 
and fauna sanctuary, lies between the Murray River and 
Gunbower Creek. The island is 50 kilometres long, stretching 
from Koondrook to Torrumbarry Weir, and is characterised 
by swamps, river red gums and box forest. Red gum timber 
has been milled in the area since the 1870s. 
A focus group was held with some local residents, and 
interviews were conducted with others in the district. 
Economic profile
Dairying is the main agricultural industry in the area, 
but there is also pig, cattle, wool and timber production. 
A number of businesses in the town service the agricultural 
industries. This includes irrigation equipment and supplies, 
concrete and plant hire, dairy equipment and supplies, 
and water trading.
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Community services
Cohuna has three churches, a secondary college, a primary 
school, a retirement village, a hotel, two motels, a caravan 
park, a golf club and several sporting and recreational 
facilities. Banking, financial and legal services are also 
available. The town is fortunate to have a new hospital and 
continuity in medical services: doctors have been resident 
in the community for 20 or more years and are skilled 
practitioners, which allows many procedures to be 
performed locally.
Community profile
Community strengths
Focus group participants exhibited a strong sense of 
community pride. When asked what the best things about 
the town were, one farmer commented, ‘This is a strong 
community. Good schools, strong sports clubs and historical 
society, good hospital, jobs in town. Next year we are going 
to be up 10 kids at the school, rather than being down 
30 kids’. Another participant believed a relatively stable 
economy (to date) was Cohuna’s strength: ‘I think dairy 
farmers are a bit unique in the fact that they are nearly 
guaranteed a set income. You go into cropping or something; 
it’s just a sort of a gamble really. You sow grain and you 
don’t know whether you’ll get a dollar or not’.
Employment was also strong in Cohuna. A farmer said, 
‘There are so many off-farm jobs around Cohuna. All the 
people who provide farm supplies employ people, and a 
lot of them aren’t skilled jobs either. If a community is to 
survive there must be positions for those who don’t go on 
to tertiary education’.
Community cohesion
Residents described Cohuna as a close-knit community 
of people who are very supportive of each other and the 
local businesses. One farmer said:
I came to this area 10 years ago, and you find with a dairy 
farming community it’s special. For a start they get out of 
bed … they are creative, incredibly hard working, they’ve 
learnt to think out of the square as you know with water 
trading, they have grown olives, and they are supportive 
of the businesses in this town. It’s just, well, special really.
A businessman added, ‘We don’t need to be here at all and 
there has been lots of pressure from time to time from the 
family to move to a bigger centre, but it’s the little things 
that go on that make a community’.
Community problems
Crime was not a concern in the area. The population is 
stable, but the local economy is feeling the effects of drought 
and close proximity to large regional centres. As a service 
provider noted, ‘Cohuna suffers somewhat with the close 
proximity to the large regional centres of Echuca and Swan 
Hill, both being an hour each side of the town. But it also 
heightens recognition that we need to look after the 
community here’.
One of the farmers observed that Cohuna suffered from a 
lack of career opportunities and the loss of young people, 
who go away to university and rarely return. But he pointed 
out that this was common throughout rural Australia. 
He continued:
I’d rather my kid—if he wasn’t going to go to university—
be in Cohuna than Pyramid because there you can only 
work at the pet food factory or abattoir. I don’t know 
if I’m being a bit elitist, but working at an irrigation 
infrastructure industry is better than an abattoir. It’s so 
easy to blame governments for things: it’s their fault 
that the train line closes, etc. But I think we are so close 
to Echuca here and its a thriving tourist centre, there is 
a lot of work around this area. You can look at negatives 
wherever you go. For example, if it stays dry another 
12 months then, so what, I’ll go do something in Echuca. 
Got a nice house, got a nice spot here, and I’ll just go 
do something there. Its only half an hour away.
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The impacts of water trading 
on the farming community
The Cohuna focus group revealed serious concern about the 
rising cost of water and the impact that was having on local 
producers. The presence of managed investment schemes in 
the market was seen as the primary reason for the increase 
in the water price. A local business owner, who was also 
from a family farm, described their position:
We are in the situation financially where we have to sell 
water in order to keep the farm. Now that’s the just the 
way things are with the drought, commodity prices. The 
cost of having water has just been blown out of the water. 
Our water bill is probably $70 000 this year, and we 
haven’t had a drop of water. We haven’t had a decent 
water right for years. So you simply stop operating. 
Because a farmer may have to sell the water to provide a 
house for himself in town when he walks off, it’s grabbed 
up by these big corporations. If it gets to the stage where 
it’s open to anyone … we will lose control of our 
commodities.
One of the local business people observed:
If temporary water gets to $350, farmers can’t make 
money. Equity is going out of farming: in some cases it’s 
down to 40 per cent due to the cost of water. Permanent 
water is worth more than actual land. And if we don’t 
have the water you are basically farming semi-arid land. 
Net water use in the district has increased but it’s gone 
out of the district and is now coming back. There is  
a loophole where you can get it back and not pay the 
channel fees, although the new charge of $22 is coming 
in to cover that.
A service provider noted:
I don’t see how people can be expected to pay for 
an allocation they don’t get. I can’t see how people 
can be expected to continue. Only a short time ago you 
purchased land and the water was thrown in: it wasn’t 
even a valued commodity. Now it’s the other way round. 
Water is more important than land. To sell water is like 
selling your farm. To sell off water that enhances the 
productivity of the farm in time will have a negative 
impact on the local community. 
One of the participants said that, before the tariff changes 
with Goulburn–Murray Water, there was an incentive to buy 
land without water because there were no fixed charges and 
water could be brought in temporarily. Now, with tariff 
changes, the dynamic has changed, and people are more 
interested in water rather than land. A local real estate 
agent said:
Just as an instance of how valuable water is. The last 
couple of years most inquiries have been about properties 
without water because of the trade. Now every phone call 
we get is, ‘How much water is on the property?’ It’s so 
reliant on the water. Last year you could buy temporary 
water for $55. It’s now up to $400. If someone’s used 
water, the amount they have used you could buy back 
and put on the property and say its got a full water 
entitlement, sell and you could achieve the extra money 
that you’ve bought the water back for. That’s how reliant 
it is. That just typifies it—no water, no district.
Another participant pointed out that the impact of water 
trading was exacerbated by several other factors:
The trouble is you’ve got economic factors, but drought 
first and foremost is causing us to have this discussion. 
We wouldn’t be having it probably if it weren’t for the 
drought. It would be another five or 10 years down the 
road before water trade itself became an issue when 
farmers who had a need for more water than they 
are getting could not buy it any more. 
Another added:
It doesn’t matter what price the water is if there is no 
water there. I have noticed that the farmers and their 
practices are a lot more efficient. They are growing 
grasses nowadays that respond quickly with water so 
they aren’t wasting water any more. If it rains and there 
is water available it will help. They can cut their costs 
Case study C: Rochester, Central Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna   201
and have extra production because of the things they 
have learnt through this drought. I think rain is the key 
to the whole thing.
Asked if they would have experienced the same extent 
of drought in the absence of water trading, the group 
was silent for a while. Then one member replied:
I can’t answer that because for years we have lived 
on the need to have more than our basic entitlement. 
If entitlement for areas of property being irrigated was 
insufficient to produce an economic return, farmers have 
bought double their entitlement. Suddenly it can no longer 
happen. Farmers were able to buy water plus extra at a 
fairly low price. But slowly it’s bid up and up and now it’s 
reached the point with what little water is in the system 
that it will be better to keep olive trees and almond trees 
alive than it will be to run permanent pasture.
Another agreed:
Farmers have got very efficient, but there is room for 
improvement in the way water is moved around the 
countryside. There is a lot of water lost from channels and 
some of the structures holding water. The government 
should have built more dams. The government have 
done some terrific things like re-use systems, incentives 
for pipelines, but the only thing they haven’t done is 
controlled where water has gone. The pipelines coming 
in now put water instantly in your paddock. Most people 
say it’s a 10 per cent plus saving in water. So that’s a good 
thing. The bad thing is there is no direction. The farmer can 
sell, can’t hold. I don’t know how we keep water in the 
district. We’ve had terrific incentives from the government 
to improve water savings but no one’s thought about the 
trade. Why couldn’t we start? If it had been held here, 
could we have grown olives, could we have grown  
the equivalents to where water is going to?
Participants were asked if they were optimistic or pessimistic 
about the future of their district. One responded:
Probably a little bit of both. On 100 per cent of water right 
last year we had 40 per cent sales. Farmers have learnt 
to adjust. They are a pretty good breed; they do adjust 
quickly to change and they do work together and help 
one another. The 100 per cent water right isn’t enough 
to make it and, depending on debt, it’s not enough for a 
dairy farm to stay viable. The margins are too short. There 
are different allocations for different areas, different-sized 
properties. Last year most farmers would have used 
40 per cent, and there was a lot of water traded as well. 
This year is back to 95 per cent sales and it’s even greater. 
At 100 per cent it’s not going to be enough to 
remain viable. 
Perceptions of water trading
The benefits
One of the farmers interviewed was positive about 
temporary trading for the community:
A lot of temporary trade goes on here. I’m only one of 
many who are buying water. We all need it; we are all 
in the same boat. Productivity only comes from milking 
more cows, and to do that you need to grow more feed 
and to do that you need more water—simple economics. 
I think, for our community, trade brings great benefits 
to our town. 
There were negatives as well as positives associated with 
permanent trading:
If I was living in Pyramid I would say trade is terrible 
because water goes out of there and comes to areas 
like this. A lot of water has gone from this area as well, 
downstream to Robinvale and the like, who are doing 
a great job. There is a lot of water being bought to grow 
grapes and olives, but I’d love to see where their markets 
are. I wonder how much is being bought by the 
superannuation funds and the like, who sooner or later 
are going to have to prove to shareholders that it’s been 
a sound investment. I can see water coming back. Well, 
everything goes back to normal patterns, doesn’t it? 
Show me where the wine market is. I can go and buy 
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any number of $2 bottles of cleanskin wines. You can’t 
tell me they are making any money on that from their 
$1200 a meg permanent water. We are a small nation, 
and the only place to sell that wine is on the export market. 
We are not going to wash in it. There must be a ceiling 
in wine production, and I think we are a million miles 
above that ceiling. And the same with olive oil: I don’t 
have a bottle of that in the fridge and drink that every 
night; there has to be a ceiling on olive production too. 
If you have water you have to make a return for it, satisfy 
your shareholders if you are a public company, or yourself 
if you have a family partnership.
The costs
One local agribusiness owner said:
I’m a bit against the trading. I’ve just been reading a book 
about it at the moment—High and Dry. It talks about how 
free trade will cripple the agricultural industry. You have 
people in business come and buy water and essentially 
force the price up and farmers are not going to be able 
to afford it. 
One participant added that some farmers were also 
capitalising by playing the market. Another agreed: ‘Looks 
to me that the government has just let it go to be the last man 
standing. The strongest person wins out of all of it, and the 
relocation of water doesn’t mean anything to any district. 
It just means that it’s passed on to whoever can afford it’. 
Another added:
The big superannuation companies are encouraging 
people to invest in olives and grape vines and forests; 
they are getting a tax break out if it and they can afford 
to pay $2000 a meg. The farmers aren’t getting anything 
of that. In years to come the super funds might decide 
to get into dairy farming.
Market forces were seen to be out of control:
We all know markets aren’t perfect, but it’s not a short-
term fix, the market. But I don’t know if there needs to 
be a short-term fix. I guess if too much water goes and 
the infrastructure here breaks down then that is an issue. 
But how long are those managed investment schemes 
allowed to keep it before they make a profit on it? Sooner 
or later they will have to satisfy shareholders. It might be 
a diverse company with their fingers in a lot of pies, but 
you can’t afford for too many of those pies to make losses. 
And unless they are making money out of their water 
then sooner or later they have to cut loose. And we are 
still here, a viable industry and we know we can make 
money on that water. Will that water come back at $1000 
a meg because there is going to be a lot on the market, 
big supplies meeting demand? You can see what’s 
happened with the grapes: there will be grape water sold 
as permanent in the near future, you can just see it. So 
where is there any control? It’s just absolutely willy-nilly. 
I really think that the government started the water trade 
and didn’t envisage what was happening and now its just 
escalated, and there are mountains of water gone out and 
now we’re brining it back as temporary trade. 
One agribusiness owner added:
My concern is the Federal Government needs to step in 
and take control of the whole situation, from water trade 
to new developments. Why allow all these new almond 
developments to go in if we haven’t got water? They are 
taking it off people making a living in this area. My other 
concern is, is this a drought or a change in environmental 
conditions permanently? I read lots of environmental 
reports, and 90 per cent will say there is a shift in weather 
patterns. Is this drought going to break? I’m sure it will, 
but are we going to see a permanent change in 
weather conditions?
A local business owner who was formerly a water trader 
suggested that there needs to be more control over the 
market: ‘I was in trading water in the Goulburn Valley, and 
I mean it’s money for jam. One farmer has 100 megs to sell; 
another wants to buy 100 megs. Facilitate that, get in for 
5 per cent. I think the trade should be out of private hands and 
Goulburn–Murray Water should facilitate the whole thing’.
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A service provider observed:
I don’t understand how it can be seen as a positive to 
open up water trading in dry times. It’s a concept for when 
there are surpluses. There are concerns about drought 
and climate change. And there are concerns about access 
or accessibility of water and concerns the water levels are 
decreasing. It’s not like people are sitting on huge storages.
An associated problem with water leaving the area was 
stranded assets:
One of the concerns that has been expressed amongst 
the farmers here is that water gets traded outside our 
system and away from land and the infrastructure that 
once may have served a number of end users ends up 
with just one. Water trading needs to be re-examined 
to work out whether it should or shouldn’t go outside 
individual irrigation areas.
The market and environmental flows were also raised 
by one of the farmers:
There have been environmental flows for many years 
and it’s never been a real issue, but rules seem to change. 
There have been environmental allocations that sometimes 
have been sold because the allocation isn’t enough to 
spill the river. These are all things outside our control. 
If there are environmental flows that’s fine: they have 
that entitlement just the same as I do. No one says to 
me, ‘We don’t have much water this year; we are going 
to have your entitlement’. It would be the same as me 
saying, ‘Environmental flows; you can’t have them’.
The uncertainty of the water market and future allocations 
was a further concern:
I think the biggest concern is the goal posts have been 
shifted all the time and that makes it very difficult for 
farmers to plan for the future and, from a business point 
of view, it creates so much uncertainty. I think there needs 
to be guidelines for where we are going, but this doesn’t 
seem to be happening. 
A business owner agreed: ‘Probably 90 per cent of our 
phone calls from farmers are to do with concerns about 
what the government may do next week, what restrictions 
will they put on us, what will they take off us. It’s just that 
uncertainty’. Another participant said:
Farmers are not sure of their share entitlement. If we call 
Goulburn–Murray Water and ask how you work through 
a share entitlement most times you get, ‘I’m not sure’. 
We are trying to explain to people from Melbourne who 
have come up to buy land what a share entitlement is. 
And we are really battling. We say, virtually, if it’s sold off 
you’ve got to buy that back or capacity shares to work 
the channel so that the channel is viable to supply water. 
Capacity shares are going to be a nightmare and next 
year they are talking about trading off stock and domestic. 
What does that say? Shut down the channel. And when 
they shut down the channel they shut down the area.
The impacts of water trading on the non-
farming community
Participants were asked about the impact of water trading 
on associated agricultural industries as well as the local 
central business area.
The associated industry perspective
Local businesses were feeling the effects of drought and 
water trading. An agribusiness manager said:
Trading permanent water out of an area has just got 
to stop. We’ve lost business over the last five years. 
In another five years there will be no permanent water 
here whatsoever. If a bloke’s got 100 acres and 150 meg 
he will sell that before he sells 100 acres with 20 meg 
of stock and domestic water allocations.
A representative of a large agribusiness company advised:
We actually run a water trading division. Over the last five 
years that hasn’t made any money at all. This is the first 
year that it has just started to make money and that is 
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because the water price has gone up. The reverse effect 
of this is farmers aren’t spending money on pipelines or 
outlets or anything else. We employ 50 people plus 
casuals. That’s a lot of wages to keep going each week. 
We are travelling OK at the moment, but if this continues, 
there is no government regulation, what’s the future hold 
for us? Fifty wages in a town like this is a lot.
A dairy industry representative agreed: ‘We employ people 
too. I’m worried about the farmers. It affects our business 
radically. The more farmers we lose, the less work there 
is for us’.
The central business area
There were several representatives of the local business area 
in the focus group, and they all said business was currently 
doing quite well. But, with the economic future of the town 
in doubt because of the current problems facing the local 
agricultural industries, community leaders were looking to 
tourism and attracting an increasing number of retirees and 
sea changers who are interested in moving to Cohuna to 
sustain the town’s economy. Land was being offered in small 
lots to encourage sales. There was some concern among 
residents that what they know and hold dear could be lost 
if action is not taken to redress the loss of businesses and 
people from the community. One participant explained: 
You drive into Cohuna and it looks like it’s going very well. 
Cohuna is a very resolute place. The farmers have pride 
and want to carry on their traditions. Immediately you go 
past Kerang you drive past some pretty ordinary towns. 
Cohuna presents well. It’s green, lush, a nice town; creek 
flowing through it, nice people, good sporting facilities, 
good hospital. We’ve got the lot, we really have. But with 
what’s happening around us now, it will disappear very 
quickly if something doesn’t happen, and we will be just 
like some of these other little Mallee towns. The business 
people keep all the sporting facilities going. So if the 
businesses struggle, sport struggles and the schools 
struggle. The government doesn’t care. Victoria ends 
at the last hotel in Melbourne. 
One business person maintained Cohuna had a future but 
that it was up to the local people to make sure of that future:
I believe Cohuna is going places. I think we are getting an 
influx of people coming here wanting to live here because 
of the lifestyle. But the worrying part of it all is there needs 
to be the infrastructure here for people to want to come 
here and, sadly and gladly, that’s farming. We have some 
terrific industries but a lot of that work revolves around 
the industry. If we lose the nucleus, how can we possibly 
encourage other people to come here to enjoy the lifestyle 
that gives the football club the numbers? The whole fabric 
of our society is being battered. It’s crucial for the next 
couple of years. 
A study that came out of Queensland about small country 
towns and how they survive in adverse circumstance 
found that the towns that survive have nothing different 
from those who died except the people were in them 
were more optimistic, more outgoing, travelled more, 
education levels were higher, and they had a constant 
reminder that the world is going on outside them whether 
they liked it or not. The statement was, ‘Our town doesn’t 
have to exist for the same reasons it used to exist’. If we 
are to prevail over what is going on here, it will be up to 
all of the people in the community to actively pursue what 
we are talking about. If there is a wrong being done in 
water trading then that has to be brought to the attention 
of people who know. We can get to Kerang in 20 minutes 
and to Melbourne and back again in a day, easy, and 
once upon a time you couldn’t do that. We used to have 
all these little towns and they don’t need to exist anymore. 
And Cohuna won’t need to exist unless we make a need 
for it to exist. We can’t expect others to do it for us. We 
have to do it ourselves.
The community
Most participants saw the loss of farm families from the 
district as one of the main social impacts of drought and 
water trading. One farmer noted:
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In the 1970s the average farm herd was about 80 to 85 
cows and I think it’s 240 at the moment, so that’s three 
farms gone. That’s pretty much the norm. Over the last 
five years a lot of the share farmers have gone. The costs 
of share farmers have to be put into buying extra feed 
and extra water to keep herds together.
Another added:
Along my road the school bus doesn’t stop now. It used 
to stop four times. That’s 13 kilometres of road. Farms have 
amalgamated and kids have left and are not coming back. 
I’m also noticing that a lot of the next-generation farmers 
have had to move to find work somewhere else. It would 
be interesting to know what the average age of the dairy 
farmer is around here now. I can guarantee it’s probably 
50 or 60 years. 
Another participant observed:
If the irrigation declines then those jobs are gone, aren’t 
they? Cohuna will be gone—well, it won’t be gone it will 
be a retirement village. It’s a lovely little town, so there 
will always be a Cohuna. Drive up the river and find 
another area like this now. There aren’t any. Because 
the irrigation is so close, the river is everything, but 
take the water away and we are in serious trouble.
One service provider was most concerned about depression 
in the local farming community and was seeking funding so 
that a drought counsellor could work in the district:
I’m really concerned about mental health in the area. 
I’ve desperately tried to get beyondblue or some other 
organisation to come into town. I was told to reapply 
next year. That’s not good enough. We need something 
in this area—whether it’s done in a small group, 
a barbecue, or one to one, or an open forum. 
Her concerns were echoed in the comments of an 
agribusiness representative:
Because of the drought our workers become like 
counsellors. I actually had one of my men come back 
in tears and said, ‘You need to go out and see this bloke. 
He’s talking about taking his own life’. We went out a 
couple of times and just listened, and we got him through 
it. I think it will happen more. There are a lot of people 
who have done up dairies and have to buy more water 
and they can’t and this is going to ruin their business. 
And it’s just the price of water. I’d just like to see the 
water stay in the area and be capped.
A district health service provider noted that the loss of 
population can have serious ramifications for communities:
In Pyramid Hill—the fact that the population base there 
is decreasing, they are losing services. We provide GP 
services 1.5 days a week, and that’s in question because 
of the viability and demand for that. The reduction in those 
services is going to significantly impact on that community, 
and people will have to travel further for medical services, 
and that will have economic ramifications for that 
community. Those are the sorts of issues, which are visible 
in a smaller community like Pyramid Hill, that we are 
starting to see in Kerang and Cohuna. The GP in Kerang 
who provides obstetric services is no longer prepared to 
continue those services due to current demand. So that 
brings into question the capacity to provide obstetrics to 
Kerang, with a population of 4000. And that has an impact 
on that community which flows on to neighbouring towns. 
It also impacts on midwives employed in local hospitals, 
and that has further economic and social impacts. GP 
vacancies continue to increase and doctors start identifying 
what they will and are prepared to do, which means there 
will be changes to the suite of services a hospital can 
provide. And that means staffing changes and when 
farmers are requiring that second off-farm income, 
it can be a double effect for those families.
We have been working with Gannawarra and Loddon 
Shires, getting them to understand that the whole concept 
of replacing a GP has social and economic consequences 
if that position remains vacant, so that they might be more 
involved in recruitment and retention strategies. There 
is not much financial support for attracting and helping 
new doctors and their families to enjoy living in the 
community. 
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Where you don’t have a doctor, as in Pyramid Hill, 
there is question about continuing the aged care facility. 
In many of these small communities where there aren’t 
lifestyle things like cinemas, the only reason people stay is 
because it’s cheap and there is access to medical services. 
But if those services go, people have to travel to seek 
medical help. Then there are all those issues with lower 
socio-economic groups being able to travel. There is 
a need to appreciate the value of maintaining existing 
medical services because … losing such services has 
dire ramifications for the local community. 
Another social impact for the town was outlined by a 
representative of the local golf club, who described the 
impact of drought and the water trade on their grounds:
We just made a decision to spend $40 000 on partial 
permanent water and temporary water on the basis that 
we figured that we could afford to do it. We don’t want 
to do it, obviously. We should have bought permanent 
water several years ago when we had the opportunity but 
we left it until it is nearly impossible. Dumb decision, but 
we are still managing to present the course in attractive 
condition. Memberships are lousy. Football club member-
ship is lousy. The cricket association disintegrated, but 
that’s fairly typical of all country centres. I’ve been to a 
number of meetings of golf associations and they are all 
in the same boat. Rural communities are declining for 
a number of reasons, such as the loss of young people 
and because the drought has been going on for 
quite a while.
When asked if these changes were a result of drought or 
the water trade, one participant replied, ‘It just goes hand 
in hand. Which comes first, the chicken or the egg? What 
it’s all about is the lack of water and where it’s going to’.
Discussion
The general mood of the focus group was pessimistic. 
As participants said, the town does look vibrant. It is in 
a beautiful setting by the river. There are new housing 
developments, and there is a movement into the town 
of retirees from the city. This is a longstanding traditional 
farming community, and the residents are very proud of 
their town and the environmental setting. Consequently, 
there is a strong attachment to place and a high level of 
community cohesion, and the residents do not want to 
lose what they hold so dearly. They perceive water trading 
to be a threat to the stability of their local industry and 
ultimately to their town structure. Community leaders were 
looking to tourism and attracting an increasing number of 
retirees and sea changers interested in moving to Cohuna 
to sustain the town’s economy.
The residents have a sense of a loss of control and 
helplessness in relation to the changes happening around 
them as a result of the trade of water out of the community. 
There is a recognition that it might be up to them to reinvent 
their town, focusing on tourism and building an attractive 
retirement location for retirees from the city. As one resident 
said, ‘Cohuna won’t need to exist unless we make a need for 
it to exist’. These structural changes will, however, come at 
a cost to the people and the dairy industry that they know 
and love and that defines who they are. Such changes require 
community leadership and energy.
Drought also saps energy, and the residents are at a low ebb. 
If structural change has to take place, this community—
like many others in a similar position—will need financial 
and physical support and encouragement.
Summary
Water trading has had a big impact on Rochester, Central 
Goulburn and Kerang–Cohuna in the past decade or so. 
Rochester was a buyer of water entitlements in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s but has sold large volumes of permanent 
water in the past three irrigation seasons (2003–04 to 
2005–06). Water use in the region has not changed 
dramatically because recent sales of water entitlements 
have been offset by purchases of water allocations from 
other regions. Irrigation in the region is predominantly for 
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dairy farming. Until the past three irrigation seasons Central 
Goulburn had bought and sold small (net) volumes of water 
entitlements. During 2003–04 to 2005–06 larger volumes of 
water entitlements were traded out of the region. Kerang–
Cohuna has consistently sold water entitlements and bought 
water allocations since the late 1990s. Dairying and mixed 
farming allow for diversification between irrigation and 
dryland agriculture.
A range of factors were seen as contributing to the observed 
patterns of water trade in the region. For example, the 
input and output costs of the dairy industry have been a key 
influence in the patterns of trade. Further, many dairy farms in 
the area were geared towards using more than 100 per cent 
of water allocations when sales water was available. Lower 
allocations in recent years have thus meant buying water on 
the temporary market, buying feed or reducing production. 
Additionally, the irrigators in Kerang–Cohuna are part of the 
Murray system that is upstream of Sunraysia—where the 
development of greenfield sites by managed investment 
schemes has increased the demand for water.
Irrigators in the region perceive a range of benefits and 
costs associated with water trading. On the plus side, they 
recognise the ability of water trading to help them manage 
their capital and adjust their cropping activities, as well 
as assist with cash flow, liquidity, and debt and drought 
management. On the negative side, irrigators expressed 
concerns about depopulation of their region, the risk of 
stranded assets, institutional risks, and the potential build-
up of pests on vacant land.
Being an importer of water over many years allowed 
Rochester to expand its dairy industry. But recent trade out 
of the district, significant reductions in water allocations—
at the time, 22 per cent within the Campaspe system—and 
the subsequent loss of productive irrigated agriculture in 
the district is a major concern for residents. Now structural 
change is occurring in the district, and residents fear the 
loss of more people from the area. The town of Rochester, 
with 2600 people, is a service centre for a large dairying 
area and the location of several support industries. The 
surrounding district traditionally is totally dependent on 
agriculture. As a result, drought, deregulation in the dairy 
industry, and water trading out of the region have greatly 
reduced incomes for businesses in the town. A large dairy 
factory that is an important employer recently stood down 
some workers. Ultimately, loss of population could lead to 
loss of community services 
such as health services.
In Central Goulburn drought was the primary cause of effects 
on the economies of the towns of Kyabram (population 5500) 
and Tatura (population 3000). In Kyabram, water trading 
has led to the establishment of water broking firms and an 
irrigation supply company, but it has also been associated 
with the downsizing of an engineering company and the 
closure of three canning factories in the district. Tatura has 
not experienced any major loss of industry, although recent 
tightening in local industry practices and reductions in 
employee numbers were a concern. Water trading has 
allowed dairy farmers to trade water out of these areas, and 
project participants were well aware of the negative impact 
that can have on a community. The towns’ proximity to the 
regional centres of Shepparton and Echuca has led to a 
growing number of hobby farms as farmers leave the land. 
There is concern about the loss of production, the social 
structure of the communities, and the environment.
In the area around Kerang (population 4000) the balance 
of dryland and irrigation-based industries contributes to 
economic stability. Crops are doing well, which confirms 
that the land can be very productive if farms have access 
to water. The town’s central business area and industrial 
estate are impressive. The industrial area, in particular, 
is growing, with some substantial industries supported 
by an enthusiastic, proactive council, although most of this 
growth is independent of the water trade. Nevertheless, water 
trading has allowed the council to facilitate the development 
of horticultural businesses, such as the Brown Brothers 
vineyard and a cherry orchard. Drought and the sale of 
permanent water entitlements, on the other hand, are seen 
as contributing to a loss of farms and people. The sight of 
previously productive farmland now dry and often in a poor 
state was demoralising for residents. In particular, the exodus 
208   The economic and social impacts of water trading
of young people was a concern for almost every person 
interviewed, although this is characteristic of most rural 
communities. 
Nearby Cohuna (population 3000) lies in beautiful 
surroundings beside the Murray River, adjacent to Gunbower 
Island. The town has been built around a long-established 
dairy industry, and among the residents there is a high level 
of attachment to place. The residents see the water trade as 
a threat to the stability of local industry and ultimately to their 
town as more water is traded out of the region and more dairy 
farms are sold. To sustain the town’s economy, community 
leaders were looking to tourism and encouraging retirees and 
sea changers to move there. Residents feel helplessness and 
a loss of control in relation to the changes that are occurring. 
There was an awareness that some adjustment might have to 
occur, but there is a sadness and resentment that it should 
be necessary.
In summary, the case studies brought to light a mix of views 
about the impacts of water trading: it can help the dairy 
industry expand during profitable times, but there was also 
widespread concern about the consequences of changes in 
land use associated with trading out in other times. Many 
project participants also had difficulty untangling the effects 
of water trading from other factors such as drought, dairy 
deregulation, and the trend to farm aggregation.
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Fieldwork objectives
The aim of the ﬁeldwork was to gain an understanding of the 
social and economic impacts of permanent and temporary water 
trading in the Victorian Murray Valley from the viewpoint of 
people living in the area. ‘Social impacts’ are deﬁned as the 
consequences for human populations of an event that alters the 
way people live, work, play, relate to each other, meet their needs, 
and cope as members of a community (Burdge 2004b). The 
study was not a true social impact assessment, which is usually 
conducted in advance to assess the potential impacts on the 
quality of life of people and communities whose environment 
will be affected by a proposed project, plan or policy change 
(Burdge 2004a). Rather, the quest was to establish the social 
impacts that have resulted from water trading. The study sought 
to clarify the social and physical reality of water trading from the 
perspectives of irrigators, industry, business owners, community 
leaders, and ordinary residents in three irrigation regions—
Sunraysia, Pyramid–Boort, and Rochester, Central Goulburn 
and Kerang–Cohuna.
People’s attitudes—their likes and dislikes in relation to objects, 
people, groups, situations, and any other identiﬁable aspects 
of the environment—are an important aspect of sociological 
research. They are often linked to beliefs about these same aspects 
of the environment. Furthermore, attitudes can sometimes 
be linked to actions taken in respect of such beliefs because 
human beings generally strive to be consistent in their beliefs 
and behaviours (Atkinson et al. 1990). Farmers’ beliefs about 
drought, the farm’s viability, commodity prices and the future 
of agriculture will inﬂuence their decision to trade and their 
attitudes toward trading (Fenton 2006). The cultural mores that 
permit or proscribe certain behaviours pertaining to the trade 
were also identiﬁed in the study. In particular, the study sought 
to do four things:
• contribute to the understanding of the impacts and processes 
of water trading on farmers, local industries and communities
• identify the key factors in regions or industries or in the 
nature of trading that are likely to exacerbate or mitigate 
the expected impacts of the trade in comparison with 
other regions
• test the validity of the assumed beneﬁts and perceived 
concerns of irrigators and the community
• provide a framework for monitoring the impacts of water 
trading from the farm, industry and community perspectives.
The study was carried out in the knowledge that severe drought 
had recently intensiﬁed in the area. At the time of the ﬁeldwork 
drought assistance subsidies were extended to horticulturalists. 
Thus, although every attempt was made to disentangle the social 
impacts of drought from those directly attributable to the water 
trade, drought did affect participants’ responses.
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The case study communities
The research was conducted in irrigation districts on the 
Victorian side of the Murray Valley—Pyramid–Boort, Sunraysia, 
Campaspe, Central Goulburn and Torrumbarry. The communities 
selected for case study within these irrigation districts were: 
• Sunraysia—Mildura and Robinvale
• Pyramid–Boort—Pyramid Hill and Boort
• Campaspe—Rochester
• Central Goulburn—Kyabram and Tatura
• Torrumbarry—Kerang and Cohuna.
Interviews for the Central Goulburn and Rochester–Campaspe 
Irrigation Districts were also conducted in the regional centres 
of Shepparton and Echuca. The case study communities differed 
in size, social structure, type of agricultural production, and 
the degree to which water is traded into and out of the area. 
Data collection
Data for the case studies are derived from secondary 
statistics, focus groups, observation and in-depth interviews. 
Two investigators visited the five districts over four weeks in 
October and November 2006 to do the fieldwork. In each 
district about 10 farmers were interviewed; a focus group and 
some supplementary face-to-face interviews were held in one 
of the case study communities; and in the others a wide cross-
section of residents were surveyed. The questionnaires used in the 
interviews were of a semi-structured form to ensure consistency 
in reporting across interviewers. The questionnaires (which are 
available from the authors on request) were based on proven 
survey instruments used in social and economic impact studies 
previously conducted by the Institute for Rural Futures and 
modified to accommodate the topic of water trading. The first 
two days of the fieldwork were used to pilot the instruments. Very 
few changes were made, so the data from the pilot interviews 
were included. The questionnaires and the study design were 
submitted to the Ethics Committee of the University of New 
England for ethical clearance before the study began.
Interviews with community residents
In one community in each district face-to-face interviews were 
held with a wide range of agencies, businesses, community 
leaders and residents:
• Rural financial counsellors. Counsellors provided their insights 
into the impact of the trade on farm families in the area.
• Police officers. Police officers provided an overview of the 
main types of crime and problems encountered in policing 
the community and whether there had been any changes 
as a result of water trading.
• Community health workers. These people provided an insight 
into specific problems emanating from water trading and 
any initiatives they had introduced to alleviate the problems.
• Neighbourhood centres. Managers of neighbourhood 
centres were able to provide an overview of community 
activities and support services available for farm families 
and workers. 
• School principals. Principals provided insight into 
difficulties facing young people in the community.
• Ministers of religion. Ministers talked of the social problems 
they encounter in their parish and any measures taken to 
resolve them.
• Editors of local newspapers. Editors provided information 
on current concerns in their local community. They also 
provided newspaper clippings covering events to do with 
water trading.
• Welfare agencies. Representatives of various government 
agencies, including Centrelink, and volunteer groups 
such as the Country Women’s Association, the Red Cross 
and St Vincent de Paul provided insights into the level of 
welfare need in the community in relation to the impact 
of water trading.
• Town councils. The Community Manager or Economic 
Development Officer was able to provide an overview 
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of the impacts of water trading on their community 
and any actions taken to mitigate those impacts.
• Business owners. Various businesses—pharmacies, 
newsagents, butchers, supermarkets, and so on—were 
contacted in order to gain an understanding of the impact 
of trading on the local economy.
• Agricultural businesses. Businesses supporting agriculture 
were an important indicator of the first line of impact of 
water trading. Among the businesses targeted were stock 
agents and rural traders such as Elders or CRT, surveyors, 
machinery manufacturers and sellers, and dairy and 
irrigation suppliers.
• Bankers. Bank managers and agricultural loans officers 
provided insights into the particular economic difficulties 
facing local farmers and businesses.
• Real estate agents. Real estate agents provided information 
about land transactions in the district as a result of water 
trading.
• Water brokers. Brokers offered unique insights as facilitators 
of trade as well as members of the community.
• Industry representatives. People from the district water 
authority offered their observations about what was 
occurring in their region. 
Organisations in each community were initially contacted by 
telephone or email and invited to participate in an interview. 
Contact details were obtained from Telstra’s Yellow Pages® and 
community lists of local businesses and by snowball sampling. 
Participants were asked to identify people the investigators 
should speak to. In addition to commenting on matters related 
to their specific organisation, participants answered a set of 
questions about the impact of water trading on their community. 
A total of 112 interviews were conducted.
The survey sought residents’ opinions about the positive and 
negative aspects of their community, including their opinion 
of the community’s cohesiveness and its ability to cope with 
change. Opinions about the costs and benefits of the water 
market for their community, who benefits the most, and who 
is most disadvantaged were sought. Participants also responded 
to a number of attitude statements about water trading. Social 
and economic impacts due to causes other than drought or water 
trade were also identified. Information on the economic impact 
was elicited through questions relating to business start-ups and 
closures that had occurred over the past five years as a result 
of water trading. Business owners were asked what proportion 
of their business revenue was dependent on farm businesses, 
what changes in their sources of income had occurred in the 
last five years as a result of water trading, and what were the 
greatest risks to their business from water trading.
The time taken for interviews ranged between five and 90 
minutes and averaged 20 minutes. With the participants’ 
permission, the interviews were recorded. The transcripts of each 
tape were evaluated, and relevant information was extracted for 
inclusion in this report. The responses to closed-ended questions 
were entered into a database and statistically analysed. 
Interviews with irrigators
In-depth interviews were conducted with 33 irrigators, who 
were selected by snowball sampling. Prospective interviewees 
were invited to participate and given information on the study. 
The investigators visited the property to conduct the interview at 
the invitation of the participant. The length of interviews ranged 
between 60 and 120 minutes. Some irrigators were given a copy 
of the questionnaire and a reply-paid envelope to allow them 
to complete the survey at their leisure and return it to the 
investigators. 
In the questionnaire some basic demographic data on the 
participants, their families, their farm operation and their level 
of involvement in off-farm work were sought. Participants were 
asked about their vision for the future of their farm business in 
order to assess the difference in attitudes and behaviours related 
to water trading between traditional farmers who intended to 
pass the family farm on to their children and those who viewed 
their land as a commodity to be sold on retirement. Their level of 
attachment to the community and their family networks in the 
district were also ascertained.
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Irrigators’ level of involvement in water trading in the past five 
years and the costs and benefits for their farm operation were 
explored. The irrigators were asked what alternative action they 
could have taken to achieve the same result if water trading had 
not been possible and, knowing what they now know about 
water trading, if they would make the same decisions again. 
Their plans for water trading in the future were explored.
Irrigators were also asked if there been any effect on their 
farm operation from their neighbours’ or the government’s 
involvement in the water market. Information about their level 
of equity in the farm business was sought. Any changes to their 
sources of income in the last five years and their asset base as 
a result of water trading were assessed.
The irrigators responded to the same attitude statements put 
to other participants concerning water trading, the costs and 
benefits of trading for their local community, and the positives 
and negatives of their local community. 
The project brief required some case studies of irrigators, so at 
the end of the interview some participants were asked if they 
would allow photographs of their property to be taken and their 
information to be recorded in a book featuring the case studies. 
Those who agreed were asked to sign a consent form and 
approve the photographs to be used.
The focus groups
Six focus groups were convened. These groups offered a means 
for assessing residents’ views on the impact of water trading on 
their community in a group situation. The benefit of this method is 
that the interaction of group members can help with identifying 
and clarifying issues and in the process contribute to the 
knowledge of participants. The limitations of focus groups are 
the non-random selection of participants and the limited numbers 
of those who are able to participate (Stayner & Foskey 1997).
Participants were drawn from the Yellow Pages® and community 
lists of local businesses and by snowball sampling. Community 
leaders were identified and asked to provide the names and 
contact details of people who might be interested in attending a 
focus group. Potential participants were contacted by telephone 
and invited to attend. Information about the study was 
then forwarded to them by fax or email. Invitations were 
also personally delivered to some businesses when the 
investigators arrived in the town.
There were six focus group participants in Mildura, 10 in 
Robinvale, 12 in Cohuna, five in Boort, six in Rochester and 
four in Tatura. Although efforts were made to have about 12 
participants in each focus group, some groups were not well 
attended. The reasons given for non-attendance were the start 
of harvest and a distaste for discussing such matters in view of 
the widespread depression accompanying the strengthening 
drought. Nevertheless, the high quality of the discussion in the 
smaller groups compensated for the low attendance. Some 
additional interviews were conducted within the focus group 
community to fill gaps in the data collection and balance the 
information gathered in other communities.
Attendance at a focus group was taken as a participant’s 
consent to be part of the study. Each participant was provided 
with a letter outlining the purpose of the study and advised 
that they were under no obligation to participate in the focus 
group, that they need only contribute to the discussion the to 
extent that they wished, and that they were free to leave at 
any time. Participants were also assured of confidentiality. 
Each workshop was recorded. Permission to do so was 
obtained from participants before the start of the workshop. 
Participants were advised that the tapes would be destroyed 
once the investigator had completed the final report. None 
of the participants objected to the recording. The transcripts of 
each tape were evaluated and relevant data were summarised 
for inclusion in this report.
The discussions took on average one-and-a-half hours and were 
followed by lunch. Participants were asked questions similar to 
those used in the face-to face interviews with residents—about 
the positive aspects of their community, their perceptions of the 
degree of community cohesion, the problems facing the district, 
and so on. General discussion followed on the costs and benefits 
of water trading for irrigators and the community, including 
the loss or gain of local businesses. 
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The participants
Thirty-three farmers and 112 community residents participated 
in the project. Of the community members, 56 completed the 
full survey. Of these, 42 were male (75 per cent), 13 were female 
(23 per cent), and there was one couple (2 per cent). They were 
aged between 18 and 85 years (mean 48.29; SD 12.14). Of 
the farmers, there were 23 males (70 per cent), four females 
(12 per cent) and six couples (18 per cent), and their ages ranged 
between 26 and 70 (mean 53.25; SD 11.56).
The farmers had been living in their district for an average 
of 42 years (SD 17.61) and had been living on their current 
property for between five and 70 years (mean 37 years; SD 
19.37). They had been farming as an adult for an average of 
33 years (SD 14.86). The greater proportion of farm businesses 
Fodder
Dairy cattle
Cereal
Sheep meat
Beef
Wool
Other
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Per cent
0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45
Wine grapes
Grain legumes/oil seeds
Processing tomatoes
Olives
Goats
Vegetables
Pome fruit/nuts
Stone fruit
Citrus
Almonds
Dried fruit
Table grapes
Figure A.1 Participating properties: types of production
(64 per cent) were family partnerships; 32 per cent were private 
or family companies and one was a public company. Just over 
half the properties (54 per cent) were previously owned by 
relatives of the participants. Only 16 per cent of the farmers 
were receiving income from off-farm sources.
Property size ranged from 11 hectares to 14 000 hectares (mean 
1757 hectares; SD 3100 hectares). Figure A.1 shows the types 
of agricultural production.
Two farmers (7 per cent) had a river diversion licence, 22 
(78 per cent) had a water right, and four (14 per cent) had both 
types. Figure A.2 shows participants’ activity in the water market.
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Figure A.2 Participants’ activity in the water market
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Appendix B:  Outcomes of consultation: 
perceptions and attitudes
Perceptions and observable actions
The study also sought to identify the ‘social construction of 
reality’ (ICGPSIA 1994) as it pertains to water trading from the 
perspectives of irrigators and the residents of rural communities 
in the case study regions. Although some perceptions might be 
thought to be emotional or misinformed, they are important to 
include if one is to understand the social signiﬁcance of the 
impact of the water trade on the behaviour of all those involved.
It is also important to note that no two rural communities are 
alike. Rural localities are deﬁned by their size, social structure, 
geographic location and economic base. Even places closely 
matched in terms of these factors differ according to the types 
of individuals or groups of people that live there and the social 
mores they uphold. All these factors yield different structures, or 
nuances, in ‘community’ that affect the residents’ experience 
of water trading. 
Although rural communities are exposed to much the same media 
as urban areas, the human need to be a part of a community 
means individuals are inﬂuenced by the information they receive 
through their frequent and continuing interpersonal contacts 
(Festinger 1950). The risk of rejection compels individuals to 
hold and express beliefs common to the group. In this way, 
particular beliefs pertaining to water trading become common 
rhetoric among residents. During the ﬁeldwork certain catch- 
phrases unique to each community featured in interviews with 
residents. For example, in Mildura it was ‘the critical mass, 
which was sustaining the community’; in Kerang the repeated 
concern was the loss of young people from the community; 
and in Cohuna people asked, ‘Is this drought or is this climate 
change?’ Accordingly, attitudes towards water trading can be 
generated and sustained within a community, and this can 
inﬂuence people’s behaviour.
The close proximity of many Victorian urban centres also means 
that community boundaries are diffuse. Several of the study 
participants were working in one town and living in another. 
Furthermore, the need for off-farm work meant that a sizeable 
proportion of the people interviewed in the case study towns were 
from farms. Among them were teachers, nurses, public servants, 
business owners and journalists. As a result, certain perceptions 
of water trading prevail across communities in these regions.
Because of the proximity of urban centres, the loss of permanent 
water entitlements from the Pyramid Hill community is a constant 
reminder for the residents of neighbouring communities that 
water leaving a district can result in community decline. Almost 
all study participants recognised that water trading out of the 
Pyramid Hill district had a positive effect on salinity levels in 
the area. Even residents of Pyramid Hill acknowledged there 
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were areas in the district that should never have been irrigated. 
There is, however, acknowledgment too that water trading has 
negatively affected the social structure of Pyramid Hill, and this has 
created a sense of unease about the gain to some communities at 
the expense of others and a fear that circumstances could lead to 
other communities suffering a similar fate. Such concerns shape 
and condition attitudes and behaviours in relation to water trading.
Cognitive dissonance
Cognitive dissonance is the uncomfortable tension that comes 
from holding two conflicting thoughts at the same time. The 
theory of cognitive dissonance sees those contradictory thoughts 
serving as a force that compels the mind to acquire or invent new 
thoughts or beliefs or to modify existing beliefs so as to reduce 
the amount of dissonance (conflict) between attitudes, emotions, 
beliefs or behaviours. In the extreme, people’s mental health 
can depend on their being able to reduce the conflict between 
those different thoughts.
It was interesting to note that two of the water traders interviewed 
were morally opposed to the sale of permanent water out of a 
district because of the negative impacts on communities. 
They rationalised that their role was practical and necessary 
and focused on the positive aspects of trading for farmers—such 
as alleviation of debt and provision of options for retirement.
Communal loss with personal gain
Many irrigators are deeply conflicted about the depopulation 
of rural areas. They speak with a sense of loss about the demise 
of the local footy club or the dwindling numbers at the local 
school, but in the next breath they speak, with justifiable pride, 
about the way they have survived in farming and how they have 
managed to build up their holding of land and water by buying 
out other farmers. They even let you in on their ambitions to 
buy more farms.
Irrigators are reconciled to the continuing amalgamation of 
properties. They know this means fewer farmers and therefore 
fewer people in the local area and fewer children in the schools. 
Accordingly, irrigation communities rail against what are seen 
to be the underlying causes of people feeling they need to sell. 
At the same time, they have sympathy for those who can no 
longer continue in farming. At least, they have done this in the 
past, when the person being forced out of farming could be relied 
on to sell the farm as a going concern. In those circumstances 
property amalgamation was a familiar, if somewhat discomforting, 
part of the farming scene. The exit was mourned, and the 
purchase was made as dignified as possible. The change 
was also understood to be an opportunity for neighbouring 
individuals as much as it was a loss for the community. 
Separating the sale of land and water changed this dynamic. 
It opened the possibility that the vendor would, in effect, cause 
irrigation to cease on that property. Not only would this bring 
about a net reduction in irrigation in the local area: it would 
deny the neighbours the opportunity to keep restructuring their 
enterprises to meet contemporary standards in operating scale. 
In these changed circumstances, when there was no ‘fire sale’, 
what were the remaining irrigators to do with their sympathy? 
When the new dynamic first emerged, they withheld their 
sympathy. In all districts social norms emerged to guard against 
community members selling water separately from land. But 
this study shows that as permanent water trade becomes more 
common, as more friends and relatives are faced with the decision 
to sell, as more going concerns are sold to people who then sell 
the water and land separately, as more people do their own sums, 
vendors start to attract more sympathy. The resentment of those 
who feel betrayed, those who are used to doing business in 
different institutional settings, those who are suffering the 
opportunity cost of having to buy water and land separately 
if they want to expand their enterprises, is then focused on the 
institutional arrangements that put the vendors in this position. 
The prisoner’s dilemma
In Pyramid–Boort in particular, but also to a slightly lesser extent 
in the other regions, the spectre of reconfiguration has converted 
this underlying tension into a situation analogous to a ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’. Most don’t want to sell their water separately from 
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the land, but if other irrigators start doing so they don’t want to 
be the last on their spur channel to sell, because they think they 
might be forced to sell under a reconfiguration plan, which they 
believe would mean selling at a discount.
In game theory, the prisoner’s dilemma is a type of game in 
which two players can ‘cooperate’ with or betray (that is, ‘defect’) 
the other player. The prisoner’s dilemma is that rational choice 
leads the two players to both play defect, even though each 
player’s individual reward would be greater if they both played 
cooperate. The dilemma illustrates a conflict between individual 
and group rationality.
In the real world of Pyramid–Boort, those irrigators that remain 
after each permanent water sale understand the attraction of 
defecting, but they put pressure on each other to cooperate. 
There are opportunities to punish non-cooperative acts:
We had a couple on the Water Service Committee that 
traded—permanently traded—their water. And at the next 
election they were booted off. So I think there’s a measure 
of what the community thought. And not only that but the 
community then got concerned because they thought, 
‘Heck, here’s two of our representatives on the Water 
Service Committee. They’ve permanently traded their 
water. What do they know that we don’t know?’
The subtlety and sophistication of the dilemma is not well 
understood by the nearby townsfolk. They are affected by the 
ultimate decisions, but they are free of the burden of continuously 
weighing up the pros and cons of selling or staying.
Attitudes to temporary and 
permanent water trading
Residents were asked their opinion about the advantages and 
disadvantages of both temporary and permanent water trading. 
Participants generally were very aware of issues surrounding 
water trading, largely because a high proportion of them were 
from farms. It was very evident that water pervades every aspect 
of the lives of residents of these communities and was foremost 
in their consciousness. Each participant gave informed, 
considered responses to questions, even if a few responses 
were coloured by misinformation or social norms and values.
Temporary trading
Overall, participants were very much in favour of temporary 
trading, primarily because water is retained in an irrigation 
district, a fact that was important to most participants. Temporary 
trading was seen to offer farmers flexibility, risk management, a 
means of sustaining cash flow, debt management (particularly in 
dry times) and business growth and development. Participants 
believed temporary trading made full use of the available water. 
For many dairy farmers who preferred to operate on 200 per cent 
of their water allocation, the temporary trade was of great benefit. 
The only disadvantage of temporary trading noted by participants 
was the current high cost of water. This they attribute not only 
to the drought but also to the presence in the market of large 
corporate farms, which create an ‘unequal playing field’ because 
they have the ability to pay any price. Consequently, some 
farmers, particularly dairy producers, are struggling to compete. 
Given the value of the milk produced, dairy farmers are unlikely 
to pay $400 or more a megalitre for water. Horticulturalists 
on efficient drip irrigation systems are forced to meet the costs 
because their current and future viability depends on maintaining 
a reliable water supply to their crops. There is also a tendency for 
some farmers to prefer to sell water at these high prices because 
the returns outweigh those achievable through production, 
particularly in times of drought and reduced water allocations. 
This has the flow-on effect of reduced spending in local 
communities. Despite these disadvantages, in general 
participants concluded that the benefits of temporary 
trading outweigh the disadvantages.
Permanent trading
In the Sunraysia region, where there has been significant 
importation of permanent water, the advantages of this type of 
trade were mentioned by a higher proportion of residents than 
in the other regions. There is very little temporary trade in the 
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Robinvale district. Overall, however, it became clear that there 
is an overwhelming rejection of the trade of permanent water 
entitlements outside an irrigation district, primarily because it 
is seen to be facilitating the loss of water from a region. This is 
followed by a loss of people as they retire or move away, which 
leads to a loss of production and subsequent effects on local 
economies and communities. There are concerns about stranded 
assets and the increased costs of supply to farmers who remain 
on a channel after water has been sold from the channel system. 
There are also concerns about the degradation of the channel 
systems as a result of the loss of users. Proposed exit fees to 
account for stranded assets were a concern for farmers who 
planned to sell their water to fund their retirement.
Permanent trading is blamed for the presence of large 
corporate developments, or managed investment schemes, 
in the marketplace, which has led to an increase in the cost of 
water. It is also seen as contributing to boom-and-bust cycles 
and profiteering by people who play the market.
One of the main concerns was uncertainty about future water 
allocations—not only because of drought or climate change but 
also as a result of policy decisions. The experience of New South 
Wales irrigators facing reductions in water allocations mid-way 
through the season was a reminder to Victorian producers 
that they could face similar problems. As Young (2003) noted, 
‘The fastest way to decrease the value and the quality of any 
investment in resource management is to increase uncertainty’. 
Overall, participants believed that the disadvantages of the 
permanent trade outweighed any benefits. 
Attitudinal differences
Participants interviewed for the study responded to 14 attitude 
statements about water trading. The responses were compared 
across regions and between irrigators and community residents. 
Since a focus group was the primary means of data collection in 
the Rochester area, the responses from participants in Rochester 
and Central Goulburn are combined. Kruskal–Wallis tests 
for comparisons of independent groups compared responses 
between irrigation districts and between farmers and community 
members. For the regional comparisons, response categories 
were combined for ‘Agree’ and ‘Strongly agree’ as well as 
for ‘Disagree’ and ‘Strongly disagree’.
The attitude statements and responses
‘Water rights should not be sold separately 
from a farm’
Respondents from Sunraysia tended not to agree with this 
statement; respondents in the other districts strongly agreed.
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‘Water trade should remain within this community’
Sunraysia respondents were significantly more likely to disagree 
than respondents in other regions (χ2=8.989, p<0.03). As one 
said, ‘You will never have water trade if you can’t trade out 
of the district’. People in Rochester, Central Goulburn and 
Pyramid–Boort strongly agreed.
‘Temporary water trade is a good thing’
This statement invoked almost universal agreement, but farmers 
were significantly more likely to strongly agree than community 
members (χ2=3.985, p<0.05).
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‘Permanent trade is ruining farm communities’
Participants in Sunraysia—who benefit most from the sale of 
permanent water—were significantly more likely to disagree 
with this statement than those in the remaining regions (χ2=7.968, 
p<0.05). There was more indecision in Kerang–Cohuna, where 
there has been a great deal of trade out of the region, yet clearly 
there is more acknowledgment of the benefits of permanent 
trading. One Kerang resident responded that it was changing 
rural communities rather than ruining them. Others noted the 
benefits for places such as Robinvale.
‘Water trade has sped up some rural adjustment 
that was inevitable anyway’
Although not significant, trends in the data show that Pyramid–
Boort residents were less likely to agree with this statement. The 
inference in the statement invoked some strong reactions from 
respondents in Pyramid–Boort, where there had been a loss of 
farmers from the region. One respondent added, ‘There’s no such 
thing as inevitable!’
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‘Water trade has provided many farmers 
with a form of superannuation’
There was general agreement with this statement.
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‘Water trade has enabled many farmers 
to leave farming’
This statement elicited general agreement. One participant 
commented, however, ‘OK, it has given them an excuse to leave, 
but I wouldn’t say it has enabled them. You can always leave 
farming; you are not tied down with a bolt and padlock and, 
even if you were, you can cut it’.
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‘Water trade has brought a lot of jobs 
to this community’
The responses to this statement reflected participants’ 
experience. Participants in Sunraysia, where there has been 
increased employment, were much more likely to agree with 
the statement than participants in the other irrigation districts 
(χ2=17.998, p<0.0001). One respondent commented:
It’s created jobs for water brokers. Probably some jobs are 
brought in, but they are going to be short term. Once the 
farms become operational they will use less man-hours and 
the workers will need to be more highly skilled because all 
the machinery they use has to be driven or operated. There 
is no manual labour; you don’t pick almonds by hand.
‘Water trade has increased the wealth of every 
farmer who owns water’
There was general agreement with this statement, although 
slightly more so in Sunraysia and Kerang–Cohuna than in other 
areas. Many respondents qualified their agreement by noting that 
wealth was increased ‘on paper’. One added, ‘It’s increased their 
asset value but if you take the water off a piece of land it’s 
probably reduced their other asset value—the land—so you 
end up with the same amount’.
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‘Water trade will lead to all water being held 
by a few rich people’
Community members were significantly more likely than farmers 
to agree with this statement (χ2=7.157, p<0.01). One said:
What’s the one thing that we have the least of in Australia? 
Water. Those who hold all the water hold all the power. I’m 
fairly right wing but that is a left wing statement—way out 
there. But I don’t think it will happen because there is no one 
with that much money. But the government is having a go at it.
Another agreed: ‘I’m inclined to agree, but I think that’s one 
of those unforeseen consequences that time will give you the 
answer. But I can certainly see it happening with more and 
more superannuation funds. Hopefully mine will be smart 
enough to buy up some water’.
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‘Water trade has caused local businesses 
and schools to close’
People tended to disagree with this statement. There was more 
agreement among those in Pyramid–Boort and Rochester – 
Central Goulburn, where several respondents referred to smaller 
communities that had lost teachers and schools. A Rochester 
resident explained, ‘Manilla’s a little community from here, 
concentrated dairying, with two or one or a half teacher school. 
The only thing that will keep that school open is hobby farmers 
that buy out dairy farmers when they can no longer go on’.
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‘Water trade gives farmers flexibility 
in how they run their farms’
Significantly more farmers than community members agreed 
that water trading does provide flexibility (χ2=5.043, p<0.02). 
One community member qualified his response: ‘It’s another 
management tool but it’s not the number one management tool. 
I think they need water security more than water trade’. Another 
disagreed: ‘Either you’ve got water and you farm or you’ve got 
no water and you can’t farm. There’s no flexibility in that’.
‘Water trade has helped farmers manage drought’
Participants were divided on this statement. Those who disagreed 
believed the trade enabled cash flow and debt management 
rather than drought management, as demonstrated in the 
following comments:
No, it’s helped them manage income through the drought 
but not farming through the drought. 
Not in and of itself. It has managed to help their economic 
situation within a drought but that’s not managing drought, 
I don’t think. So not in the long term.
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Although there were similar patterns in the responses between 
regions, farmers were significantly more likely to agree with this 
statement than community members (χ2=4.985, p<0.03). This 
finding confirms some participants’ observation that people living 
in country towns often do not really understand what the farmers 
are going through with drought and low water allocations or 
the role that water trading plays.
‘Farmers won’t be able to compete 
with cities for water’
Significantly more farmers than community members agreed 
with this assertion (χ2=4.776, p<0.03). Some were aware of 
the relatively small amount of water used by regional cities 
compared with the amount used for irrigation.
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Appendix C:  A brief history of water trading 
in Victoria
The evolution of water trading
The ability to trade water in south-eastern Australia developed 
as a response to emerging pressures on the resource during 
the early 1980s. As the squeeze between competing uses for 
water—both from consumptive users and from those wishing 
to see more water allocated to the environment—and caps 
on supply began to be felt, attention turned from engineering 
solutions to the use of economic instruments to deal with the 
emerging scarcity problem.
There had been some informal trading before then, or people 
had found other ways around the inability to trade water that 
was tied to land—for example, farmers were buying land in less 
productive areas purely for the water right attached to the land, 
which they could then effectively transfer to their own land—
but in the early 1980s some users and policy makers increasingly 
advocated the reallocation of water through trading.
In order to enable trading, jurisdictions progressively converted 
old forms of licensed entitlements to new, better deﬁned, secure 
and tradeable entitlements. The main elements of this conversion 
have been the speciﬁcation of entitlements with clearly deﬁned 
volumes and reliability, separation of entitlements from land, and 
‘unbundling’ of various components of entitlements such as the 
associated works and use approvals and delivery capacity. 
The introduction of legislation and institutional arrangements 
formalising trade was a gradual process. Initially, trading was 
limited to particular locations and types of trades—in particular, 
to trading of annual allocations to allow farmers to top up or sell 
excess water for the remainder of a season. So-called temporary 
trading is the transfer of the water allocation for a particular 
season, particular seasons, or the remainder of a season, after 
which the buyer has no further claim on the water. Temporary 
trading thus entails trading in water that is available now, not 
the underlying entitlement to water in the future.
In contrast, permanent trading is the transfer of a water 
entitlement and hence all future allocations associated with 
that entitlement. It is known as a permanent trade because 
it involves not just the right to the current season’s allocation 
but the right to future seasons’ allocations as well.
A major impetus for the development of water markets in 
Australia was the 1994 national water reform agreed by the 
Council of Australian Governments as part of the broader 
National Competition Policy. The COAG agreement represented 
a watershed in the evolution of water allocation arrangements in 
Australia, away from administrative allocation by governments 
towards a market-based approach using clearly deﬁned 
property rights.
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Further impetus for water trading as a mechanism for efficiently 
reallocating water resulted from the implementation of limits on 
water diversions because of growing concern about the health 
of waterways. In 1995 an audit of water use in the Murray–
Darling Basin concluded that the current level of extraction was 
not sustainable. In 1997 the Murray–Darling Basin Commission 
capped the level of extraction from the basin at the 1993–94 
levels. A pilot interstate trading program was established in 1997. 
Further changes intended to promote open water trading 
will follow from the National Water Initiative agreed by the 
Commonwealth and state and territory governments in 2004. 
These include a partial relaxation of limits to trading of water 
entitlements between regions in the 2006–07 irrigation season.
The water trading framework 
in Victoria
Bulk entitlements form the basis of the Victorian water rights 
system; they cover 95 per cent of the water used in agriculture 
in Victoria. Rural water authorities receive an aggregate of 
individuals’ water rights and diversion licences. The role of the 
authorities is to supply the water entitlements to the end users.
There are two basic types of water entitlements in Victoria. 
Water rights are available for communally supplied irrigation 
districts and were tied to the title of land. Yearly allocations 
vary according to the storage level, and the rights have strict 
volumetric or share limitations. These rights are held in perpetuity. 
Private diversion licences on regulated streams control direct 
water extraction from waterways and aquifers. They are for a 
period not exceeding 15 years, with the assumption of renewal.
Victoria introduced temporary trading in allocations in  
1989, permanent intra-district entitlement trade in 1991, and 
permanent inter-district entitlement trade in 1994. To date, 
volumes of temporarily traded water have far outweighed 
those of permanently traded water.
The permanent trade has been regulated in order to stop large 
volumes of water moving out of regions in a single irrigation 
season. Until 2006–07 only 2 per cent of water entitlements 
held in a region could be traded out in a given year. For the 
2006–07 irrigation season the limit was raised to 4 per cent. 
The limit has led to permanent trade being suspended in a 
number of years when the 2 per cent had been reached. In 
some cases the limit is met very early in the irrigation season 
(as in Central Goulburn in 2005–06) or even before the season 
begins if enough applications to trade water entitlements are 
lodged (as in Pyramid–Boort in 2004–05). Table C.1 shows 
details of suspensions.
In Victoria ownership of water rights has been restricted to people 
who own or occupy land and have access to individual water 
entitlements. The Government’s 2004 White Paper proposed 
loosening the nexus between water and land. From 1 July 2007 
non-users of water will be able to buy water, but this will be 
limited to 10 per cent of the maximum volume of entitlement 
(for water shares of that class) in the particular water system. 
Victoria is also moving forward with the unbundling concept 
by separating out the different elements of water entitlements 
into the separable rights. The date for implementation of the 
unbundling is now 1 July 2007. This will separate existing water 
rights into three components: a water share, a water use licence, 
and an allocation account. In order to manage this change, and 
to manage potential third party effects of water trades on the 
reliability of supply between different irrigation systems, the 
market rules were changed during the 2006–07 irrigation season 
(see box). One possible explanation for the significant movement 
of water entitlements from the Goulburn system to the Murray 
system observed in the past three years may be to gain advantage 
before the new rules take effect.
There are also rules regulating temporary water transfers. 
For example, limits are placed on the volume of water that 
can be back-traded up the Goulburn River because of the 
hydrological restrictions on such water movements. Under 
the current framework, there are limits on back-trade for the 
Murray-to-Goulburn allocation trade: ‘If the total volume of 
applications received [to back-trade water from the Murray to 
the Goulburn system] exceeds the available trading opportunity, 
we [Goulburn–Murray Water] will conduct a ballot to select 
the successful applications’ (Goulburn–Murray Water 2006a).
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Table C.1: Suspensions of permanent trade
District Irrigation season Date of suspension
Campaspe 2004–05 13 December 2004
Campaspe 2005–06 19 January 2006
Campaspe 2006–07 29 December 2006
Central Goulburn 2003–04 7 January 2004
Central Goulburn 2004–05 30 August 2004
Central Goulburn 2005–06 28 June 2005
Central Goulburn 2006–07 19 February 2007
Pyramid–Boort 2003–04 8 July 2003
Pyramid–Boort 2004–05 29 September 2003
Pyramid–Boort 2005–06 19 May 2005
Pyramid–Boort 2006–07 8 March 2007
Rochester 2003–04 12 March 2003
Rochester 2004–05 10 November 2004
Rochester 2005–06 27 March 2006
Rochester 2006–07 8 March 2007
Shepparton 2005–06 15 May 2006
Torrumbarry 2004–05 30 June 2004
Torrumbarry 2005–06 19 July 2005
Notes: Suspension is introduced after permanent trading for the irrigation season reaches the allowable limit for water entitlement 
leaving the region. If transfers of entitlement into the region reduce the net trade out to less than 2 per cent during the irrigation season, 
transfers out will be allowed until the 2 per cent limit is reached again. For example, Torrumbarry ended the 2004–05 season with a net 
transfer out of 1.86 per cent, despite trade being suspended (Rod Killmartin, Goulburn–Murray Water, pers. comm., 3 January 2007).
The allowable limit for 2006–07 was 4 per cent; for all other years it was 2 per cent. 
Source: Goulburn–Murray Water media releases.
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A statewide overview of water trading
Water trading in Victoria is most prominent in areas serviced 
by Goulburn–Murray Water and Lower Murray Water. This is 
the case for both permanent water trading (see Table C.2) and 
temporary water trading (see Table C.3). Water trading in the 
Southern Rural Water district is a great deal smaller in terms  
of the number of trades and the volume of water traded, and 
trading in the First Mildura Irrigation Trust and Grampians–
Wimmera–Mallee Water regions is smaller again.
Water trading is restricted for transactions that reallocate water 
from above the Barmah–Millewa Forest (the Barmah Choke) to 
below it. A maximum of 8500 megalitres a day can pass through 
the Barmah Choke without causing flooding.
Water trading within regions
Intra-regional water trades—trades between irrigators in 
the same industry (such as dairying in Rochester and Central 
Goulburn) or between irrigators that are in close proximity but 
produce different crops (such as mixed farms and horticulture 
in Boort)—reallocate water within a region. Permanent intra-
regional trades are not restricted by limits such as the 2 per cent 
or 4 per cent limit because water entitlements are not moved out 
of the region. Table C.4 shows permanent intra-regional trades in 
Victoria for 1995–96 to 1997–98 and 2004–05 and 2005–06.
The trend shown in Figure C.1 for 2003–04 continued until 
2005–06 (N Barr, pers. comm., 23 January 2007). Notably, this 
has continued the sale of water by parish regions dominated by 
dairy farms.
In the 1900s few parishes had a loss of water right greater 
than 2.5 per cent. The exceptions were some of the most 
salt threatened areas—near Pyramid Hill and the country 
between Kerang and Swan Hill. Temporary trading in particular 
precipitated some major shifts in water use, with some localities 
trading away up to 40 per cent of their water in some seasons.
Goulburn–Murray Water’s announcement 
on permanent water market rules
Goulburn–Murray Water made the following 
announcement on 20 December 2006:
As of close of business 18 December 2006, 
permanent trading arrangements in Victoria will 
require a seller’s allocation of water to be at least 
equal to the allocation levels that apply in the 
buyer’s system, protecting other users in the system 
receiving the traded water.
The new condition on permanent trading in Victoria 
will ensure current allocations for all customers are 
secure. This change will no longer allow a shortfall in 
allocation when trading from the Goulburn, Campaspe 
and Loddon systems to the Murray system.
Under the previous rules, if 100ML of Goulburn 
entitlement (24% allocation) was permanently traded 
to the Victorian Murray system (95% allocation),  
the buyer received 95ML of allocation in the current 
season, while the seller only held 24 ML of allocation. 
The shortfall of 71 ML affects all users.
Traders will now have two options:
•   Sellers can either “top up” their unused water to 
the allocation of the destination system prior to 
transfer, or
•  Buyers can elect to surrender the shortfall volume.
This change will only affect transfers of permanent 
unused water entitlement between systems with 
differing allocations in the current season.
Source: Goulburn–Murray Water (2006b).
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Table C.2 Permanent water trading in Victoria, 2004–05
Rural water authority
Water traded within Water traded in Water traded out Total water traded
No. of 
trades ML
No. of 
trades ML
No. of 
trades ML
No. of 
trades ML
First Mildura Irrigation Trust 2 61 2 7 26 981 30 1 049
Goulburn–Murray Water 364 16 115 1 200 180 25 908 545 42 224
Grampians–Wimmera–Mallee Water 2 40 – – – – 2 40
Lower Murray Water 60 8 218 180 25 535 37 4 597 277 38 351
Southern Rural Water 31 1 467 – – – – 31 1 467
Total 459 25 902 183 25 742 243 31 486 702 57 389
– Zero. 
Note: Total for Victoria cannot be calculated by taking the sum of the rural water authority areas because this would double-count 
inter-regional trades. 
Source: ABS (2006).
Table C.3 Temporary water trading in Victoria, 2004–05
Rural water authority
Water traded within Water traded in Water traded out Total water traded
No. of 
trades ML
No. of 
trades ML
No. of 
trades ML
No. of 
trades ML
First Mildura Irrigation Trust 62 1 756 24 460 195 5 904 281 8 120
Goulburn–Murray Water 7 236 305 920 610 48720 66 10 036 7912 364 676
Grampians–Wimmera–Mallee Water 124 387 – – 4 880 128 1 267
Lower Murray Water 591 31 058 158 9097 397 40 523 1146 80 678
Southern Rural Water 353 16 723 – – – – 353 16 723
Total 8 366 35 5843 792 58277 662 57 343 9323 444 263
– Zero. 
Note: Total for Victoria cannot be calculated by taking the sum of the rural water authority areas because this would double-count 
inter-regional trades. 
Source: ABS (2006).
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Table C.4: Intra-regional trades in permanent water entitlements, Victoria, selected years
Region 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 2004–05 2005–06
Shepparton 197 339 219 286 405
Central Goulburn 370 421 419 355 4 792
Rochester 253 193 596 398 256
Pyramid–Boort 1 336 1 004 2 621 522 5 166
Broken River 15 190 261 – 128
Goulburn River 154 69 295 159 125
Loddon River 20 290 119 – 254
Goulburn system total 2 345 2 506 4 530 1 720 11 126
Murray Valley 218 488 363 315 1 676
Kerang–Cohuna 183 1 396 1 639 619 3 425
Swan Hill 606 131 2 069 248 392
Tresco – 25 108 20 –
Nyah 25 – 73 31 46
Woorinen – – 32 46 65
Upper Murray – – 50 – 2
Mitta Mitta River – – – – 5
Kiewa River 80 – 25 – 150
Ovens River 171 193 95 2 153
Murray River 245 288  187 184
Murray system total 1 528 2 521 4 454 1 467 6 098
Campaspe district 70 – – – 329
Campaspe River 110 – 23 424 20
Campaspe system total 180 0 23 424 349
Total 4 053 5 026 9 007 3 611 17 573
– Zero. 
Source: Goulburn–Murray Water annual reports.
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Figure C.1 Rate of change in water right ownership, by parish, 
 Goulburn–Murray Water regions, selected years
Greater than 5% decline
–5% to –2.5%
–2.5% to 0
0 to 2.5%
Greater than 2.5% increase
Annual rate of change in water right 1993–96
Greater than 5% decline
–5% to –2.5%
–2.5% to 0
0 to 2.5%
Greater than 2.5% increase
Annual rate of change in water right 2002–03
Greater than 5% decline
–5% to –2.5%
–2.5% to 0
0 to 2.5%
Greater than 2.5% increase
Annual rate of change in water right 2003–04
As noted, the 2 per cent limit that applied before 2006–07 
meant that no more than 2 per cent of water entitlement held 
in a region could be traded out in a year. This does not, however, 
mean that only 2 per cent can be traded out of a given part 
of the region. In fact, the limit at the regional level can mask 
considerable variation in the distribution of water entitlements 
through reallocations via intra-regional permanent water trading. 
For example, in Pyramid–Boort and Kerang–Cohuna there are 
neighbouring red and blue zones, which represent significant 
water entitlement sales and purchases respectively.
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Glossary
Extraction The withdrawal of water from surface water or groundwater sources.
Carryover The option to hold in storage a portion of unused seasonal allocations for use at a later date.
Consumptive use  The application of water to a use that typically diverts the water from its natural ﬂow and permanently 
withdraws at least some of the water from the water source.
Conversion process  The process of converting water rights—such as take, use, divert and dam—from a previous water 
management regime to a form appropriate for new arrangements.
Delivery capacity share  A share of an irrigation supply channel’s capacity or watercourse’s capacity, speciﬁed as a percentage 
share or a volumetric supply rate at a particular time.
Dilution ﬂow A volume of relatively fresh water used to dilute polluted ﬂows.
Entitlement  An entitlement to exclusive access to water in each irrigation season—a seasonal allocation—speciﬁed 
in volumetric terms or as a share of a speciﬁed consumptive pool.
Environmental manager An agency with overall managerial responsibility for the achievement of environmental objectives.
Environmental ﬂow  A water regime applied to a river, wetland or estuary to improve or maintain ecosystems and their 
beneﬁts where there are competing water uses and where ﬂows are regulated.
Environmental outcomes  Consequences for the environment—for example, maintaining ecosystem function, biodiversity, water 
quality and river health targets.
Externality  Occurs when a side-effect of a decision by an individual (or business) affects another party’s wellbeing 
but that effect is not taken into appropriate account by the decision maker.
Fully allocated  Refers to situations where the total volume of water able to be taken by entitlement holders equals the 
environmentally sustainable level of extraction for that system.
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Grandfathering  The process of granting water rights based on historical use of water or on the allocations of water rights 
in previous periods.
Groundwater recharge The movement of water from the surface into a body of groundwater by percolation through the soil.
Home consumption A mechanism of producer support that increases producer revenue by diverting supply from the less  
price scheme elastic domestic market to the export market.
Non-consumptive use  Water use such as hydro-electricity generation and in-stream environmental use that does not reduce 
the amount of water available to other users.
Non-point-source  Pollution originating from many diffuse sources for which it is difficult to identify the precise source— 
pollution  for example, pollution linked to runoff from agricultural land.
Opportunity cost The benefits forgone from the next best alternative use of a resource.
Over-allocation  Refers to situations where, with full development of entitlements in a particular system, the total volume of 
water able to be extracted by entitlement holders at a given time exceeds the environmentally sustainable 
level of extraction for that system.
Overland flows  Water that runs across the land after rainfall before it enters a watercourse, after it leaves a watercourse 
as floodwater, or after it rises to the surface naturally from underground.
Permanent trade Trade in the underlying entitlement to continuing allocations of water.
Point-source pollution Pollution originating from a particular and identifiable source—for example, a pipe or other conveyance.
Private diverter An irrigator that directly extracts water from a main channel or river using their own infrastructure.
Pumped district A district with shared infrastructure for delivering irrigation water to farms.
Reallocation Reallocation decisions made by regional councils that alter the permissible water quantities available 
of water rights  to consent holders—as opposed to the direct transfer of water rights between two water users, through 
trade, for example.
Return flow The portion of extracted water that returns to the water system through seepage or runoff.
Seasonal allocation  A specific volume of water allocated to a water entitlement in a given season. Sometimes referred to as 
a water allocation, a water determination or a seasonal assignment.
Sleepers and dozers  Water entitlement holders who do not use any of or only partially use the amount of water they are 
entitled to.
Temporary trade  Trade in seasonal water allocations that involves transferring some or all of the water allocated to the 
entitlement for the current irrigation season, part of an irrigation season, or an agreed number of seasons.
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Turbidity  A measure of water clarity and an indicator of the presence of suspended material such as silt and clay 
in water sources.
Unbundling  The separating of historic water entitlements that bundled water takes, land, water use, delivery and works 
approvals—for example, dams and intake and diversion gates—into separate entitlements or licences.
Voluntary transfer The direct transfer of water rights between two water users—for example, through trade—as opposed to 
of water rights  reallocation decisions made by regional authorities.
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